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THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF LANGUAGE: A STUDY

OF THE SOURCES OF POETRY AND RHETORIC

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THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF LANGUAGE: A STUDY

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The two most important points of this dissertation are (1) that language is founded upon the act of speaking, and (2), that this active foundation of language can be realized only when it is understood how poetry and rhetoric are the counterbalancing functions of language.

The first chapter acquaints the reader with how the phenomemology of language is to be contrasted with other approaches to the study of language and communication, particularly the linguistic approach. Working from the language theory of Martin Heidegger, the general intention of the second chapter is to show how language has its source in poetry, and how this source has been lost sight of in the contemporary contortions of logic and grammar. But language is not founded on poetry alone. Heidegger's account of language (though largely plausible as far as it goes) is incomplete because he fails to realize the other co-source of language in rhetoric. Working from the language theory of Nietzsche, the third chapter shows how language has its source in rhetoric or ideology. Chapters Two and Three together will show how poetry and rhetoric are the counterbalancing functions of language.

The fourth chapter gives a description of the role of analytic structures in thinking, speaking and perceiving. Because of the way analytic structures disrupt the flow of poetic imagery, it is argued that such structures are to be identified with the rhetorical functioning of language. By identifying the laws of logic with rhetoric (as

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Nietzsche does), it is not the aim of this study to deny the laws of logic, but to show how such laws are to be properly placed within the phenomenological context of language. As tautology and contradiction are considered as the intellectual poles of language by analytic philosophers, the fifth chapter shows how the notions of subjectivism and objectivism (as in, for example, Sartre's sadism and masochism), are the phenomenological poles of language upon which the above analytic notions are formed. Necessity (i.e. logical necessity) is created through the social dynamics of hierarchy--the hierarchies of sex, economics etc. The creation and dissolution of necessity occurs only through the social encounter. What exactly is going on then in this process where speakers create necessity for themselves and others? What is going on in deception, particularly self deception?

While Chapter Five develops what should be considered as a phenomenologist's psychology of communication, Chapter Six develops what should be considered as a phenomenologist's sociology of communication. Building on to Chapter Five and its analysis of intrapersonal and interpersonal conflicts (as such conflicts take shape in sadism and masochism), the argument in Chapter Six moves outward to larger social or communicative units. Sartre talks about an oppressing class and an oppressed class as a We-subject and an Us-object, and how these are built upon or extentions of the sado-masochistic tendencies that are indigenous to the interpersonal communication process. Chapter Six adopts and expands this idea through an analysis of Marxism and the phenomenology of language.

The seventh chapter makes use of the phenomenology of language outlined in the preceding chapters in trying to discern some structural

principles of art and literature, along with the relation of these aesthetic principles to individuals and their social orders. Here it is explained how artistic movements (e.g. formalism, naturalism and social realism) are ultimately based in certain forms of intercourse or the communication style that typifies a particular socio-linguistic order.

The Appendix of this study appropriates Giambattista Vico's analysis of how language and thought evolve through metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche and irony. For Vico, these four tropes are not mere figures of speech. They are, more importantly, four ways of summarizing the way individuals see language and life. From the phenomenological point of view, it is important to understand the nature of the language experience associated with each of these tropes. Working from ideas developed in Chapters One through Seven, this essay explains how the language experience of both individuals and society begins with the naivete of metaphor, evolves through the alienation of metonymy and synecdoche, and hopefully reaches the maturity of irony.

PREFACE

At one time, poetic and rhetoric were the two crucial points
of focus for language study. Down to at least the nineteenth century,
poetic and rhetoric were largely regarded as the two principle areas
of language investigation. However, with the hyper-development of lin-
guistics, logic and other lines of scientific inquiry, poetic and rhet-
oric had been "overcome" or had suffered at least a diminished impor-
tance. Much of the impetus for this movement away from poetic and
rhetoric was derived from the work of Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913).
Often regarded as the founder of modern linguistic science, Saussure was
the first to draw a sharp distinction between _la langue_ and _la parole_.[1*]
La langue, he said, refers to the general system of forms or rules that
regulate the usage of language. _La langue_, which refers to the struc-
ture of any language, exists _apart_ from those individuals who speak the
language. In contrast, _la parole_ refers to speech or the act of speak-
ing as it is carried out by a particular speaker. _La parole_ has to do
with the _event_ of language as it occurs _in speech_. Saussure went on
to argue that the science of linguistics should concern itself prima-
rily with _la langue_, not _la parole_. He believed that _la parole_ was on-
ly a development or manifestation of _la langue_. In _la parolr_, he claim-
ed that speakers were only making use of a language code already in _la
langue_.

Nearly the whole body of subsequent linguistic investigations
was to follow Saussure in his pursuit of _la langue_ and his eschewal of
la parole. And it was at this juncture that poetic and rhetoric became
reduced to the lowest rank as perspectives or approaches to language

*Reference notes begin on page 409.

study. But in even more recent times, especially with the development of phenomenology, these two outcasts of language inquiry are making a comeback. This return of poetic and rhetoric to academic prosperity though, is not to be achieved by doing away with _la langue_ (as linguistics tried to do away with poetic and rhetoric), but by showing how _la langue_ is to be comprehended or subsumed by poetic and rhetoric. And such a comprehension or subsumption of _la langue_ can be achieved by taking a more careful look at the _sources_ of poetry and rhetoric. In these two _sources_ of _speech_, we will find the sources of logic, grammar and the other form giving agencies of language.

In this study then, I would like to show how language investigations have just about come full circle back to the ancient insight which recognized the fundamentality of poetic and rhetoric. Only now this insight is harder to get at because of the evolution of societies and their modes of speech _away_ from considerations of poetic and rhetoric (both in theory and practice). The language theories of Nietzsche Heidegger, Sartre and Marx all come close to or at least work toward retrieving this insight about language. But in the end each falls short because he fails to give enough _explicit_ consideration to the role of rhetoric. This study will give to _both_ poetic and rhetoric the distinctly stated role they deserve in any theory which seeks to understand the structure of the language experience.

CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION

> There seems to be no evidence whatever that man
> learned to speak primarily because he wanted to
> speak logically.--Northrop Frye[1]

Much will be gained for speech studies when it becomes fully
realized how poetry and rhetoric are the counterbalancing language
functions that regulate completely man's interaction with himself and
others. Traditionally poetic has referred to the study of verse while
rhetoric has referred to the study of prose. In this tradition lan-
guage has been studied mostly by itself, that is, apart from the minds
that create and use language or apart from the sources of language.
But in this study we will be concerned with poetry as it is representa-
tive of the expressive faculty of speakers (or writers), and with rheto-
ric as it is representative of the social or communicative faculty. By
expressive faculty or function we will mean that aspect of speech that
tends to reveal the I or the personal reality of the speaking subject,
while by communicative faculty or function we will mean the project of
the speaking subject to join together the I and the You in a We. The
relationship of poetry and rhetoric to each other and to their origins
in the speech process is then the central focus of this study. And to
carry out such an inquiry, we will conduct an examination of the phe-
nomenological foundations of language which will show how language takes
shape through the interaction of these expressive and communicative
functions.

In this study we will sketch out a phenomenology of language
showing how it would be of significance to the speech discipline. As

used here, the word <u>phenomenology</u> does not refer to any particular school or movement in philosophy or psychology. The name of Edmund Husserl seems to have an ubiquitous association with phenomenology. However, our study is not to be orthodoxically associated with his work. Though some of the ideas of Husserl will be appropriated here, this study should not be considered as a direct development of his philosophy. Instead, we will use the word <u>phenomenology</u> in a more general sense as it refers to a descriptive study of consciousness and/or language. We will use the word <u>phenomenology</u> to denote a general approach to the study of language and communication that might be contrasted with linguistics, and especially, linguistic analysis. While the first concern of these latter approaches to language is an analytical classification and arrangement of the features of language, the first concern of a phenomenology of language is to <u>describe</u> the genesis and development of language as this process takes place within the speaking subject. Merleau-Ponty says "Linguistics invites us . . . to place ourselves inside language and not to consider it from the outside,"[2] whereas it is the aim of phenomenology to get outside of language and <u>look in</u>. Merleau-Ponty also says that "In principle, linguistics studies language objectively: that is, it considers language as it is 'behind the backs' (Hegel) of those who speak."[3] Linguistics does not realize that we cannot separate language from speaking man, since language and man himself are formed in and through the creative act of speaking. Language then is not just a finished product to be analytically dissected, rather it is a process of production. And this growth and development of language takes place only because of each speaking subject's need to give expression to himself and because of

his social need to communicate.

To see poetry (i.e. expression) and rhetoric (i.e. communication) as the fundamental modes of speech and language usage is not a novel perspective in the history of Western thought. Aristotle gave us only a poetic and rhetoric in his language studies, though his formulation of these is different from our own. Martin Heidegger says even though the Greeks "established rhetoric and poetics . . . this did not in itself lead to an appropriate definition of the essence of language."[4] Adding to the complexity of defining its essence, language in the twentieth century is seen as playing a more critical role in the theory of knowledge. Language or its usage is now itself seen as a major epistemological problem. As is well known, Wittgenstein even thought that the problems of philosophy are reducible to problems of language. But within the philosophical practice of linguistic analysis, it is not possible to see poetry and rhetoric as the fundamental modes of speech and language usage. In linguistic analysis, poetry and rhetoric have no role at all. Here poetry is dismissed as the language of mystics while rhetoric is dismissed as the language of pitchmen. But one doesn't need to be a very shrewd judge of human nature to sense that, for better or worse, there is at least a little of the mystic and the pitchman in all of us and all of our speech. And that linguistic analysis is not able to comprehend the continued presence of these features in our thinking and speaking should be seen as a strong mark against it. Moreover, as we will see, the range of poetry and rhetoric goes far beyond mere mysticism and salesmanship.

Because of this new importance given to language by Wittgenstein and numerous others in recent years, many are not willing to let

poetic and rhetoric serve as the pivot points for language investiga-
tion. The general attitude among most linguists is that they are not
about to let the roots of language be traced to a study as tenuous as
poetry or as epistemically erratic as rhetoric. For instance, in the
cybernetic approach to language and communication with its affinity for
information processing and computation, poetry and rhetoric are viewed
as aberrations of factual discourse. Though it may well be pointed out
that Aristotle in his language studies never meant for poetry and rheto-
ric to precede or to be the source of legitimacy for philosophy or fac-
tual discourse, it should also be added that he never intended philoso-
phy or factual discourse to hold in bondage or to stunt the growth of
poetry and rhetoric as it seems to have done in our own day. But mod-
ern linguistic studies has had as its aesthetic and epistemic by-
product just this deterioration and distortion of poetry and rhetoric.
In the present day Kenneth Burke and Paul Campell are among those who
have stressed the fundamentality of poetic and rhetoric to language
studies. In a suggestion that may even anticipate our own study,
Harold Zyskind offers a "counterpart hypothesis"[5] where he would ap-
proach rhetoric as the counterpart of poetic, just as Aristotle ap-
proached rhetoric as the counterpart of dialectic. But however Zyskind
would carry out his own "counterpart hypothesis," a phenomenology of
language is still needed to modernize the ancient Greeks' basic insight
about the role of poetic and rhetoric in language studies. And perhaps
more importantly, a phenomenology of language is needed to answer the
excesses of linguistics by providing the aesthetic and epistemic cor-
rectives.

Linguistics is the culmination of this tendency to study lan-
guage apart from its source or "behind the backs" (Hegel) of those who

use it. One of the most distinctive aspects of the linguistic approach is its _unempirical_ account of the representational or symbolic function performed by language. Though linguistics may deny this, our claim will be clarified as we go along. In such studies as those of the semanticist S. I. Hayakawa,[6] we are told to watch how language is a map of the ter- ritory. Even in general semantics, which supposedly studies the rela- tion between signs and behavior, language tends to be treated just as if it had always been with us--a thing among other things. Though such studies are sometimes interesting and do have some potential for in- creasing our understanding of human communication, they have nevertheless omitted the most distinctive part of language and the hardest to capture essence of human communication. Such studies fail to comprehend lan- guage as the product of a _speaking subject_. They fail to realize lan- guage as the embodiment of life itself. More specifically, they fail to give an account of how facts and ideas built out of words are able to transcend the subjective or phenomenological conditions in which such facts and ideas were created or processed. Bertrand Russell has said "The essential business of language is to assert or deny facts."[7] Such is _not_ the essential business of language at all, and misconstrues in the most fundamental way what is going on in the speech process. Theo- ries of language and communication built upon such views as these do not consider, either by construction or implication, the significance of language's not existing apart from the living speakers who produce it.

Paul Ricoeur observes how the theories of language and communi- cation proffered by linguists fail to realize how ". . . language is a centrifugal movement in relation to life and the activities of living."[8] He goes on to say that under the tenure of linguistics "We are forever

separated from life by the very function of the sign; we no longer
live life but simply designate it." Ricoeur believes that more than
just saying something man does something in saying; or as Kenneth Burke
would want us to see, language itself is a form of action.[9] In con-
trast to the view of linguistics then, language is not just a logically
constructed instrument of signs used to communicate already existing
facts and ideas; rather, language is a process or development that is
inextricably bound up with the creativity of the communicator attempt-
ing to use it. The phenomenology of language tries to explicate the
way language is tied into this creativity or the basic life movement
of the speaking subject. And the path to explaining this tie lies in
examining the way poetry and rhetoric are conjoined in both our think-
ing and speaking. These two trends exist in every moment of linguistic
life and cover the whole warp and woof of the language process. Poetry
and rhetoric crystallize into that one process we know as speech.

To say that language is a map of the territory explains very
little if we do not first look at the life-world or the motivations of
the persons making the maps. Though Hayakawa stresses "the map is not
the territory it stands for,"[10] this does not seem to be obvious to
most scholars and persons swept up in the everyday hustles of life. We
are all map makers who when drawing up our picture of the world have a
tendency to "overestimate" or "underestimate" (in the eyes of others)
the boundaries of our own physical and metaphysical estates. There are
obviously then many different maps for the same territory. The map of
the Middle East that the Israelis draw for a just peace is unlike the
one drawn by the Palestinians. And while conflicting parties each of-
fer maps that are consistent within themselves, the question that keeps

coming up in this approach to language is who is going to offer <u>the one</u> <u>correct map</u> by which the validity of the others is to be assessed? And just this one unanswered question is enough to justify the search for a more adequate accounting of language and its phenomenological roots.

But a phenomenology of language might easily be accused of being a mere subjective idealism. Nothing could be futher from the purpose or result of phenomenology. A phenomenology of language does not deny the existence of·a reality behind language. On the contrary, only by a phenomenological approach to language can the reality behind the word be <u>revealed</u> or <u>exposed</u>. In our next chapter we will make this clear by an exposition of Heidegger's term <u>unconcealment</u>, which is to be con- trasted with the linguist's <u>signification</u> or <u>denotation</u>. From the per- spective of our phenomenology of language, it is the linguists and se- manticists with their "maps" who are the subjective idealists. Because their theories of language give a nearly exclusive emphasis to signifi- cation or denotation (rather than unconcealment), we should think of their theories as founded upon ideology rather than experience. I realize that to claim signification is founded upon ideology (or is in some ways identical with it) may be a difficult and puzzling premise for the reader taught to use language in a technological society. But I hope any technological predilection will be at least ameliorated as we move through our study. Heidegger says technology is "the meta- physics of the atomic age."[11] Because of their penchant for infor- mation processing and computation, we should think of the linguist or semanticist as the metaphysical double agents who, while assuring us of their loyalty to reality, offer us only idealistic maps that cannot possibly portray the territory they are alleged to because of an <u>empty</u>

empiricism. Their empiricism is empty since it does not focus on sensations themselves, but on ideas or concepts that preform or structure experience or sensations. In their battle for knowledge, our soldiers of academia (especially in the social sciences) are always becoming bogged down in the dross of meaningless sophistication and end up retreating in confusion, because their attacks on their topics are misdirected by these maps that include a faulty view of the battlefield or of language and its relationship to reality.

Of course, we do not mean to just completely disregard linguistics or semanticism. Benjamin Lee Whorf and Edward Sapir and their principle of linguistic relativity may in some ways be a counter-example to our generalizations. Our phenomenology of language would easily accommodate the notion that "Facts are unlike to speakers whose language background provides for unlike formulation of them."[12] However, to say that each culture molds the way its members think and speak is a proposition that would be more fruitfully explored phenomenologically than scientifically. We will see how our phenomenology of language would be especially useful for giving an account of what are sometimes called validity forms, i.e., the means by which the rationality of a particular speaking community is established. Also, when comparing the Whorf-Sapir thesis to our own phenomenology of language, we should note that "Whorf was more concerned with substance than with process"[13] in his language investigations, and that both Whorf and Sapir tended to elevate content (of what is thought about) above phenomenological process. In contrast to the Whorf-Sapir approach, our phenomenology of language will explore the communication process, along with its implications for language relativity. Our principle aim then is not to refute or

completely deny the linguistic approach to language, but rather to show

the necessity of phenomenology for aquiring a subjectively and empiri-

cally adequate account of language.

Steered by the spirit of science and technology, it seems that

most modern studies have tried to wring the life out of language. The

heavy accent of reason or order, along with the notorious tendency of

modern scientific language to freeze experience into concepts, has

caused some experimental theatre artists like Peter Brook and Antonin

Artaud[14] to abandon regularly spoken language and to search for more

mimetically adequate means of communicating. The English language of

the twentieth century does not seem to be a poetically healthy language.

Because of the technological orientation of language investigations,

little effort is spent trying to understand how a subject comes to

situate himself in the speaking world. There is still needed a view

of language and communication that is better able to accommodate a

dynamic concept of person. If language is the map of anything, it most

representatively depicts the structure of consciousness. According to

Marx,[15] language is even _identical_ with consciousness. For Burke, lan-

guage is a means of separating consciousness from the unconscious

through the use of words as "terministic screens."[16] Language is the

tool we use for shaping and _screening out_ the unconscious, or in a

sense we will explain later, language with its _literal meanings_ is

the very framework or superstructure of the unconscious. Language _is_

the underclothes of consciousness—the foundation garment worn by the

self. This living activity of language as consciousness consists of

emotionally and intellectually filtering out our perceptions in a way

that causes us to be aware of some things and unaware of others. Words

are the "terministic screens" that screen-in awarenesses and screen-out

unawarenesses.

But if the phenomenology of language is to avoid charges of
subjective idealism, its most pressing concern is to comprehend how
language synthesizes our own internal world with the outer social
world. We need to be concerned with how the expression of the I (our
poetic faculty) is to be reconciled with communication (our rhetorical
faculty) or our means of achieving identification with a Me or You.
At this point George Herbert Mead's inquiry[17] might be recalled. Mead
tried to show how through an inner dialogue of the "I" and the "me" a
conception of the "self" emerges. In much the same way, we will explain
how language itself results from the interplay of our poetic and rhe-
torical faculties. From the interplay of expression and communication,
a _speaking subject_ emerges. Without this expression of the I there can
be no communication, and without communication there can be no meaning-
ful expression. By explaining the interaction of the I and the Me, we
can then uncover the vital animating principle of living speech. Lin-
guistics, or especially linguistic analysis, cannot bring about such
an understanding of the speech process since it is concerned primarily
with the contents or the logical relations of ideas _within_ language.
In contrast, the phenomenology of language is a description of language
and/or mind as we are directly aware of them, rather than through the
mediation of logical categories. In this sense, again, the phenomenology
of language is _outside_ or prior to linguistics. By beginning with the
actual utterances or _la parole_ of the speaking subject, phenomenology
is more in touch with the origins or groundings of real life language.
And by considering these origins or groundings in this study, we want
simply to be able to say _Look, here is how language works, or here is_
how language is put together.

It is exactly toward this purpose that a phenomenology of language must be involved. A phenomenology of language is needed to describe our expressive and communicative faculties, and to follow the threads that lace poetry together with rhetoric through out the entire fabric of our language. No one has made sufficiently clear the pattern of this weave, especially the peculiar way in which the threads of poetry and rhetoric strengthen and weaken each other. In any fabric, the criss-crossing threads pull against each other, yet for the whole of the fabric they demand and require each other. Poetry and rhetoric are the criss-crossing threads that give the fabric of language both its strength and weakness. Nietzsche says "Good prose is written only face to face with poetry. For it is an uninterrupted, well mannered war with poetry."[18] Prose and verse are the two primary tendencies of speech life. Wordsworth is both right and wrong when he says "There neither is or can be any essential difference between the language of prose and metrical composition."[19] Wordsworth is right in the sense that both prose and verse have their origins in the speaking subject and that they are both a part of the same language fabric; he is wrong when we consider prose and verse to be representative of man's contrasting communicative and expressive functions within language or within the fabric. It is not that important, and perhaps even misleading, that we should distinguish between prose and verse as the way of fashioning the fissure between rhetoric and poetry, especially when we consider prose and verse as they have traditionally been approached, i.e., apart from the speaking subject. To understand the difference between poetry and rhetoric, what has to be explained is how they are manifestations of the expressive and communicative faculties of a speaking subject. And only a phenomenology of language can carry out this project; only a phenomenology of language

can show how poetry and rhetoric are the counterbalancing language func-
tions that regulate completely man's interaction with himself and others.

To explain the demise of the speaking subject in modern communi-
cation, we will take apart the poetic-rhetorical weave of language and
explain how the creativity of speech has become lost or hidden within
the constructions of grammar and logic. Moving strongly against tradi-
tional approaches, we will explain how the constructions of grammar and
logic are to be properly considered as aspects of rhetoric. The prac-
tice of language begins in the poetry of experience, moves through
grammar and logic, then culminates in language as rhetoric. Poetry
and rhetoric thereby form the two opposing poles of the language process.
This phenomenological process of the speech act will be explained in
the next three chapters. Beginning with the theories of Heidegger and
Nietzsche in Chapters Two and Three, we will give a literary or anthro-
pological account of how language became separated from the creative act
of speaking through the development of grammar and logic. An understand-
ing of these aspects in the historical development of language will
enable us to get a more secure handle on what we mean by speech act.

So far as I have been able to make out, language or the speech
act has not been broken down into its fundamental poetic and rhetorical
elements before. To a large extent this neglect has been caused by the
modern technological climate that actually began with Plato and Aristotle.
Plato's disparagement of poetry and rhetoric is well known. But the
negative effects of Aristotle's philosophy and logic on poetry and rhe-
toric, particularly as he directed philosophy toward logic, were more
subtle and took longer to fester. Though to some degree Aristotle had
pulled on the poetic and rhetorical strands of language himself, he
thought it ultimately more important for the philosopher to give his

attention to logic and epistemology. And since all of philosophy fol-
lowed Aristotle's lead at this crossroads, not even the phenomenology
of language has yet produced a well developed theory of poetry and
rhetoric. Because of its failure to give a central focus to poetic
and rhetoric, the present study does not follow orthodox phenomenology.

In Chapters Five and Six, we will examine the role of social
considerations in the development of language. After unweaving the
poetic and rhetorical strands of language in Chapters Two, Three and
Four, we will describe the procedure in which these threads are inter-
laced in the speech act or communication process. One of the most im-
portant forces at work guiding the development of modern communication
is alienation. From the perspective of our phenomenology of language,
alienation is a breakdown or corruption of the communication process.
There is a seldom noticed partnership, or perhaps collusion, between
alienation and the logic of linguistic analysis. Both alienation and
logic involve the removal of language from real life speech or the
creative act of speaking. Logic does not precede language, as the
linguistic analyst would have us think; rather, logic grew out of lan-
guage through the self-deception of literal meanings. We shall see
how only through the self-deception of literal meanings does logical
necessity become possible as a feature of language. And conversely,
only through the development of logical necessity does the self-decep-
tion of literal meanings become possible. Even for the linguistic
analyst, all necessity is logical necessity. But a phenomenological
approach to language must explain how this necessity is created
through the act of speaking. Specifically, what are the communicative
dynamics involved in the creation and dissolution of necessity? What

exactly is going on when communicators persuade or create necessity
for themselves and others? What is going on phenomenologically in de-
ception, particularly self-deception? Because of the role in language
given to logic and literal meanings by linguistic analysis, speakers
do not master language, rather language masters them. When a speaker
loses control of his language, he in effect loses control of his ex-
istence. Ultimately, this lack of control over language produces an
alienation from social or communicative experience.

     In this alienation brought on by a misuse of language and logic,
we also have the seed for mental illness. From the therapeutic angle,.
we will be interested in understanding the schizophrenic and psycho-
path in terms of the patterns of communication they weave using the
rhetorical strands of language. And while for Jordan Scher[20] aliena-
tion is the steppingstone to schizophrenia, alienation also works to
support hierarchialized society at large. Having traced language
backward to the empyrean of pure and undeveloped consciousness in the
early chapters of our study, we will be prepared to trace forward the
development of language and/or consciousness through the alienation·
of modern society. Applying some of the ideas of Marx and Sartre, we
will explain how meaning is born and shaped through the social encoun-
ter. The notion that meaning is constructed in the social encounter
is a view that is frequently expressed by Marxists and existentialists.

     In Chapter Seven, we will discuss the relationship between the
patterns of communication in·society and the structure of artistic
forms. Very generally, we contend that in societies where there is
widespread alienation or a paucity of communication, poetic forms like
epic and tragedy which focus on the wholeness of human beings will not

be able to develop. Alienation tends to nurture art forms that focus on pure expression to the exclusion of communication. In societies with widespread alienation, artistic practices always reveal a desperate grasp for personal expression, as we see for instance in surrealism or symbolism. Language here tends to be a force that <u>divides</u> rather than <u>unites,</u> or to be a means of setting persons apart from each other rather than bringing them together. The perspectivism of this formalist art leads to an <u>atomizing</u> of speech that is the aesthetic parallel to the linguist's tendency to <u>analyze</u>. Both modern art and science reveal the lack of wholeness experienced by modern human beings in their social organizations. There are certain principles of form giving inherent in the communication process which regulate the structure of language, and hence regulate the structure of art and society. By understanding the phenomenological dynamics of language and communication, we can take a large step toward understanding the relationship of society or polity to artistic forms.

At the foundation of modern society's separation of art from science is the tendency of each to develop its own <u>specialized</u> language. In theatre arts, for instance, Peter Brook[21] has been searching for a new language that he believes could <u>defy rationality</u> and thereby be more suitable for the artist, while in the philosophy of science Rudolph Carnap[22] and others have pressed for an analytic view of language that would <u>defy irrationality</u>. But it seems that language cannot defy rationality if it is to communicate or to be a vehicle for meaningful expression. Nor can language defy irrationality and still be able to recognize its origins in the <u>speaking subject</u>. Language cannot be made a more effective instrument for communication merely by simplifying or

purifying it of emotional sediments, or by increasing its conceptual
rigidities. Again, as we will try to show, language results from the
interplay of our expressive and communicative faculties. Therefore in
principle language cannot be reduced to pure expression or pure commu-
nication. Each of these extremes of modern art and science rejects
different but what are still essential parts of the living activity of
language. Furthermore, it can be shown that the best poetry and
rhetoric always absorb those very elements that an artist like Brook
or a linguistic analyst like Carnap regard as foreign. The poet Goethe
observed how "The power of language lies not in its rejecting but ra-
ther in its devouring [my italics] what is foreign."[23] Because of
this absorption of foreign matter, the authentic speech act will some-
how always transcend or at least point beyond itself.

Following through some of the insights of Marx, we will want
to show how the above specialization in language usage is connected
to a social organization's overall division of labor. Economic spe-
cialization has fairly exact corollaries in both the inner workings
of language and artistic forms. Our phenomenology of language will
hopefully give new weight to the argument that the best poetry and
rhetoric is most representative of social humanism and its tendencies
away from specialization. There may be no perfect poetry and rhetoric,
just as there may be no perfect society, but art and societies (or po-
etry and rhetoric) approach perfection as they leave behind the per-
spectivism and hierarchy that is always associated with the division
of labor. Only language that transforms the impact of these essen-
tially anti-social factors can lead its users to recognize their own
freedom and self-determination. To the extent that a phenomenology of

language explains the anti-social impact of specialization, hierarchy etc., it might be able to show us how rhetoric can work as an instrument of civic betterment.

And though both Marxism and existentialism tend to largely support this above view of aesthetics and society, some like the Marxist Georg Lukacs[24] have argued that Marxism and existentialism are irreconcilable. Basically Lukacs contends that a theory that puts the individual _first_ must always end up putting society _last_. In our phenomenology of language though, some of the central tenets of Marxism become necessary for rounding out existentialism, and vice versa. As existentialism relates principally to our understanding of internal or I-Me communication, so Marxism relates principally to external or I-You communication. If we were to exclude either one of these levels of communication we could no longer have language, since language is formed in the _intersection_ of internal and external dialogue. We cannot have dialogue with others without having it with ourselves, and vice versa. If individuals lived by themselves, language would never have developed. Whatever is the final verdict on the relation of Marxism to existentialism, it will be found that one of the advantages of discussing these two highly influential philosophies from the communicative perspective is that they are given the most lucid exposure at the most critical junctures.

Much of these above discussions will be centered around the philosophies of Nietzsche, Marx, Sartre and Heidegger. Each of these four theorists has made significant, though _incomplete_, contributions to the phenomenology of language. We will use the theories of these four philosophers as _leads_ for uncovering the sources of poetry and

rhetoric. I have selected these four philosophers for our attention because each tends to give emphasis to an area where the other falls short. But when considered collectively and with the right kind of re-emphasis, they tend to fill out the theoretical area where each of the others is incomplete, though none has given enough _explicit_ consideration to rhetoric. Also, there are enormous differences among these four philosophers. The gap between Heidegger (the Parmenidean philosopher of being) and Nietzsche (the Heraclitean philosopher of becoming) may well seem untraversable to many, not to mention the gap between Heidegger and Marx etc. But through a critical examination of their views on language, I think we can find a common thrust of thought that binds them together in a useful, if sometimes tenuous, continuity. We will stress how in overall _matters of language and communication_, these philosophers should be seen as augmenting each other, rather than working toward one another's detriment. By considering their theories collectively, we can comprehend both the poetic and rhetorical roots of language, and how these roots develop in the communicative process.

The detrimental impact of linguistics, and especially linguistic analysis, on communication studies should also become apparent by a discussion of these four philosophers. Under the guidance of linguistic analysis and technology, we have come to see truth as just an intellectual act _within_ language, rather than as a form of experience that transcends language. The way language participates in an intellectual act is different from the way it participates in poetic experience. To understand this latter mode of participation and its relation to the former, a phenomenological approach to language must be

made. Language becomes rounded out and meaningful only in this du-

ality of poetry and rhetoric. Only when language is finally realized

as the product of <u>both</u> our expressive and communicative faculties will

it be able to become a humanizing force and a vehicle for securing au-

thentic human relations. It's this realization that a phenomenology

of language aims to achieve.

II. THE RISE OF GRAMMAR

AND DECLINE OF POETIC EXPERIENCE

> Grammar is the self-consciousness of language, just as
> logic is the self-consciousness of thinking.--Eugen
> Rosenstock-Huessy[1]

> [O]ur age has so often been auctioned off by our
> learned hucksters of indulgences under the name of
> information.--Soren Kierkegaard[2]

In our "Introduction" we suggested that language is no longer
a reflection of the real life speech process because it has been sev-
ered from the creative act of speaking. Martin Heidegger expresses
this same notion by saying that language has lost hold of being. In
this chapter, we want to examine Heidegger's historical account of how
language has lost hold of being and has become severed from the act of
speaking through the rise of grammar and philosophy. We want to ex-
amine why language is no longer a reflection of the real life speech
process.

We should make it clear that Heidegger is not the first lan-
guage theorist to charge that grammar and philosophy interfere with
the natural creative or poetic functioning of language. We might see
such a viewpoint as representing a fundamentally Romantic line of in-
quiry, though the philosopher Giambattista Vico[3] (1668-1744) should
also be seen as a part of this tradition. The fathers of Franco-
German Romanticism, Rousseau and Herder, both saw grammar and philoso-
phy as detracting from the poetic energy of language. In his "Essay
on the Origin of Languages," Rousseau says "The study of philosophy
and the progress of reason, while having perfected grammar, deprive

language of its vital, passionate quality."[4] And Herder says: "Since
every grammar is only a philosophy of language and a method for its
use, it follows that the more primordial a language is, the less gram-
mar must there be in it."[5] In the older primordial languages, there
is an "analogy of the senses noticeable in their roots."[6] Such lan-
guages then are more likely to give voice to feelings and sensations.
"The more original a language and the more frequently such feelings
appear intertwined in it, the less is it possible for them to be sub-
ordinated to one another with precision and logic."[7] And a contempo-
rary of Rousseau and Herder, Johann Georg Hamann, said that poetry is
"the original language of the human race."[8]

But even though this disparaging attitude toward grammar and
philosophy is traceable to at least the beginning of the Romantic pe-
riod, it is only with Heidegger that this argument gets carried much
closer to its conclusion. Heidegger's amplification of this argument
is powered by perhaps a general sharper awareness in the twentieth
century of the inadequacy of language to function as an instrument
for viable speech. Numerous movements in modern art are also powered
by this same awareness. Working in an aesthetic climate that senses
a more pressing need to investigate language problems, Heidegger gives
a more detailed account of how grammar and philosophy impinge on the
natural functioning of language, than is given by Rousseau and Herder
in their essays on the origins of language. We are focusing on Heideg-
ger's theory of language in this chapter then, because his theory of-
fers a more accessable route to locating the sources of poetry, and
for separating the poetic strands of language from the rhetorical.
Like his above predecessors, Heidegger considers poetry as the origin

of all language. To put it another way, it might be said that for
Heidegger poetry is the very language of language. Poetry is the es-
sence of language and the point to where all languages must trace their
roots. "Language itself is poetry in the essential sense. . . . [P]oesy
takes place in language because language preserves the original nature
of poetry."[9] For Heidegger then, to understand language means to under-
stand this primal language of poetry.

But as was mentioned in our "Introduction," most linguistic ap-
proaches to the study of language and communication tend to eschew po-
etry, preferring to regard poesy as the language of mystics or as some
radically subjective form of speech. Along with such approaches to the
study and usage of language and communication is the tendency to stress
facts, data, information etc. There is a general belief that the more
of these units of knowledge that are present in a message the more ef-
fective it will be. Guided by this principle, some modern communica-
tions seem to have become overstocked with facts, data etc. to the point
where even the most analytically sophisticated people and computers have
difficulty handling them. And when there occurs what are sometimes
called "communication breakdowns" as the result of this overload, the
nostrum usually offered is to feed even more facts, data etc. But any-
one who has looked at language and communication with even a slightly
wider angle of vision, knows that communication is not necessarily en-
hanced by the glut of these epistemic enervators. Though scientists
have produced great volumes of information on the desirability or un-
desirability of nuclear power, the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of
wage-price controls, and numerous other issues that make up public de-
bate, there seems to be still even greater confusion and disagreement
than before.

According to Heidegger, all this leads to a deprecation of language and a general feeling of helplessness and ineffectiveness in the attempt to communicate. Heidegger even thinks that the psychological problems and the general feeling of alienation experienced by Western twentieth century man is the result of construing language and practicing communication in this logical or technological way. Heidegger thinks "Authentic speaking . . . dissolves if it is placed in the cheap acid of a merely logical intelligence."[10] Modern Western languages no longer seem to be an effective way of communicating because they have been exhausted or emptied of their animation by the characteristic style of thought of logic and technology. "[L]anguage in general is worn out and used up--an indispensable but masterless means of communication that may be used as one pleases, as indifferent as a means of public transport, as a street car which everyone rides in."[11] These kinds of considerations cause Heidegger to turn from an analytic approach to language to a poetical inquiry. To discover what language is missing and why we have communication breakdowns, Heidegger believes we need to go back and reexamine the origins of language, particularly the genesis of philosophical language. We need to ask different kinds of questions about communication problems than what might be asked by a "communication specialist" from the telephone company or the computer industry.

The general exhaustion of modern Western languages is due to what Heidegger calls "the evaporation of being."[12] Since the word "being" is not a part of ordinary parlance, it may seem puzzling to non-philosophic readers. "Being" seems like an empty word that refers to at most some tenuous vapor or what Nietzsche calls "the last cloudy streak of evaporating reality."[13] To understand being it may help if

we think of its opposite, non-being. Simply put, being is that which

is without any qualifications, while non-being is that which is not.

Heidegger observes how "the word 'being' is indefinite in meaning and

yet we understand it definitely."[14] Heidegger's inquiry into language,

and his philosophy in general, are based upon his analysis of being.

It is important to understand being because "The determination of the

essence of language, the very inquiry into it, are regulated at all

times by the prevailing preconception about the essence of being."[15]

In the Heideggerean sense then, let us think of being as the soul of

language. Being is the verve and vivacity that is intrinsic to language

and gives to real life speech its spark of life. Without being we

could have no language at all. And since being reveals itself to us

only in language, we can be aware of being only insofar as we are aware

of language as the keeper of Being or "the house of Being." Heidegger

says:

> Language is the precinct (templum), that is, the house of
> Being. The nature of language does not exhaust itself in
> signifying, nor is it merely something that has the char-
> acter of sign or cipher. It is because language is the
> house of Being, that we reach what is by constantly going
> through this house. When we go to the well, when we go
> through the woods, we are always already going through
> the word "well," through the word "woods," even if we do
> not speak the words and do not think of anything relating
> to language. . . . All beings--objects of consciousness
> and things of the heart . . . all beings, each in its own
> way, are qua beings in the precinct of language.[16]

Because being reveals itself only in language, if language loses hold

of being there is no alternative way of grasping or unconcealing being.

Being then must have language, and language must give voice to being.

Being and language are two essential elements for authentic speech.

But we must consider more carefully this "evaporation of being"

in modern Western languages. Heidegger traces this disappearance of

being from language to the philosophy of Plato, and particularly to

the logic of Aristotle. The technology and modern industry which

Heidegger so strongly protests against had its seeds sown in these

philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. For anyone who has never carefully

considered the matter, it may seem strange to see the roots of technolo-

gy and industry extending so far back in history. But other philosophers

of civilization have also made this point. Lewis Mumford says:

> I have found the beginnings of the so-called Industrial
> Revolution, not in the eighteenth century with its steam
> engines and automatic looms, but in the highly mechanized
> human machines (megamachines) that built the great tombs,
> ziggurats, walls, cities, and irrigation works of the
> earliest civilizations.[17]

Heidegger goes even further though and asks what made these "highly

mechanized human machines"? His answer is that they evolved out of the

changes taking place in thought and speech.

In the ancient world, these tendencies toward order and organi-

zation came to a head or at least reached a new plateau of development

in the logic of Aristotle. This new logic, along with its new concep-

tion of truth, were based upon changes in the relationship between being

and thought--changes that were eventually to culminate in the technology

of the modern age. Heidegger believes that language is based upon an

interaction of thinking with being. Thought becomes fused with being

through the genuine speech act. However, in modern philosophy and its

science, thought has been emphasized to the exclusion of being. Another

way of approximating this idea would be to say that intellectual activity

has been accelerated at the expense of experience. In pre-Socratic phi-

losophy though, being and thought were not separated as they are under

the reign of logic and technology. With the pre-Socratics there was an

awareness of being, allowing being to be subsumed with thought in the

oneness of language. This wholeness of speech conveyed in the pre-
Socratics use of language was typified in their view of truth as
alethia. The truth or alethia of the pre-Socratics is what Heidegger
equates with the awareness of or the revelation of being through
speech.[18] The very purpose of pre-Socratic speech was to give voice
to being through "unconcealment."[19] Through "the work of the word in
poetry,"[20] being emerges in unconcealment.

But with the development of Aristotle's logic, there came a
profound change in this early Greek conception of truth as alethia or
unconcealment. With Aristotle's logic, truth changed from an unconceal-
ment of being to a property contained in propositions. Through this
new interpretation, truth was restricted to a function of intellectual
activity that did not include lived experience. The new function of
the word was to signify or denote, rather than to show or unconceal.
The excluded-middle and the law of contradiction in Aristotelian logic
gave a true-false polarity to propositions. A true statement became
one that corresponded with the facts, while a false statement became
one that lacked such correspondence. In this logical polarity, the
mold was cast for linguistic analysis and its concentration on thought
to the exclusion of being and quantity to the exclusion of quality.
And so even though Aristotle had given us a poetic and rhetoric, he
didn't seem to realize how his view of logic would be used, in a way
he didn't intend, to destroy his view of language. The development of
artificial binary languages, algorithms, the phenomenon of calculation
even as practiced by computers--all trace their origins to this initial
shift of truth from an unconcealment of being to a property of proposi-
tions. Because of Aristotle's logic, Heidegger says that language since

the pre-Socratics has lost hold of being, and modern language users must

now try to recover this oneness or wholeness of language and life. In

the present age, it is now up to the poet to push his way through the

excluded-middle of Aristotle and restore language to its pristine power,

for only then will language be able to fulfill its essence as "the house

of Being."

But with this outline of Heidegger's argument before us, we must

now turn to a more detailed account of the linguistic and particularly

the grammatical factors involved in this shift of truth from unconceal-

ment to signification or denotation. Heidegger says these changes in

the function of language are based upon changes in how language devel-

ops agreements with reality. "The transformation of the sign from some-

thing that shows to something that designates has its roots in the

change of the nature of truth."[21] Modern language, Heidegger complains,

concentrates on signifying objects rather than showing or revealing be-

ing. To understand why "being" has become an empty word whose signifi-

cance has faded away, Heidegger wants us to understand the grammar and

the etymology of the word "being" prior to Aristotle. He thinks we need

to examine the form of the word "being" by way of the insights language

studies might offer us about its original meaning.

In the attention we give to grammar as phenomenologists, we are

not concerned with just the arrangement of words, as we ordinarily

think of everyday grammar. We are more concerned with the psychological

and ontological factors involved in the formation of these arrangements.

Here the modes of _experiencing_ language become more important than the

logical relations of the elements within language. Our concern is more

with what might be called the _gravimetry_ of language, i.e., the experi-

ential weight and density of language. This change from a logical to a phenomenological approach will then focus our attention on some different aspects of grammar. We can look in a modern grammar book and find out that the word "go" is the imperative of the present indicative "he goes" etc. But Heidegger says:

> . . . these terms [imperative, present indicative etc.] ceased long ago to be anything more than technical instruments with the help of which we mechanically dissect language and set down rules. Precisely where a pristine feeling toward language still stirs, we sense the deadness of these grammatical forms, these mere mechanisms. Language and linguistics have been caught fast in these rigid forms, as in a steel net. In the barren and spiritless doctrines of the schools, these formal concepts and terms of grammar have become totally uncomprehended and incomprehensible shells.[22]

It seems to be often forgotten that these grammatical archetypes have not existed eternally, and that they do not exist independently of the act of speaking. And though it may not be certain that grammar is necessary for speech, it should be clear by the end of our inquiry how speech is necessary for grammar.

Heidegger focuses our attention on the process whereby these now ossified grammatical forms grew out of the Greek and Latin languages and were taken over by subsequent language traditions. Through such a phenomenological inquiry into language, he wants to show how the deadness of these grammatical forms has come to deny to speakers a spontaneous and creative attitude toward language, and especially how these forms have inhibited the poetic process of unconcealment. Heidegger observes how the investigations of modern linguistics often ask whether the first words spoken by man were nouns or verbs? Even the early Romantics, Herder and Vico, were stimulated by this issue. Herder answers this question by saying "From the verbs it was that the nouns

grew and not from the nouns the verbs. The child names the sheep, not as a sheep, but as a bleating creature, and hence makes of the interjection a verb."[23] Vico gives a contrasting answer: "And that nouns sprang up before verbs is proved by this eternal property: that there is no statement that does not begin with a noun, expressed or understood, which governs it."[24] But Heidegger thinks the very positing of this question involves a misdirection of language inquiry. The original character of speech is not to be found in a theory that gives primacy to nouns over verbs, or vice versa. This "pseudo question" which asks whether the first words were nouns or verbs ". . . first grew up in the light of a developed grammar, and not from a contemplation of the essence of language as it was before the grammarians ripped it apart."[25] The question as to whether the first words were nouns or verbs arose only as grammarians turned toward an analytical breaking down of the constituent elements of speech.

The distinction between noun (onoma) and verb (rhēma) was first developed by the early Greeks. (By early Greeks here, we will mean those in the generations before Plato and Aristotle.) Onoma and rhēma were developed by the early Greeks through observations they made on their own language. But Heidegger notes how with the early Greeks there was an "inner bond between these two processes."[26] Contemporary speech of course still has an internal relationship between noun and verb. In putting together the sentence structures used in day to day discourse, the noun and verb are inextricably involved. But this relationship, and more particularly the nature of nouns and verbs as they were derived from living speech, has changed from the original formulation of onoma and rhēma. So important is this change, that Heidegger

seems to think that the whole story of Western language and communi-
cation can essentially be explained by understanding what happened dur-
ing the generations beginning with the sophists and pre-Socratics, and
ending with Plato and Aristotle. Heidegger says:

> . . . the crucial differentiation of the fundamental forms
> of words (noun and verb) in the Greek form of onoma and
> rhēma was worked out and first established in close connec-
> tion with an exegesis and interpretation of being, which
> was to exert a determining influence on the whole West.[27]

To put Heidegger's point more tersely, he thinks that while the early
Greek formulation of onoma and rhēma was able to contain or give voice
to being, subsequent developments in grammar denied the expression of
being. What then was the difference between early original grammar
and later grammars that caused this change in the way language was to
relate to being? In contemporary English grammar, nouns are words for
denoting or signifying persons, places and things. For the early Greeks
though, onoma meant more than just the word referring to the object.
Heidegger says "Onoma meant the linguistic appellation in distinction
to the named person or thing."[28] Onoma included the appellative process
or the act of calling something by a name. This act of calling some-
thing by a name became referred to as rhēma. "And rhēma in turn meant
speech, discourse; rhētōr was the speaker, the orator."[29] For the
early Greeks then, onoma was able to include a "revelation of things"
(i.e. things in being) since it included rhēma or a "revelation of
action."[30] Seeing or experiencing language in this way allowed the
early Greeks to be aware of the phenomenological overlay language and
things have with the act of speaking. Heidegger says that "authentic"[31]
speech consists of "an interweaving"[32] of onoma with rhēma. The early
Greeks then were living and pulsating communicators for whom language

was contingent upon the act of speaking. For them, to speak was to en-
ter into a certain process of life where being was revealed or "uncon-
cealed" in the activity of speech. For the early Greeks, the very prac-
tice of speech seems to have been an ethic or theory of value. But au-
thenticity here does not mean primarily a stodgy or serious moral con-
cept. Authenticity refers to a certain style of structuring thought
and perception through speech. This important concept of authenticity
will become clearer as we move through the next few chapters.

Now in contemporary grammar and language usage, the noun and
verb do not have this "interweaving" of language and things with the
act of speaking. To explain the relationship that the noun and verb
have in contemporary grammar, Heidegger directs our attention to two
late additions to the grammatical analysis of language, the infinitive
and substantive. The infinitive is a form of verbal noun which per-
forms the function of a noun, yet it displays the features of a verb
in not specifying a subject, e.g., "to eat," "to see," "to have" etc.
A substantive is a form that portends existence and even expresses in-
dependent existence. Particular attention should be given to the sub-
stantive verb "to be." Because the substantive "to be" expresses an
independent existence, it is a form which attempts to subdue being in
thought, or to make thoughts or ideas stand in the place of being it-
self. Since the substantive is able to make thoughts or ideas stand
in the place of things, its development marks the moment in language
history where the more modern phenomenon of signification and denotation
became possible. With the rise of infinitives and substantives, being
became interpreted as idea. Being became extirpated from experience
and replaced by its shadow in the intellect. The development of

infinitives and substantives led to "the interpretation of being as idea"[33] or "the evaporation of being"[34] which Heidegger contends is the primary flaw of modern thinking and speaking. It is not just infinitives and substantives themselves that are unpoetic, but also, and especially, the very frame of mind presupposed in their use.

More specifically, the way infinitives and substantives lead to the intellectual construction of being in idea is this: Unlike the onoma and rhēma of the early Greeks, Heidegger says what is named in the infinitive "is not invoked as really present but represented as only potentially in being."[35] The infinitives "to eat," "to see" etc. cause nothing to arise or be seen. The infinitive contributes nothing toward the exposure or unconcealment of being. As an abstraction, the infinitive "is represented by the word as such."[36] In short, "the infinitive no longer manifests what the verb (rhēma) otherwise reveals,"[37] i.e., the essent. With the infinitive, the essent is no longer asserted in speech, as it was in the "interweaving" of onoma with rhēma. Heidegger says "For the Greeks 'being' basically meant this standing presence"[38] of the essent. By standing in the place of the essent, the infinitive stands in place of being. Starting with the infinitive, speakers came to find the essent ready made in speech. The infinitive is the initial move away from authentic discourse made by the grammarians. This movement away from authentic discourse is exacerbated by the substantive. Heidegger says "the transformation of the infinitive into a verbal substantive further stabilizes as it were the emptiness that already resided in the infinitive."[39] This pivotal move made by the infinitive and substantive lays down the foundation for an ontology of data, information, or facts that "speak for themselves." Because of this new onto-

logical independence of the abstraction, language becomes "a visibili-
ty of things that are already-there,"[40] or a "map of the territory"
where the map is more real than the territory.

The modern speaker is fond of telling his listeners that "the
facts ring loud and clear" or that "the handwriting is on the wall."
He seems to want to drive a wedge between himself and his argument.
Among such communicators, arguments must be perceived as arguing them-
selves, independently of the speaker who presents them. The pivotal
move made by infinitives and substantives toward abstraction is what
makes possible this form of speakerless argument. In moving language
toward abstraction, infinitives and substantives layed the ontological
foundation for what we now call literal meanings, i.e., the phenomenon
in language where words appear to be beyond the control of the speaker.
Though Heidegger himself overlooks this important result of interpret-
ing being as idea, we wish to stress that the literal meaning was able
to develop only after the essent was found ready made in speech. In
literal meanings, language seems to vouch for its own legitimacy be-
cause it is according to its own letter. Through this misuse of lan-
guage, being became transferred to idea, and speaking became determined
by an "unchosen" grammar and literal meanings. This matter of literal
meanings is of critical importance to our phenomenology of language and
will be treated more fully in later chapters. But let us at least agree
at this point to the detrimental effects of literal meanings upon poetry.
Because language has become "a visibility of things that are already-
there," seeing (i.e., poetic seeing) has degenerated into a pure cogni-
tion. Heidegger says "The eye, the vision, which originally projected
the project into potency, becomes a mere looking at or looking over or

gaping at. Vision has degenerated into mere optics."[41] In his Phenom-enology of Expression, Remy Kwant says "To see is not to appropriate a ready-made present visibility of things but to constitute this visi-bility."[42] Treating something poetically means letting it emerge in the unconcealedness of its being. But as an abstraction there is a certain emptiness to literal meanings that precludes the experiencing of being. The literal meanings brought on by the rise of infinitives and substantives have drained language of experience. Noting the re-sults for language brought on by the development of infinitives, and especially the substantive "to be," Heidegger says: "Can it now sur-prise us that 'being' should be so empty a word when the very word form is based on an emptying and apparent stabilization of emptiness?"[43] The rise of infinitives and substantives gave a new relatedness to nouns and verbs. The new bridging function between nouns and verbs performed by infinitives and substantives ruined the delicate "interweaving" that existed between the early Greek onoma and rhēma, or between lan-guage and the act of speaking. Heidegger observes how "onoma and rhē-ma, which originally designated all speech, narrowed in meaning and became terms for the two main classes of words"[44]--nouns and verbs.

Some extra measure of illumination of these matters might be gained by making a brief comparison of Heidegger's view of grammar to the transformational grammar of Noam Chomsky. Though Heidegger himself may have felt uneasy about such a comparison, in the long run the gen-eral aim of our phenomenology of language will be validly served by noting these points of correspondence and tension. Chomsky thinks that language is made up of "Kernels"[45] of noun phrases and verb phrases which each speaker of the language is able to transform into a variety

of sentences. The aim of a transformational grammar is to establish
the transformational rules which regulate the generation of sentences
from the Kernels. To understand a sentence means to understand the
Kernel from which it has originated. Also, Chomsky says that each sen-
tence has a "surface structure" and a "deep structure."[46] The surface
structure consists of the words or sentences actually spoken. To get
the full meaning of the sentence though, the listener (or the speaker
in putting the sentence together) must relate the surface structure to
a deep structure through a series of transformational rules. In turn,
the deep structures are base strings which generate the surface struc-
ture through transformational rules. Deep structures are much the same
for all languages and seem to be innate to all speakers. Chomsky seems
to give to the deep structures an ontological status roughly equivalent
to that of the Platonic forms. The rules of transformation are under-
stood by users of language at an unconscious level. It is this uncon-
scious operation of grammatical transformations between surface struc-
tures and deep structures that allows language users to understand each
other. And in this way, grammar becomes the logic of speech. The un-
conscious operations of language are expressed in these transformational
rules, and Chomsky puts forward as the goal of linguistics the discovery
and cataloguing of these rules.

When we relate Chomsky's grammar theory to our phenomenology
of language, we put in clear relief the tension between linguistics and
phenomenology. Our phenomenology of language would maintain that through
the development of infinitives and substantives, speakers began to lose
hold of the deep structure of language, i.e., to lose hold of being.
The experience of being became buried in the unconscious as idea or

reason. We would agree with Chomsky then that the aim of language in-
quiry is to show how to recover this deep structure. Where we disagree
with Chomsky most severely is the way in which he seeks to describe this
deep structure. For Chomsky the deep structure is an abstraction (or
the very opposite of being). For Chomsky the deep structure is logic,
or more precisely, the syntactic structures which regulate word or
sentence formations. While Chomsky even thinks that logic makes possi-
ble or is the very means for making transformations to the deep struc-
ture, we along with Heidegger would stress the tendency of logic to
work against such transformations, especially as they would occur in
authentic speech. Indeed, it is the very development of logic that
has moved speaking man so far away from the deep structure. When the
phenomenologist winds in his fishing line from the depths of the uncon-
scious, his prize is being, while Chomsky's is logic. And we would
criticize Chomsky for not recognizing this old boot, and not having
enough awareness of the speech process to throw it back.

· Chomsky is typical of the modern scientifically oriented lin-
guist in that he supposes that the essential or ultimate nature of
language is logical. And this glorification of logic was inevitable
once Saussure had demoted la parole from linguistics. From the stand-
point of our phenomenology of language, Chomsky's transformational gram-
mar is still to be grouped with Bloomfield[47] and the structural linguists,
even though Chomsky has modified the mode of attachment of speech to
logic and grammar. The basic aim of Chomsky's transformational grammar
is to uncover what he mistakenly assumes to be the logical nature of
language. In Chapter Four when the case of Wittgenstein is discussed,
we will give a fuller account of how logic is to be located within the

phenomenology of language and the speech act. But let us just note at this point that we see Chomsky doing with grammar just what the early Wittgenstein tried to do with logic. As Wittgenstein searched for the logical or atomic sentences to which all sentences of all languages must be _reducible_, so Chomsky searches for the deep structures to which all sentences of all languages must be _transformable_.

As we have been describing both historically and anthropologically, logic developed out of grammar, while both grew out of the speech act. And by putting _la langue_ before _la parole_, the modern linguist inverts and obscures this whole process. We want to try to give further explanation of how this mistaken inversion evolved in both language theory and practice. To see logic as the basis for language and grammar is not a recently developed perspective, but it is, unfortunately, a very pervasive one. Even a literary critic with the poetic astuteness of S. T. Coleridge considered grammar as "no other than the laws of universal logic, applied to psychological materials."[48] In the Middle Ages also, grammatical rules were thought to have their origins in logic. But to understand the pivotal initiations where logic was able to get under the skin of language and to become a determining factor for grammar, we must look to the Greeks.

When the rhetorical theorist examines the history of the word _grammar_, he should not be surprised to find that it was once not distinguished from _glamour_. Let us emphasize that _glamour_ refers to a spell or enchantment that produces a delusive charm, exhalation or praise. In grammar as glamour then, the _delusive_ and _rational_ aspects of speech were one in the same. Grammar and glamour developed as aspects of the same speech impulse. Before grammar and glamour became separated,

speakers who made any well developed use of rational thought must have
been suspected as deceivers--and as we will see, perhaps rightly so.
During this early period, the modern speaker with his penchant for facts
that speak for themselves would have seemed as only a queer species of
linguistic gigolo who used speech as a means for creating ideas, and
grammar or rational thought as a means for magnifying them with a spell
of delusive charm.

The rise of infinitives and substantives gave a new abstract
mode to the way speakers related nouns to verbs. With the rise of in-
finitives and substantives, language became separated from being because
of its separation from the act of speaking. Because language was now
conceived of and practiced apart from being, the intellectual or logi-
cal connection between nouns and verbs, the "is," came to be emphasized.
Heidegger says "Now 'being' itself becomes something that 'is,' though
manifestly only essents are and not being in addition."[49] By making
"being" identical with the "is" in the statement, the essence of a thing
can have existence only when it has something extra, i.e., the "being"
conveyed by the "is" of the intellect. This simple formula marks out
the paradigm for all cases where language has lost hold of the human
reality. In subsequent chapters, we will explain how this paradigm for
language misusage supports hallucination, self deception and even men-
tal illness. And it is only by mounting a poetic effort that speakers
can attain an undoing or breaking up of the "is." Touching on an idea
we will take up in our next chapter, Heidegger observes a "dissolution
of the 'is' in the positing of the Will to Power with Nietzsche."[50]
But what we presently wish to stress is how through the "is" of state-
ment language breaks apart from the human reality. By disconnecting
being from the essent and placing it in the statement through the "is,"

being can only evaporate or be forgotten in the idea, and the poetic

quality of language blotted out. In expressing an independent exist-

ence of their own, the infinitive and substantive, and especially the

frame of mind presupposed in their use, do not need to look to the

lived world of experience.

Heidegger says we come to understand the substantive "to be"

through the "is." "To be" is the infinitive of "is." He says "invol-

untarily, almost as though nothing else were possible, we explain the

infinitive 'to be' to ourselves through the 'is.'"[51] Looking at this

from a Freudian point of view, we might say that "to be" is understood

"unconsciously" through the "is." A Sartrean would say that the "is"

results when a speaker refuses to consciously choose. Unfortunately,

Heidegger does not offer much in the way of a detailed structure of

consciousness and its relation to language or grammar. But if we were

to apply Heidegger's language theory to considerations of consciousness,

it would not be a far stretched inference to say that the unconscious

developed hand-in-hand with infinitives and substantives.[52] When "to

be" is explained through the "is," language and the life world of its

users have moved farthest from the authentic experience of conscious

choice and into the heights of abstraction. Language then is not able

to express what an object is, but only what is thought about it. The

change in the relation of subject to predicate brought on by the "is,"

marks a fundamental change in both the psychology of cognitive functions,

and in reality or ontology. And I think maybe the most important aim

of Heidegger's language theory is to make this point clear, since it

comes up repeatedly in different contexts. By making "being" identical

with the "is," "being" becomes identical with idea. And when being

becomes idea, things become non-entities and are no longer the standard for what is real. Here again, being has evaporated or has been forgotten.

This movement in language begun by the grammarians became exaggerated as logic. The movement of language toward abstraction became further stabilized in Aristotle's reorientation of _logos_ toward logic. The early Greek _logos_ included the experiencing of being; Aristotle's logic did not. The new logic ruined the fusion of thought with being, and made thought into an independent realm. Thought as logic was no longer able to work in the service of unconcealment. Instead, thought became the means of showing the truth or falsity in propositions. Aristotle's logic, then, further squeezed experience out of language. Heidegger says Aristotle's reinterpretation of _logos_ "was taken as a model in the subsequent development of logic and grammar. And even though grammar degenerated almost immediately into academicism, the subject itself retained its crucial importance."[53]

Aristotle's reinterpretation of _logos_ in the sense of statement "defines being on the basis of _its own_ 'is,' the 'is' of statement."[54] The logical copula "is" involves a _folding in_ or turning away from experience which is to be contrasted with the _unfolding_ or unconcealment of poetry. As an extension of the same frame of mind initiated by infinitives and substantives, the "is" brought on a further eclipse of experience, and further cancelling out of the speaker's performance (_rhēma_) in speech. Individual words (as ideas or signs) came to have an existence of their own through the logical copula "is." With the further development of logic, the "is" was given new magnitudes through the "is not" or negation, and the "is as" or simile.[55] Truth and

falsity, or affirmation and negation (as in "is" or "is not"), could

arise only _after_ the development of the "is" from infinitives and sub-

stantives. Because of the course of this process, we say it was gram-

mar that made logic possible, rather than vice versa. On the relation-

ship of grammar to logic, Northrop Frye says:

> Logic grows out of grammar, the unconscious or potential
> logic inherent in language, and we often find that the
> containing forms of conceptual thought are of grammati-
> cal origins, the stock example being the subject and
> predicate of Aristotelian logic.[56]

Frye goes on to say that even though logic developed out of grammar,

it eventually outgrew grammar and developed a life of its own.

This logic of Aristotle is based upon three laws: the law of

contradiction which says A cannot both be B and not be B; the law of

excluded middle which says A either is or is not B; and the law of

identity which says A is A. Though these laws don't readily reveal

their grammatical heritage, they have exerted a profound and direct

effect on the shaping of Western languages. One poignant example of

their effect is the _dichotomizing tendency_ that characterizes nearly

all Western thinking and speaking. The article on "Language" in the

Encyclopedia Britannica says:

> In the languages of the western world there is a great
> deal of dichotomizing. Terms are paired with meaning
> references to opposite extremes ("good"-"bad," "black"-
> "white," "clean"-"dirty," "strong"-"weak"). It has been
> observed that in western cultures generally dichotomies
> are constantly made in behaviour as well as words. A
> question arises whether dichotomizing is a general cul-
> tural habit accurately reflected in language or whether
> the linguistic habit is stimulus for the rest of the
> behaviour. Or do the two interact?[57]

Leaving aside the more difficult cultural aspects of this ques-

tion for the time being, we wish to focus on the effects of this dichot-

omizing tendency for language and experience. Particularly, how does

this dichotomizing tendency lead to a contortion or disruption of the
full flow of experience? Erich Fromm says "Language, by its words,
its grammar, its syntax, by the whole spirit which is frozen in it,
determines which experiences penetrate to our awareness."[58] Fromm
also observes a difference between the structure of language and exper-
ience in Western societies which is based upon Aristotelian logic, and
Eastern societies where he says the structure of language and experience
is based upon paradoxical logic.

> In opposition to Aristotelian logic is what one might
> call paradoxical logic, which assumes that A and non-A
> do not exclude each other as predicates of X. Paradoxi-
> cal logic was predominant in Chinese and Indian thinking,
> in Heraclitus' philosophy, and then again under the name
> of dialectics in the thought of Hegel and Marx. The
> general principle of paradoxical logic has been clearly
> described in general terms by Lao-tse: "Words that are
> strictly true seem to be paradoxical."[59]

There is a certain linguistic mentality or style of structuring experi-
ence associated with each of these kinds of thinking. In Aristotle's
logic with its law of excluded middle, a subject A either is or is not
B. This dichotomizing tendency gives rise to a set of fictive polari-
ties that do not reflect human experience. Fromm observes that one
incisive way in which such laws of logic work to bind-up experience is
demonstrated in the Freudian concept of ambivalence. As we recall,
Freud's theory of ambivalence says that a person can simultaneously
experience love and hate for another. Fromm says:

> This experience [of ambivalence], which from the stand-
> point of paradoxical logic is quite "logical," does not
> make sense from the standpoint of Aristotelian logic.
> As a result it is exceedingly difficult for most people
> to be aware of feelings of ambivalence.[60]

This repression of Western man's "illogical" feelings of course leads
to many psychological problems, and Fromm goes on to press the case for

a connection between Aristotelian logic and mental illness. We will consider the relationship between logic and mental illness in more detail in a later chapter, but let us at least understand the constipating effects for experience brought on by the development of grammar and logic.

The "is" of statement and its folding in or away from experience is expressed in a slightly different way by Kenneth Burke. In _Language as Symbolic Action_, Burke draws a distinction between what he calls "scientistic" and "dramatistic" approaches to the nature of language. He says:

> The "scientistic" approach builds the edifice of language with primary stress upon a proposition such as "It _is_, or it _is_ not." The "dramatistic" approach puts the primary stress upon such hortatory expressions as "thou _shalt_, or thou _shalt not_." And at the other extreme the distinction becomes quite obvious, since the scientistic approach culminates in the kinds of speculation we associate with symbolic logic, while the dramatistic culminates in the kinds of speculation that find their handiest material in stories, plays, poems . . . [61]

And in the way that Burke is a proponent of _Dramatism_, so Heidegger is a proponent of _being-there_. Heidegger uses the expression _Dasein_ to mean man's being there _at_ being. Heidegger says "Being-there implies an awareness of being."[62] _Dasein_, or being there, means a conscious social existence in the world. Heidegger talks of redirecting language toward the lived world of experience. He wants to restore the speaker's sense of being there, or perhaps, his sense of being in the drama. But when being becomes interpreted as idea through the "is" of statement, speaking falls away from being there. When "to be" is unconsciously explained by the copula "is," being falls into the administration of reason or _logos_ in the sense of statement. Though I think this general

comparison of Heidegger's being there to Burke's Dramatism is largely

valid, anyone who has read only a single book of Heidegger's senses

that he is often a long way from recognizing the full dramatic force

of the social encounter. Though the Dramatism of Burke and the being

there of Heidegger press for a comparable restructuring of the language

experience, Burke axiomatically says "if drama, then conflict."[63] And

Heidegger does not give enough attention to how the poetic aspects of

language and communication are disrupted (and restored) by the conflict

in human relations. We will see as we go along that one of the criti-

cisms to be made of Heidegger is that he doesn't give enough attention

to the social or rhetorical dimensions of language. But this is not

because his study of language precludes social aspects so much as it

is that his study is just incomplete. For we will see how Heidegger's

theory of poetry is able to make a compliant hook-up with our theory

of rhetoric.

But both Heidegger and Burke realize that when speech becomes

infused with the quasi-ontological strength of the "is," the structure

of language is always in danger of becoming the structure of reality.

Heidegger says that in such speech "man transposes his propositional

way of understanding things into the structure of the thing itself."[64]

As our inquiry progresses, we will see how all approaches to language

studies and usage that give strong emphasis to logic or grammar must

lead to a Platonism or realism of some sort. And with the emptying of

experience in such realist based theories of language, that which is

named is what "is." Such realist based theories of language then always

lead to a degeneration of the creative act of speaking. And for Heideg-

ger the development of infinitives and substantives is the key to this

degeneration: "[I]n the infinitive the definite meanings of the word

no longer make themselves felt; they are effaced. The word becomes a

name for something indeterminate."[65]

The results we have seen so far of Heidegger's critique of

grammar suggest how the development of grammatical forms "has produced

a blunted, indefinite meaning"[66] in the experience of being. This ex-

perience or interpretation of being as idea came as the result of

changes in the practice of thinking--changes that revealed themselves

in grammar and logic. Language is constructed out of the interaction

of thinking with being. Thinking constructs the "house of Being"

(i.e. language) out of speech. And the relationship of thinking to be-

ing determines whether or not speech is authentic. We pointed out

that in analytic philosophy, science and technology, a view of language

has been adopted where truth is a property of propositions. In analyt-

ic philosophy, being and its unconcealment is overlooked as having any

philosophical significance. In contemporary thought, being is over-

looked because of a redirection of thinking initiated by Plato and

Aristotle. In order to understand the poor craftsmanship involved in

thinking that leads to the interpretation of being as idea and the

lethargy of a language which speaks all by itself, Heidegger examines

two important words and the role they played in the evolution of Greek

language and thought. These two words are logos and physis.

Though the word logos has already been mentioned, its signifi-

cance still needs to be made more clear. If the word logos were a part

of modern English vocabularies, it would refer to what is logical, or

to what is rational or real, as opposed to what is illogical, unreal,

mythical etc. To the extent that logos relates to speech, logos would

be seen by moderns as the epistemic antidote to the incorrect or false statements of rhetoric. But Heidegger reminds us that the purpose of speech, as the early Greeks saw it, was not merely to secure logically true and correct statements. (By statements that are logically true and correct, we mean statements that support a commonly recognized body of facts that are consistent within themselves.) For the early Greeks, the purpose of speech was to make something appear, or to reveal the essence of being which is itself a part of appearance. In this way, through speech, an object is lifted out of concealment. In the act of speaking, an object is lifted out of the shadows of indistinction and is illuminated by the light of rationality. But even though it is the _logos_ that lights up the rationality of things, it needs to be stressed that it is _not_ the _logos_ that does the lifting or aims the light of rationality. These latter functions are performed by the _mythos_. It is the _mythos_ that casts the beam of light made up of the _logos_. The _mythos_ aims the light of rationality since it is involved with the initial choice to speak. Heidegger says "_Mythos_ is what has its essence in its telling."[67] For us this means that the _mythos_ has its essence in the very act of speaking. The _mythos_ then, as the act of speaking, provides a necessary assistance to the phenomenon in completing its manifestation of itself.

Heidegger thinks that modern philosophers have confused the relationship of _logos_ to _mythos_ by trying to use _logos_ against _mythos_. He says:

> The _mythos_ is that appeal of foremost and radical concern to all human beings which makes man think of what appears, what is in being. _Logos_ says the same; _mythos_ and _logos_ are not, as our current historians of philosophy claim, placed into opposition by philosophy as such; on the contrary, the early Greek thinkers (Parmenides, fragment 8)

are precisely the ones to use <u>mythos</u> and <u>logos</u> in the
same sense. <u>Mythos</u> and <u>logos</u> become separated and
opposed only at the point where neither <u>mythos</u> nor
<u>logos</u> can keep to its original nature. In Plato's
work, this separation has already taken place. His-
torians and philologists, by virtue of a prejudice
which modern rationalism adopted from Platonism,
imagine that <u>mythos</u> was destroyed by <u>logos</u>.[68]

At the hands of Plato and Aristotle, <u>logos</u> became narrowed in meaning
toward logic, and <u>mythos</u> became equated with falseness. The <u>mythos</u> or
creative act of speaking was then no longer needed where language be-
came something that was to be spoken through <u>its own</u> logic or literal
meanings.

The philosophies of Plato and Aristotle also brought on a simi-
lar changing or narrowing of <u>physis</u> toward idea. But, Heidegger says
Parmenides and the other pre-Socratic philosophers had sensed "the ex-
perience of being as <u>physis</u>."[69] For these philosophers <u>physis</u> was iden-
tical with being. For the early Greeks, the psychical, the animated
and the living all belonged to <u>physis</u>. Heidegger says:

> What does the word <u>physis</u> denote? It denotes self-
> blossoming emergence (e.g. the blossoming of a rose),
> opening up, unfolding, that which manifests itself in
> such unfolding and preserves and endures in it; in short,
> the realm of things that emerge and linger on. . . .
> <u>Physis</u> means the power that emerges and the enduring
> realm under its sway. . . . <u>Physis</u> is being itself,
> by virtue of which essents become and remain observable.[70]

As a force of poetry or language, <u>physis</u> originates in concealment and
blossoms out in unconcealment (<u>alethia</u>) within the human reality of
authentic speech. But at the hands of subsequent philosophers, Hei-
degger says there was a "narrowing of <u>physis</u> in the direction of
physics."[71] Modern science approaches reality through the study of
natural phenomena. But says Heidegger, "physis . . . is not synony-
mous with these phenomena, which today we regard as part of 'nature.'"[72]

In the modern descendant of physis, that is, the physical, man is usu-
ally taken to be just a passive observer. In contrast, physis is the
emerging life force that makes man a part of the world. Physis does
not convey the mathematization of the world that modern physics does.
Heidegger says physis is "the overpowering presence that is not yet
mastered in thought."[73] Physis has not yet been mediated by symbol or
idea. From the standpoint of our phenomenology of language then, we
might sum up the difference between physis and physics by saying that
the former is pre-linguistic and radically empirical, while the latter
is post-linguistic and radically abstract.

Heidegger says the original unity of being and thinking was
based upon the early Greek's unity of physis with logos. And the sub-
sequent separation of thought from being was based upon this above
separation of logos from physis. As the early Greeks conceived of logos
together with physis, truth was a matter of unconcealment achieved
through "the work of the word in poetry."[74] Heidegger defines the early
Greek logos as "the primal gathering principle."[75] Logos is the gather-
ing together of the essent of being. Unlike modern logic, it is a pro-
cess which includes both thinking and perception. Logos does not in-
clude the meaning or the word, except in the secondary sense that these
are partly a consequent of the gatherings of logos. Heidegger notes
how logic was developed in the schools of Plato and Aristotle. He also
notes that even though the philosophers before Plato and Aristotle had
no formally developed logic, they were not illogical. He concludes
that logic is a tool for schoolteachers, not for philosophers.[76] Prior
to the development of logic by Plato and Aristotle, logos tended to be
more closely associated with apprehension than with the mere managing

of relations among ideas. This latter function came to be assumed by logic. The turning away of logos from apprehension or gathering to the regulating of ideas already apprehended or gathered marks the transformation of logos to logic. Originally, the gathering of logos (along with the telling of mythos) had been the very incident of unconcealment. But now instead of the essent being a part of being, it has become a part of the gathering itself. With the transition of the essent from being to gathering, the process of unconcealment begins to be left out of speech, since the essent is now found ready made in the logos, which has by now become logic. Heidegger summarizes these new developments thus:

> The essent is disclosed in the logos as gathering. This is first effected in language. Consequently the logos becomes the essential determinant of discourse. Language —what is uttered and said and can be said again—is the custodian of the disclosed essent. What has once been said can be repeated and passed on. The truth preserved in it spreads, and in the process the essent originally gathered and disclosed is not each time experienced for itself. In the transmission the truth detaches itself as it were from the essent. This can go so far that the repetition becomes a mere babbling by rote, a glossa. Statement is always exposed to this danger.[77]

When language becomes abstractly oriented in this way, it forgets or disregards the origin of the essent. Heidegger says "Apprehension should so disclose the essent as to put it back in its being."[78] But the logic which results from the separation of logos from apprehension does not allow this putting back of the essent.

We can sum up the results of this brief discussion of logos and physis by noting (1) that logos has been transformed into statement thereby putting itself in the severe hands of logic, and (2), that physis has been transformed from being to idea where it is thereby also made to conform to the strict administrations of logic. In the center

of both these transformations is the change in the nature of truth from unconcealment to correction of statement. Heidegger says "The transformation of _physis_ and _logos_ into idea and statement has its inner ground in a transformation of the essence of truth from unconcealment to correctness."[79] Furthermore, this domination of logic results in the separation of thinking from being. This separation, which received its initial cleavage in the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, has dominated all of Western thinking down to the present. For these reasons, Heidegger thinks the essential story of Western language development is to be found in the philosophy of the Greeks. Based on the above discussion, it seems that one of the most distinguishing marks of poetry is that it does _not_ forget that the essent must be captured anew in each act of speaking. And this strong feeling for the pristine experience of the essent has been sensed by every great poet, if not in an explicitly expressed theory, then at least in actual practice. Goethe gave an explicit expression to this point saying "Do not look beyond the phenomena; they are the doctrine."[80] He also said: "That my perception be not separated from things . . . that my perception itself be thinking, my thinking perception."[81] In just this way, thinking must align itself with experience if it is to energize the poetic voice of unconcealment. In his book _What is Called Thinking?_, Heidegger discusses the relationship of thinking to poetry. We should be able to sense at this point that thinking is not to be equated with logic. Heidegger even asks: "Why does the traditional doctrine of thinking bear the curious title 'logic'?"[82]

Phenomenologists generally stress the non-conceptual aspects of thinking, especially when discussing the way thinking is to be related

to poetry. This thinking is of a different form from the kind of
"thinking" involved in using words as signs or designators, or in as-
sessing the logical relations among a collection of signs or designators.
This latter kind of "thinking" is carried out in conjunction with a mis-
understanding of the nature of words. In contrast, words for the poet
are not absolute or cosmically set significations. Words do not con-
tain a content that is independent or prior to their use in speech.
Heidegger says:

> Words are not terms, and thus are not like buckets and
> kegs from which we scoop a content that is there. Words
> are wellsprings that are found and dug up in the telling,
> wellsprings that must be found and dug up again and again,
> that easily cave in, but that at times also well up when
> least expected.[83]

The semantic goal of day-to-day communication and its characteristic
use of language has its basis in a correct coordination of thing with
word, or object with name. The kind of "thinking" associated with such
practices as signification or designation does not recognize the evanes-
cent character of words as wellsprings. The semantically oriented commu-
nicator wants only to scoop-out a content that is already there. But
for phenomenologists generally, thinking is not merely a matter of cor-
rectly coordinating words with objects, or assessing the logical rela-
tions among a collection of signs. And for Heidegger particularly,
thinking is a matter of exposing the unconcealed. One of his editors
says that for Heidegger "thinking is a concrete seeing and saying of the
way the world is."[84] Because the logical copula "is" gives rise to the
interpretation of being as idea, thinking cannot be just logic. With
the interpretation of being as idea, that which is to be thought about
(i.e. being) becomes forgotten or withdrawn. Therefore, since with
logic there is nothing to be thought about, there cannot be thinking.

For Heidegger, thinking is a dwelling in being, and language is the emergent product of this dwelling. As this thinking is manifested in speaking, it constructs language or the house of Being. Heidegger says thinking is "a primal telling and speaking of language."[85] And articulated speech is "the echo of [this] thinking experience [with being]."[86]

Heidegger is fond of quoting Parmenides that "One should both say and think that Being is."[87] With Parmenides, being always remained as the concrete basis of thinking. Heidegger believes that the now lost unity between being and thinking enjoyed the most perspicuous livelihood in Parmenides. With the interpretation of being as idea though in post-Platonic philosophy, thinking became subjected to the autocratic laws of logic. And Heidegger says "we shall overrate and overtax [thinking],"[88] so long as it is subject to only the demands of logic. The interpretation of being as idea and the concomitant practice of thinking only in the forms of logic has caused language to lose its hold on being. Furthermore, these practices brought on "the transformation of logic into the question of the essential nature of language."[89] Logic was able to become recognized as the backbone of language because of changes in the practice of thinking which evolved around the fourth and fifth century B.C. With Aristotle's emphasis on logos in the sense of statement, a crucial turn was made in the history of language development. Under Aristotle, logic had become the doctrine of the $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma os$ (logos). Heidegger says:

> Logic, as the doctrine of the $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma os$ [logos], considers thinking to be the assertion of something about something. According to logic, such speech is the basic characteristic of thinking. In order for such speech to be possible in the first place, the something about which something is said--the subject--and that which is said--the predicate--must be compatible in speech.[90]

In other words, for objects of experience to be recognized as valid or real, they must first conform to the logical matrix now in speech. With logic as the doctrine of the utterance, only experiences that fit into Aristotle's logical forms were expressible. And speech that would have attempted to give expression to certain "illogical" experiences (e.g. Freud's ambivalence) becomes untenable.

During this transition period, the practice of thinking seems to have been having more difficulty comprehending the growing complexity and divergence of opinions. The dissoi logoi of the sophists had pushed the intellects of many beyond their limits, and the practice of thinking may have shifted to logic as a result of a growing exasperation over efforts to deal with this radical relativism. As a general rule, it seems that strong forces of order are reactions to strong forces of disorder. When faced with the intellectual complexity of two ideas in opposition being equally viable, Aristotle and subsequent philosophers allowed thinking to completely surrender to logic. And even up to the present, it is still believed that thinking is primarily a logical process. But Heidegger makes this important observation about Aristotle's law of contradiction that cannot be overstressed: "Only because thinking is defined as $\lambda \acute{o} \gamma o s$, as an utterance, can the statement about contradiction perform its role as a law of thought."[91] Only after thinking is defined as a matter of relating subjects and predicates within propositions (as in the logos of statement) can the law of contradiction come to regulate thinking. While most modern thinking and speaking proceeds on the mistaken assumption that we can have language only because we have logic, the phenomenologist of language must stress that we can have logic (as in the law of contradiction)

only because we have language. Or perhaps more accurately, we can
have logic only when we have a misuse of thought that is possible only
through language. Heidegger wants the modern communicator to realize
that thinking, as an experiential and concrete seeing, must precede
the law of contradiction. There are no contradictions in being. Con-
tradictions can arise only when language has lost hold of being by
making ideas more important than experience. And in this whole process
language is the pivot. Only through language can thinking shift from
the experience of concrete seeing and saying to the ideology of logic
and the law of contradiction. With this modern logicized view of lan-
guage, communication takes on a less imaginative and perhaps even a
moribund character. Speaking is no longer able to be involved with what
had been its primary basis and source of energy. A new form of commu-
nication called conversation arises to replace dialogue. Heidegger
says: "Every conversation is a kind of dialogue. But true dialogue is
never a conversation. Conversation consists in slithering along the
edges of the subject matter, precisely without getting involved in the
unspoken."[92]

Essential for getting involved in the unspoken is what Heidegger
calls $\nu o\hat{\epsilon}\iota\nu$, a taking to heart.[93] For Heidegger this taking to heart
is not a sentimental idea, as it would perhaps seem to most Anglo-Ameri-
cans. It involves no excess of tender or "emotional" susceptibilities.
We could say that a taking to heart ($\nu o\hat{\epsilon}\iota\nu$) involves the poetic percep-
tion of something. This is a different form of perception from the
modern empiricist's perception as receptivity. While for these latter
empiricists perception is centered around a passive receiving of infor-
mation, Heidegger says the early Greek taking to heart ($\nu o\hat{\epsilon}\iota\nu$) also

included "the spontaneity with which we assume this or that attitude toward what we perceive."[94] In a taking to heart (νοεῖν), we do not just let come what lies before us; rather, "we take it up specifically, and do something with it."[95] Heidegger says "In receptive perception we remain passive, without the active attitude toward what is perceived. But such passive acceptance is precisely what νοεῖν does not mean."[96] The latter empiricists who were to center their investigations around perception as receptivity distorted the early Greek taking to heart, and in this distortion they enervated the spontaneity that provided the phenomenological connection of thinking with being.

But why does modern thinking and speaking preclude this spontaneity or native internal proneness of language toward being? Heidegger says that in modern language usage a taking to heart (νοεῖν) has been subsumed by the making of statements (λέγειν). Though λέγειν means to state, utter, report, or to reflect, Heidegger stresses that it does not mean to speak. Heidegger says λέγειν (to state and reflect) is the verb of the noun λόγος (statement and reflection). Though what happens in thinking cannot adequately be explained by λέγειν and λόγος, according to logic "the theory of the λόγος [logos of statement] and its λέγειν [its stating], is the theory of thinking."[97] According to logic, "thinking develops in the λέγειν [reflecting] of the λόγος [logos of statement]."[98] Modern logicized thinking consists of the reflecting (λέγειν) of the statement (λόγος) because of the distortion of a taking to heart (νοεῖν) involved in its subsumption by reflecting (λέγειν). In modern logicized thinking, a taking to heart (νοεῖν) becomes "kept within λέγειν [reflecting] . . . and unfolds out of λέγειν."[99] Instead of a taking to heart then, νοεῖν becomes a pre-rationalized apprehension based in

an already constructed language on λέγειν (reflecting) and λόγος (the

logos of statement). In its subsumption of a taking to heart (νοεῖν),

reflecting (λέγειν) brings on the transformation of perception from a

taking to heart to passive receptivity. Without the spontaneity of

νοεῖν as a taking to heart then, thinking surrenders to a reflecting

(λέγειν) of the logos of statement (λόγος). In this situation, Hei-

degger says:

> Thinking becomes the λέγειν [the reflecting] of the
> λόγος [logos] in the sense of proposition. At the
> same time, thinking becomes the νοεῖν in the sense of
> apprehension by reason. The two definitions are
> coupled together, and so determine what is henceforth
> called thinking in the Western-European tradition.
> The coupling of λέγειν and νοεῖν, as proposition
> and as reason, are distilled into what the Romans
> call ratio. [Thus,] thinking appears as what is
> rational.[100]

Because logic is made to precede language, thinking becomes a reflec-

tion of what is said, rather than what is experienced. Heidegger says

"the original nature of λέγειν and νοεῖν disappears in ratio. As

ratio assumes dominion, all relations are turned around."[101] Instead

of thinking serving as a means of constituting the proposition, the

proposition becomes the means of constituting thinking.

Though Heidegger's philological arguments are much more complex

than the brief exposition given here, we have still culled out what is

most important to our phenomenology of language. We have seen how the

investigations of language initiated by grammarians and philosophers

were based primarily on a distortion of logos. In the end though, this

logical approach dissolves language because it dissolves the house of

Being into Idea. The interpretation of being as idea is the basis of

all philosophies of language not based upon poetry, and Heidegger claims

the history of Western philosophy "is at bottom a sequence of variations

on this one theme."[102] Heidegger believes the poetic sense of experi-
encing needs to be reawakened in the twentieth century through a re-
appropriation of the Greek past. In order that language might be rein-
vigorated, Heidegger wants us to realize language as the house of Being.
For to see language as the house of Being "touches upon the nature of
language without doing it injury."[103] By seeing language as the house
of Being, awarenesses can be reshaped so as to preserve the elemental
force of speech in its relationship with experience, and to thereby re-
gain access to phenomena. We have also pointed out that a marginal com-
parison might be made between Heidegger's notion of _being there_ and
Kenneth Burke's Dramatism. Up to this point we haven't attempted any
serious criticism of Heidegger. But if we examine Heidegger's theory
of language more closely in its relationship to a rhetorical theory
like Burke's, it seems there is an important component or building
block of language that Heidegger does not take enough into account.
As we suggested in Chapter One, language is born of the _interplay_ of
its poetic and rhetorical components. Neither of these components, in
and by themselves, is sufficient to account for the genesis and devel-
opment of language. But as we have seen in our brief survey, Heidegger
does not give much attention to the communicative or rhetorical aspects
of language. Others also have criticized Heidegger for not giving
enough attention to social being. Jean-Paul Sartre criticizes the early
Heidegger's _being-with_[104] for not effectively grasping social conflict,
and Georg Lukacs criticizes Heidegger for conceiving of man as "an
ahistorical being."[105]

It seems then that to move Heidegger's theory of language closer
to completion, we must ask questions such as--What are the social forces

that cause a thing to be "unconcealed" in one way rather than another?
A purely poetic language would be free of these social or rhetorical
constraints. A physis based theory of poetry like Heidegger's even
supposes an inherent bond between the word and object. But can any
speaker ever be completely unconstrained by the socio-cultural crucible
in which he attempts to speak? And if not, under what circumstances
are speakers most and least constrained? Being there implies not only
a poetic presence, it requires a rhetorical involvement also. Being
there implies being a part of a social drama. We might say that as
Heidegger stresses our poetic presence in language and reality, Burke
stresses our rhetorical presence. In A Rhetoric of Motives,[106] Burke
observes how images are related to poetry in the way that ideology is
related to rhetoric. As poetry is the voice of the image, so rhetoric
is the voice of ideology. We should think of images here as loosely
fitting together and not conflicting with each other. Since poetry is
language used to expose or unconceal something, and since such exposure
and unconcealment precedes logic, poetry as unconcealment cannot be
permanently or absolutely set, i.e., it cannot be an ideology. In con-
trast, the result of rhetorical language is to intellectually lock-up
its auditors within a certain perspective. While poetic language aims
at increasing our perceptions and perspectives of something through a
flood of images, rhetorical language aims at decreasing or eliminating
perceptions and perspectives through an imaginatively lethargic ideolo-
gy. In subsequent chapters we will see how this view of images versus
ideology comfortably comports with our discussion of Heidegger. It can
almost readily be inferred that in Heidegger's view rhetorical language
would be the result of interpreting being as idea. As Heidegger thinks

of poetic language as the house of Being, so we want to think of rhe-
torical language as the house of Ideology.

It is perhaps because Heidegger does not see the necessity of
including ideology in his language theory that he does not see the ne-
cessity of including rhetoric. But the linguistic movements surround-
ing grammar and logic which Heidegger depicts _must_ include rhetoric.
Northrop Frye says:

> [T]he direct union of grammar and logic . . . does
> not, in the long run, exist. Anything which makes
> a functional use of words will always be involved
> in all the technical problems of words, including
> rhetorical problems. The only road from grammar
> to logic, then, runs through the intermediate ter-
> ritory of rhetoric.[107]

Though we agree with Frye, we will still modify this view in two ways:
As a "road" or connecting link between grammar and logic, we will em-
phasize rhetoric as a _way_ of language or a tendency, rather than a
place or "territory." Our phenomenology of language will also con-
tend that the road from the origins of language to grammar is likewise
a rhetorical road. The road to grammar and subsequently to logic is a
rhetorical road on which the experience of being is transported to the
idea. In attempting to show how language might be freed of ideology,
Heidegger is attempting to show how language might be freed of rhetoric.
But again, the essential question that must be put squarely before Hei-
degger is whether there can be an ideologically or rhetorically purified
language. Doesn't the mere use of words (even prior to the rise of in-
finitives, substantives and the whole attitude toward language of which
these are indicative) require conceptualization or idealization in some
sense? Also, we would want Heidegger to give more attention to the
Marxist theory that language develops according to forms of social

organization. Language presupposes society just as society presupposes language. To a large extent, language itself is a system of social relations. Picking up then where Heidegger's theory of language leaves off, we will try to carry forward the movement of some of his themes. But in our next chapter, we will first try to see how and for what reasons rhetoric should be considered as the counterpart of poetic.

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III. LANGUAGE AS MUSIC AND IDEOLOGY

[Poetry is] a rhetorical idea presented in music.--Dante[1]

All language is mind. It is a verbal melody which pre-
supposes an intellectual vigilance. But the mind that
governs language is not mind for itself; it is paradoxi-
cally a mind that possesses itself only by losing itself
in language.--Maurice Merleau-Ponty[2]

The basic ingredients of rhetoric flow necessarily from the
structure of language. Perhaps nowhere in modern philosophy has this
view been presented more originally and forcefully than in the writings
of Friedrich Nietzsche. While for Heidegger language in its most essen-
tial sense is poetry, we will try to show that for Nietzsche the most
essential sense of language is in rhetoric. In Nietzsche's view, the
development of rhetoric was an attempt to extend order over. the spon-
taneous and rhythmical outbursts of emotion and imagination that orig-
inally characterized man's attempt to speak. Rhetoric developed with
man's attempt to give excessive rationalizations about the world at the
expense of his musical or Dionysian existence. Such an interpretation
of Nietzsche's view and the development of rhetoric would not be whol-
ly disagreeable to Heidegger. If Nietzsche means that language after
the rise of Platonic philosophy is essentially rhetorical (and we will
try to show that he does), he is offering a view of language that could
easily blend with or even compliment Heidegger's. And if given a chance
to mull over Heidegger's arguments, Nietzsche would probably accept the
view that when language was forced to swallow grammar (the pill of rea-
son), it choked, or at least badly coughed. In The Gay Science, Nietz-
sche himself even talks about "epistemologists who have become entangled
in the snares of grammar (the metaphysics of the people)," and in Beyond

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Good and Evil he talks about "the unconscious domination" of "grammatical functions" in philosophy.[3] At any rate, both Nietzsche and Heidegger see the rise of Platonic philosophy as having a pivotal importance on the way thinking and speaking evolved in Western civilization. Both see the rise of philosophy as marking a lamentable decline of poetry. But Nietzsche gives us a clearer picture of how these developments led to the growth of rhetoric, and for this reason our discussion in this chapter will center around his theories.

There is another concern we should be aware of in trying to understand the language theory of Nietzsche. Because most of his books are moving on several different levels at once, Nietzsche's thinking on poetic and rhetoric often seems to run through his writings in only a very shadowy sort of way. Language, aesthetics, morality and science are usually inextricably involved in all of his writings. Because Nietzsche may have nothing less than an obvious obsession for nailing down a sound vision of poetic theory, some may think that his rhetorical theory then gets left in the umbra of what is usually perceived as a more primary concern for poetry. But this neglect of his rhetorical theory may be caused in part by the kind of emphasis given to his writings by Walter Kaufmann and other popular commentators who haven't yet accepted the new significance given to rhetoric by Kenneth Burke and others. The neglect of Nietzsche's rhetorical theory may also be caused by the infrequency with which the word "rhetoric" is mentioned in his writings. (I counted it only twice in six books.) But nonetheless, Nietzsche does have quite a bit to say about rhetorical theory for the reader who wants a more comprehensive understanding of his poetic theory, and especially for the reader looking for the missing thread to

tie together the whole of his language theory.

When Nietzsche was in his mid-twenties he wrote his first book, The Birth of Tragedy. Ostensibly this book is about the genesis, growth and decline of Greek tragedy. But like his other works, this book has parallel discussions on language, science etc. It is these latter that we want to cull out and give focus to. Whatever the ostensible subject of The Birth of Tragedy, it contains Nietzsche's most explicit statement about language. And for the purpose of giving clarity to our present discussion, it will be helpful to have a summary of The Birth of Tragedy before us, since the seedling premises of Nietzsche's whole argument about language seem to have been spawned in this first book. In The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche says that tragic art, or art and life in general, are the result of the continuous interplay of two opposing tendencies within the creative life of man "--just as procreation depends on the duality of the sexes, involving perpetual strife with only periodically intervening reconciliations."[4] These two opposing creative tendencies are the Apollinian and the Dionysian, or dreams and intoxication. The Apollinian world, or dream world, is the world of appearances. It is the world of concepts and logical thought; it is the impulse behind the act of making distinctions in thought, what Nietzsche calls the "principle of individuation;"[5] or it is the very impulse behind language as rhetoric. The Dionysian world, or the primordial world of music, is the world of chaos and reality upon which the Apollinian casts its spell of appearances. Through the use of logic and language, the Apollinian attempts to impose order on chaos, and to infuse meaning and determinism into what might otherwise seem as directionless energy or effort.

In Greek tragedy, Nietzsche says the Dionysian impulse was

exerted by the chorus, while the Apollinian was exerted by the stage characters. The aesthetic superiority Nietzsche sees in Greek tragedy was based upon the edifying agreement reached by the Apollinian and Dionysian tendencies. In the tragedies of Aeschylus and Sophocles, these tendencies reached their peak of harmonious interplay. With the plays of these two authors, Apollinian order was imposed on the Dionysian urge in such a way that the dream world of the scene augmented the poetry and music of the chorus. But Greek tragedy began to decline when this essential ratio of Apollinian and Dionysian instincts was upset. Nietzsche says that in the plays of Euripides the dream world of the scene was exaggerated at the expense of the Dionysian urge. Showing an iconoclastic attitude toward myths and gods, Euripides developed the logical facets of action. According to Nietzsche, there was an effort in Euripides' plays to make things more intuitively appealing. One criticism sometimes made of The Birth of Tragedy is that Nietzsche doesn't include any comparative documentation from the plays of Euripides and the others to support his claim. This is perhaps an unfair criticism since Nietzsche says his book is to be understood with an "immediate certainty of vision."[6] It would take us too far afield to enter into a debate with classical scholars on this matter. But for the purpose of giving at least some clarity to how Nietzsche thinks Euripides developed the logical facets of action, we might compare Euripides' version of the scene where Electra recognizes her long unseen brother Orestes with that of Aeschylus. In Aeschylus' play, Electra recognizes Orestes by a hardly plausible footprint and lock of hair. In Euripides' play, Electra recognizes Orestes by a scar on his forehead. Euripides' recognition scene is not only more logically satisfying than Aeschylus'

(or poetically dissatsifying according to Nietzsche), but to even strengthen his argument Euripides has his Electra say that Orestes could not be identified by a mere footprint, as if to refute Aeschylus. As we move through our study, we will see how Euripides' development of logical argument led to the evolution of tragedy toward melodrama.

Through this development of the logical facets of the play, Euripides transported the spectator's attention on to the stage, and thereby severed the Apollinian dream world of the scene from the Dionysian poetry and music of the chorus. The chorus had allowed the spectator to enter into the selfless and primordial world of Dionysia. But by stressing the role of the actor, by arousing our logical sensibilities, and by transporting the spectator on to the stage, Euripides created an identification of the actor with the spectator that ruined the aesthetic experience of Greek tragedy. We should recall here that the word identification is used by Kenneth Burke[7] to distinguish rhetoric from poetry. Identification, Burke insists, is the watchword for rhetoric. With his stress on logic Euripides had made possible better analytical understanding, but only at the expense of expression, or only at the sacrifice of poetry itself. Nietzsche says Euripides "sought out a new language and a new tone" that had as its main feature an "Apollinian precision and lucidity."[8] Euripides shifted the involvement of the spectator from one of experiencing to one of engaging in rational thought.[9] This shift resulted in a destruction of the aesthetic experience, since "So long as the spectator has to figure out the meaning of this or that person, or the presuppositions of this or that conflict of inclinations and purposes, he cannot become completely

absorbed in the activities and suffering of the chief characters or feel breathless pity and fear."[10]

The aesthetically sensitive spectator has a different kind of involvement with the play from the philosopher or Euripidean spectator. For the aesthetically sensitive spectator, "the whole divine comedy of life, including the inferno, also pass before him, not like mere shadows on a wall—for he lives and suffers with these scenes—and yet not without that fleeting sensation of illusion."[11] Regarding the philosopher or the spectator in a Euripidean play, Nietzsche says "Knowledge kills action; action requires the veils of illusion."[12] The essence of action is in part veiled in illusion, and these veils can be supplied only by the Apollinian tendency when it is functioning harmoniously with the Dionysian urge. But in the plays of Euripides, "The Apolli- nian tendency has withdrawn into the cocoon of logical schematism,"[13] and cannot have a fruitful exchange of influences with the Dionysian urge. The Euripidean character then becomes taken up with the contem- plation of "excess possibilities [and] does not get around to action."[14] In contrast to the Euripidean character, Nietzsche points to Hamlet as an example of a Dionysian man of action whose imagination is not stifled by the lethargy of logic. Because of his action, Hamlet is able to prevent identification with the spectator. In Greek tragedy though, character development had not yet reached the complex level it did in Shakespeare. Because of the simplicity of their characters, the Greek plays were perhaps more readily disposed toward the prosaic. Conse- quently Greek tragedy needed the involvement of a chorus to prevent identification, or to keep Apollinian language (i.e. rhetoric) fruit- fully entangled with the Dionysian urge. In the end, Nietzsche says

"ancient tragedy was diverted from its course by the dialectical de-
sire for Knowledge."[15] The birth of reason was the death of tragedy.

In Classical Greece, Socrates was the chief proponent of phi-
losophy as rational thought through his theory of Forms or Ideas.
These Forms or Ideas were immutable archetypes which insured the order
and intelligibility of the world. They existed a priori outside the
sensible world and were inaccessable to the Dionysian man of action.
In defying chaos and Dionysia, the Forms or Ideas were at the very
foundation of language or the rhetorical impulse. For Nietzsche this
only means they are at the foundation of drawing "just boundaries" that
have a "deceptive distinctness."[16] The Forms or Ideas displayed in
the most basic way the tendency of language to freeze events or Diony-
sian experience into concepts. According to Socrates, these Forms or
Ideas were accessable only to the man of reason. And for Socrates
reason was the gateway to knowledge, while tragic art addressed itself
to "those who are not very bright."[17] Nietzsche contends this "Socratic
demon" spoke to us through the plays of Euripides, and that Socrates
even helped Euripides write his plays.[18] Because of this Socratic in-
fluence in Euripides' plays, "the virtuous hero must be a dialectician."[19]
Euripides gave his audience the theatrical unfolding of the Socratic
dictum "To be beautiful everything must be intelligible."[20] And, "With
this canon in his hands, Euripides measured all the separate elements
of the drama--language, characters, dramaturgic structure, and choric
music--and corrected them according to this principle."[21] In this way,
the Socratic demon spoke through Euripides, making him the poet of aes-
thetic Socratism. Because of identification, "The spectator now actu-
ally saw and heard his double on the Euripidean stage, and rejoiced that

he could talk so well. . . .[F]rom him the people have learned how
to observe, debate and draw conclusions according to the rules of art
and with the cleverest sophistries."[22]

    This theme of Euripides as a teacher of rhetoric has been ex-
plored more recently in Friedrich Solmsen's. book, Intellectual Experi-
ments of the Greek Enlightenment.[23] Solmsen thinks that in Euripides'
plays the art of persuasion reaches a new level of refinement. He be-
lieves that it is only for the first time in the plays of Euripides
that we are able to see speakers making use of cleverly calculated
strategies that lead the audience to an end the speaker may elect to
keep hidden from them. With Euripides working as an agent of Socrates,
there evolved a new form of thinking and speaking that has persisted in
different variations down to the present. In the most general form,
the reader should see developing here an argument against philosophy
as rational thought that parallels our theme in Chapter Two. He should
also be seeing a developing similarity between rhetoric and philosophy
as rational thought. Nietzsche thinks that philosophy as rational
thought was begun by Socrates and has persisted to the present in var-
ious forms such as science or even Christianity. In Beyond Good and
Evil he declares that "Christianity is Platonism for 'the people.'"[24]
Regarding this development of philosophy as rational thought, he says
"since Socrates, this mechanism of concepts, judgments, and inferences
has been esteemed as the highest occupation and the most admirable gift
of nature, above all other capacities."[25] With the domination of Soc-
rates, philosophy as rational thought became inextirpably established
in Western societies.

    In any such societies where philosophy as rational thought plays

the most important role in discerning the life-world, there will be
the highest value placed upon epistemological considerations. In such
post-Socratic societies, illusions and myths are seen as patently false,
and sometimes seen even as immoral. This "falseness" of illusions and
myths is based upon the separation of mythos and logos described in
Chapter Two. With this separation, there then develops the tendency
in argument to "expose myths." In the present society dominated by
science and technology, consider how many books or articles are entitled
"The Myth of . . . " as a way of arguing against something, or dis-
approving by dis-proving. In contemporary argument, every speaker or
writer wants to "expose the myths" surrounding his subject. There are
feminists who want to "expose the myths" about rape, churchmen who want
to "expose the myths" about abortion, oil men who want to "expose the
myths" about how much money they make, etc. But Nietzsche thinks it's
important to have myths (though this should not be taken to mean that
he would condone rape, abortion or economic plunder). He says "without
myth every culture loses the healthy natural power of its creativity."[26]
He also says that "Through tragedy the myth attains its most profound
content, its most expressive form."[27] From the phenomenological point
of view, it is important not to focus on the truth content of one myth
vis-a-vis the truth content of another. Phenomenologically, it is
more important to focus on one style of believing vis-a-vis another
style. In The Ethics of Rhetoric, Richard Weaver makes the interesting
point that a person's "method of argument"[28] or style of argument will
be a better index of what he believes and how he sees the world, than
will be his explicitly proclaimed principles. This is exactly the
point Nietzsche is making about myth: A style of believing is a better

measure of aesthetic or poetic worth than the content of a belief. As far as tragic art or poetry in general is concerned, it is not of primary importance whether a belief is "true" or "false"--the sort of distinction Socrates or Aristotle would have us make. Most important to the growth of poetry is whether there is a style of believing that will allow for the fullest expression of the Dionysian urge. And myth promotes this style or quality of experience not accessable through rational thought. We will hope to make clear as we go along as to what this style of believing consists.

We should also make the point that Nietzsche considered philosophy as rational thought as itself a myth. Moreover, he considered it as the ultimate form of deception. But rational thought is not an acceptable myth for tragic art precisely because it is a myth that attempts to immolate its mythical status. It is a lie that denies its status as a lie. Unlike other myths, rational thought contains within it a cryptic contrivance by means of which it gives to itself a complete disguise as non-myth. Rational thought always comes back or recoils only upon itself in an internal validity, rather than reaching beyond itself to give shape or form to the Dionysian urge. By increasing the logical sophistication of the dialogue in his plays, Euripides buried within rational argument what some existentialists might call initial choice, i.e., the point at which rational thought comes in contact with irrationality, or the point at which Apollo becomes fruitfully entangled with Dionysia. Nietzsche says though "Socrates might be called the typical non-mystic, in whom, through a hypertrophy, the logical nature is developed as excessively as instinctive wisdom is in the mystic, . . . the logical urge that became manifest in Socrates was absolutely prevented

from turning against itself"[29] [my italics]. The logic of Socrates was able to redound only to its own idealistic sense of reality.

For Nietzsche, myths by themselves are neither false nor insidious. His view is that thinking and speaking become insidious when through the ruse of rational thought a communicator (whether in an exchange with himself or another) attempts to pass off rational thought as unmythical. And as we move through our study it will be realized how the attempt to pass off rational thought as unmythical is one of the central themes uniting the communication phenomenologies of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre and Marx. In Heidegger the attempt to pass off rational thought as unmythical is carried out by interpreting being as idea and by attempting to make language speak through a logic of its own. In Sartre also the attempt to pass off rational thought as unmythical will be equated with the attempt to make speech into a language which speaks by itself. In Sartre, the attempt of the speaker to hide his freedom from himself is based upon an attempt to hide the poetic-mythical contents of language. And as we will see in Marx, the attempt to pass off rational thought as unmythical is identical with the attempt of the ruling class to pass off its ruling ideas as facts.

To make all the above more clear, we want to better understand the role Nietzsche gives to music in the structuring of language. The full title of Nietzsche's book is The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music. Language is based upon the two experiential polarities of music and ideology. As it becomes manifested through the act of speaking, language will typically involve the leaping of a spark between these two poles. Nietzsche's theory of poetry and rhetoric is based upon a view of language as music and ideology. He says "we may discriminate

between two main currents in the history of the language of the Greek people, according to whether their language imitated the world of image and phenomenon or the world of music."[30] Prior to Euripides and Socrates, Nietzsche thinks that language tended to have a stronger affinity with music than with ideology. We should add though that in its more general aspects this view is not original with Nietzsche. In his "Essay on the Origin of Languages,"[31] Rousseau explains how music and speech were once one in the same, and that their subsequent separation resulted in a degeneration of both. Rousseau says that during the generations of Socrates and Plato, Greece was full of philosophers, "though she no longer had any famous musicians or poets."[32] Bridging the language interests of Nietzsche and Heidegger, Rousseau says music and poetry had sunk to a lower order because of a new fascination with grammar. With the development of grammar, he says:

> To the degree that language improved [in clarity, precision, etc.], melody, being governed by new rules, imperceptibly lost its former energy, and the calculus of intervals was substituted for nicety of inflection. • • • Thus melody, originally an aspect of discourse, imperceptibly assumes a separate existence and music becomes more independent of speech. That is also when it stopped producing the marvels it had produced when it was merely the accent and harmony of poetry and gave to it the power over the passions that speech subsequently exercised only on reason.[33]

By understanding the relationship of music to speech, we can better understand the frontiers where poetry and rhetoric overlap. We can also better understand how poetry and rhetoric differ. The use of poetic language involves an intentional or conscious effort to absorb and give expression to the energy of music. Rhetoric is also able to make use of certain elements of music, particularly rhythm. But as we will show, rhetoric always involves a contortion of the essential nature of music.

Poetry resembles music in that both attempt to avoid the use of concepts or ideas. Nietzsche says poetry is like music in that it "does not need the image and the concept, but merely endures them as accompaniments."[34] By itself, "Language can never adequately render the cosmic symbolism of music."[35] Since language as rhetoric is founded upon the Apollinian tendency toward order and making distinctions in thought, it can never be, like music, "an immediate copy of the will itself."[36] Images, however, have a closer association with music than do words or ideas. The development or evolution of language leads away from music and images toward words and ideas, i.e., toward rhetoric. Here we also have in a general form Nietzsche's view of the sequence of events in the speech act. Describing this development of language in a later work, The Will to Power, Nietzsche says: "In the beginning images. . . . Then words, applied to images. Finally concepts, possible only when there are words."[37] Though music does not have the clarity and precision of words and ideas, Nietzsche still thinks music provides us with a better index of reality. In The Birth of Tragedy, he says: "This deep relation which music has to the true nature of all things also explains the fact that suitable music played to any scene, action, event or surrounding seems to disclose to us its most secret meaning, and appears as the most accurate and distinct commentary upon it."[38] And later in The Will to Power, he says: "Compared with music, communication by means of words is a shameless mode of procedure; words reduce and stultify; words make impersonal; words make common that which is uncommon."[39] Poetry is superior to rhetoric as a means of communication because it attempts to give visual or linguistic symbolization to music. Poetry then springs from a fruitful competition of music with

words and ideas; or as Dante says in our caption, poetry is "a rhetor-
ical idea presented in music." Nietzsche observes how in poetry "lan-
guage is strained to its utmost that it may imitate music."[40] In poet-
ry, language is strained to reach back toward being (Heidegger) or to-
ward the becoming (Nietzsche) of the primordial Dionysian will.

For the purpose of giving clarity to the discussion on the next
few pages, let us offer the standard definitions to these four elements
of music. Rhythm: the pattern of occurrence of beats, accents, etc.
Tone: any sound considered with reference to its quality or pitch.
Harmony: the agreeable combination of tones. Melody: the particular
succession or order of tones. Both harmony and melody have tones as
their basic building blocks. And of these four elements of music,
rhythm is the least intricately related to the others, while tone is
essentially involved in both harmony and melody.

The Apollinian tendency reveals itself in music through rhythm.
From rhythm music derives much of its form and suggestiveness. The or-
ator, of course, also makes use of rhythm to secure a collective release
of symbolic effects among his listeners. While rhetoric and un-Dionysian
music tend to stress rhythm, Dionysian music tends to stress tones as
they manifest themselves in melody and harmony. Nietzsche observes how
un-Dionysian music even tries to exclude tones: "The very element which
forms the essence of Dionysian music (and hence of music in general) is
carefully excluded as un-Apollinian--namely, the emotional power of the
tone, the uniform flow of melody, and the utterly incomparable world of
harmony."[41] As we have described him above, Euripides was not an ex-
ample of what Nietzsche calls "the tone poet."[42] With his "thoroughly
unmusical nature," Euripides was not able to incite "the symbolic

intuition of Dionysian universality."[43] The logic of Euripides drove
music and poetry out of speech "with the scourge of its syllogisms."[44]
In a similar fashion, rhythm has developed to become the scourge of
music. This atrophy of melody and harmony is apparent in rock music,
for instance, with its hard driving rhythms. In The Gay Science,
Nietzsche says "When the proper tension and harmony of the soul had
been lost, one had to dance, following the singer's beat."[45]

Harmony and melody (i.e. tones) are the most artistically edi-
fying elements of music precisely because the effects they have on
listeners are sharply contrasted with the effects of rhythm. Though
rhythm would ordinarily be thought to have no functional relationship
with logic, we wish to suggest that the phenomenological effects of
rhythm on a listener are in some important ways similar to those of
logic. Just like speech that features logic, music that features rhythm
tends to suppose man as a fixed point, rather than as an ongoing living
process. Like the logic of the philosopher, rhythm produces an Apolli-
nian consciousness, or more modernly a self consciousness which veils
Dionysian universality. Nietzsche says "the development of speech and
the development of consciousness (not of reason, but of reason becoming
self-conscious) go hand in hand."[46] Music with poignant rhythms, like
speech with poignant logics, is able to paint only the particular psy-
chological situation of a particular individual. We want to stress
the similarity of rhythm to logic beacuse of the way both foster an
introversion or a withdrawal from Dionysian universality. And Nietzsche
says "nothing is so much deception as this inner world."[47]

To explain first the connection rhythm has with introversion,
let me ask the reader to consider his own state of mind if he were to

allow himself to be swept-up in the clapping and chanting of a rock concert, a political rally, a religious crusade, etc. The marches of the political rally, like the clapping to hymns that is a part of some hard-sell religions, produce a tempest of emotions that can be felt only privately. Through the stirrings of rhythm audience members become, as it were, deductively locked into a particular conclusion or course of action. We have already seen in Chapter Two how logic involves a locking-in of certain internal awarenesses. This is the same effect produced by rhythm. Seeming to have been influenced by Nietzsche's study of music, Christopher Caudwell says "Rhythm, because it shouts aloud the dumb processes of the body's secret life and negates the indifferent goings-on of the external universe, makes the hearer sink deep down into himself in a physiological introversion. . . . When man invented rhythm, it was the expression of his dawning self-consciousness which had separated itself out from nature."[48] In comparing rhythm to the other elements of music, Caudwell goes on to say: "Rhythm is the feeling of a man; melody the feeling of _Man_. Harmony is the feeling of _men_."[49] The movement of music away from harmony and melody toward rhythm involves a passage from Dionysian universality to Apollinian individuality. But this new found individuality is not an object of praise for Nietzsche. As we will explain shortly, this is not the individuality of the "overman;" it is the pathological individuality of the self-conscious or alienated man.

The language of this pathological man became more abstract or rhetorical as it did away with the tonality and universality of music. When music was uprooted and cast out of speech, it took the above four elements with it, but it left un-Dionysian _rhythm_ for the use of the

newly developing orator. In ancient public address, orators seem to have made more _explicit_ use of rhythm than their modern counterparts. For example, in _The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World_,[50] George Kennedy says that some Roman orators would keep a beat by stomping the foot or slapping the thigh. In modern communications a night club singer may stomp his foot or slap his thigh to keep a beat, but never a public speaker. It was perhaps because of their chronological closeness to the separation of music from speech that ancient orators were able to make such an explicit use of rhythm. Speakers at this time may have still felt some primordial association with music. But though the contemporary orator's use of rhythm may be less ostentatious and explicit, we do not mean to imply that his speech is even potentially less rhetorically effective.

The rhythm originally of poetry and music did _not_ remain unchanged as it was made use of by rhetoricians. But how else did this rhythm manifest itself besides in pretentious show? We would like to suggest that some of these rhythmic aspects of speech as rhetoric became transmuted into _figures_. We might consider as examples of this transmutation the use of rhythm made by _repetition_ or _climax_, or the use of rhythm in the balanced phrasing of _antithesis_. As a part of the "calculus of intervals" (Rousseau) that arose to replace melody and harmony, rhythm came to be involved in regulating the structural aspects of speech as a force in alliance with Heidegger's grammar. Because it promoted an _introversion_, rhythm supported the interpretation of being as _idea_. In modern rhetoric then, part of the decomposed corpse of music remained in speech, but only in the form of rhetorical figures, emphatic gestures and grammar. But in spite of these abuses suffered

by speech and music at the hands of Socrates and others, Nietzsche's view is still that the essential nature of speech as music can never be completely extirpated from the act of speaking. As a manifestation of the Dionysian tendency, music is a part of the irreducible foundation of life itself. What happened to speech in the hands of Socrates and others was only a contortion of the speech process. With rhythm, logic and the other trismic trappings of the new speech, the speaking man was only silenced, not killed.

The Dionysian vision had been covered up by rhythm, rational thought, or what might more generally be referred to as the rhetorical process of Apollinian consciousness. And only through the development of this Apollinian consciousness were myths and illusions in their present form as anti-facts able to evolve. Given this view of the structure of language as it has been explained thus far, it should be realized that myths and illusions are not just occasional divergences in our thinking and speaking; rather, they are the very backbone of linguistic life. Considered by themselves, there is nothing deceptive about myth and illusion. But when a speaker uses language without a clear conception of how his literal meanings are themselves myths and illusions, we then have deception, and especially, self deception. We have deception when the natural metaphorical process of thinking and speaking is disrupted or forgotten, and the artificial steps of rational thought are put in its place. Hans Vaihinger[51] in "Nietzsche and His Doctrine of Conscious Illusion" and Ruediger H. Grimm[52] in his very fine Nietzsche's Theory of Knowledge are among the few commentators to give a strong emphasis to these aspects of Nietzsche's conscious will to illusion, and its relation to the rational thought of the language process.

Nietzsche believes that language arises out of the need for a feeling of permanence. This need for permanence arises within us by virtue of thinking itself. Logic and science then came along to further this need for a feeling of permanence by exacerbating the original inclination to think in words and concepts. In The Will to Power Nietzsche goes so far as to say that "We cease from thinking if we do not wish to think under the control of language."[53] He apparently would have rejected Heidegger's notion of concrete thinking that has an experiential focus, though it should be clear that he and Heidegger are reacting to the same problem of language's illegitimate participation in the shaping of experience. Nietzsche believes the sense of permanence as reality is gotten at by taking the Apollinian world of words and ideas (as they are developed in rational thinking) and attempting to substitute them for the primordial and chaotic world of Dionysia. The original attempt at substitution was made by Socrates in the theory of Forms. In traditional philosophy this substitution is found in the theory of adequation, and more modernly in the correspondence theory of truth as in semanticism. But words can never be an adequate substitution for the reality they are supposed to represent. No truth can be permanently possessed in words. Grimm observes how in Nietzsche's epistemology "the traditional valid-in-all-cases concept of truth is simply dissolved."[54] Truth is not something we can absolutely possess by using words that "correspond" to reality. Nietzsche says "We never come across a single 'fact.'"[55] The thought that produces facts is not a way of attaining Knowledge; it is "a means of designating, arranging and manipulating events for our use."[56] He even goes to the extreme of maintaining that "'Thinking,' as the epistemologists understand it,

never takes place at all: it is an absolutely gratuitous fabrication, arrived at by selecting one element from the process and by eliminating all the rest—an artificial adjustment for the purpose of understanding."[57]

Why exactly then is the substitution of words for objects in the act of thinking so deceiving? Because words always involve this substitution of one part of a thing for the whole. This substitution in turn gives rise to the notion that the word as idea has an independent existence of its own. Nietzsche says:

> Every idea originates through equating the unequal. As certainly as no one leaf is exactly similar to any other, so certain is it that the idea "leaf" has been formed through an arbitrary omission of these individual differences, through a forgetting of the differentiating qualities, and this idea now awakens the notion that in nature there is, besides the leaves, a something called the "leaf," perhaps a primal form according to which all leaves were woven, drawn, accurately measured, colored, crinkled, painted, but by unskilled hands, so that no copy had turned out correct and trustworthy as a true copy of the primal form.[58]

Such words or ideas as the leaf are arrived at by creating identifications within the diversified elements of experience. As the act of creating identifications, language then is to be understood as essentially a rhetorical process. Thinking in words and ideas is a falsifying operation because it involves a turning away from the particular elements of experience, and erroneously equating such elements with a word or idea. The subsequent substitution of the word or idea for the experience means that we experience the world through a language or rhetoric that is "spun out of intellectual errors."[59] Since thinking involves the equating of unequals through the process of substitution, Nietzsche considers thinking as a form of deception. And since we are socially oriented creatures who must use language, thinking is a forced

form of deception Nietzsche calls "lying in the extra-moral sense,"[60] or the forcing of an illusion upon oneself through the use of words and ideas. He says "the world of which we can become conscious [then] is only a superficial and symbolic world, a generalized and vulgarised world."[61]

It is a fair surmise to say that for Nietzsche the best way to characterize the process of the conceiving being is invention. We say this by way of observing that invention is a canon of rhetoric. But we are not saying that invention is merely a way of creating lines of argument to be used upon others. Invention is also the process whereby we create lines of argument to be used upon ourselves. Intrapersonal communication is shaped by the same forms and procedures as interpersonal communication. These same above epistemic impediments encountered when attempting to argue or communicate with others are encountered when attempting to argue or communicate with oneself. Nietzsche is the first language theorist since Gorgias to so radically deny the communicability of truth.

Thinking and speaking based upon rational thought is the process of forcing conceptual constructions upon Dionysian reality. Thinking and speaking then become a form of coercion where we force and deceive ourselves and others into seeing certain things and into not seeing certain others. Nietzsche says "Rational thought is a process of interpreting according to a scheme which we cannot reject."[62] And it is the Socratic man of reason or the philosopher who makes the most frequent and beguiling use of this process. The theorizing of these rational thinkers is an arbitrary intellectual packaging used in a mis-directed attempt at presenting the primordial world of Dionysian reality. The

linguistic world of the rational thinker is a simplified and artificial world invented and adjusted to meet his own needs. Again, there can be no such things as "facts." There are only perspectives and interpretations that are based upon a speaker's imposition of language upon Dionysian reality. Facts are the result of experience that has been "mummified" in the intellect. Facts are rhetorically developed words or ideas that have ossified in the intellect as literal meanings. Nietzsche thinks of science as "the cemetery of perceptions."[63] Through the ruse of rational thought, perceptions that have withered become preserved or embalmed as facts.

Facts then are not real, and Nietzsche would perhaps chuckle at the strong tendency in contemporary argument to playoff "the facts" against myths. In both the language theories of Nietzsche and Heidegger, it is not ontologically possible to use facts to refute myths, since both facts and myths ultimately hold their tenure in existence through the fancy of the imagination. The tendency in argument to use facts against myths serves mostly to confound, not confute. Facts themselves are ultimately based upon metaphors. Grimm observes: "We might say that for Nietzsche, an alleged statement of fact about reality is actually nothing more than a statement about how our linguistic metaphors relate to one another."[64] A statement of fact is based upon a speaker's own personalized fictions or metaphors. Nietzsche says "To know is merely to work with one's favourite metaphors."[65] Metaphor is at the foundation of each person's thinking and speaking because "The construction of metaphors is the fundamental instinct of man."[66] "That impulse toward the formation of metaphors [is the] fundamental impulse of man, which we cannot reason away for one moment--for thereby we should reason away man himself."[67]

Metaphor is the first element of speech to emerge out of the nephelometric fog of perceptions. Nietzsche believes the whole phenomenon of speech is based upon a metaphorical adaption of perception. He sees these "metaphors of perception . . . pouring forth as a fiery liquid out of the primal faculty of human fancy."[68] Describing this metaphorical transformation of perceptions as it occurs through the speech act, he says: "A nerve stimulus, first transformed into a percept! First metaphor! The percept again copied into a sound! Second metaphor!"[69] The speech sound then is a metaphor of a metaphor of perception. The speech act always involves this imbricative positing of a metaphor on top of another metaphor. While most philosophers with their penchant for the true and the logical would be rankled by this prominent role of metaphor in speech and perception, Nietzsche is not. He believes that human beings must have these fictions and illusions in order to live.

What nettles Nietzsche, though, is the rational thinker who corrupts this metaphorical process of speech and perception. The rational thinker destroys any possible integrity of speech and perception because he "forgets that the original metaphors of perception are metaphors, and takes them for the things themselves."[70] The rational thinker transmutes the metaphor into an idea or concept, resulting in the denigration of experience Nietzsche so strongly protests against. All facts and literal meanings are based upon this "resolving a perception into an idea."[71] Though we will discuss the relation of passions and desires to logic more fully in later chapters, let us state Nietzsche's belief that the rapid interaction of passions and desires intervening in the perceptual process causes things to be shaped in a logically

preordained way. Language then becomes, in Heidegger's description, "a visibility of things that are already-there."[72] This development of words as litteral meanings is based upon the unconscious translation of metaphors into ideas or concepts. And, "by this very unconsciousness, by this very forgetting, he [the rational thinker] arrives at a sense for truth."[73] The notorious logic of the rational thinker results in "the congelation and the coagulation of a metaphor"[74] into a literal meaning. And after these metaphors have thickened or curdled into litteral meanings, they become so firmly established that Nietzsche says "we would rather break a leg than a word."[75]

With this forgetting of the metaphors of perception and the concomitant development of the unconscious, the world comes to seem as logical, because it is now weighed and measured in terms of ideas and concepts and their internal consistency. Nietzsche says "The world seems logical to us, because we have already made it logical"[76] by a prior shaping of perceptions, which takes place through the poetically sluggish linguistic habits that produce literal meanings. Literal meanings are always the result of a slothful imagination. Experiences then are not able to enter our awareness which do not have a certifiable word or logical form to grant them access. Nietzsche observes that "logical truth cannot be consummated before a fundamental falsification of all phenomena has been assumed,"[77] or before the metaphors of perception have been transmuted into ideas or concepts. To the promoters of logical truths, Nietzsche asks: "What sensation lies beneath the comment 'true?'"[78] He sums up his own view of truth and its relation to language, metaphor and perception thus:

> What therefore is truth? A mobile army of metaphors,
> metonymies, anthropomorphisms: in short a sum of human

relations which became poetically and rhetorically
intensified, metamorphosed, adorned, and after long
usage seems to a nation fixed, canonic, and binding;
truths are illusions of which one has forgotten that
they _are_ illusions; worn out metaphors which have be-
come powerless to affect the senses; coins which have
their obverse effaced and now are no longer of account
as coins but merely as metal.[79]

Following Nietzsche, while still adapting him to our specific

concerns, our phenomenology of language will then see truth as a

metaphor of perception where the metaphor has been _forgotten_ or buried

in the unconscious, and which now takes the form of a literal meaning.

Though other phenomenologists of language like Heidegger and Sartre do

not give an explicit role to metaphor in the process of perception and

word formation, we would still maintain that metaphor is a common fea-

ture to the communication phenomenologies of Nietzsche, Heidegger and

Sartre. In Heidegger, for instance, the forgotten metaphor of percep-

tion should be equated with the interpretation of being as idea. And

in Sartre, we will equate making metaphors with the doctrine of _con-

scious choice._ For these phenomenologists, the genesis and development

of language does not proceed on fundamentally _logical_ grounds, but on

the different poetic and rhetorical intensifications given to language

through the act of speaking. While in the view of the rational thinker

metaphorizing is only an act of poetical naivete or rhetorical lying,

for the phenomenologist it is the way human beings most directly take

part in the living activity of language. Unlike the rational thinker,

the phenomenologist of language sees linguistic inauthenticity not in

using metaphor, but in thinking that the world itself is _identical_ with

the literal meanings of one's language.

Since metaphor is at the foundation of thinking and speaking,

logical reasoning is at most the process of carrying out or realizing

the implications of one's metaphor. Logical reasoning is the process
of advancing toward the culmination or the perfection of one's illu-
sion. This brings Nietzsche to say "Logical thinking represents the
model-example of a perfect fiction."[80] As we move through our study
we will modify this important principle of Nietzsche's to read: Logi-
cal thinking represents the model example of a perfect rhetoric.
Nietzsche thinks logic is perfectly unreal. And as perfect poetry would
be perfectly real, so perfect rhetoric would be perfectly unreal. Obvi-
ously though, these are only theoretical limits of language which do
not typically make up the substance of communications. Nietzsche says
logic "is based upon presuppositions to which nothing in the real world
corresponds."[81] Two examples of these presuppositions would be the
illusions of identity and the archetype. In order for there to be laws
of logic that are universally valid, there must be identical cases and
situations to which these laws can be applied. We will explain in our
next chapter that just as logic is the business of creating identities,
so rhetoric is the business of creating identifications. As we ex-
plained earlier though through the example of the leaf, Nietzsche de-
nies there is any sameness or identity in reality. He says "Every
idea originates through equating the unequal" or identifying the idea
with the thing, yet "every metaphor of perception is individual and
without equal."[82] As a product of the Apollinian dream world, logic
causes us to see identities that don't exist in reality. These alleged
identities in turn are based upon the archetypes as in the Platonic
Forms. Such Ideas are developed by dropping away the particulars of
immediate experience, and substituting through the unconscious an Idea
or word which seems to the user to exist on its own.

In our last chapter, we explained the erroneous relation that developed between subject and predicate because of the logical copula "is." Identities and identifications are developed in the unconscious through the use of this connective. The statement "x is y" creates a false identity between x and y, since the logical copula "is" tends to make us forget that y is a metaphor. Because of the logical copula "is," y loses its metaphorical status and becomes interpreted as an idea. Through the logical copula "is," that which was originally and consciously metaphorical becomes frozen in the unconscious as literal meaning. Language then breaks apart from the human reality because its poetic or metaphorical qualities are blotted out. The logical copula "is" involves a creation of identity through a folding in or turning away from the metaphors of perception. Partly because of a prolific use of the logical copula "is" in the thinking and speaking of the present age, language has become inflexible to the point where any conscious use of metaphor now seems as an obstreperous outbreak of the imagination, rather than as the basis of speech as it is naturally spoken. But as Nietzsche says,"--what can I say of any Being except the mere predicates of its appearance."[83] What can be said of Being except each speaker's self created metaphors.

On this matter of the relationship of subjects to predicates, Northrop Frye says the act of making predicates does not even belong to poetry because it is anti-metaphorical. He says "Predication belongs to assertion and descriptive meaning."[84] And as Frye says that predication does not belong to poetic language, Rudolph Carnap says predication does not belong to scientific or quantitative language. Carnap draws a distinction between scientific or quantitative language and

qualitative language. According to Carnap, predication properly be-
longs to qualitative language. He says: "The qualitative language is
restricted to predicates (for example, 'grass is green'), while the
quantitative language introduces what are called functor symbols, that
is, symbols for functions that have numerical value."[85] When we com-
bine these purist views of Frye and Carnap, the result is that the act
of making predicates belongs to a descriptive or qualitative language
which is exactly midway between poetry and logic. Apparently, Frye
and Carnap feel such language would be of little use to the specialist
poet or specialist scientist.

As framed in this most general outline, our phenomenology of
language may agree with this particular _theoretical_ structuring of
language: Poetry should be opposed with logic, while general speech
undertakings typically fall somewhere in between. But our phenomenol-
ogy of language would disagree with the tendency of these purists to
exclude predication from poetry and logic. Actually, predication be-
longs to _both_ poetry and logic, not neither. Since poetry and logic
are themselves extentions or developments of real life speech, they
must both retain in some form the music and rhetoric from which they
evolved. That is, there can be no poetry without rhetoric, as there
can be no rhetoric without poetry. As a rhetorical phenomenon (i.e. a
phenomenon of _words_), predication is present in both poetry and rhetoric.
We don't ever arrive at the pure poetry supposed in Frye's observation.
Poetry doesn't destroy or abandon the predicate as Frye seems to think;
rather, poetry shows the _disproportion_ between the word or idea and
the experience. In showing this _disproportion_ words and ideas have
with experience, good poetry shows the unfitness of language to fully

communicate the reality of the experience, while it is still a predicative use of language itself. And Carnap's "functor symbols" are not a means of doing away with predication either; rather, here we even have a means of *developing* predicates or moving predicates up the ladder of abstraction toward the perfect rhetoric. Actually, the development of predication (i.e. words or rhetoric) comes to a head in Carnap's "functor symbols."

To understand the phenomenologist's position more clearly, we must recall that logic is derivative of the Apollinian dream world of words and rhetoric. According to this Nietzschean account, the quantitative or mathematical process of Carnap's scientific language (along with its numerical values) runs this dream or fictive tendency of language out to the extreme. Nietzsche also considers *invention* as the best way to describe such numerical or mathematical operations. He says: "Just as certainly as our concepts are inventions, so certainly are the constructs of mathematics inventions."[86] The constructions of mathematics are mere inventions since numbers also are based upon the fiction of *identity*. Without this mistaken assumption of there being identical things in reality, the phenomenon of *counting* would have never developed. Nietzsche says "numerals are based on the error that more than one identical thing exists. . . . Number is an out-and-out invention. . . . The arithemetical formulae are only regulative fictions."[87] Just like logic (and we should say rhythm, too), mathematics is a part of the Apollinian dream world. Through the use of logic and mathematics, the rational thinker becomes completely separated from the world of experience or the metaphors of perception. The Apollinian dream becomes logic and mathematics when through a sufficient

introversion there is a complete blocking out of sensory stimuli. Be-
cause of the extreme degree of introversion they require, Nietzsche
thinks of logic and mathematics as the perfect dream or fiction. For
exactly these same reasons we are going to consider them as the perfect
rhetoric. Also, this introversion supported by logic and mathematics
will be seen as the cornerstone of ideology in Chapter Six.

Logic and mathematics (considered collectively as rational
thought) represent the paradigmatic ways human beings use in deceiving
themselves and relieving themselves of their responsibility as makers
of metaphors. In Nietzsche's view, logic and mathematics are the in-
tellectual pillory of the sick individual because of the way they bind-
up the Dionysian urge. Through his rational thought, the sick individ-
ual keeps himself locked up in his own fantasy and unexposed to other
perspectives or fantasies. Chesterton may have been inspired by
Nietzsche when he proclaimed "The madman is not the man who has lost
his reason. The madman is the man who has lost everything except his
reason."[88] Through an introversion developed by logic, mathematics and
rhythm, the sick individual has suffered the most profound disruption
in his metaphors of perception. Through the use of rational thought,
he has cut himself off from life's florid flow of experiences. Locked
up in the pillory of logic and mathematics, or the physiological intro-
version produced by rhythm, he cannot turn outward to explore new pos-
sibilities. Nietzsche would perhaps see something paradoxical in the
scientific psychologist using rational thought to explain mental illness,
when rational thought is itself largely the basis for the existence of
such illness.

It would be a mistake though to conclude from the above that
the phenomenologist of language must be against logic and mathematics.

Even Nietzsche considers logic and mathematics as "a serviceable and handy scheme . . . for bringing order into the world."[89] And even more importantly, Nietzsche believes human beings must have these logical fictions and illusions to nourish their imaginations. Nietzsche says man is an engine which "has to be stoked with . . . illusions."[90] Through the use of logic and mathematics, it is possible for the in- tellect to poke or shake-up the coals in the fire of the mind. But it must be remembered that logic is a means of schematizing, not of know- ing. What Nietzsche protests so strongly against is the self-deception involved in the attempt to "replace" illusions and fictions with the "truth" of logic. The intellect does not become free by scrupulously following the dictates of logic, but by overthrowing these dictates through new efforts at schematization.

More to the point, the intellect can become liberated only by mounting a poetic effort where it becomes conscious of its concepts and ideas as self-created metaphors and illusions. This recognition of the self-creation of concepts and ideas through metaphors is what is meant by Nietzsche's conscious will to illusion. With the development or maturity of man comes a consciousness of illusion as illusion, and the recognition of logic and science as "regulative fictions." With the consciousness of illusion as illusion there comes a willingness to let go of or to no longer see the necessity of a particular illusion. In this way the dogmatism of logic, science and ideology is overcome. For the modern poet truth seems to begin in the literal meanings of the unconscious, but then through the animation of poetry this truth bubbles- up into his awareness as illusion. This consciousness of illusion as illusion reaches its pinnacle of perspicacity in the poet. Nietzsche

says: "For a genuine poet, metaphor is not a rhetorical figure but a vicarious image that he actually beholds in place of a concept."[91] However, with the modern hyper-development of logic and language as literal meaning, this consciousness of illusion as illusion is harder to attain, and even harder to hold on to. I. A. Richards has sensed this trend in modern philosophy. He says: "As philosophy grows more abstract we think increasingly by means of metaphors that we profess not to be relying on."[92] But even while the consciousness of illusion as illusion becomes harder to attain and the usage of metaphor harder to manage, metaphor is no less the only epistemic corrective for abstraction. The intellect can be rich and alive only when through the use of metaphor it overthrows logic and "shifts the boundary stones of the abstractions."[93]

Nietzsche believes "it is nothing but a moral prejudice that regards truth as of more value than illusion," and therefore, "we must do battle with all the presuppositions upon which a 'true world' has been fictively constructed."[94] Guided by these considerations, the most important aim of speech becomes not the exclusion of myth and metaphor through rational thought, but to give the fullest expression to the Dionysian urge, i.e., to use myth and metaphor to actualize the fullest potential of speaking man. Moving in tandem with this purpose of the enlightened language user, the most important aim of the language theorist or phenomenologist of language involves exposing the way myths and metaphors have ossified into literal meanings within a speaking community. In essence, this is the project of Nietzsche himself in The Birth of Tragedy, and it is largely the driving force behind his later attacks on Christianity. Because of his consuming involvement

with the way rational thought has become enervatingly ensconced within
language, we might think of Nietzsche as primarily a rhetorical theo-
rist--perhaps the first modern rhetorical theorist capable of "doing
battle" with modern epistemologies in the way that the sophists chal-
lenged Plato. He considers his philosophy to be "an inverted Plato-
nism."[95] Within the whole of Western speculative writing, his theory
of knowledge should be considered as _inverted philosophy_. Moreover,.
we should consider Nietzsche as primarily a rhetorical theorist be-
cause the one major concern that seems to permeate all his writings is
discovering the tactics and strategies that human beings unwittingly
use in deception, especially self-deception. Nietzsche wants his read-
ers to understand how they are apt to become victims of their own
thoughtlessness through the use of language.

In these ways Nietzsche might be considered as the modern pre-
cursor of the rhetorical tradition brought to fruition by Kenneth
Burke. The reader of Burke's works can often _feel_ the presence of
Nietzsche more than he is explicitly mentioned. In his approach to
the study of language and knowledge, Nietzsche advises us to make the
following critical shift. He says: "It is finally time to replace
the Kantian question, 'How are synthetic _apriori_ judgments possible?'
with another question: 'Why is it _necessary_ to believe in such judg-
ments?'"[96] Instead of asking if knowledge is possible, Nietzsche wants
us to ask why the belief in knowledge is necessary. Before we can talk
about truth, "the will to truth itself first requires justification;
here there is a lacuna in every philosophy."[97] While the Kantian ques-
tion is perhaps the fundamental issue of modern scientific philosophy,
the latter is perhaps the ultimate question of modern rhetorical studies,

and is certainly a central question to our phenomenology of language.
In this latter question, our attention is shifted from a consideration
of _what_ is true to a consideration of _how_ and _why_ human beings must
have the psychological or metaphysical comforts provided by the notion
of _truth_, and to a consideration of the role of language in providing
these comforts. Our attention is redirected from _logic_ to motive so
that we might investigate the _hows_ and _whys_ of discourse being shaped
the way it is. Specifically, what are communicators going after when
through their speech they deny to themselves or others a consciousness
of illusion _as_ illusion, and try to give to language and logic an ex-
istence of their own? Nietzsche's answer is that such communicators
are attempting to _deny_ their "will to power."[98]

Logical truths, or truths as they have been traditionally con-
ceived, _deny_ the will to power. The "true" world created by the rhet-
oric of logic and science is the creation of decadent and self-deceiv-
ing wills. Logic and science were created primarily as tools for use
in the quest for advantage over others. Nietzsche thinks the desire
for power over others is based upon a lack of power over oneself, i.e.,
a lack of power to creatively _encounter_ one's own metaphors of percep-
tions. How this denial of the will to power affects the social processes
of communication will be explained in more detail in Chapter Five. But
let us presently make clear Nietzsche's view that the intellect can be-
come liberated or exercise its will to power _only_ when it becomes con-
scious of its concepts and ideas as self-created metaphors and illusions.
And as Heidegger observed in Chapter Two, the very positing of the will
to power of Nietzsche results in a "dissolution" of the "is" and the
predicate as an _idea_. With the imagination's annulment of the "is" in

the exercising of the will to power, the y in "x is y" becomes recognized as a metaphor.

Perhaps the largest single impediment to the realization of the will to power is consciousness. As the product of the truth makers or "cobweb-spinners of the spirit,"[99] consciousness is the unreal inner world which is founded upon error and self-deception. Consciousness is the master illusion which denies an awareness of illusion as illusion. Consciousness is the result when speakers abandon la parole for the sake of la langue; or as we will explain in Chapter Five, consciousness is the result when speech is practiced as if it were based upon literal meanings. At any rate, for Nietzsche consciousness is the result of a loss of the will to power or of speech based upon the metaphors of perception. Also, consciousness is a rhetorical construction which develops through the communication process. In The Gay Science, Nietzsche says:

> Consciousness has developed only under the pressure of the need for communication; that from the start it was needed and useful only between human beings (particularly between those who commanded and those who obeyed); and that it also developed only in proportion to the degree of this utility. Consciousness is really only a net of communication between human beings; it is only as such that it had to develop; a solitary human being who lived like a beast of prey would not have needed it.[100]

With the development of communication came the development of hierarchy and consciousness, or what Nietzsche redundantly refers to in some later works as "bad conscience."[101] In turn, the rise of bad conscience is what caused human beings to have to communicate with a speed and subtlety of which "the ultimate result is an excess of this strength and art of communication."[102] With the development of communication skills, human beings learned "to lie gregariously in a style binding for all."[103]

In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche traces this excessive development
of communication skills to Socrates. Following the direction set by
Socrates, the whole language enterprise collapsed into logic, science,
and the subsequent modern cult of fact finding. Consciousness and com-
munication then are the result of yielding to the Apollinian tendency
of illusion and drama, or denying one's will to power.

With the rise of Socratic or rational thought, human beings
became introverted. The very process of rational thought, particularly
thinking in words, makes a person keenly conscious of himself. And we
should remember that thinking for Nietzsche is possible only under the
sponsorship of language or words. In The Will to Power, Nietzsche
said "We cease from thinking if we do not wish to think under the con-
trol of language."[104] However, in an earlier observation made in The
Gay Science, he seems to imply that there is also a less sophisticated
(i.e., less rhetorized) kind of thinking that doesn't require the use
of language or words. He says:

> Man, like every living being, thinks continually without
> knowing it; the thinking that rises to consciousness is
> only the smallest part of all this--the most superficial
> and worst part--for only this conscious thinking takes
> the form of words, which is to say signs of communication,
> and this fact uncovers the origin of consciousness.[105]

Whether this thinking which does not rise to the level of consciousness
should be equated with poetic or concrete thinking isn't clear. But
even though this earlier observation implies the existence of a form
of thinking which seems to take place on an "instinctual" level,
Nietzsche still always recognized the implicit beguilement in the use
of language or words. And consciousness, or bad conscience, developed
through this communication by words.

In his book <u>On the Genealogy of Morals</u>, it is clear that
Nietzsche considers bad conscience to be the paradigmatic problem of
our age. He believes the development of communication and bad con-
science "has been the greatest event so far in the history of the sick
soul."[106] For the purpose of priming our later discussion on mental
illness, we might quickly translate Nietzsche's view of bad conscience
and excessive word use into contemporary psychiatric jargon by observ-
ing that the "schizophrenic" is the person for whom this excess of words
and communication is <u>directed at himself</u>, while the "psychopath" is the
person for whom this excess of words and communication is <u>directed at</u>
<u>others</u>. In <u>both</u> cases though, the development of consciousness and
communication is a danger and disease; for "consciousness [and commu-
nication do] not really belong to man's individual existence but rath-
er to his social or herd nature."[107] It is clear that Nietzsche sees
modern society as predominantly populated with "sick souls" who have
succumbed to their "herd nature." It is also clear that he sees this
herd phenomenon as having begun to develop during the first millennium
B.C. in conjunction with the development of philosophy as rational
thought (i.e., rhetoric). The recent much discussed book by Julian
Jaynes, <u>The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral</u>
<u>Mind</u> (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. 1976), provides an interesting con-
trast to Nietzsche's view on psychopathology. While Nietzsche thinks
that nearly everyone <u>after</u> the first millennium B.C. is psychologically
sick because of the development of communication and consciousness,
Jaynes argues that nearly everyone <u>before</u> the first millennium was psy-
chologically sick because consciousness had not yet developed. Jaynes
holds that consciousness developed roughly during the same period as

Nietzsche. But Jaynes has a vastly different understanding of the na-
ture of consciousness from Nietzsche, making the two tricky to compare.[108]

In contrast to the sick soul with his herd instincts of rhet-
oric and communication, the poet or "overman" relies on his own meta-
phors of perception which are revealed through the natural instincts
of his will to power. For the poet or the aesthetically sensitive
human being, "the whole linguistic capacity is excited by [the]. . .
principle of the imitation of music,"[109] rather than by concepts or
ideology. But then, seeming to go against everything else he says
about communication, Nietzsche exclaims "The aesthetic state repre-
sents an overflow of means of communication as well as a condition of
extreme sensibility to stimuli and signs."[110] In this same section of
The Will to Power, he goes on to maintain that "Every elevation of life
likewise elevates the power of communication."[111] But typical of
Nietzsche, he gives little clarification as to how this elevation of
communication takes place. Perhaps these observations are to be under-
stood like The Birth of Tragedy itself--i.e., with an "immediate cer-
tainty of vision."[112] Probably the most significant characteristic
though of the poet's attitude in his encounter with the Other is his
lack of ressentiment.[113] Without the ressentiment of bad conscience,
the poet does not need to reach outside himself to confirm a socially
created identity of leader-follower, victimizer-victim, etc. But
Nietzsche warns that this tendency toward bad conscience is always with
us. Not even the poet can be completely unhampered by it. In The Dawn,
he says "the striving for excellence is the striving to overwhelm one's
neighbor, even if only indirectly,"[114] since as a user of language
even the poet cannot escape the constructions of rhetoric and ideology.

But still, the deception of others is done with a good conscience by
the poet, since it is founded upon a consciousness of illusion as illu-
sion, and a recognition of the inescapability of illusion.

Through out this chapter we have seen Nietzsche's pervasive
concern with language. He sees the demise of Greek tragedy, and lan-
guage in general, as a result of the rise of philosophy as rational
thought, or what might more appositely be understood as the rhetoric
of consciousness. Heidegger also blames the demise of poetry on an
idolatry of rational thought. But while Heidegger's theory tends to
overlook the inextricability of rhetoric from language, Nietzsche con-
tinually stresses how rhetoric and ideology (i.e., illusions) are the
ever present facets of language and life. Both Nietzsche and Heidegger
criticize the pro-intellectual anti-experiential attitude that under-
lies post-Socratic thinking and speaking. These two philosophies of
Nietzsche and Heidegger though, spring from very different sources in
antiquity. While Heidegger is the philosophical descendant of Parmen-
ides, Nietzsche receives his inspiration from Heraclitus. Along with
Heraclitus, Nietzsche would say there is only Becoming; Being is an
invention or illusion. Nietzsche observes: "Parmenides said: 'One
can form no concept of the non-existent';--we are at the other extreme
and say, 'That of which a concept can be formed, is certainly fiction-
al.'"[115] As to whether the ultimate nature of reality is Being or Be-
coming is an issue beyond the pale of our phenomenology of language.
Of most importance to us is that both Nietzsche and Heidegger believe
the language process has gotten thrown off course by the post-Socratic
speaker's concentration on rational thought and the substitution of
words and ideas for objects of experience. With the development of

philosophy as rational thought, both see a shift from <u>la parole</u> to <u>la langue</u>.[116] While Nietzsche believes the problems engendered by this shift can never be completely overcome because of the inextirpability of illusion and the rhetoric of consciousness, Heidegger believes in the possibility of a more fundamental shift in man's attitude toward language by a re-directing of thinking toward the concrete. Nietzsche and Heidegger would agree that language is a more suitable instrument for getting a handle on Being than on Becoming. But once language has layed its hands on Being, Heidegger would tell us that we have "uncon-cealed" reality while Nietzsche would say we have merely created another fiction. Still, it would be interesting to hear Nietzsche's reaction to Heidegger's theory of "unconcealment" as a remedy to signification and the substitution of words and ideas for objects of experience.

IV. PERCEPTION AND THE ANALYTIC STRUCTURE OF LANGUAGE

> Analytic thought interrupts the perceptual transition
> from one moment to another, and then seeks in the mind
> the guarantee of a unity which is already there when we
> perceive. Analytic thought also interrupts the unity
> of culture and then tries to reconstitute it from the
> outside.--Maurice Merleau-Ponty[1]

> Husserl had understood: our philosophical problem is
> to open up the concept without destroying it.--Maurice
> Merleau-Ponty[2]

One fundamental concern of our study is to explain how poetic
and rhetoric, when properly understood, are able to mark out the full
range of language usage and inquiry. I am saying that _if_ we are able
to understand essentially everything about poetic and rhetoric, we
should then be able to understand essentially everything about lan-
guage--though, please don't underestimate the size of this _if_. In
Chapters Two and Three it was explained how being and thought or Dio-
nysia and Apollo might be used as ways of sorting out and identifying
the poetic and rhetorical elements of language. I suspect though that
for some readers notions such as being and thought or especially Dio-
nysia and Apollo may seem rather esoteric or culturally restrictive.
There are few modern Anglo-Americans who are likely to see Dionysia
and Apollo as the guiding forces that shape their language or their
lives. In this chapter then, we will explore some phenomenological as-
pects of language using some notions that may seem less mythological
to some.

Edmund Husserl and Ludwig Wittgenstein are two twentieth cen-
tury thinkers who make much use of analytic terminology in their lan-
guage theories. Though neither of these thinkers has much to say ex-

plicity about rhetoric and poetic, we are going to stress how the notions of logic and intentionality in Husserl, or tautology and contradiction in Wittgenstein, are in some ways comparable to the Apollo and Dionysia of Nietzsche, especially when we view rhetoric and poetic as the basis of language. In our last chapter, we outlined the connection between analytic thought and Nietzsche's Apollinian consciousness. But as we know, Nietzsche is often regarded as a passionate and emotional writer, rather than as rigorous philosopher. If we are able to firm up this connection between literary concepts and logical concepts, we will then have shown how poetry and rhetoric reach further into the structure of language than is ordinarily thought. What we need to do though, first and briefly, is to lay out in review some of the major ideas of Husserl that will be presently relevant. We want to acquaint ourselves with the foundations of his view of language and perception so that we might ultimately apply these to our own concern of poetry and rhetoric. I should stress though that in our discussion of Husserl, as in our discussions of Nietzsche and Heidegger, we are not primarily concerned with propagating their philosophies per se, but rather in appropriating or eclectically incorporating their insights into our own theory of poetry and rhetoric. We therefore make no pledge of allegiance to Husserl's particular idiosynchratic method.

On an historical note, we should observe how the language theory of Husserl was not always easily amenable to poetic and rhetorical theorizing. One of Husserl's most perceptive students, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, observes how in his early writings " . . . Husserl sets forth the concept of an eidetic of language and a universal grammar which would establish the forms of signification indispensable to every language if

it is to be a language, and which would allow us to think with complete
clarity about empirical languages as 'confused' realizations of the
essential language."[3] As we saw with Nietzsche and Heidegger, such
essentialist and ultimately Platonic views where language is thought
to have some specific and independent structural nature are not very
accommodating to poetic and rhetorical theorizing. When we have such
things as universal grammar and an eidetic of language which would serve
to regulate the formation of images, poetic and rhetoric tend to be con-
signed to obscure and trivial roles in the investigation of language.
But the later Husserl turned this essentialist view of language on its
head. Merleau-Ponty says the later Husserl " . . . defines the phe-
nomenology of langauge not as an attempt to fit existing languages into
a framework of an eidetic of all possible languages (that is, to ob-
jectify them before a universal and timeless constituting consciousness),
but as a return to the speaking subject, to my contact with the language
I am speaking."[4] More generally, we could describe this change made
by Husserl as a shift from la langue to la parole. For the later Hus-
serl, the event of language in speech is the primary focus of the phe-
nomenology of language.

This change between the early Husserl and the late centers a-
round his theorizing on the relationship of language, thought and per-
ception. In his important work Ideas,[5] Husserl introduces a distinc-
tion between noesis and noema to help explain this relationship. We
will concern ourselves with this distinction not only because of what
we will show to be its obvious relevance to language, thought and per-
ception, but more particularly because it will allow us to sort out and
identify the poetic and rhetorical elements of language, even though
we admit this is not the use that Husserl himself originally intended

to make of it. The problem of the relationship of language, thought
and perception has long been a thorn in the side of philosophers. In
Chapter Two we pointed out that phenomenological thinking about language,
thought and perception seems to have begun with the Romantic philosophers.
In his "Essay on the Origin of Language," Herder summed up the experience
of language, thought and perception this way:

> Man manifests reflection when the force of his soul acts
> in such freedom that, in the vast ocean of sensations
> which permeates it through all the channels of the senses,
> it can, if I may say so, single out one wave, arrest it,
> concentrate its attention on it, and be conscious of being
> attentive. He manifests reflection when, confronted with
> the vast hovering dream of images which pass by his senses,
> he can collect himself into a moment of wakefulness and
> dwell at will on one image, can observe it clearly and
> more calmly, and can select in it distinguishing marks
> for himself so that he will know that this object is this
> and not another. . . . This first distinguishing mark,
> as it appeared in his reflection, was a work of the soul!
> With it human language is invented![6]

Language then is born of reflection and perception, and Husserl's use
of noesis and noema will help to clarify this process described by
Herder.

Noesis and noema are not new expressions in the philosopher's
wordbook. Going back to the Greeks, particularly Plato, noesis denoted
the highest kind of knowledge, or knowledge of the Forms or Ideas. For
Plato, noesis referred to the cognition involved in direct knowledge.
In contrast, noema denoted the less important perceptual aspects of un-
derstanding. For Husserl also, noesis denotes the act of cogitating.
More particularly, for Husserl noesis denotes the purely subjective or
intellectual and abstract aspects in an act or intentional experience.
In contrast, the noema for Husserl is the objective aspect or content
that makes up an intentional experience. But the noema is not identical
with the thing perceived. Husserl says the noema is a thing perceived

as such.[7] The _noema_ is the object as it is rendered by the perceptual apparatus of the perceiver. Some of Husserl's commentators have offered definitions of _noesis_ and _noema_ that may add some clarity to these. In his historical introduction to the phenomenological movement, Herbert Spiegelberg defines _noesis_ as "any act directed to an intentional object," i.e., any act directed to a _noema_. _Noema_ then is "the object-referent of a noetic act or _noesis_."[8] According to another commentator, Aron Gurwitsch, Husserl means by _noema_ the "object _as_ it is intended," and by _noesis_ he means the "object which is intended."[9] For our purpose here, let us consider _noesis_ as the specific act by which we bestow the character of symbol upon perceptual experience, though keeping in mind that Husserl believes such acts are always directed toward a _noema_. Husserl says "material elements are 'animated' through noetic phases, they undergo . . . 'formal shapings,' 'gifts of meaning,' which we grasp, in reflexion, upon and with the material elements."[10] When an object undergoes such _noetic_ phases, it is having its meaning or significance shaped in and by language.

Every object of experience has what Husserl calls a "noematic nucleus."[11] Apparently working from this suggestion, Aron Gurwitsch says we could consider every object of experience as a "noematic system."[12] There can be numerous _noemata_ (e.g. mine, yours and others, and even a plurality of _noemata_ in each individual's experience) that all refer to the same material object. The _noema_ then is a _perspectival_ presentation of an object. And since there is a plurality of these experiences, it follows that none can coincide with the object itself. The _noema_ is not the thing perceived, rather it is the multiplicity of perceptions and meanings to any object of experience. As an essential

feature of our experience, the noema cannot be separated from con-
sciousness. And, since we know a thing or experience a thing only
through its noematic manifestations, our life world itself cannot be
separated from consciousness. A thing, for instance a table or chair,
should be considered as a noematic system. Again, as far as conscious-
ness is concerned, a table or chair is nothing beyond its multiplicity
of noematic features. My apprehension of this table or this chair is
based upon the perspective of a given noema. As Gurwitsch says, my
apprehension of a thing is the "apprehension of a noematic system as
a whole from the vantage point of one of its members,"[13] i.e., from
the vantage point of one of its noemata. The noema then is a one-sided
"adumbrational presentation"[14] of an object.

Before developing the significance of noesis and noema for our
own phenomenology of language, we must first put forth for considera-
tion another fundamental concept of Husserl and his followers. Con-
trasted with the perceptual process is a practice or function which
Husserlian phenomenologists believe allows them to realize the struc-
ture or what they take to be the "universal essence" of an object.
They call this practice or function reduction or bracketing. In his
glossary of phenomenological terms, Spiegelberg defines reduction as
"the act which leads from particulars to universal 'pure' essences."[15]
Developed by the early Husserl, reduction is one of the two directions
or trends in which users of language can depart from the "natural atti-
tude" or the attitude which characterizes day-to-day belief. (This
second direction will be discussed later.) In reduction the prevailing
edifice of belief or meaning is at first bracketed. To bracket a mean-
ing, the Husserlian phenomenolgist suspends his belief in that meaning,

though this does not mean that he denies it. After such beliefs are
bracketed or put into limbo, he then goes through a process called
free imaginative variation. These are experiments in the imagination
which are supposed to lead to a better understanding of universal es-
sences. In the process of free imaginative variation, the Husserlian
phenomenologist takes an object he has already described, or more par-
ticularly what is now his idea of this object, and freely associates
potential predicates or characteristics of the present object in expe-
rience, attempting to see which predicates or characteristics are the
constant qualities of the object, or the qualities that cannot be dis-
pensed with if the object in experience is to be an example of the orig-
inally described object or the original idea of the object. Through
this process, he hopes to arrive at the universal essences of objects.

In his article "Phenomenology,"[16] Richard Schmitt compares the
free imaginative variation of the Husserlian phenomenologist to the
"counter-example" technique of analytic philosophers. For the analytic
philosopher, a universal statement (i.e. a statement that sweepingly
speaks of a whole class of things) can be refuted with one negative in-
stance. For the Husserlian phenomenologist, a particular object can
come to be disregarded as an example of a particular kind of thing when,
through free imaginative variation, he is forced to add or delete cer-
tain predicates to or from the object under consideration. Schmitt
gives perhaps the most concise description of free imaginative variation
and its role in reduction. He says:

> Here we describe an example and then transform the de-
> scription by adding or deleting one of the predicates
> in the description. With each addition or deletion,
> we ask whether the amended description can still be
> said to describe an example of the same kind of object
> as that which the example originally described was said

to exemplify. Sometimes we shall have to say that if
we add this predicate to the description or take that
one away, what is then described is an example of a
different kind of object from that exemplified by the
original example. At other times the additions or
deletions will not affect the essential features of the
kind of object exemplified by the different examples.
    In this way we discover the necessary and in-
variant features of a given kind of thing that the
example must possess in order to be an example of
that kind of thing. We also discover which features
are accidental and hence irrelevant to the question
whether this object, as described, is or is not an
example of a certain kind of thing. What we discover
is what phenomenologists call the "essence" of objects.[17]

As Husserl construed it, this above practice of philosophy was first

and foremost a science. He thought the process of reduction, as carried

out through free imaginative variation, underlay all the natural sci-

ences. For instance, free imaginative variation can be related to the

creative aspects of hypothesis construction, and perhaps other areas

of thought construction not usually given explicit consideration by

practicing scientists. All good scientists probably use a form of

free imaginative variation, even if only tacitly. Husserl wanted to

formalize and make explicit this process.

    But many of Husserl's fellow epistemologically oriented philos-

ophers disputed this technique. (By epistemologically oriented philos-

ophers, we mean those who focus on the Kantian question "What can I

know?" instead of the Nietzschean question "Why is it even necessary

to know?") They charged that Husserl's process was circular. That

is, once you construct the idea of a thing, then what predicates or

characteristics will be added or deleted has already been determined.

They charge there is no independent criterion which decides whether

the predicate or characteristic is to be added or deleted when initial-

ly considering the original example. Now as interesting as these

epistemological puzzles may seem to some, they do not give a clear fo-
cus to the problem of reduction as seen by our own phenomenology of

language. As poetic and rhetorical theorists, what is most significant

to us is that reduction involves a certain adjustment of the perceptual

and linguistic apparatus. Particularly, it involves an adjustment _away_

from the things themselves toward ideas or words. Regarding the onto-

logical status of these ideas arrived at through reduction, we think it

is important to stress their similarity to Platonic Ideas. The early

Husserl comes at least very close to Platonic realism, since he con-

siders ideas as having an existence in their own right. We might

quickly add though that this is not the case for the later Husserl.

Spiegelberg says:

> . . . later on, when Husserl adopted the view that all
> logical entities, along with all other objectivities,
> had their origin in subjectivity, he explicitly tried
> to show how universals are "constituted" by the sub-
> jective consciousness which derives them from the per-
> ceptual experience of particulars.[18]

This view of the later Husserl is much closer to the view of Nietzsche

as explained in Chapter Three.

But the early Husserl is very near to idealism. It is even

possible to interpret him to mean that the objects of external per-

ception are constituted by ideas or words. The reduction of the early

Husserl served to reduce the objects of experience to ideas or concepts

which ultimately are not based in experience. Though reduction may be

based on a "purposely" induced attitude, it still bears the strongest

similarity to what we identified in our last chapter as the rhetorical

functioning of language and thought, since it culminates in the ideation

of a thing. The criticism we wish to make of reduction then is that

it leads to a rhetorical intensification of language and thought.

A less sympathetic view of reduction would perhaps say that it involves the development of an ideology. If we were to _correctly_ press Heidegger's case for him, we would note that reduction leads to the interpretation of being as idea, and thereby the making of language into "a visibility of things that are already-there."[19] With reduction and its end product the universal essent, speakers come to find the essent already made in language. In Nietzsche's view, the reduction of the particular metaphor of perception to an idea is the means of making fictions or of withdrawing into the inner world of error and self deception. And as we are led higher into the heights of abstraction via reduction, the consciousness of illusion _as_ illusion becomes harder to maintain. Reduction includes no mechanism to help users of language (either thinkers or speakers) to recognize their concepts as self created metaphors and illusions. With the end product of reduction, the perceiver's attention becomes arrested on a _single_ "mummified" wave of sensation, i.e., a single word. The rich play of poetic images becomes disrupted as the image rigidifies into a concept. Though free imaginative variation may temporarily open up the perceptual process to a wider range of noemata, the end product of reduction is to close-off alternative perspectives. Reduction works ultimately as a rhetorical roboration of the concept or idea.

But not everyone would agree that reduction works in support of the rhetorical functioning of language. Paul Ricoeur and José Oretga y Gasset are two theoreticians who even see a resemblance between reduction and the poetic or artistic enterprise. Ricoeur says: "In an extreme form we might even say that the poetic project is one of destroying the world as we ordinarily take it for granted, just as

Husserl made the destruction of our world the basis of the phenomeno-
logical reduction."[20] But what exactly actually gets destroyed in the
poetic project? In Chapter Three we stressed that the poetic project
involves a destruction of the rhetoric of consciousness or the inner
world of error and self-deception. But then, this is exactly what re-
duction creates. In reduction the particular of experience is denied
or destroyed and the universal essence or idea is affirmed. We might
recall here that the central dictum of Sartre's existentialism says
that existence precedes essence, or the particular or concrete precedes
the idea in terms of ontological superiority. Sartre asks:

> What is meant here by saying that existence precedes
> essence? It means that, first of all, man exists,
> turns up, appears on the scene, and, only afterwards,
> defines himself. If man, as the existentialist con-
> ceives him, is indefinable, it is because at first he
> is nothing. Only afterward will he be something, and
> he himself will have made what he will be.[21]

According to Sartre's philosophy of existence, human beings are aimless
and purposeless creatures. Human beings can reveal a sense of purpose
to themselves only through their ideas or words, i.e., their rhetoric.
But this sense of purpose is always unreal, since ideas or words are
themselves unreal. In a nutshell, self deception for the existential-
ist consists of taking an idea or purpose as independently real, and
denying to oneself that such ideas are merely self created fictions.
The poetic project, or more generally the poetic life, involves in part
the realization of an idea-less world, and this realization comes via
the destruction of language and ideology.

Perhaps a detailed example would be helpful in clarifying some
of the aspects of how reduction and free imaginative variation are to
be related to rhetoric and poetry as we have been trying to define them.

In The Dehumanization of Art,[22] Ortega sees a similarity between the
project of the modern theatre artist and the Husserlian phenomenolo-
gist. Ortega asks us to consider the example of a great dying man
and how we would perhaps see such a scene performed in the modern ex-
perimental theatre. First of all, there would be no "plot" to this
play in the traditional sense. In this example, the great dying man
is our object of experience, or he is our noematic system. Present at
the great man's bedside are a wife, physician, reporter and painter.
All are present at an identical event, yet each sees this same event
from a radically different perspective--so different that each per-
spective has hardly anything in common with the other. For instance,
the wife's grief or the physician's concern with administering medica-
tions bear little resemblance to the painter's watching impassively or
the reporter's concern for a good story. Through free imaginative var-
iation (though the process need not be explicitly described as such),
the audience experiences the event of the great dying man from four
different perspectives on the basis of four different noemata. Each
of these four characters in the play apprehends the event of the great
dying man as a whole but still from the vantage point of one of its
noemata. Each of the four then has no more than a perspectival or ad-
umbrated experience of this event, while the audience on the outside
sees the event from a multiplicity of perspectives.

According to Ortega, this splitting up of perspectives is a cen-
tral feature of modern art and a principle point of its poetic merit.
But the atomizing of perspectives through free imaginative variation
is only one step in the process of reduction. When words or ideas sub-
sequently become involved, there is always an attempt to make the noema

more than a perspective, or to make the noema identical with the thing itself. In one of the most important passages in Ideas which clarifies the relation of language to experience, Husserl says: "[The noema is] the object as copy or the copied object, the object functioning as sign and the significate disregarding [its] own proper characterizations 'copy of,' 'copied,' 'sign for'. . . . "[23] Even though the noema is rightly an object of experience, it will always come to function as a sign through a disregarding of its noematic status. This denial or disregarding of the noema as noema is the very foundation of all distortions or illusions developed through language and thought. Words or ideas are deceptive because they tend to deny or disregard their noematic origins as perspectives on things. Moreover, we should stress that words or ideas can be formed only through this denial or disregarding of the noema as noema. By denying their noematic origins, the subsequently evolved words or ideas become identical with or a substitute for the thing itself. As Nietzsche explained in our last chapter, words or ideas are arrived at by equating the unequal, or by creating identifications within the diversified and unique elements of experience. We also explained in our last chapter how this identity and substitution are the basis for deception and the rhetorical functioning of language and thought. In such rhetorical functioning, the word purports to signify or designate the object as a whole. Rhetoric, or language usage in general, is based upon this attempt to interpret an object in its sum or totality, though such interpretations are not possible since words are ultimately based upon the noemata of experience.

Let us try to make all the above more clear, since as a means

of developing ideas there is something going on in reduction which is crucial to our understanding of the nature of rhetoric and poetry.

In Chapter Two, we contrasted the poetic project of _unconceal-ment_ with the rhetorical project of _signification_ or designation. The poetic project of _unconcealment_ encourages an opening up of the percep-tual field, which is to say it encourages the visibility of other noe-mata. Like the free imaginative variation in Ortega's example, the poetic enterprise consists in part of lighting up different noemata and illustrating alternative perspectives. But with the subsequent involve-ment of words and ideas, we must remember the tendency of the noema to deny or _disregard_ its noematic status, and to become a sign. With the denial or disregarding of the noema as noema, the word as sign evolves, giving to itself an existence of its own. Merleau-Ponty interestingly says "The most exact characteristic of a word is 'what the others are not.' Signification exists not for a word but for all words in rela-tion to each other."[24] Though the linguist would tell us that a sign is an indication for something else, we would suggest that in the prac-tice of language as signification, the relation of words _to each other_ tends to be more important than the relation of words _to things._ In signification, a speaker is more primarily concerned with achieving internal consistency _within_ a collection of signs, than with unconceal-ing something in the world. And because of an at least seemingly ine-luctable slide of words toward signification and logic, we should again ask Heidegger how _unconcealment_ through the use of words is possible?

Though it is through the act of noesis that the sign or symbol is bestowed, the noema is the tray upon which the sign is served up to the intellect. As noesis was described above, it is an act of pure in-tellectual apprehension. Though the noema is always the object-referent

in an act of noesis, the noetic act can relate to a noema only as a
sign and not as uncensored experience. Through the noetic act, the
noema becomes rhetorically animated in the word or idea. And we in-
sist that this animation be described as rhetorical, since rhetoriza-
tion, as we have explained it, is a result of making abstractions.
For us, Ortega's example of a great dying man stretches out or shows
in slow motion the perceptual and rhetorical process of how words or
ideas are arrived at. Caught in the throng and throe of converging
sensations, a perceiver, through reflection, grabs a noema and certi-
fies it with a word. It is exactly this "certification" and noetic
bestowal of word or sign that is rhetorical. Whenever we get into the
management and coordination of words and signs, we get into rhetoric.
This is not to say that the reduction of the Husserlian phenomenologist
involves no poetic operation at all, especially to the extent that it
makes use of free imaginative variation. What we wish to stress is
that whenever we get into words and ideas, we cannot avoid rhetoric.
No matter how poetically pure we take our artistic or scientific pro-
ject to be, when we bestow the word or the idea upon the noema, the
noema will always deny or disregard its character as noema.

Whatever epistemological merit Husserl may have attached to
reduction, for our own phenomenology of language reduction is to be
seen as being consummated in the rhetorical function of the word or
idea. And with this function of language and thought, there comes the
tendency to deny the visibility of other noemata. A thing tends to be-
come this and only this, rather than a multiplicity of noemata or a
noematic system. When we apply the above discussion of noesis and
noema to our own theory of poetry and rhetoric, there comes to the

fore this important point that has been evolving throughout the past three chapters: While poetry involves the illumination or unconceal-ment of possiblities, rhetoric involves the concealment or elimination of possibilities. Applying the above discussion of noesis and noema to poetry and rhetoric, we can see that poetic language would involve an attempt to make the word not disregard its characterization as noema. And exactly to the extent that it is not possible for the word to avoid disregarding its status as noema, poetry itself is not possi-ble. But then, this is the challenge and basic paradox of all poetry. No matter how carefully the poet constructs his weave of words, the noematic objects of experience are the prize catch that somehow always slip through his net. In a sense, the poet must use language against itself if he is to recover or prevent the loss of the noema. However, this is not to say that all poetry that makes use of language is doomed to failure. In Chapter Seven we will explain more carefully the kind of success possible in the poetic endeavor.

Before moving on to other matters, we would like to draw an important parallel between Nietzsche's theory of poetry and our inferred Husserlian theory of poetry. Discussing the place or the role of the noema in the proposition, Husserl says " . . . to the noematic charac-ters there correspond predicable characters."[25] The noema of Husserl might be compared to the metaphor of Nietzsche, particularly the "met-aphor of perception." Recall also that when these metaphors of percep-tion "coagulate" into literal meanings and lose their metaphorical character, they then become a means of deception, particularly self deception. The logical copula "is" makes us "forget" that the predi-cate is a metaphor. Though Husserl is insufficiently explicit on this

matter, it would seem to us that the same movements of language and thought are involved when we "disregard" the predicate as a noema or come to count the noema as the thing itself. (Actually, for Husserl the noema is "real" and "inherent in the object,"[26] but it is no more than one part of the object which is disregarded as such and becomes treated as the whole.) This disregarding in Husserl, like the forgetting in Nietzsche, is what we take to be the central feature in the rhetorical project. Rhetoric conceals or eliminates possibilities because it closes us off to the uncensored experience of metaphor and noema. For the past three chapters we have worked toward showing how this elimination or concealment constitutes the essence of rhetoric as ideology. In this present chapter we should be aware of how Husserl's noesis and noema can corroborate our overall view.

Husserl makes no explicit statement about the relationship of noesis and noema to rhetoric and poetry. As we mentioned earlier, philosophers for the most part have traditionally avoided strong involvements in poetry and rhetoric. Socrates thought that poetry was for those who are not very bright, and Santayana is supposed to have said "I am an ignorant man, almost a poet." But having been influenced by Husserl and his theory of perception, Heidegger brings up the phenomenon of poetry and tries to show how it is essential to understanding the relation of language to perception. Heidegger improves on Husserl by overcoming the philosopher's long standing inhibition of making poetry central to an inquiry of language and perception. But there is an even longer standing predisposition to not recognize the rhetorical component in language and perception. In pressing this additional consideration of rhetoric, we wish to improve on these philosopher's

understanding of how experience relates to word formation. With
Heidegger's theory of poetry and the poetic role Ricoeur would assign
to Husserl's reduction, we are left with the mistaken impression that
language is a one-dimensional poetic event. Such speculations ignore
the rhetorical dimension of language and perception.

Some of the things we are saying about this rhetorical dimension
might be more comprehensively understood if we take a slight historical
digression. In his study of the historical influences on the devel-
opment of phenomenology, Aron Gurwitsch[27] found a fruitful source of
stimulation for Husserl in David Hume. From Hume, Husserl adapted
certain aspects of phenomenalism, though actually our own phenomenology
of language may come closer to this view than Husserl's. Put most
simply, phenomenalism is the view that physical objects are no more
than collections of observable properties. For Hume, nothing is ever
present to the mind except its perceptions, impressions and ideas.
Hume does not even question whether bodies have "an existence distinct
from the mind and perception."[28] The distinction between perceptions
and objects or bodies is only "a palliative remedy"[29] for solving the
problem of the mind's relationship to the world. From the standpoint
of phenomenalism, it is not even important to ask if such bodies con-
tinue to exist when they are not perceived. Physical objects appear
to exist in a continued unity because of an illusion of identity cre-
ated by a resemblance among our perceptions. This illusion of identity
develops because the perceiver mistakenly takes a sequence of continu-
ous perceptions to be equatable with the thing itself. Through his im-
agination, the perceiver is also told that what he perceives continues
to exist when he is not perceiving it. Even though the continuing

existence of an unaltering perception conveys the sensation of unity,
it is, as Hume tells us, a unity created by the imagination. He says:
"The smooth passage of the imagination along the ideas of the resembling
perceptions makes us ascribe to them a perfect identity."[30] The need
to give consistency and continuity to the world gives to perceivers "a
propension to unite these broken appearances by the fiction of a con-
tinu'd existence."[31]

For the most part, only modern philosophers of a literary (as
opposed to an epistemological) orientation have given this kind of
salient role to the imagination in perception. For example, S. T.
Coleridge says "The primary imagination I hold to be the living Power
and prime Agent of all human perception."[32] But Hume's theory on the
imagination and how it produces a "fiction of continued existence"
among the objects of perception has received its most astute develop-
ment in Nietzsche. What is of most significance to us is that Nietzsche
adds to Hume by giving a more explicit role to language in sustaining
the fiction of continued existence. For Nietzsche, this fiction of
continued existence is a rhetorical creation based upon the dreamworld
of Apollinian consciousness. This fiction is based upon the creation
of identifications among the individual metaphors of perception, and
upon man's attempt to give excessive rationalizations about his world.
The important point Hume forgot then is this: Only through the prac-
tice of language as rhetoric does the world come to have this fiction
of continued existence. This fiction is based upon a forcing (via
language and thought) of conceptual constructions upon Dionysian real-
ity. Through the ruse of rational thought, dead perceptions are given
a fictive life of their own as facts and ideas. The fiction is then

sustained by a withdrawal into the inner world of error and self decep-
tion. But ultimately, Nietzsche realizes how the fiction of continued
existence is based upon words, and his observations on the substitution
of words for objects in experience are an important refinement in clar-
ifying how the fiction of continued existence continues to exist.

On another point of interest to us, Hume said of the nature of
logic: "Upon the whole, necessity is something, that exists in the
mind, not in objects."[33] Our phenomenology of language would locate
logic in the mind also, though we would add that it is only through
language, more particularly a misuse of language as Heidegger would
say, that logical necessity and identity come to exist in the mind and
subsequently thought to exist in the world. Overall, perhaps Hume's
phenomenalism could have gotten an extra boost and boast if he had
given this extra attention to language as rhetoric. The rhetorical
perspective on language and thought tends to mix well with "scepticism."
But since he was more in step with the issues of his own day, Hume di-
rected his arguments against the representative theory of perception
and its surrogate style of having ideas and words stand for objects.
The representative theory of perception is the historically ascendant
theory of contemporary semantic views of language, where words are
thought to signify objects.

Though his own philosophy had some similarities with phenome-
nalism, much of Husserl's own efforts were spent trying to solve what
he took to be the problem of Hume's phenomenalism and its tendency
toward subjective idealism. We do not wish to endorse either just
Hume or just Husserl on this "issue." Let us only generally observe
that while Hume and his phenomenalism had emphasized what we take to

be the _rhetorical_ aspects of language and consciousness, Husserl wanted
(in this present respect) to emphasize the _poetic_ or concrete aspects.
Actually, the "issue" of Husserl's phenomenology versus Hume's phenom-
enalism is only an issue of a poetic view of language and consciousness
versus a rhetorical view. But the general thesis of our study is that
poetry and rhetoric are _counterbalancing_ language functions and cannot
be separated. According to Gurwitsch's description, Hume had developed
a "consciousness of identity"[34] where objects in experience were iden-
tical with mental states. This consciousness of identity is the core
principle of phenomenalism. For us though, the phrase "consciousness
of identity" is a redundant phrase, since consciousness is itself based
on identity. As we explained through Nietzsche, it was only with the
fiction of identity or the equating of unequals that consciousness was
able to arise. In the Husserlian sense, we might say that this equat-
ing of unequals occurs when the noetic act _shorts out_ the poetically
energizing noema of perception. And this _shorting out_ is again the
result of _disregarding_ the noema as noema. For Husserl, the mind it-
self is formed by the equating of unequals or by this consciousness of
identity. Speaking of Husserl, Gurwitsch defines consciousness as _a_
noetic-noematic correlation.[35] Husserl himself speaks of a "parallel-
ism"[36] between the noetic act and the noema of perception. For our
own phenomenology of language, this correlation or parallelism of noesis
and noema is what constitutes language itself. Like consciousness,
language is the result or terminating point of noetic and noematic
functioning. Applying a paraphrase of Husserl, we could say that lan-
guage (like consciousness) is a transcendentally constituted product
shaped (in varying degrees) on the basis of concrete experiences.[37]

To develop more fully the set of suppositions about language surrounding noesis and noema, Husserl's philosophy includes two other more subsuming notions that are of even greater importance to our phenomenology of language, especially in terms of understanding the sources of poetry and rhetoric. These two more important and subsuming notions are logic and intentionality. We have already given, at least implicitly, a description of what Husserl meant by intentionality. Involving both the noetic and noematic aspects of consciousness, intentionality refers to the act which intends (i.e., an intentional act) and the object as it is intended (i.e., an intentional object). Husserl says "'intentionality' is the fundamental characteristic of 'psychic phenomena.'"[38] It involves the full range of psychological experiences-- loving, hating, imagining, desiring, willing etc. And Husserl thinks of these different experiences as "noetic layers"[39] superimposed upon one another. But Husserl considers intentionality as the most important aspect of consciousness, since it reveals the nature of consciousness as always conscious of something.

To say consciousness is always conscious of something, or that consciousness is always directed at the world and must be directed at the world, is a radical departure from traditional notions where consciousness is considered as a one dimensional and self sufficient sphere.[40] In exactly the same way, the phenomenology of language is a radical departure from traditional notions where language is thought of (though not always admittingly) as a one dimensional and independent sphere. For phenomenologists then, language and/or consciousness are founded upon world directedness through intentionality. With this world directedness as an essential part of consciousness, phenomenology (taken as the study of consciousness and/or language) cannot be just a mere

subjective idealism. Through intentionality, objects of experience become immanent within the noetic act and its bestowing of sign or symbol. And by virtue of this bestowal of sign or symbol, we could say that experience may become immanent within language, since the world directedness of intentionality determines or constitutes the very relationship between a sign or symbol and its referential object of experience.

But language is not based upon intentionality alone. Logic also has a role to play in the phenomenology of language. In its ordinary sense, logic is considered as an inquiry which investigates the principles that regulate correct and reliable inferences. As phenomenologists of language, we don't flatly disagree with the logical process; rather, we find it to be a process of negligible significance once the poetic and rhetorical origins of language are fully grasped. But even if we might softly admit to this traditional definition of logic, we cannot accept the philosophical approach that applies logic to an understanding of language (i.e., linguistic analysis), as if logic existed superiorly outside or apart from language. Phenomenologists believe we cannot study language apart from the intentionality upon which language is founded. And intentionality has its source in the speaking subject as _la parole_, not _la langue_. We have made this point in different ways in our last two chapters. The formulation of language through speech _precedes_ logic. Heidegger shows how logic arose out of grammar which in turn arose out of language. The logical content of a proposition then is supported by the linguistic expression itself, while the linguistic expression in turn is supported or given animation by the power of intentionality. What then exactly is the role of logic in language? In the remaining part of this chapter we will take up this

question. As the reader who has been following the drift of our essay
will have expected, we are going to emphasize how logic is the end
product of the speech act. In the speaking process, language moves
from intentionality _toward_ logic, not _from_ logic as is often thought.

In a short but perceptive article, Paul Ricoeur explains the
lucid connection he sees between the language theories of Husserl and
Ludwig Wittgenstein.[41] We will refer to Ricoeur's astute article here
not just because of the synthesizing clarity he gives to Husserl and
Wittgenstein, but also and especially because of the significance of
his article to our own theory of poetry and rhetoric. If we can apply
Ricoeur's article here, we will be able to give a new illumination to
how the analytic aspects of language are related to poetry and rhetoric.
As we observed above, for Husserl language involves both intentionality
and logic, or as Ricoeur says, language is the "intermediary" between
these two levels. Language is the intermediary between the logic in the
linguistic expression and the prelinguistic experience of intentionality.
And we might add parenthetically that this prelinguistic experience is
not unlike the Dionysian experience of Nietzsche. Ricoeur says the first
level of language constitutes its ideal of logicity or its _telos_. By
first level here, we mean the initial level encountered by the theoreti-
cian moving _retrogressively_ through the speech act. This first level
is also the level of meaning, since meaning can be recognized as such
only when it has been translated into a rationality or logic. To use
a phrase from our discussion in Chapter Two, an expression exhibits its
meaning through the _logos of statement_. The meaning of an expression
becomes fixed by its logicity, or intellectually held in place by the
logos of statement. _Telos_ refers to the notion that in logicity the

creative act of speaking has run its course and has become permanently formed or historicized in speech as language or logic. In other words, meaning is the telos, the end product, or the culmination of the act of speaking in language that is held in place by logic. In contrast to this first level, Ricoeur says the second level of language is constituted not by an ideal, but rather by "a ground, a soil, an origin"[42] that Husserl calls Ursprung. Here is the point that the creative act of speaking takes its first step in intentionality and evolves through speech as language into its telos as logic. Language, then, or the speech act, is the manifestation of intentionality as it reaches toward its end or telos in the logos of statement.[43]

Ricoeur says that theoretically "Language may be reached 'from above,' from its logical limit, or 'from below,' from its limit in mute and elemental experience. In itself it is a medium, a mediation, an exchange between Telos and Ursprung."[44] With the hope of not rushing the reader too much, let me give a preview of where we are heading. When language is reached "from above," we will call it rhetoric; when language is reached "from below," we will call it poetry. In consideration of our suggestion that rhetoric is language made use of with a primary concern for telos, we might recall here George Campbell's definition of rhetoric (in The Philosophy of Rhetoric) as the "art or talent by which discourse is adapted to its end" [my italics]. Campbell is saying that rhetoric determines or is the teleological use of language. Through language as rhetoric, telos or purpose comes to the fore. We do not mean to imply that poetry is language that has no purpose, but that the role of purpose in poetry is very unlike its role in rhetoric. However, to make this particular distinction clear, we will have to

wait till Chapter Five when we discuss the relationship of language to personal freedom. Obviously, Telos and Ursprung are only theoretical poles. Since they describe the basic operations and causes of rhetoric and poetry, and since we described language earlier as a poetic-rhetorical weave, it would be a tricky exercise to take a certain speaker's language and say that in this instance it has been approached "from above" or in that instance "from below." We are saying that Telos and Ursprung are two sources of rhetoric and poetry, and that in the act of speaking they become inextricably laced together to form language.

Our theory of poetry and rhetoric gets more support, if we compare it to what we think are some parallel developments in the early Wittgenstein's theory of language. Ricoeur says though the contexts Wittgenstein uses are different, the position and function of his major ideas are similar to Husserl's logic and intentionality, and to Telos and Ursprung. On these differing contexts of Wittgenstein's philosophy from the phenomenology of language, we should note that as an analytic philosopher Wittgenstein is primarily concerned with the Kantian question "What can I know?" instead of the Nietzschean question "Why is it even important to know?" The use we will make of Wittgenstein's Tractatus for defining the limits of rhetoric and poetry is obviously not the use he would make of it himself. As with Plato and other philosophers who have tried to approach knowledge through rational thought, we consider Wittgenstein's Tractatus to be itself an astute exercise in rhetorical prowess. Northrop Frye says "Wittgenstein's Tractatus . . . endeavors to purify verbal communication of the emotional content of rhetoric." But as Frye goes on, speaking of the attempts at conceptual schematization made by Wittgenstein, Plato and others, " . . . all of

them, however, impress the literary critic as being themselves rhe-
torical devices."[45] We wish to explain then how in the _Tractatus_
Wittgenstein defines the essence of rhetoric without even acknowledging
it.

Instead of a discussion of logic and intentionality, the _Tracta-_
tus gives a discussion of tautology and contradiction. But unlike the
later Husserl, Wittgenstein attempts to use _logic_ as the basis for lan-
guage. Citing Wittgenstein, Ricoeur says the concern of logic is with
the possibilities of truth, or with the logical conditions under which
truth is attained. Analytically speaking, tautology and contradiction
are the polarities within which such possibilities and their truth con-
ditions are structured. But though Wittgenstein tries to use logic as
the foundation of language, Ricoeur says "the _Tractatus_ as a whole over-
flows this structure and does not use logic as a basis."[46] The _Tractatus_
spills over its logical basis in its attempt to account for a non-tauto-
logical notion of truth, i.e., a truth that is based upon the correspond-
ence of propositions to objects in experience. Concerning these objects
of experience, it may provide some clarity if we point out that in the
Tractatus Wittgenstein is more concerned with the relationship of signs
and symbols among themselves, than with the properties of things which
these signs or symbols may or may not denote. Wittgenstein does not
take up the problem of _verification._ Also, one of his commentators,
David Pears, says Wittgenstein "deliberately left it an open question
whether the objects in the _Tractatus_ would be material or phenomenological
because for his purpose it did not matter."[47] But still, Wittgenstein
wants to show how there is a logical structure to language which corres-
ponds to what he takes to be as the logical structure of reality. And

Wittgenstein must develop this non-tautological notion of truth since, as he says, "Tautologies and contradictions are not pictures of reality."[48] There is nothing in reality that is necessarily true or necessarily false; there is no necessity in the world. Wittgenstein says "The only necessity that exists is logical necessity."[49]

To accommodate this non-tautological notion of truth, Wittgenstein developed his famous "picture theory" where he claims that a proposition is a picture of reality. In trying to put forward this non-tautological notion of truth through his picture theory, the challenge before Wittgenstein was much the same as the challenge that had been before the early Husserl. Ricoeur says "as Husserl had to elaborate a theory of meaning distinct from that of logical propositions" and the universal ideas reached through reduction, so Wittgenstein had "to elaborate a picture theory distinct from that of truth conditions."[50] Since tautology and contradiction cannot be pictures of reality, how are they still to structure the logical relations among propositions that do convey factual sense? For Husserl it is language as meaning that provides this pivotal or mediating role between logic and the world as it is experienced in intentionality; for Wittgenstein it is the proposition as picture (which in turn has more elementary propositions as its truth function) that provides the mediation between tautology and contradiction. Diagramatically then, the comparison Ricoeur makes between Husserl and Wittgenstein might be expressed thus:

HUSSERL   WITTGENSTEIN

Logic or Telos   Tautology

Language is the manifes-   Language \ Proposition   As a picture of reality,
tation of intentionality   as   as   the proposition is the
as it reaches for its   Meaning /   Picture   pivotal point between
Telos in logic.   tautology and contradiction.

Intentionality or Ursprung   Contradiction

As Ricoeur says, the contexts of Husserl and Wittgenstein are different,
but the position and function of their major ideas are comparable. Our
diagram shows how the notion of _meaning_ for Husserl, like the notion of
picture for Wittgenstein, constitutes the essence of language.

But exactly how does the proposition come to serve as a picture
of reality? Again, the problem with Wittgenstein that Ricoeur emphasizes
is this: If a tautology is not a picture of reality, and yet a true
thought must be a picture of the world, how can the picture which ex-
plains the structure of non-tautologically true propositions avoid
"overflowing" its logical base? For the reader unfamiliar with the
Tractatus, I have selected these eight crucial premises that outline
Wittgenstein's argument of how a proposition works as a picture of
reality:

1. We picture facts to ourselves (2.1).
2. A picture is a model of reality (2.12).
3. A picture presents a situation in logical space (2.11).
4. It [a picture] is laid against reality like a measure (2.1512).
5. A proposition constructs a world with the help of a logical
   scaffolding, so that one can actually see from the proposi-
   tion how everything stands logically if it is true (4.023).
6. The logical scaffolding surrounding a picture determines
   logical space. The force of a proposition reaches through
   the whole of logical space (3.42).
7. The totality of propositions is language (4.001).
8. A proposition can be true or false only in virtue of being
   a picture of reality (4.06).

If we had enough space to include some other intermediary premises, we
would see that Wittgenstein's argument is very tightly knit. There is
little room for the reader's mind to wonder as the _Tractatus_ moves from
one point to the next. Carrying on this same train of thought, Wittgen-
stein says "I construe a proposition as a function of the expression
contained in it," and, "An expression has meaning only in a proposition."[51]
Only a proposition can give meaning to an expression, since only in a

proposition can an expression be formed by the structure of logical re-
lations. This is parallel to Husserl saying that only through language
as meaning (the proposition for Wittgenstein) can intentionality reach
its Telos.

For Wittgenstein, logic lays bare the structure of the proposi-
tion. He thought the sentences of ordinary speech contain a hidden
structure that can be revealed by logical analysis. Any written or
spoken language, says Wittgenstein, can be analyzed into the universal
language of elementary propositions. And with the attainment of these
elementary propositions, he believed it would be possible to plot out
the limits of any actual language, since these elementary propositions
formed the common logical core of all languages. It is in this sense
that we earlier suggested a comparison of Chomsky to Wittgenstein: As
Chomsky searches for "kernels" and "deep structures" to which all sen-
tences of all languages must be transformable, Wittgenstein searches for
elementary propositions to which all sentences of all languages must be
reducible. Though Wittgenstein doesn't use the word reduction as
Husserl did, he clearly implies that through logical analysis we can
reduce "factual discourse" to the truth functions of elementary propo-
sitions. Moreover, he says "A proposition has one and only one complete
analysis."[52] But as with the early Husserl, it is at this point that
we come to the punch line of the Tractatus: Wittgenstein does not give
any examples of these so-called elementary propositions. Though he does
specify that elementary propositions do not need to be consistent with
each other (If one is true or false, there is no implication that any
other must be true or false.), with no examples of these elementary
propositions the curiosity of the inquisitive reader must remain unslaked.

Such inquisitive readers may have already sensed, though, that our phe-
nomenology of language would deal with this problem by explaining how
these fundamental analytics of language are founded upon the rhetorical
process of creating identities through abstractions, and we will further
develop this thesis shortly. Even for Wittgenstein, these elementary
propositions constitute the inner limits or abstract core of language.
In attempting to account for why no examples of these elementary propo-
sitions are given, David Pears says "Wittgenstein . . . thought that
neither he nor any other philosopher had yet got down to the ultimate
components of factual propositions."[53] But the history of philosophy
is full of rationalizers who held out an optimistic faith in the ability
of their philosophies to eventually yield the perfect knowledge. We
need only mention the optimistic faith in the positivism of Auguste
Comte or in the rationalizations of Nietzsche's Socrates. Wittgenstein
holds out a Comtean hope that one day our logical thinking will reach
this epistemic El Dorado.

Here is the exact point at which the Tractatus "overflows" its
structure and points to the implausibility of using logic as the basis
of language, or of making pictures of reality out of propositions, shaped
while standing on a logical scaffolding. And with this "overflowing,"
the significance of the speaking subject must again be considered. The
early Husserl (i.e., the Husserl of the reduction) was faced by just
this problem encountered by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus. While the
early Husserl had to overcome logical truths and the sterile universal
ideas of reduction, the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus had to overcome
the destitution of sense in tautology in order to show how logic still
says something about the world by implicatively growing out into the

whole of language. The discomfort of this position spurred the later Husserl's return to the speaking subject. We should add, though, that as a phenomenologist even the <u>early</u> Husserl seemed more aware than Wittgenstein that the sterility of logic may keep it from being intimately involved in producing the offspring predicates that characterize regular speech. But still, the early Husserl also had what ultimately was an <u>essentialist</u> view of language.

Ricoeur also suggests that in their later philosophies Husserl is still better able than Wittgenstein to comprehend language as a living activity. For the later Husserl, the relationship between language and prelinguistic experience was a point of principle interest. Ricoeur directs our attention to "two trends"[54] in Husserl that are important for understanding the relation between language and prelinguistic experience. For our purpose here, let us think of these two trends as constituting the essential dynamics of intentionality. These two trends are <u>reduction</u> or bracketing, and <u>Rückfragen</u> or back questioning. We have already discussed the early Husserl's theory of reduction which led to an essentialist based notion of language, but let us still summarize a few of its key points. Reduction involves a retreating within one's own thinking apparatus, partly so that one might savor the various aspects of a particular idea. Closing even one of his later works, the <u>Cartesian Meditations</u>, Husserl had quoted St. Augustine saying "Do not wish to go out; go back into yourself. Truth dwells in the inner man."[55] This, of course, is in strong conflict with the poetic tendency contained in our phenomenology of language. Nietzsche particularly, is fond of talking about the <u>inner world</u> of error and deception. Whatever epistemological advantage Husserl may have attached to reduction, our own phenomenology stresses that in reduction the noema is always <u>disregarded</u>

as noema. This disregarding transmutes the noema into an idea or sign. The very structuring of the idea or sign is based upon reduction. Ricoeur says "this distanciation, this suspension, this reduction [is that] which constitutes the sign as sign."[56]

But once we have arrived at the sign through reduction and have distanced ourselves from the objects in experience, there arises the question of what should be used to _fill_ the sign. Ricoeur notes "the sign is 'empty' in the sense that it is not the thing, but indicates the thing, and is not itself, since it exists only to indicate."[57] It is what Ricoeur calls the problem of _fulfillment_ that was not adequately dealt with by the Husserl of the reduction. What is to be done about the emptiness of the idea or sign? This omission made by Husserl may seem strange, since the notion of _a return to the things themselves_ has always been a rallying point for phenomenology. Even the proto-phenomenologist Goethe had stressed the importance of keeping a close connection of thinking with perception. On this relationship of thinking to perception, Ricoeur stresses that a complete fulfillment is not possible, i.e., the thing can never completely correspond with or be identical with the sign. But there is still the process of Rückfragen or back questioning that counterbalances _reduction_ by at least aiming toward _fulfillment_. Ricoeur says:

> [P]erception is by nature perspectival and inadequate;
> syntactic and categorical factors are always implied in
> the least judgment of perception; and the thing itself,
> as a unity of all its profiles or perspectives, is pre-
> sumed, not given. Therefore, what we call "intuition"
> is itself the result of "synthesis," of passive syntheses
> that already have their syntax, that are articulated in
> a prereflective and prejudicative (or prepredicative)
> sense . . . . [But these] prepredicative and prelinguistic
> structures are not given; we cannot start from them.
> We have rather to be _brought back_ to them by the means
> of a process that Husserl calls Rückfragen.[58]

Because the structure of the sign is itself based upon reduction, we need to have a reverse process that allows us to breakdown its structure and to see what it is the sign is supposedly signifying.

Through the process of Rückfragen, we penetrate or get behind the sign and restore our connection with prelinguistic or premordial lived experience. Spiegelberg says the phenomenologist "bids us to turn toward phenomena which had been blocked from sight by the theoretical patterns in front of them"--or blocked from sight by prejudgments or preconceptions that are always based upon language. In the process of Rückfragen, we strip away language "to undo the effect of habitual patterns of thought and to return to the pristine innocence of first seeing" or first experiencing.[59] In Rückfragen, there is an attempt to disassemble the ideological edifice that is structured and held in place by language as rhetoric. Considered in the sense of Nietzsche, the process of Rückfragen would involve the dissolution of Apollinian consciousness. The back questioning of Rückfragen then makes other signs possible by showing that no particular sign is necessary. It illuminates other possibilities, rather than eliminating them. And this in essence is what we described earlier as the poetic project of unconcealment, in contrast to signification.

We should be careful though not to underestimate the difficulty of carrying out this process of Rückfragen. As Ricoeur says, even a process as creative and spontaneous as intuition does not precede syntactic formations because of the analytic structure of language. It is difficult to penetrate or get "under the skin" of language. With the prodigious presence of grammar and categorical factors, there is a tendency for the sign to always jump into an intuition ahead of the imagi-

nation. As we recall Merleau-Ponty in this chapter's caption, analytic thought disrupts the perceptual process in its movement from one noema to another. Analytic thought forces upon perceivers "a unity which is already there when [they] perceive." What is usually called intuition then, is based upon analytic unities that are not regularly or consciously recognized as prior existing unities. We might even consider the whole of the Tractatus as a set of inutitive generalizations about language, though still itself based upon language and prior existing unities beneath the surface of the author's awareness. In Nietzsche's sense, the Tractatus approaches the perfect fiction; in our sense, it approaches the perfect rhetoric. And even the present study would be susceptible to this charge to the extent that it could be said to be hiding analytic unities of its own. In the effort to recover the authenticity of lived experience, Ricoeur warns " . . . this so-called lived experience, for men who were born among words, will never be the naked presence of an absolute, but will remain that toward which this regressive questioning points."[60] Like the Dionysian experience of Nietzsche, the authenticity of lived experience is something that can never be fully or absolutely realized. For human beings who are born among words or the rhetoric of consciousness, pure poetry or the poetic life can never be completely attained, but only worked toward.

When we consider the later Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations looking for the corresponding move of the later Husserl's Rückfragen, Ricoeur says "we have the impression that the author does not even consider the possibility of coming back from a logical language to ordinary language by way of a regressive inquiry."[61] But even though the later Wittgenstein, moreover, does not attempt any phenomenological

penetration of the structure of language, there is still an overall

reversal in the language theory of the later Wittgenstein. It is not

crucial to our present inquiry to detail this reversal, but it is worth

mentioning. Pears summarizes the difference between the early Wittgen-

stein and the late by saying:

> [H]e abandoned the idea that the structure of reality deter-
> mines the structure of language, and suggested that it is really
> the other way around. Our language determines our view of
> reality, because we see things through it. So he no longer
> believed it to be possible to deduce the pre-existing struc-
> ture of reality from the premise that all languages have a
> certain common structure.[62]

The later Wittgenstein lost his Comtean hope that one day his logical

analysis would uncover the ultimate components of a factual discourse.

Of significance to us, Pears also says:

> It is Wittgenstein's later doctrine that outside human
> thought and speech there are no independent, objective points
> of support, and meaning and necessity are preserved only in
> the linguistic practices which embody them. They are safe
> only because the practices gain a certain stability from
> rules.[63]

The language theory of the later Wittgenstein, then, has a certain epis-

temological flexibility that would make it more accommodating to rhetor-

ical speculations about thinking and speaking.

But lacking in _both_ the early and late language theories of

Wittgenstein is a sense of consciousness or mind as a rhetorical con-

struction. <u>There is no concept of a speaking subject in Wittgenstein.</u>

There is nothing, or no one, to ignite or cause the leaping of a spark

between tautology and contradiction. While the movement from the inten-

tionality of a speaking subject to logic involves a movement from the

concrete to the abstract (or from the poetic to the rhetorical), the

movement between contradiction and tautology is only a movement between

abstractions, and therefore cannot fully describe the speech act.

Ricoeur says lacking in both the early and late language theories of Wittgenstein is "the dialectic between the reduction which creates distance, and the return to reality, which creates presence."[64] In Wittgenstein, there is no way of getting at the concrete. Any full account of language must explain these phenomenological movements of language and thought as they take place within the speaking subject. The intentionality of Husserl can be interpreted as involving the movement between reduction and Rückfragen, since it is through the power of intentionality that language derives its potential to create the human reality and infuse it with meaning. The dialectic of reduction and Rückfragen, as powered by intentionality, constitutes the inhaling and exhaling of the living activity of speech.

We have already explained in Chapters Two and Three how we should think of rhetoric as the language function that creates distance between signs or symbols and primordial lived experience. We also explained earlier how the poetic project creates presence by returning to this lived experience. One essential aspect of the poetic process that has come to the surface repeatedly in these last three chapters is that to create this presence poetry must in some way work against the established edifice of literal meanings. Poetry then becomes a rebellion against language, but paradoxically carries out its rebellion through the use of language. Describing the development of the child's mind into that of a mature adult's, Georges Gusdorf says "the life of mind ordinarily begins not with the acquisition of language, but with the revolt against language once it is acquired."[65] Gusdorf also seems to think that this poetic life of the mind never seems to exist for most persons. Whatever the case on this latter issue, we have here an important point of contrast

between poetry and rhetoric: <u>Poetry is an attempt to use language</u>

<u>against itself</u>, while rhetoric is an attempt through the ruse of ra-

tional thought and its literal meanings to make language <u>identical</u> with

primordial lived experience. <u>Rhetoric is an attempt to make the world</u>

<u>of words more real than the primordial lived experience</u>. We would now

like to add to our line up of terms <u>Rückfragen</u> and reduction as ways

of giving a significant (though still partial) depiction of these poetic

and rhetorical tendencies within a speaking subject.

But we also want our theory of poetry and rhetoric to acknowl-

edge the connection Ricoeur makes between Husserl and Wittgenstein.

Seeing such a connection would imply that we see an intimate relation-

ship of logic with rhetoric--and, of course we do. If we must look at

language in a primarily analytic sense, using the three categories of

modal logic (tautology, contradiction and contingency), we could think

of tautology and contradiction as the <u>abstract</u> raw materials of lan-

guage. Through the involvement of tautology with contradiction in the

speech process, there arises the <u>possibility</u> of contingency. And for

Wittgenstein, only a contingent proposition can be a picture of reality.

The notion of contingency, especially the <u>contingency of man</u>, is a fun-

damental idea examined in the works of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty which

we will take up in our next chapter. Our present point though is to

stress that instead of thinking of tautology and contradiction in the

simplistic way of the logician, we should learn to think of them <u>phe-</u>

<u>nomenologically</u>. What does this mean? It means we can cautiously

accept Wittgenstein's definition or description of tautology and contra-

diction, but we must see them or their effects as they relate to <u>ex-</u>

<u>perience</u>. Wittgenstein says "A tautology leaves open the whole--the

infinite whole--of logical space," but phenomenologically it denies the
whole--the infinite whole--of prelinguistic experience. Likewise,
though "a contradiction fills the whole of logical space,"[66] phenomeno-
logically it too denies the whole of experience. As rhetorical theorists,
we should be on the look out for these logical propensities in speech.
We said before that in the speaking process language moves from its
groundings in intentionality _toward_ logic, not _from_ logic as is often
thought. Let us further explain then how logic is to be considered as
the end product of language as rhetoric by recalling some observations
made in Chapter Three.

Nietzsche said "Logical thinking represents the model-example
of a perfect fiction."[67] We refined and updated Nietzsche's observa-
tions to explain how logical thinking represents the model example of
a _perfect rhetoric_. We explained how logical thinking involves an
attempt to make the world itself _identical_ with the literal meanings of
one's language. We also explained how these fictions or rhetorics de-
velop through an erroneous relationship of subject and predicate based
upon the logical copula "is." The "is" makes us _forget_ or _disregard_
the predicate as a metaphor or noema. In the perfect _identity_ of tau-
tology (e.g. "x is x"), metaphor and the poetic vapors of speech have
completely evaporated. The perfect identity of subject and predicate
in tautology produces the perfect illusion, since only through metaphor
or the imagination does a predicate ever pass on into a subject. Tau-
tology is the ultimate attempt to transcend a poetic or metaphorical
relationship between subject and predicate, and therefore we consider
tautology as the ultimate rhetoric. Instead of considering tautology
as the logic of _identity_, we might borrow a term from Burke and consider

tautology as the logic of identification. When a speaker addressing the

local chamber of commerce says "business is good" or "communism is bad,"

he is attempting to shape language into tautology through the use of

identification. In both cases the predicates of these propositions

("good" and "bad") do not expand upon the subjects ("business" and "com-

munism"). In rhetoric or the tautological propensity of language, there

is an identity of subject and predicate based upon an identification

within the communication situation. Since phenomenologically a speaker

cannot be separated from the sociology of his speech situation, tautol-

ogy and reasoning in general are to be understood as forms of identifi-

cation.

This tautological propensity of speech comes to a head in what

Richard Weaver calls "rhetorical absolutes,"[68] or what are more widely

known as ultimate terms. The aim in speech as rhetoric is to move toward

a rhetorical absolute. Thereafter, with the establishment of such an

absolute for a particular speaking community, the reasoning will move

from the absolute, as Weaver says, "flowing down through many links of

ancillary terms."[69] But even with the establishment of a rhetorical

absolute, this tautological propensity is still the shaping force of

discourse. Burke says "'tautology,' refers to the fact that, insofar

as an entire structure is infused by a single generating principle, this

principle will be tautologically or repetitively implicit in all the

parts."[70] In the ideology of the local chamber of commerce then, the

proposition "business is good," etc., will be implicit and repetitive

throughout the structure of that particular system of symbols. Tautol-

ogy is primarily a study in ideology, since it concerns itself exclu-

sively with the internal logic of a particular symbol system. In our

phenomenology of language, logic as a whole is to be taken as the ideological bombast of the intellect. We will have a fuller discussion of ideology in Chapter Six.

These above observations can also be applied to some other themes in contemporary rhetorical theory. T. O. Windt and other rhetorical theorists make frequent use of the expression moralistic rhetoric. As I understand them, a moralistic rhetoric is a piece of communication that has cut off negotiation. In a moralistic rhetoric, a speaker amplifies his insistence for his own point of view to such an extent that he cuts off all other opinions. In an analytic sense, such a speaker could be said to have cut off contingency, since no other points of view are possible. But when defined in this way, a so-called moralistic rhetoric is then no different from what our phenomenology of language means by rhetoric proper. The aim of a moralistic rhetoric, like rhetoric in general, is to conceal or erase the contingency of man. Like rhetoric in general, the speaker using a moralistic rhetoric forgets or disregards the metaphorical or noematic status of his predicates. But even though most of these rhetorical theorists may well agree with our definition or description of moralistic rhetoric, very few are rigorous or persistent enough to carry on their inquisitions to the point where they could realize that such a definition would ultimately have no footing in essentialist or logically based theories of language. Such a definition of moralistic rhetoric can be plausible only when we consider logic as the outcome (not an antecedent) of the speech act. When logic is considered as the basis for language, a moralistic rhetoric must be taken as just another valid and laudable form of argument. The concept of a moralistic rhetoric ultimately then becomes unfounded in logically

based theories of language. However, the above definition of moralistic rhetoric could find a solid placement in our phenomenology of language.

With our above characterization of the three categories of modal logic, it is possible to get a better _feel_ for how logic is to be related to rhetoric and poetry. Since logic, numbers, and the whole "hocus-pocus of mathematics" (Nietzsche) grew out of an attempt to create _identifica-tions_, analytic terminology should finally be recognized as being founded on language as rhetoric. Tautology and contradiction anthropologically did not exist, and even ontologically cannot exist, until _after_ both the act of speaking and a withdrawal into the inner world of error and deception. It is in light of these considerations of the last three chapters that we have regarded rhetoric and poetry as _preceeding_ logic in the phenomenological structure of language. We are saying: _Once we consider language as a living activity based in la parole, poetry and rhetoric replace Wittgenstein's contradiction and tautology as the theo-retical outer limits of language._ Instead of regarding poetry and rhet-oric as arising out of some logical abuse of language, we should then realize how tautology and contradiction are themselves possible only be-cause of the rhetorical and poetic foundations of language.

We have seen in this chapter how logical concepts are not totally irrelevant to a discussion of poetry and rhetoric (as an extreme relativ-ist might have us think). However, _logical concepts must be correctly placed within the phenomenological context of the speech act._ In this chapter, we have hopefully added some insight as to what that theoreti-cal placement should be. We must now offer an examination of how these logical concepts get developed in the communication process, i.e., what is going on communicatively when language users _create necessity_ for

themselves or others? Though we have said much in the last three chap-
ters to give a theoretical or abstract characterization of poetry and
rhetoric, we have not said much about the communicative dynamics involved
in these. Reason, necessity, tautology--these don't exist prior to or
outside a certain accumulation of speech experiences. What then is the
role of the communication process in structuring these within a partic-
ular speaking community? It is to a consideration of these matters that
we now turn.

V. THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF COMMUNICATION

> How can we understand someone else without sacrificing
> him to our logic or it to him?--Maurice Merleau-Ponty[1]
>
> The lordly right of giving names extends so far that
> one should allow oneself to conceive the origin of
> language itself as an expression of power on the part
> of the rulers: they say "this is this and this," they
> seal every thing and event with a sound and, as it were,
> take possession of it.--Friedrich Nietzsche[2]
>
> What do you consider most humane?--To spare someone
> shame.--Friedrich Nietzsche[3]

In this chapter, we intend to work out a general phenomenolog-
ical theory of communication. Working with and implementing some of
the ideas sketched out in our last three chapters, we will give a phe-
nomenological account of the role of language and communication in the
shaping of personal and communal identities. All the phenomenologists
have something to say about communication, but the one who has made
communication the central feature of his whole philosophy is Jean-Paul
Sartre. Merleau-Ponty, also, has given a more poignant role to commu-
nicative matters in his philosophy than is given by Husserl and some
of the other phenomenologists. Therefore, our discussion in this chap-
ter will for the most part center around the theorizing of Sartre and
Merleau-Ponty. We will begin with an exposition of Sartre's basic con-
ceptions as they are developed in his major philosophical work, Being
and Nothingness (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966). Then we
will apply these conceptions to communicative matters in their con-
junction with social conflict, sex, and language pathologies.

A. Basic Conceptions

Necessary for an understanding of any philosopher's view of communication is an understanding of how he sees reality. The duality of objects and consciousness is what makes up Sartre's reality. Borrowing two terms from Hegel's <u>The Phenomenology of Mind</u>, Sartre thinks of an object as a being-in-itself, while he thinks of consciousness as being-for-itself. Being-in-itself is nonconscious being. It is the world of things that becomes subjectively disclosed to us through consciousness; it is the existence of things which appears before consciousness, though these things are never completely revealed by consciousness. Being-in-itself is the irreducible foundation of the existent. Sartre says: "Being is. Being is in-itself. Being is what it is. These are the three characteristics which the preliminary examination of the phenomenon of being allows us to assign to the being of phenomena."[4] When Sartre says being-in-itself is simply the being that <u>is</u>, he means it is neither "derived from the possible nor reduced to the necessary."[5] Like Heidegger, he considers being as beyond both affirmation and negation. As something that simply <u>is</u>, being is not subject to the conscriptions of logic. Like Hume and Wittgenstein in our last chapter, Sartre says "Necessity concerns the connection between ideal propositions but not that of existents." In contrast, "The possible is a structure of the <u>for-itself</u>, that is, it belongs to the other region of being. Being-in-itself is never either possible or impossible. It <u>is</u>."[6] When considered along with some of our earlier observations, one quick inference we might draw from this is that since language as poetry tends to concern itself with possibility or contingency, even <u>it</u> cannot have the status of or fully convey being-in-itself. And since language as rhetoric tends to concern itself

with necessity (tautology) and impossibility (contradiction), it is even further removed from being-in-itself. Since language as rhetoric tends to concern itself with necessity and impossibility, it cannot "give voice to being" (Heidegger) or be a "picture of reality" (Wittgenstein). As we move along, we will see how language as rhetoric denies to the for-itself the structure of the possible.

The nihilation of being-in-itself, or consciousness, stands in contrast to this being of objects. Consciousness is a negation of the world because it is itself non-being. Sartre expresses this notion by saying that consciousness is a nothingness. As a nothingness, consciousness is a reality negating function comparable to the negative of Kenneth Burke. Through his use of language, Burke says man injects negativity into the world. Man is the inventor of the negative since "there are no negatives in nature, where everything simply is what it is and as it is. . . . The negative is a function peculiar to symbol systems. . . [and] we could not properly say that man 'invented' the negative unless we can also say that man is the 'inventor' of language itself."[7] While Burke thinks of man as the inventor of the negative, for Sartre man is the negative or a nothingness. For Sartre, man is his language. Consciousness then becomes an individual's personal expression through language of his being in a world of beings-in-themselves. As a lack of being, consciousness draws upon being-in-itself in an attempt to fill its own emptiness. As a state of ontological deficiency, consciousness must attempt to transcend itself to compensate for its lack. Through this effort to transcend itself or to make itself a being-in-itself, consciousness produces and becomes language. In this language, consciousness becomes entangled in the world. And while consciousness cannot sever itself from the being of

objects, a harmonious integration of being-in-itself with consciousness is not possible, since these constitute the positive and negative poles of Sartre's ontology. The accurate estimate of human reality then is one that recognizes this duality of being and nothingness, along with its integral tension. Everything Sartre has to say about man and communication will be based upon this ontological structure. We might parenthetically note at this point how Sartre's understanding of consciousness compares to that of Nietzsche's. While for Nietzsche consciousness is a socially constructed entity, for Sartre consciousness is a nothingness. While for Nietzsche consciousness seems to be the result of language, for Sartre consciousness is the negative that makes language possible. These differences, though, are not great ones when they are considered within the overall context of our phenomenology of language. Like Sartre, Nietzsche also considers consciousness as a negation of the world. More particularly, for Nietzsche consciousness is a negation of the metaphors of perception. Also, what we will call the self in this chapter, will have the same position and function as Nietzsche's consciousness in Chapter Three. Nietzsche would consider consciousness or the "herd" tendency as a product of what Sartre calls bad faith. In this chapter, we will explain how the self is a product of communication and bad faith.

Sartre says the antagonistic relationship between being-in-itself and being-for-itself leads to a feeling of anguish. This anguish, or existential dread, is one of the most important ideas in phenomenological psychology. Kierkegaard goes to the extreme of saying "So soon as psychology has finished with dread, it has nothing to do but to deliver it over to dogmatics."[8] Anguish or dread, though, should not be confused with fear. Following Kierkegaard, Sartre

distinguishes between anguish and fear in this way: Both fear and anguish involve an anticipation of misfortune or pain. But while fear is based upon something in the world, anguish is the feeling of a person before himself, or of a person sensing his own freedom in a meaningless world. Sartre says this feeling of dread or anguish is the result of experiencing a world void of value and meaning. Anguish is the feeling that results from a direct perception of the human real- ity. Furthermore, Sartre's human reality is, hostile to the intellect. No matter how hard a human being tries, he cannot deduce or reason out any values or meaning from being-in-itself. Since reason has to do only with necessity and impossibility, it cannot get a grip on that which simply is. But everyone has to believe in something or have some sense of purpose, since these are the only activities that can comfort in the face of existential dread or anguish. To believe though, or to have a sense of purpose, is to distort the human reality. For, as Sartre says, there are no ontological indicatives to meaning or values. Most persons find this harsh feeling of anguish caused by exposure to the meaningless and valueless human reality too much to bear. Their remedy for this existential discomfort always involves an attempt to surrender their freedom to the being of objects. But again, being-in-itself has no values or meanings that can function as a deter- minism or purpose, and thereby relieve this anguish or dread of freedom. Values and meaning are the result of what Sartre describes as a projec- tion of "facticity" on to nothingness. Values and meaning are the product of attempting to bring facticity into consciousness through the use of language as rhetoric, or of attempting to synthesize being and nothingness--and--such a project will always fail.

The essential dilemma of the human situation then is giving meaning or value to existence. This longing for meaning and values in a world that does not contain these leads to a state of _bad faith_ or self deception. Bad faith does not mean that a particular belief is either true or false; rather, bad faith pertains to the quality or phenomenological structure of belief as a whole. Bad faith is the consequent of trying to escape the responsibility of one's freedom to _choose_ or _create_ values and meaning. Bad faith takes place in conjunction with (or in collusion with) the Other. Each for-itself tries to make of himself a being-in-itself by making an object of the Other and his own for-itself. By the _Other_, Sartre means any object or other for-itself outside one's own for-itself. Through bad faith, there arises a new dimension of being or a third ekstasis called _being-for-others_. This attempt to escape the human reality, to lie to oneself or to make one a being-in-itself, is _the driving force of communication_. Of the intensity of the individual's need to escape this responsibility to choose by making use of the Other, Dostoyevsky says in _The Brothers Karamazov_: "[He has] no more pressing need than the one to find somebody to whom he can surrender, as quickly as possible, that gift of freedom which he, the unfortunate creature, was born with." This attempt to escape freedom through a project of bad faith constitutes the fundamental dynamics of the communication process that we will try to detail in this chapter.

Also of particular importance to Sartre's understanding of language and communication, and his philosophy as a whole, is his theory of freedom as _conscious choice_. The issue of freedom versus determinism is one that runs through much philosophical writing, though the significance of this issue for rhetoric as persuasion is seldom

adequately acknowledged. It is commonly held that successful persuasion is commensurate with _determining_ for a listener how he will view or act upon a certain set of circumstances. But Sartre contends that human beings are _not_ moved to action by reason, by biological drives, and not by any other kind of _determinism._ Instead, he contends that human beings are moved to action by _self choice._ Does this mean that Sartre would reject the idea of rhetoric as persuasion? Yes, when persuasion is considered in the above traditional sense; no, when the persuasive function is placed in its proper phenomenological context. And just how the persuasive function as it unfolds in the communication process is to be placed in the phenomenology of language is a matter this chapter will work toward clarifying. But though an individual cannot escape _self choice,_ his choice can be made consciously and authentically, or it can be made inauthentically at the level of what Sartre calls the unreflective or non-thetic consciousness. It is in this difference or contrast between conscious choice and choice made at the level of the unreflective consciousness that we will find the key for separating the poetic and rhetorical elements of language. Still, it should be stressed again that whatever the _level_ of choice, Sartre says human beings _must_ choose. They cannot escape choice since they are _condemned_ to be free.

Most human beings seek to escape this onus of choice, along with the anguish or dread implied in the experience of freedom. And believing that their actions are _determined_ is their way of attempting to relinquish this freedom or responsibility to choose. There are two basic ways or deceptive strategies in which human beings try to escape from freedom or conscious choice into determinism. Believing that there is a _rational_ way to act (i.e., think, speak, or do things) is one way

being-for-the-Other or bad faith is commonly expressed. On the basis of this particular style of self lie, it is usually thought that there exists an objective analysis of one's existence or life situation. This view of the human situation reaches its apex in the Platonist or the ideologist. Here, passions are contrasted with rational thought and persons are urged to opt for the latter. Here, "the good," "the just," "the true" etc., are considered as a priori notions that serve as measuring sticks for thought, speech and action. But in our phenomenology, this activity of rational thought is to be considered as a product of the unreflective consciousness. That is, it is with the unreflective consciousness that the criterion of objectivity is laid down. For the Platonist or ideologist, rational thought is believed to be the cause of how he is supposed to see the world; for the phenomenologist, rational thought is the result, i.e., a result that comes about through the speech act as it reaches toward its telos. In the case of the Platonist or ideologist, the unreflective consciousness has delineated the intellectual universe of the for-itself before it has confronted the poetry of experience. The Platonist or ideologist though has still chosen his system of reason, but he has not chosen it authentically or consciously. The objective situation then does not determine an action, rather it is only through the projection of the for-itself through thought, speech or action that the objective situation becomes defined. In evaluating a situation, the Platonist or ideologist must posit an end or telos. Only from this self chosen end can he then adduce the rationality of speech or action. The Platonist or ideologist then still chooses, but because he has chosen to hide his choice from himself through the ruse of rational thought, Sartre says he "chooses not to choose."

Another way being-for-the-Other or bad faith is commonly expressed by human beings is through their belief that they are driven by bodily instincts. Regarding biological drives, Sartre says the only meaning or significance these can have must be socially or communicatively _created_. Sartre stresses that "We choose the world, not in its contexture as in-itself but in its meaning, by choosing ourselves."[9] Consider the sexual "instinct." In _Being and Nothingness_ we will see how sexuality seems to be at the foundation of all human relations. But this is not sexuality as Freud thought of it; rather, it is what we will call a _social sexuality._ Arguing against Freud, Sartre says the sexual desire is not the result of biological pressures, nor is it a drive for physical satisfaction. Instead, he says the sexual desire arises as the result of a _choice_ made by the for-itself to enter into an _enslaving_ or _self deceiving_ relationship with the Other. " [T]he sexual attitude is a primary behavior toward the Other". But, "desire and sexuality in general express an original effort of the for-itself to recover its being which has become estranged through contact with the Other."[10] This is not to deny the possibility of a biological "malfunctioning," but to assert how the symbolic and social aspects of sex are more important than ordinarily thought. Desire and sexuality have their ultimate origins in communication or the drama of the social encounter. Sartre says desire is the consciousness of certain objects as desireable. Sexual desire cannot be biologically built in when we consider it as the product of a dramatically or socially constructed consciousness. A person (as in the sex of Freud), or an object (as in the private property of Marx), can become desirable only _after_ a social encounter has _coated_ it with a particular meaning, thereby _making_ it desirable. For all

meaning and values are the product of the for-itself as it enters into
communication with the Other to relieve itself of freedom and self choice.

B. Metaphor and the Theory of Freedom

We will come back to a detailed discussion of the relation of
communication and sexuality later in this chapter. But before we can
finish our discussion of these basic conceptions, we must first con-
sider more carefully the implications of Sartre's theory of freedom to
speech, particularly as it relates to the act of predicating. As we said
above, it is Sartre's view that what distinguishes some human beings
from others is not that some are free and some are not, but that some
human beings recognize their freedom and <u>consciously</u> choose, while
others fail to recognize their freedom and make their choice at the
level of the unreflective consciousness. We should realize that such a
theory of freedom implies or assumes much about language, particularly
about meaning, and more particularly about the relation of literal
meaning to metaphor. It is to the chagrin of the theoretician of poetry
and rhetoric that Sartre gives so little attention to metaphor in <u>Being</u>
<u>and Nothingness</u>. But it will not be difficult for us to cull out the
significance of Sartre's theory of freedom to our own view of metaphor.

Sartre says that <u>all</u> meaning can be traced back to the original
choice of the for-itself. With the positing of the original choice,
the cornerstone of an axiological or semantic system is laid down. All
values or meanings are built upon this cornerstone as the implications
of the original choice. Also, with the original choice there comes the
creation of motives or the "causes" of behavior. In this way, the
effects of the original choice reach far beyond what we would ordinarily

expect to be the impact of one decision. Sartre defines motive as "The ensemble of the desires, emotions, and passions which urge me to accomplish a certain act."[11] But even more significant to Sartrean phenomenology is the fact that these motives or causes of behavior are not psychologically determined. They are, rather, freely constituted. Sartre says: "Causes and motives have meaning only inside a projected ensemble which is precisely an ensemble of non-existents. And this ensemble is ultimately myself as transcendence; it is Me in so far as I have to be myself outside of myself."[12] In the phenomenology of language, there is an intimate connection between motive and meaning or value. Motives are generated by self chosen meanings or values. And, an expression can have meaning or significance only to the extent that it generates a motive of some kind. Burke goes to the extent of saying that for a symbolic being motives are words. In the process of dreaming, motives become "condensed"[13] into symbols. On this matter, Burke also says "The symbolic act is the dancing of an attitude"[14]--an attitude that is shaped at the level of the unreflective consciousness and emerges (or dances) into our awareness as word or meaning. The result of this choreographic treatment of attitudes is the production of motives as meanings or words. And for Burke, this series of events basically depicts the rhetorical process of language.

The above is the nascent process that produces all meaning and value. Of course, Sartre realizes that "each man finds himself in the presence of meanings which do not come into the world through him." In this sense, "My speech then is subordinated to the speech of others."[15] We are born into a world the Other has already looked at or has given meaning to. Since each person is born into an already established

speaking community, it would seem his speech is in some way based

upon what are taken to be the literal meanings of that particular com-

munity. But still, Sartre insists:

> . . . there can be no laws of speaking before one speaks
> [my italics]. And each utterance is a free project of
> designation issuing from the choice of a personal for-
> itself and destined to be interpreted in terms of the
> global situation of this for-itself. What is primary
> is the situation in terms of which I understand the
> meaning of the sentence; this meaning is not in itself
> to be considered as a given but rather as an end chosen
> in a free surpassing of means. Such is the only reality
> which the working linguist can encounter.[16]

The original project of the for-itself constructs a linguistically based

reality by building a framework of meaning within which this reality takes

its form for each speaker. Again, Sartre stresses that even though we

do not choose the world in its constitution of the in-itself, we still

choose its meaning. We must make this choice because there are no

ontological indicatives to meaning. Meaning has no existence independent

of self chosen speech. Like rational thought then, meaning cannot be

the cause of how one sees the world; it can only be the result of a

personal for-itself expressing a choice.

With these considerations of the relationship of meaning to

conscious choice before us, we can see how freedom and slavery, in

Sartre's view, will be based upon "an inner structure of consciousness."[17]

But the crucial factor in all of this for our own inquiry is that lan-

guage is the very support beams of this structure. A terminology that

is chosen at the level of the unreflective consciousness will work as

an oppression or self imprisonment for its user. A speaker can become

trapped by the prison of words as literal meanings that he has built

around himself and his life-world because these are his life-world.

Poetry, or especially metaphor, would then become the only way out for

this prisoner who has let himself be jailed by his unreflective con-
sciousness. The prisoner must rediscover his ability to choose his own
meanings. It is in actualizing the process of <u>conscious choice</u> that
poetry or metaphor sets us free. We want to define <u>literal meaning</u> here
as meaning that the speaker does <u>not</u> recognize as the product of his own
free choice. This is an addition or refinement of our view in Chapter
Three where we identified literal meanings with rhetoric, or in Chapter
Two where we identified literal meanings as the result of interpreting
being as idea. In inauthenticity, words as literal meanings are used
by the agent to shield himself from his responsibility of choosing.
For such a speaker, literal meanings are the words that seem to have
evolved out of being-in-itself on their own, <u>without</u> the mediation of
choice. Specifically then, the relation we want to see between metaphor
and Sartre's theory of freedom is this: We want to suggest that the con-
scious choice of predicates be equated with metaphorizing, while the
choice of predicates at the level of the unreflective consciousness be
equated with rhetoric or literal meanings. We are suggesting that a
<u>style of predicating</u> (literal or metaphorical) will be representative
of a <u>style of choosing</u>. Choosing predicates with "literal meanings"
is a form of bad faith or being-for-the-Other. Literal meanings do not
evolve from being-in-itself on their own; they always can be traced back
to the original project of a for-itself. (We will see later how it is
the concern of existential psychoanalysis to carry out this tracing back
of these meanings to the original project of the for-itself.) Literal
meanings are the result of an attempt to bring facticity into conscious-
ness or to synthesize being and nothingness. The construction of literal
meanings involves an attempt to make nothingness into a <u>something</u> by
showing (or implicitly assuming) that meaning has its origins in being-

in-itself--the being that simply _is_. In contrast, the world of the con-
sciously choosing speaker is not frozen is this "already existing"
crucible of meaning.

One very widely held view suggests that metaphor evolves out of
a struggle or a tension between two conflicting meanings. Variations
of the tension theory of metaphor can be found in I. A. Richard's dis-
cussion of tenor and vehicle, or in Richard Weaver's opposition of posi-
tive and dialectical terms. We also find it in the metaphor theories
of Philip Wheelwright, Paul Ricoeur, Max Black and others.[18] It should
be clear that our phenomenology of language does not deny this tension
or struggle between metaphor and literal meaning; rather, we are only
trying to be more precise as to what this tension or struggle consists.
The tension between metaphor and literal meaning is based upon a struggle
between consciousness and the unreflective consciousness; it is a strug-
gle between a consciously chosen predicate and a predicate that is the
result of a speaker choosing not to choose. The relationship between
the metaphorical and the literal is the relationship between conscious-
ness and the unreflective consciousness, no more and no less.

The differences and similarities between literal and metaphorical
meanings might be compared to the differences and similarities between
ice and water. Both literal meaning and metaphor, and both ice and water,
are made of the same substance (words or H_2O), though they come in dif-
ferent forms. As the form of H_2O is determined by the temperature, we
think the form of language is determined by the imagination or by the
style of choice. The iced up imagination of the speaker of literal
meanings tends to present the human reality in a frigid and inflexible
manner. But as the psychical temperature of a speaker warms, more move-
ment of the imagination is possible. With the warming brought on

through conscious choosing, there is a perspicuous _flow_ of creative movement. But whether a speaker's language is ice or water, or whether a speaker's predicates are literal or·metaphorical, depends _not_ on the language considered by itself (as is the common view based upon a positivist theory of Knowledge); rather, it depends primarily on _the disposition of the speaker toward what he says._ In exactly the same way, Sartre says that a human being's freedom is _not_ based upon the content of action, but rather on the attitude of choice that the agent brings to the action. Only through conscious choice can a speaker warm language to the point where it melts and flows so as to become authentic speech. And whether this language is melting and flowing can be decided only by understanding the _style of choosing_ predicates employed by the speaker. _Metaphorical expression gains or loses its peculiar force of predication only within the limits of a speaker's own style of choosing._ Though other language theorists have argued that language is inherently metaphorical, so far as I know none has yet grasped this exact sense in which this is so.

Let us try to consider some of the objections to such a view of literal and metaphorical meanings. It would seem that a proposition such as "the sea is _blue_" is very different in its metaphorical content from a proposition such as "the sea is _life_." The employment of predicates in these two propositions _seems_ very different in terms of their imaginative value. To understand how these two employments of predicates might be similar, we must refer again to Sartre's notion of original project. We want to understand how a speaker who sees a proposition such as "the sea is _blue_" as bearing no more than a literal meaning has only allowed himself to become trapped in the lethargy of custom. This speaker fails to realize that in saying "the sea is _blue_" he is

still engaging in a moment of free choice for himself. We might better
see this original choice if we consider "the sea is blue" as it would
be spoken by a child. Essentially, there is no difference between
a child uttering "the sea is blue" (as one of his first sentences) and
a mature poet saying "the sea is life." Both are struggling to associate
predicates that are on the horizon of their imagination with subjects
that are close at hand. Prior to their original speaking of these sen-
tences, "blue" is no more intrinsic to "sea" for the child, than "life"
is intrinsic to "sea" for the poet. When the child watching "Sesame
Street" is confronted with "the sea is blue," he is confronted with a
metaphor, not a literal meaning. The later Wittgenstein said the best
way to understand a word is to envisage how a child might come to use
it. In our example, the child's encounter with the predicate "blue" is
paradigmatic of all subsequent encounters with language, particularly
those encounters seen as poetical. In this sense Heidegger is correct
to say "Language itself is poetry in the essential sense."[19] The poet
using a metaphorical predicate is undergoing an experience with lan-
guage similar to that of a child in his acquisition of "literal meanings."
We might say that to a very significant extent learning to be a poet
involves learning to redo what we did in childhood, only with more sophis-
tication and intensity, and especially with more deliberateness. In a
manner similar to that of the child, the poet is stretching language as
he stretches the horizon of his field of meaning.

Sounding much like Nietzsche in our earlier chapter, Burke says
"we learn language 'rationally' only by much forgetting [my italics] (which
necessarily involves an 'unconscious' of some sort)."[20] The child's
acquisition of language as literal meanings is based upon his "skill"

at forgetting the metaphors of perception, or at disregarding the noema as noema. He learns language by repression, or more precisely, by hiding from himself his original choice. Speakers learn a language by forgetting their freedom. And as was discussed in the last three chapters, the logical copula "is" makes this forgetting even easier. The acquisition of language as literal meanings is based upon the process of proairesis--the use of freedom to lose freedom, or to choose not to choose. This is the "catch-22" feature inherent in the language acquisition process. Through this procedure of proairesis, speakers have given to language an existence of its own. As Sartre complains, "People have made of speech a language which speaks all by itself."[21] Paralleling our distinction between metaphor and literal meaning, Sartre distinguishes between speech and language. He says language is made up of dead words. Language has lost the breath of living speech. Once spoken, speech becomes sealed in the lexicographic coffin of language. The poet Horace said "the word once let slip flies beyond recall." Speech becomes language when the umbilical cord joining it to a speaking subject becomes severed as it moves through the sharp incisiveness of analytic thought, which gives to it an existence of its own. Whenever this cord is severed, speech dies. Sartre says "to know how to speak a language is not to have an abstract and pure knowledge of the language as it is defined by academic dictionaries and grammars."[22] To speak a language authentically one must know how to choose, or know that he must choose. And when we say that the poet has more complexity than the ordinary language user, we are referring to his style of choosing. Sartre wants his readers to understand how freedom or choosing "is the only possible foundation of the laws of language." He says:

> [T]he _speaker_ is the concrete foundation of his speech. . . .
> . . . . [T]here can be
> no laws of speaking before one speaks . . . .
> . . . . [since] it is within
> the free project of the sentence that the laws of speech are
> organized; it is by speaking that I make grammar.[23]

Applying Sartre's theory of freedom to our own phenomenology of

language then, we can say that literal meanings are the result of choosing

not to choose. In the way that human beings are necessarily free, they

are necessarily users of metaphor (though, seldom do they fully realize

this freedom). For all literal meanings involve the suspension of

belief in one's freedom to choose or to be creative. When we chart out

the literal meanings of a particular speaking community, we are only

revealing the structure of its unreflective consciousness. To sum up

this brief discussion of Sartre's theory of freedom and its relation to

the act of predication in speaking: We have been suggesting that meta-

phor be equated with authenticity in speaking. For to consciously choose

a predicate is to metaphorize, and to metaphorize is to consciously

choose a predicate. With these observations on the similarity of meta-

phor to authenticity, perhaps we can more fully understand Aristotle

when he says in the _Rhetoric_ that "the greatest thing by far is to be

a master of metaphor. It is the one thing that cannot be learnt from

others; and it is a sign of genius."[24] In a similar way, Sartre says

genius is "the way out a person invents in desperate cases."[25] This

"way out" is found by a speaker's ability to overthrow literal meanings

and rediscover choice. A speaker finds his "way out" by making metaphors.

C. Expression Through Body and Speech

In general, phenomenologists tend to value highly and to at-

tribute great significance to _expression_ and its role in the social

process. This expression of freedom is a built in characteristic of
consciousness on the same grounds that metaphor is a built in charac-
teristic of language. But speaking is not just a vocal activity. More
fundamentally, speaking is a bodily activity. And we can better under-
stand this vocal activity by understanding the bodily activity that
precedes it, or upon which it is based. To view body communication as
the foundation for oral communication is not a view unique to phenome-
nologists. In Mind, Self and Society, George Herbert Mead considers ges-
ture as "the basic mechanism whereby the social process goes on." He
says: "Language . . . has to be studied from the point of view of the
gestural type of conduct within which it existed without being as such
a definite language. And we have to see how the communicative function
could have arisen out of that prior sort of conduct." Mead also
cautions against approaching the study of language as the linguist does
". . . from the standpoint of the symbol that is used."[26] This modern
view as to the basicness of nonverbal communication was at least antici-
pated by Rousseau in his "Essay on the Origin of Languages." Rousseau
observes how primitive man attempted to imitate in gestures the images
he wished to impose on his fellow communicator's mind. He says that
vocal speech is just as natural as the language of gesture, but that
the latter is less dependent upon conventions and is easier since "more
things affect our eyes than our ears." Rousseau says:

> Since learning to gesticulate, we have forgotten the
> art of pantomime, for the same reason that with all
> our beautiful systems of grammar we no longer under-
> stand the symbols of the Egyptians. What the ancients
> said in the liveliest way, they did not express in
> words. . . . They did not say it, they showed it.[27]

There is a definite connection of the present technological society's
highly developed grammar and gesticulation with the contemporary theatre

artist's pervasive concern with mime. Such artists typically believe
that through mime they can recover the founding impulses of communi-
cation. However, we will have more to say about the aesthetic merits
of mime in Chapter Seven.

Rousseau thinks that in the most forceful communication, the
nonverbal aspects of a message will supersede the verbal. He cites the
example of Darius who:

> . . . engaged with his army in Scythia, receives from the
> King of Scythia a frog, a bird, a mouse, and five arrows.
> The herald makes the presentation in silence and departs.
> That terrible harangue was understood; and Darius returned
> to his own country as quickly as he could. Substitute a
> letter for this sign . . . the less frightening it will be.
> It will be no more than a boast, which would draw merely a
> smile from Darius.[28]

But the nonverbal message demands a more serious response. Thus,
Rousseau concludes, "one speaks more effectively to the eye than to the
ear. . . . Clearly, the most eloquent speeches are those containing the
most imagery; and sounds are never more forceful than when they produce
the effects of colors."[29]

But phenomenologically Rousseau's most important observation
about communication is his suggestion that the communication of ideas
is not so much directly dependent upon the organs of speech or ges-
tures as it is upon a power proper to man. What exactly is this power
proper to man? Phenomenologists identify this unique quality of human
beings as expression. In his Phenomenology of Language (Pittsburgh:
Duquesne University Press, 1965), Remy Kwant says that meaning is a part
of speech in the way that meaning is a part of dance. And expression
is this fundamental function that gives rise to meaning in both the body
and speech. Expression is the unfolding of human beings through their
bodies and their speech, but the body is still the more incipient form

of expression. Through the movements of the body, we give the most
primary indication of our being-in-the-world. Ricoeur says expression
is "the transformation of the psychic into the noetic,"[30] though he
doesn't explain if or how the body figures in this transformation. We
want to emphasize, though, that from a phenomenological point of view
the movements of the body are not an auxiliary to language; rather, they
are the very soil out of which language grows. And even though think-
ing is an activity often thought of as taking place within the confines
of the intellect or language (e.g. as in Nietzsche), we wish to con-
sider here how thinking is interwoven with other bodily movements.
Heidegger says:

> [T]he hand's gestures run everywhere through language,
> in their most perfect purity precisely when man speaks
> by being silent. And only when man speaks, does he
> think--not the other way around, as metaphysics still
> believes. Every motion of the hand in every one of
> its works carries itself through the element of think-
> ing, every bearing of the hand bears itself in that
> element.[31]

In this way, Heidegger considers thinking to be laced in with bodily
functions. And throughout much of Burke's writings is a concern "with
the ways in which the functions of bodily excretion attain expression."
Burke says "As for the functions of the privy parts (fecal, urinary, and
genital) and their 'spiritual' analogues: I am a confirmed trinitarian."[32]
And it even seems that the more analytic or quantitative aspects of think-
ing are directly linked or interwoven with bodily activities. In The
Story of Language, Mario Pei says "Many measures owe their names to
parts of the body. 'Foot' is obvious. In many languages the equivalent
of the 'inch' is the 'thumb.' A 'cubit' is an elbow . . . [and] digit . . .
is originally 'finger.'"[33]

But more exactly how does the body's power of expression extend beyond itself to communicate something? How does the body's power of expression make itself felt by the Other, i.e., how does the body's power of expression communicate, and what does it communicate? For Sartre, this ultimate source of expression is manifested through the look. For Sartre, the human reality or social reality takes shape through an ocular encounter. The look is the single most important idea in Sartre's theory of communication. The significance or the power of the eyes in the communication process has long been known, or at least tacitly sensed. Speaking of primitive statuary, Julien Jaynes notes "the exaggerated eyes in the early stages of civilization, the practice of inserting gems of brilliant sorts into the eye sockets."[34] The earliest of human beings must have sensed the mysterious power of the eyes. Even for the child receiving his first initiations in the social processes, the most primitive and shocking revelation of the Other is in the the look. Sartre says the look is "the concrete manifestation of the original fact of my existence for others."[35] Not only does the look precede language, but perhaps more importantly, it is the very cause or source of language. Sartre says "Language is . . . not distinct from the recognition of the Other's existence. The Other's upsurge confronting me as a look makes language arise as the condition of my being."[36] The look works as the ignition switch for language by turning on the surge of being as idea. But not only does language arise from the upsurge of the look, the meaning conveyed by a linguistic expression is also latent within the look. Just how the look works as the foundation or origin of meaning is not an idea that is easily explained. Let us begin though by observing that meaning does not require vocalized

language. If we did not have vocal language, we would still have
meaning, because we would still have social orders and their hierarchies.
The look creates meaning by providing a context for action. In the
sense of Chapter Four, we could say that the look lays a foundation for
telos or purpose. Also, in sowing the seeds for meaning, the look addi-
tionally creates necessity. Meaning and necessity both begin with the
ocular encounter, and culminate (as rhetoric) in the symbolic activity
resulting therefrom. Without the look, we could have neither this con-
text for action, nor the symbolic activity of language itself. The
presence of the Other and his look is essential to language. Sartre says:

> The Other is always there, present and experienced as
> the one who gives to language its meaning. Each expres-
> sion, each gesture, each word is on my side a concrete
> proof of the alienating reality of the Other. . . .
> The very fact of expression is a stealing of a thought
> since thought needs the cooperation of an alienating
> freedom in order to be constituted as an object. . . .
> [T]he word is sacred when I employ it and magic when
> the Other hears it. Thus I do not know my language
> any more than I know my body for the Other. I can not
> hear myself speak nor see myself smile. The problem
> .of language is exactly parallel to the problem of bodies,
> and the description which is valid in one case is valid
> in the other.37

More particularly, the look forms the crucible for meaning and
necessity through its generation of a socially constructed hierarchy.
Sartre says on the level of the unreflective consciousness we experience
the look of the Other in two fundamental ways--pride and shame. The con-
trasting experiential polarities of any hierarchy are based upon pride
and shame. The human situation is such that it will entail the experi-
encing of one of these two feelings in the presence of the Other. Both
pride and shame stem from or are the phenomenological consequents of
the original encounter. Shame is caused by the realization of one's
own objectivity in the presence of the Other. Sartre says that through

his look the Other confers a mode of being upon me that disarms my subjectivity and _objectifies_ me. However:

> Pure shame is not a feeling of being this or that guilty object but in general of being _an_ object; that is, of _recognizing myself_ in this degraded, fixed, and dependent being which I am for the Other. Shame is the feeling of an _original fall_, not because of the fact that I may have committed this or that particular fault but simply that I have "fallen" into the world in the midst of things and that I need the mediation of the Other in order to be what I am.[38]

But Sartre goes on to observe that just as I can become an object at the hands of the Other's look, so then can the Other become an object at the hands of mine. And, I can be vindicated from the guilt incurred by the Other's look only by exercising the power of my own look. Psychologically symmetrical with the objectivist and his shame then, is the subjectivist and his pride. Through his look (and the language arising therefrom), the subjectivist has shaped a reality for the objectivist. But the objectivist has also shaped a reality for the subjectivist, since the pride of the subjectivist is itself ultimately based on a form of objectivism. The feeling of pride is ultimately based upon shame. Sartre says "In pride I recognize the Other as the subject through whom my being gets its object-state."[39] The subjectivist is dependent upon the objectivist for his pride as much as the latter is dependent upon the subjectivist for his shame. Since both of these states of being are equally dependent upon the mediation of the Other, they are equally inauthentic. Both are based upon a form of _being-for-the-Other_. And as we move through this chapter, we should be able to realize with increasing clarity Sartre's important observation that "Language is not a phenomenon added on to being-for-others. It _is_ originally being-for-others; that is, it is the fact that a subjectivity experiences itself as an object

for the Other."[40] By creating language as rhetoric (along with its
meaning and necessity) the subjectivist and objectivist are involved
in a conspiracy where they try to relieve each other from their freedom
to make metaphors or their responsibility to choose. They have attempt-
ed to escape their freedom through a determinism based upon language
that has evolved out of the look. Both the subjectivist and objectivist
are engaged in bad faith since pride, like shame, "is the apprehension
of myself as a nature" or an object.[41]

We will explain shortly how on the basis of shame and pride
self identities become formed in and through the Other. Sartre says
"It is shame or pride which reveals to me the Other's look and myself
at the end of that look."[42] Because the shame and pride resulting from
the look creates a context for meaning and action, it also creates a
sense of who or what is important or unimportant within a particular
speaking community. Sartre says "I am fixing the people whom I see
into objects. . . . In looking at them I measure my power."[43] The look
not only creates a system of order and authority among human beings,
it sustains that order and authority. One must maintain his look if he
is to maintain his power. All attitudes toward the Other "are ordered
around the look and are given as a series of means employed in order
to 'maintain' the look."[44] In the sense of Burke, pride and shame are
able to provide a context for action (along with meaning and necessity)
because they involve the formulation of a hierarchy. Burke describes
hierarchy as the "entelechial principle" intrinsic to symbol systems.
"An 'entelechial principle' in the social order (what we have called
the 'hierarchial psychosis'). . . coincides with the purely linguistic
kind, the need of symbolic systems as such to move 'freely' toward the
'necessity' of ideal consistency."[45] As the animating life force of

symbol systems, the entelechial principle of hierarchy becomes the shaping force of social orders. The regulation of words (in grammars, logics etc.) always results in the regulation of men. And for Sartre, these words and their implicit social order are the upsurge of the look. Through its generating elements of pride and shame (or the sublime and the ridiculous in Burke), social hierarchies are created and sustained by the look.

We should be careful though not to push too far a similarity between the views of Burke and Sartre on nonverbal communication. We will offer here a brief comparison of Burke and Sartre on this matter, so that we can hopefully thereby make more clear the significance of nonverbal communication to our own phenomenology of language.

Burke thinks the essential difference between verbal and non-verbal communication is that language or the verbal adds the possibility of the Negative.[46] Burke contrasts his own view with that of Henri Bergson. He says: "Whereas Bergson starts from problems of truth or falsity, we start from problems of action. . . . Bergson approaches the problem of the negative in terms of the negative command."[47] Our phenomenology of language would agree with Burke's criticism of Bergson; action is better understood as the antecedent of language. But it is important to note that for us this Negative is also prelinguistic. Specifically, our point is this: The linguistic does not add the possibility of the Negative (as in Burke); rather, the linguistic serves to enforce or refine a Negative that has been ocularly established. As phenomenologists, we can agree with Burke that "the negative must have begun as a rhetorical or hortatory function,"[48] but it is not clear why this rhetorical or hortatory function must require a verbal message.

Sartre considers the for-itself as the negative that makes language possible. But even if we don't accept his definition of this so called "for itself," we can at least see in his description of the look a distinct rhetorical or hortatory function. Indeed, it is only from the look that language is able to derive its own potential to function as such. As we observed earlier on behalf of Sartre, the look not only precedes language, but is the very cause or source of language. It is "[t]he Other's upsurge confronting me as a look [that] makes language arise as the condition of my being."[49] Burke says "Dramatistically, we watch always for ways in which bodily attitudes can affect the development of linguistic expression." He also says "communication deals with the choice of gesture for the inducement of corresponding attitudes."[50] But being on the look-out for how a multiplicity of non-verbal cues might influence the shaping of language is not enough. Language as the negative is formed prior to verbal expression because hierarchy (the "entelechial principle" intrinsic to symbol systems) is formed prior to verbal expression through the pride and shame induced by the look.

Burke cautions that "Dramatistically, we should not derive the linguistic negative from physical repugnance."[51] Our phenomenology of language would agree to this if we were to consider the body in the Freudian or biological sense. In this sense, repugnance would be based upon the words or ideology that "signifies" the body and consequently precludes a direct experiencing of the body. But when considered phenomenologically, we can see how the negative would be based upon a direct experiencing of the Other's body. Sartre says that such a negative would be directly realized, for instance, by the sadist in his perception of the Other as obscene. In his discussion of the body and

the Other, Sartre contrasts grace with the obscene. Through its displaying of grace, one body attempts to demonstrate its independence or freedom from the Other. Sartre says "In grace the body is the instrument which manifests freedom. The graceful act, in so far as it reveals the body as a precision instrument, furnishes it at each instant with its justification for existing."[52] It is the Other's demonstration of his freedom through his grace that is so unsettling to the sadist. Through his grace the Other tries to hide his flesh and to make himself unapproachable to the sadist. The aim of the sadist then becomes to destroy the grace of the Other, since in doing so he would thereby abolish the Other's freedom. Sartre says:

> Grace both unveils and veils the Other's flesh, or if
> you prefer, it unveils the flesh in order immediately
> to veil it; in grace flesh is the inaccessible Other.
> The sadist aims at destroying grace in order actually
> to constitute another synthesis of the Other. He wants
> to make the Other's flesh appear; and in its very ap-
> pearance the flesh will destroy grace, and facticity will
> reabsorb the Other's freedom-as-object.[53]

We want to press the point that this drama of veiling and unveiling does not require the use of words. In this nonverbal drama, hierarchy (along with meaning and necessity) are determined by a certain posturizing of bodies. Anyone who questions how these messages can be communicated without words would be interested in seeing Leon Katz's play Marquis de Sade's Justine (as performed in Pittsburgh by Theatre Express during the 77-78 season). And though the actors in this play are clothed in simple body suits, the communicative dynamics of veiling and unveiling (and grace and the obscene) become visible even without any costume adjustments by the actors.

But even if clothes are not required for carrying out the drama of veiling and unveiling, our phenomenology of communication must

recognize how this veiling and unveiling process is greatly augmented
through the use of clothes. Indeed, it could even be argued that such
augmentation of this veiling and unveiling drama is the very purpose of
clothing, and the driving force behind the evolution of fashion. Con-
sidered phenomenologically, the purpose of clothing is to give a sexual
focus to different parts of the body--those parts of the body thought
to be more provoking by the adherents of a particular fashion ideology.
Historically, there has always been a desire on the part of wearers of
clothes to exaggerate the body features indigenous to their own sex.
This is why at different times men have padded their shoulders, women
have padded their bosoms, etc. In his well thought out Psychology of
Clothes (London: Hogarth Press, 1930), John Flügel says that if we
trace the history of fashion we could "easily establish the existence
of a continuous transition from blatant exhibition of the actual geni-
tals to the totally unconscious symbolisation of them by garments which
resemble them but very little."[54] Flügel suggests that one of the most
important considerations that moved primitive human beings to start
wearing clothes was their desire to shield themselves from the look
of the Other. It was felt that clothes might protect them from a kind
of ocular magic exercised by their enemies. These primitive human
beings realized how the Other, through his hostile gaze, could confer
the mode of the obscene upon them.

Flügel also offers a discussion of the "shifting erogenous zone."
The phenomenologist of communication must understand how this "shifting"
takes place through the veiling and unveiling process. In a phenomeno-
logical sense, no single part of the body is inherently more "sexy"
than any other part--even the genitals themselves. It is the veiling

and unveiling process that marks out the boundaries of the erogenous
zone. The sexual salience of any one part of the body is determined
by the frame of reference created by body posturizing and fashion
ideologies. Here in this process is also centered the phenomenological
foundations of the fetish or the mystery in clothing. We noted in
Chapter Two the similar etymological origins of glamour and grammar, and
suggested a connection between the delusive charm of glamour and the
rational thought of grammar. We should think of the ideology of any
particular fashion (as this ideology is given impetus by its glamour)
as involving an effort to reach for an ideal consistency, i.e., as an
effort to reach for the "perfect fiction" (Nietzsche) or perfect rhetoric.
The result of a successful exercise in glamour (as with a successful
exercise in grammar) is the establishment of an unconscious. As we ex-
plained that grammar is able to produce its end product of rational
thought only through the establishment of an unconscious, so glamour is
able to produce its end product of delusive charm only through a similar
denial of conscious awareness. The purpose of any fashion is to delude.
Furthermore, we would speculate that a particular fashion will be suc-
cessful or sustained only so long as this purpose for which the fashion
exists is not too consciously perceived. This becoming too conscious
or too aware is what causes some garments that are thought to be pro-
vocative or compelling (cf. logically compelling) at one time to be
laughed at in another. In the sense of Burke, there is an "unmasking"
here that causes the evolution of a particular fashion from the sublime
to the ridiculous. It is perhaps this preoccupation with unmasking
or penetrating myths etc. in our own day that has stepped up the evo-
lution of fashion. But this turning away from any one fashion should

not be understood as an authentic enlightenment, since in most cases this
turning _away_ from one fashion is only a means of turning _toward_ another.

But the veiling and unveiling process that leads to a shifting
of erogenous zones, or a shifting from one fashion to another, occurs
on a different level or over a longer span of time from the veiling and
unveiling that goes on within a _single_ fashion. It is concerning the
letter that Sartre says:

> [T]he supreme coquetry and the supreme challenge of
> grace is to exhibit the body unveiled with no clothing,
> with no veil except grace itself. The most graceful body
> is the naked body whose acts enclose it with an invisible
> garment while entirely disrobing its flesh, while the
> flesh is totally present to the eyes of the spectators.
> The ungraceful, on the contrary, appears when
> one of the elements of grace is thwarted in its realiza-
> tion.[55]

The aim of the sadist then becomes to maneuver his victim into a vul-
nerable _position_ by disrupting his grace or glamour. Sartre says "The
obscene appears when the body adopts postures which entirely strip it
of its acts and which reveal the inertia of its flesh. The sight of a
naked body from behind is not obscene. But certain involuntary waddlings
of the rump are obscene."[56] The appearance of the obscene involves a
disruption of the self assurance and self initiated _purpose_ of the Other.
The Other loses his own sense of direction, and carries out movements
that are done without his own accord. What happens to the Other's body
in the obscene might be compared to a moving car without a driver. With
this loss of control and the autonomy implicit in lithe movements, the
sadist unveils or "unmasks" the Other, thereby exposing his flesh and
his being-as-object. We should note also how this unveiling process does
not need to involve a change in being-in-itself or the being that simply
is. Veiling and unveiling involves only projects of the for-itself and

how these projects relate to conscious choice. And even though the in-
itself has not been changed in any way, with the sadist's unveiling of
the Other a completely new edifice of meaning has been produced. This
unveiling of the Other results in a change of hierarchy, which signi-
fies at bottom a change in reality or the whole system of social relations.

But the principle point of these past few pages has been to show
how the obscene or the negative does not require language for its expres-
sion. Language is not needed because both the Other's body and the full-
est richness of its meaning come across to us within the unity of a sin-
gle perception, or without the mediation of words. The verbal negative
(along with the froth of clothes) would come only as an outgrowth of
the social process of this encounter, or as Sartre says, as an upsurge
of it. We will have more to say shortly about the sadist and his rela-
tion to the Other. But for the present let us fully realize Sartre's
observation that "The problem of language is exactly parallel to the
problem of bodies."[57] This parallel has also been noted by Merleau-Ponty
in his famous chapter of the Phenomenology of Perception, "The Body as
Expression, and Speech." Merleau-Ponty tries to show how the meaning
of words is based upon the meaning of gestures, and that the meaning of
a gesture is the gesture itself. Moreover, the gesture of a word will
always transcend a speaker's verbal formulation of it. Merleau-Ponty
says:

> The spoken word is a genuine gesture, and it contains its
> meaning in the same way as the gesture contains its. This
> is what makes communication possible. . . . .
> . . . . The gesture does
> not make me think of anger, it is anger itself. . . . . . .
> . . . . The meaning of a
> gesture thus 'understood' is not behind it, it is intermin-
> gled with the structure of the world outlined by the ges-
> ture. . . . .
> . . . Speech is the surplus of our existence over [this]
> natural being . . . which, like a wave, gathers and poises

itself to hurtle beyond its own limits.[58]

We should not agree then with Burke that "there is a 'qualitative leap' between the motives of pre-language and those of language."[59] Because the meaning of the obscene is "intermingled with the structure of the world outlined by the [body]," language is not necessary for the negative. Dramatistically speaking, Burke should be concerned with how the look is involved in "spinning out the resources of language." Having a spontaneous feel for the negative is necessary for language only because it is necessary for, or phenomenologically assumed, by the look in its production of the obscene.

D. The Self and the Other

With these additional considerations of the body before us, we want to further see the significance of sexuality that Sartre attributes to communication. As we suggested before, for Sartre the speaking subject is also a sexual subject. He says "the sexual attitude is a primary behavior toward the Other."[60] But again, this is not sexuality as Freud thought of it (i.e., it is not a sexuality based upon biological drives); rather, it is what we called earlier a social sexuality. Sexual desire is the consciousness of certain bodies as desireable, and this consciousness is socially or communicatively constructed by way of the dynamics of grace and the obscene. As manifested in sexual relations, the pride and shame of the original encounter receive their purest and most radical expression in sadism and masochism. Sartre considers sadism and masochism as the "two original attitudes" toward the Other, and he says "all of men's complex patterns of conduct toward one another are only enrichments of these two original attitudes."[61] Love, maternal love, piety, obedience, rivalry, collaboration, etc.--these are all manifestations

of the two original attitudes toward the Other. Sartre says of these numerous patterns of conduct:

> [They] are infinitely more delicate to describe, for they depend on the historic situation and the concrete particularities of each relation of the For-itself and the Other; but they all include as their skeleton--so to speak--sexual relations. This is not because of the existence of a certain _libido_ which would slip in everywhere but simply because the attitudes which we have described are the fundamental projects by which the For-itself _realizes_ its being-for-others and tries to transcend this factual situation.[62]

In other words, sadism and masochism are not the unique perversions of a few especially depraved human beings; rather, sadism and masochism are at the core of all human interactions because of an ontological and phenomenological structure common to human beings as such. Sadism and masochism are based upon a structure of being and a structure of experience implicit in the human situation. All communication will involve these struggles of concupiscence (though some more obviously than others), since all states of mind and all communicative events are somehow demonstrative of these two phenomenological propensities. In the encounter with the Other, there is always an experience of at least the seed or germ of sado-masochism because of the ontological structure of being-in-itself in its relation to being-for-itself. In The Denial of Death (New York: The Free Press, 1975), Ernest Becker refers to sadism and masochism as "the acting out of our twin ontological motives"--Eros and Agape. Sadism and masochism are character disorders based upon "a problem of too much narrowness toward the world or of too much openness"[63]--a narrowness or openness based upon one's form of susceptibility to the Other. In our next section, we will explain how this narrowness and openness is manifested in specific communication styles, but what we wish to stress presently is the _inherency_ of sado-masochism

to the communication process. As Becker says, these are not "rare and grotesque aberrations of normal human conduct."[64] We wish it to be understood how sadism and masochism come naturally to human beings as communicators or users of language.

To understand this inherency of sado-masochism to the communication process, we must realize how the confrontation of two beings-for-themselves is the confrontation of two freedoms, each trying to ensnare or abolish the freedom of the Other. This is not to assume any "innate depravity" as a part of a "human nature." A fundamental tenet of existentialism is that the nature of human beings is to have no nature. Human beings are completely free in a world that compels them to be no other way than the way they _choose_ to be. The confrontation of two freedoms is shaped by the ontological structure of the human situation we have explained, and _the look_ with its resulting facticity of language. Sartre says that speech, once spoken, becomes language. When we speak, the facticity of language will always pollute the reality or ensnare the freedom of the Other. And only with the most energetic of poetic efforts can this ensnarement or pollution be lessened, though never eradicated because communication is essentially a rhetorical enterprise. With the original encounter of the Other understood as a confrontation of two freedoms, Sartre says:

> The mainspring of the conflict of consciousnesses is
> the effort of each one to transform his self-certitude
> into _truth_. And we know that this truth can be attained
> only in so far as my consciousness becomes an _object_ for
> the Other at the same time as the Other becomes an _object_
> for my consciousness.[65]

On an historical note to this important passage of _Being and Nothingness_, we should point out a similarity between Sartre's observations on conflict and Hegel's famous discussion of lordship and bondage in _The_

<u>Phenomenology of Mind</u>. In a parallel way Hegel said:

> The relation of both self-consciousnesses is . . . so
> constituted that they prove themselves and each other
> through a life-and-death struggle. They must enter into
> this struggle, for they must bring their certainty of
> themselves, the certainty of being for themselves, to the
> level of objective truth, and make this a fact both in the
> case of the other and in their own case as well.[66]

Though Sartre criticizes Hegel for "remaining on the same ground as
idealism," it is clear that he sees much the same struggle depicted by
Hegel. However, Sartre refines Hegel's notion of conflict by adding
to it the consideration of sexual matters. Perhaps influenced by
Freud, Sartre gives Hegel a twentieth century update. But the basic
point we wish to make in citing these passages from Sartre and Hegel
is this: Upon confrontation with the Other and his <u>look</u>, a hierarchy
will always develop, and in this hierarchy power and truth will be
interchangeable entities. And what counts as <u>truth</u> in any speaking
community will always have been born through just such a communicative
encounter.

Merleau-Ponty suggests that speech developed, in part, as a
means of <u>interrupting</u> this ocular encounter, rather than as a means of
<u>suppressing</u>. He says:

> What is it like when one of the others turns upon me,
> meets my gaze, and fastens his own upon my body and
> my face? Unless we have recourse to the ruse of speech,
> putting a common domain of thoughts between us as a third
> party, the experience is intolerable. There is nothing
> left to look at but a look. Seer and seen are exactly
> interchangeable. The two glances are immobilized upon
> one another.[67]

But we wish to stress that language does not <u>only</u> interrupt the ocular
encounter, since language itself is a development from or a verbal
incarnation of this encounter. This "common domain of thoughts" Merleau-
Ponty speaks of <u>is</u> language, and more essentially, it is <u>hierarchy</u>. By

showing us how to locate ourselves in the social universe, hierarchy
interrupts the feckless feeling of a meaningless world. So even
though language may interrupt the look, the development of language
still carries forward the rhetorical movements initiated by the look.
George Herbert Mead says "language . . . carries the . . . conversation
of gestures to its highest and most perfect development."[68] Language
brings to completion the rhetorical movement set going by the look when
through its conceptual structuring it translates emotion into rational
thought.

We should refer to hierarchy, particularly the ocular process
through which hierarchy is formed, in order to locate the origin common
to all languages. This phenomenology of social relations is the loom
of language and the basis for one person feeling threatened by the look
of another. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann have observed: "The
appearance of an alternative symbolic universe poses a threat because
its very existence demonstrates empirically that one's own universe is
less than inevitable,"[69] or less than tautological. There is the fear
that if we do not cast our spells of necessity upon the Other (through
our glamour, grammar, and logic), then he will cast his upon us. With
the rise and development of language then, the impelling movement in
the conflict of consciousnesses becomes the struggle for the power to
make definitions, or to show the inevitability of one's own symbolic
universe. On this matter, Thomas Szasz has said: "The struggle for
definition is veritably the struggle for life itself. . . . In ordinary
life, the struggle is not for guns but for words: whoever first defines
the situation is the victor; his adversary, the victim."[70] And
Nietzsche in our caption talks about taking possession of things through
a "lordly right of giving names." These definitions in the sense of

Szasz, or names in the sense of Nietzsche, amount to what we described earlier as literal meanings. These meanings (or definitions or names) are the result of each consciousness becoming an object for the Other, and each consciousness attempting to use the Other as a means of absolving or relieving itself of its freedom and responsibility to choose. Also like literal meanings, these definitions or names are actually metaphors or evaluations that stand deceptively independent of the evaluator. Only when such definitions or names stand independent or Platonically prior, can the "victor" deny that they are no more than his own metaphors of perception. In some communicative events, for instance those called "science," it is especially important for the speaker to make such a denial. That scientists choose to praise themselves for making discoveries of literal truths rather than their their ability to be creative or make metaphors has much more to do with a phenomenological contortion in the language process than with any "misconceptions" about the in-itself.

From the perspective of our phenomenology of communication, truth then is the outcome of a struggle to make one's own definitions or names into literal meanings. Truth is the product of one consciousness dominating and the Other being dominated. This new born truth will then serve as a preserver and stabilizer for the newly formed hierarchy or the newly formed dichotomy of sadist-masochist, leader-follower, specialist-layman, owner-laborer, etc. But note that these two parties are of equal importance in giving birth to this new truth, since each needs to become an object for the Other before this truth can be validated. This co-sponsorship of literal meanings is necessary, since language as literal meanings could never have evolved on its own as a

self sustaining set of abstractions within the mind of a solitary human being. "You cannot convey a language as a pure abstraction; you inevitably in some degree convey also the life that lies behind it," said George Herbert Mead.[71] And as we explained in Chapter Three, language as literal meanings arose only through the goadings of social and communicative life. It is precisely this process of each speaker becoming an object for the Other that is itself the process of "validation" for language as literal meanings. Sartre says that truth results when I have infected the Other with facticity, while the Other has infected me. He says "I can grasp the Other only in his objective facticity, the problem is to ensnare his freedom within this facticity." Reminding us again of the role of the body in this taking possession of someone by trapping him within facticity, Sartre goes on:

> . . . It is necessary that he be "caught" in it [the facticity] as the cream is caught by a person skimming milk. So the Other's For-itself must come to play on the surface of his body, and be extended all through his body; and by touching this body I should finally touch the Other's free subjectivity.[72]

In the sense of our phenomenology, communication in general might be considered as the process of infecting others with facticity, thereby freezing metaphors into literal meanings. And since this infecting with facticity is formed in the dialectics of pride and shame, it must involve more than one person. Also, it would seem that this infection is especially incused in modern communication with its festering of facts that "speak for themselves." From the phenomenological perspective, these facts are the suppurating sores of language as poetry. And though in modern communication the risk of developing this infection seems greater, the means for controlling the festerment seems less. We will see shortly how this infection cuts into and spreads through the whole

of human relations.

As _interpersonal_ communication always involves a for-itself in-fecting the Other with facticity, _intrapersonal_ communication likewise involves the process of a for-itself infecting itself with facticity. Indeed, the very existence of a _self_ is based upon a for-itself (or a nothingness) that has become infected with facticity. Specifically then, what is the self? A self is the result of one's personal attempt to avoid one's freedom through an effort to bring facticity into con-sciousness with the use of language as rhetoric. A _self_ is the result of human beings wanting to have a nature or essence that they feel obliged to fulfill. The same communicative dynamics at work between the self and the Other described above, are also at work within each self. And the very notion of _ipseity_ presupposes this social or communicative movement. Sartre says "I need the mediation of the Other in order to be what I am."[73] As a linguistic or rhetorical creation, the self can be no more than a fiction or illusion. This viewpoint of the self as a _fabrication_ is not new to our phenomenology of language; it can be traced back at least to David Hume. Hume said the _mind_, or what we more contemporaneously call the _self_, ". . . is nothing but a heap or collection of different per-ceptions, united together by certain relations, and suppos'd, tho' falsely, to be endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity." And later in his _Treatise_, Hume says the _self_ is ". . . nothing but a bundle or col-lection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement."[74] As we explained in Chapters Three and Four, both Hume and Nietzsche thought that the _identity_ of perceptions is based upon the imagination. Per-ceptions become unified and ordered under the dictates of concepts and

words, which ultimately have their source in the imagination. Concepts and words are "mummified" (Nietzsche) perceptions. It is only when the metaphors of perception have dried up into ideas and language that there arises the notion of self. These ideas or words, or more particularly this language as literal meanings, is what gives to the self a "fiction of continued existence" (Hume). The self then is the dross of the rapid flow of images and perceptions that have gotten clogged up in the intellect as language or literal meanings. In the sense of Sartre, we could say that only with the attempt to abandon free or conscious choice does a self (or personal nature or essence) develop and become held together by the fictive or literal meanings of language. A self results when perceptions become ordered or hierarchialized through the pride and shame of the communicative encounter, or when a perceiver arrests a single wave of perception (a noema) and makes it identical with the thing itself. A self is a hierarchy or an arbitrary ordering of perceptions brought about through the use of language as rhetoric.

The notion of the self as a linguistic creation has been pressed more recently by Ernest Becker in The Birth and Death of Meaning (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1962). Becker says "the self is primarily a linguistic device," or, "The self . . . is a linguistic ideational system in a constant state of modification."[75] We should clarify for Becker, though, how this "modification" takes place through the metaphors of perception. Regarding the role of communication in the formation of the self or personality, Becker says:

> What we term "personality" is largely a locus of word possibilities. When we expose our self-esteem to possible undermining by others in a social situation, we

> are exposing a linguistic identity to other loci of
> linguistic causality.[76]

When a communicator puts himself in contact with the Other and his

look, he is putting himself up for redefinition. This confrontation

with the Other causes a disorganization in one's perceptual field.

But it seems that the risk in such an encounter, while likely to pro-

duce a rhetorical result, is still necessary for any poetic engagement

with language. Sartre says that to be free one's freedom must always

be on trial. In other words, one must risk rhetoric to achieve poetry.

And likewise, a symbolically constituted self would be subject to these

same strengths and vulnerabilities of language itself. Becker says

"To present an infallible self is to present one which has unshakable

control over words."[77] Such a self that would be wholly exempt from

social liability would also be completely severed from poetry and the

metaphors of perception. As our phenomenology of language has been

trying to comprehend the strengths and weaknesses of language, it has

no more and no less been trying to make clear the strengths and weak-

nesses of human beings themselves. For people are their language. In

this sense, the phenomenology of language might well be considered as

a phenomenology of self or mind. The fiction or literal meaning of

the self is what symbolic creatures attempt to substitute for the

nothingness of the for-itself. And this linguistically created self

allows human beings to think of themselves as having a nature or a Pla-

tonic realness, thereby shielding them from the responsibility of having

to choose.

As a point of historical clarification, it should be added that

not all phenomenologists have thought of the self as a socially or lin-

guistically created entity. Husserl, for instance, thought of the self

as a pure transcendental consciousness or as a pre-existent static

entity uninfluenced in its structure by social processes. Even Sartre's

theorizing does not wholly fit our own on this point. Sartre says the

self "can not inhabit consciousness."[78] But as we explained at the

beginning of this chapter, in our phenomenology of language the self is

to have the same position and function as Nietzsche's consciousness.

That is, the self is primarily a rhetorical construction erected through

social interactions. The self is not an agency unto itself; it is the

product of a synthesizing organization of experiences. And it is lan-

guage that is the most important instrument in the fashioning or organ-

izing of experiences into a self. Both language and the self are the

result of an unfolding of the social process, rather than a pre-existent

set of abstractions or static entities.

In the structuring of the self, intentionality also has an

important role to play. Intentionality is the force that gives anima-

tion to the social process which produces language and the self. In

our phenomenology of language, intentionality is to be taken as roughly

equivalent to the entelechial activity of Burke. For Burke, hierarchy

is the entelechial motive intrinsic to symbol systems, and which leads

any given symbol system to its logical fulfillment. Stated slightly

differently, we could say that hierarchy is the product of intentionality

or the entelechial motive. Through intentionality, a speaker becomes

laced into the pyramid of the social world of language he and others

have created through their speech. We explained in Chapter Four how

intentionality is the very generating force behind the speech act. De-

picting this process of speech coming into the world, Merleau-Ponty says:

> [T]he intention to speak can reside only in an open
> experience. It makes its appearance like the boiling
> point of a liquid, when, in the density of being, volumes

of empty space are built up and move outwards. 'As
soon as man uses language to establish a living rela-
tion with himself or with his fellows, language is no
longer an instrument, no longer a means; it is a mani-
festation, a revelation of intimate being and of the
psychic link which unites us to the world and our fellow
men.'79

Hierarchy and literal meanings are the result of this movement of in-

tentionality as it boils over and exteriorizes itself through speech.

Hierarchy and literal meanings are also the nexus or the "psychic link"

with the Other that is developed through intentionality. Consciousness

or the self is always hierarchical since it is formed in or based upon

the pride and shame of the original encounter; it is based upon the

look of the Other that has made me what I am. Through intentionality

as it reaches into the communicative encounter, human beings both give

expression to reality and develop a conception of self. In his Phenom-

enology of Expression, Remy Kwant says "Reality finds its expression

in man, but only on condition that man becomes a self. On the other

hand, man becomes a self by giving expression to the other-than-himself."80

Perhaps if we were to consider the elements of the self, par-

ticularly what we call its poetic and rhetorical elements, we could get

a better idea of how the self functions as a linguistic entity. Making

use of some more traditional American terms, let us consider the self

as based upon an I and a Me (i.e., an inner Other), and an I and a You

(i.e., an outer Other). An I addressing a Me constitutes an individual

self, while an I addressing a You constitutes a We or the social iden-

tity shared by a speaking community. Intentionality is the force behind

an I addressing its Me or a You. The movement of intentionality estab-

lishes the self and sustains its ongoing development through communica-

tive encounters with the Me and the You. When we consider the individual

functions of the I and the Me or You, we are struck by how closely these

are aligned with the poetic and rhetorical elements of language. Since
the I is the source of personal expression and the spontaneity of a
speaking subject, it is to be seen as the source of poetry. Since the
Me or the You is formed in the attempt to locate or identify the
speaking subject in the social mirror, it is to be more closely associat-
ed with the rhetorical functioning of language. Furthermore, we should
note that poetry involves primarily a centripetal movement toward the
I, while rhetoric involves primarily a centrifugal movement toward a
Me or You. As we described the movement of intentionality and its
relation to the speech act in Chapter Four, it can be seen how the lan-
guage process involves essentially a centrifugal thrust, rather than a
centripetal. As primarily a centripetal movement, poetry is in con-
flict with this basic rhetorical movement of the language process, and
hence, as we described it earlier, poetry involves an attempt to use
language against itself.

We would like to especially stress that internal communication
is not to be understood as a poetic undertaking. We would agree with
only the second part of the famous injunction of W. B. Yeats ". . . of
our argument with ourselves we make poetry . . . of our argument with
others we make rhetoric." When we make arguments with ourselves (our
Me), we are engaged in essentially a rhetorical enterprise. When an
I is joined together with either its Me or a You through intentionality
to produce language, we have in both instances a case of what Burke
calls consubstantiality.[81] Burke says one aspect of the nature of
rhetoric is that it is always addressed, and whether the addressee is
a Me or a You does not change the centrifugal movement of intentionality.
On the nature of internal communication as rhetoric, Burke says:

> A man can be his own audience, insofar as he, even in
> his own secret thoughts, cultivates certain ideas or

images for the effect he hopes they may have upon him;
he is here what Mead would call "an 'I' addressing its
'me'"; and in this respect he is being quite rhetorical
as though he were using pleasant imagery to influence
an outside audience rather than one within.[82]

For Burke, the self is a process of becoming by an identification within,
i.e., by an identification with a Me. A social unit (family, group,
nation, etc.) would be based upon a process of becoming through an
outer identification, i.e., by an identification with a You to form a
We. The internal movements of the I and Me then, parallel the external
movements of the I and the You, and thereby carry out the rhetorical
movements of language.

On this matter of the relation of poetry to rhetoric, we should
also recall Hoyt Hudson's adaption of J. S. Mill's apothegm: "Rhetoric
is written to be heard, poetry to be overheard."[83] Like the You, the
Me also is a hearer, not an overhearer. Under Hudson's analysis, it
would seem that only language that is unaddressed could be deserving of
the label poetry. But can there be any such language? Because poetry
is based upon the centripetal movement involved in giving expression
to an I and a tendency to avoid identification with the Me and the
You, we think of poetry as a linguistically implausible enterprise.
Without the animating life force of intentionality to goad the I toward
a Me or You, it seems there can be no language. On this difficulty or
implausibility of poetry, we additionally explained in Chapter Three
how with the regressive movement of poetry toward music or Dionysian
experience, language tends to dissolve or at least to lose its con-
ceptual structuring. The poetic I is both individual and universal--
individual in that through it are expressed the individual metaphors of
perception--universal in that through these metaphors is revealed the
Dionysian universality.

Both interior language (with its Me audience) and exterior lan-
guage (with its You audience) are essentially rhetorical undertakings.
Both are shaped within the same phenomenological structure of experi-
ence, i.e., both abandon the individual metaphors of perception for the
sake of seeking out identities (logic) or identifications (rhetoric)
in language as literal meanings. This process produces both the indi-
vidual self and the social body of language. Their sharing of the same
structure is implied by Merleau-Ponty when he says: "It is in communi-
cating with the world that we communicate with ourselves."[84] Using
another expression of Merleau-Ponty, we might consider the interior
language of an I addressing its Me as "intercorporeal communication,"[85]
and the orally expressed language of an I addressing a You as "corporeal
communication." Though language is in part based upon intercorporeal
communication, orally expressed language "can vary and amplify inter-
corporeal communication as much as we wish [since] it has the same
spring and style as the latter."[86] Trying to capture the exact rela-
tionship between these two levels of communication, Merleau-Ponty goes
on to say:

> In intercorporeal communication as in language, signi-
> fications come through in whole packages, scarcely sus-
> tained by a few peremptory gestures. In both cases I
> envision things and others together. Speaking to others
> (or to myself), I do not speak of my thoughts; I speak
> them, and what is between them--my afterthoughts and under-
> thoughts. Someone will reply, "This is not what you say;
> it is what your interlocuter induces." Listen to Marivaux:
> "I do not dream of calling you coquettish. Those are things
> which are said before one dreams of saying them." Said by
> whom? Said to whom? Not by a mind to a mind, but by a
> being who has body and language to a being who has body and
> language, each drawing the other by invisible threads like
> those who hold the marionettes--making the other speak,
> think, and become what he is but never would have been by
> himself.[87]

From the rhetoricians point of view, Merleau-Ponty is here trying to

navigate the thin line between persuasion and self persuasion (or be-
tween achieving identification with a You or with a Me), and to note how
these two levels of communication relate in the formation of the self
and the social body of language. Specifically, where does one's in-
ternal identification leave off and the external identification begin,
and vice versa? The internal relations of the self and the relations
of the self to the Other are continually snagged on the tips of this
equivication. And in our next section we will make more clear how the
communication process can operate only while it is caught on the horns
of this equivication. What we wish to stress presently are some of the
differences and similarities between these two levels. Merleau-Ponty
himself does not elevate the role of either one of these levels above
the other. Though in the above passage (where he says oral lanugage
has "the same spring and style" as intercorporeal communication) he may
seem to give primacy to intercorporeal communication, he also says:
"The function of language is only a particular case of the general re-
lation between self and others, which is the relation between two con-
sciousnesses, of which each one projects itself in the other."[88] Though
we don't wish to argue that either intercorporeal or corporeal communi-
cation is more important or primary than the other, we do wish to point
out that both are necessary, though neither by themselves sufficient,
for the genesis and development of language. Both figure essentially
in the rhetorical dynamics of the self and the Other.

E. The Three Communicative Manners

As we have thus far sketched out our phenomenology of communi-
cation, it seems there are basically three possible communication

strategies or speaker dispositions that might be adopted by the human

communicator. In this section, working from some of the ideas thus far

outlined, we will try to give a general characterization of these three

speaker dispositions. We want to stress though that these three speaker

dispositions are only theoretical constructions. No particular person

will fit completely into one of these categories at all times, yet it

might be said that a particular person tends to embrace one of these

communicative manners more typically than he embraces another. But

still, each speaker has the whole of his communicative manner made up

of no more than either of these three phemonemological stances. For

these three communicative manners constitute the phenomenological foun-

dations of the speaking subject and his possible ways of relating to the

Other. These three communicative manners are founded upon an ontology

of social being.

Which of these three tendencies is representing the project of

a particular speaker can be discerned by the way he expresses himself

to the Other. A style of speech or a style of argument will be ex-

pressive of a style of thinking, or of visualizing the Other and one's

self. Even more poignantly for Sartre, a style of speech will be expres-

sive of a style of choosing. We will call these three communicative

manners of a speaking subject the objectivist, the subjectivist, and

the authentic communicator. Both the objectivist and subjectivist

embody speech styles based upon the idealism of literal meanings. Since

they are founded upon this idealism, it is characteristic in both these

speech styles that the speaker not possess and control his language;

rather, it is felt that language possesses or controls him. Both these

speech styles involve efforts to escape the metaphors of perception and

the responsibility to choose, though each makes a different or con-
trasting use of the Other in these escape plans. There are two ways
then of falling into the idealism of literal meanings. Of these two
ways, Sartre says: "The one consists of dissolving the real in subjec-
tivity; the other in denying all real subjectivity in the interests of
objectivity. The truth is that subjectivity is neither everything or
nothing; it represents a moment in the objective process (that in which
externality is internalized), and this moment is perpetually eliminated
only to be perpetually reborn."[89] But while subjectivism and objectivism
involve different methods of denying reality or the metaphors of per-
ception, both still involve an _introversion_ in the sense of Nietzsche.
And upon this introversion is based the idealism of literal meanings.

The objectivist communicator embraces what Sartre calls the first
attitude toward the Other. He says this attitude consists of masochism,
love and language. Our own phenomenology, however, will consider _lan-
guage_ as the key to both of these attitudes. In love, objectivism is
produced through the lover's project of _seduction_. The lover or seducer
does not forcefully assert himself in the face of the Other; he makes
no expenditure of choice or affirmation. Instead, he presents himself
in a passive way, hoping to draw the Other into a lover-beloved rela-
tionship. The lover or seducer wants to be _acted upon_. Sartre says:

> In seduction I do not try to reveal my subjectivity to
> the Other. Moreover I could do so only by _looking at_
> the other; but by this look I should cause the Other's
> subjectivity to disappear, and it is exactly this which
> I want to assimilate. To seduce is to risk assuming my
> object-state completely for the Other; it is to put my-
> self beneath his look and to make him look at me; it is to
> risk the danger of _being-seen_ in order to effect a new de-
> parture and to appropriate the Other in and by means of my
> object-ness. I refuse to leave the level on which I make
> proof of my object-ness; it is on this level that I wish to
> engage in battle by making myself a _fascinating object_.[90]

The lover wishes to disown his freedom by giving it over to the Other. This will in turn give credence to his own notion that the beloved is his source of freedom. The lover wants to surrender his freedom to the Other so that the freedom of the beloved will become the freedom of the lover. Sartre says: "the lover wishes to capture a 'consciousness' . . . He wants to possess a freedom as a freedom."[91] The beloved then is the Other in whom the lover believes he will find his freedom. But again, the project of the lover is not actually directed at finding his freedom, but at losing it. Sartre says:

> In love it is not a determinism of the passions which we desire in the Other nor a freedom beyond reach; it is a freedom which plays the role of a determinism of the passions and which is caught in its own role. For himself the lover does not demand that he be the cause of this radical modification of freedom but that he be the unique and privileged occasion of it. . . . [The lover also] wants to be the object in which the Other's freedom consents to lose itself. . . . [H]e does not want to act on the Other's freedom but to exist a priori as the objective limit of this freedom; that is, to be given at one stroke along with it and in its very upsurge as the limit which the freedom must accept in order to be free. . . . . Thus to want to be loved is to want to be placed beyond the whole system of values posited by the Other and to be the condition of all valorization and the objective foundation of all values.[92]

Such a project as the lover's leads to or culminates in masochism. The lover becomes a being-for-the-Other when his attempt to place himself beyond the sphere of values and meaning of the Other fails, and he becomes caught in the facticity of the beloved. This ineluctable failure of the lover's attempt to assimilate the freedom of the Other (ineluctable because each individual is uncompromisingly free) further ensnares him in the facticity of the beloved. In the attainment of masochism through this "jilting," the lover has completely unloaded his own subjectivity and reached the most extreme form of objectification.

It should be noted that this attitude of the lover toward his beloved is not unlike the attitude of the rationalizer (Platonist, ideologue, scientist etc.) toward his system of reason. Though these two personality types are usually thought of as polar opposites, to see a rationalizer like the scientist as a cold calculator of facts and the lover as one given over to emotional effusions is to miss something very important. Obviously there are enormous differences between the content of the experiences of the lover and the rationalizer. But we would like to suggest that there is an exact similarity in the phenomenological structure of these experiences, since the lover and the rationalizer pursue the mediation of the Other in the same way. The lover wants the freedom of the Other in order that it might function for him as a determinism. A system of philosophy as rational thought can play this deterministic role for the objectivist as plausibly as the subjectivity of another. We explained through Nietzsche how a system of rational thought constitutes consciousness or one's personalized fiction. Through the ruse of rational thought, both the ideologue and the lover are involved in the creation of necessity. Moreover, both have a feeling of shame that manifests itself in the ideologue as self consciousness. Nietzsche says "The sign-inventing man is at the same time the man who is always more acutely self-conscious."[93] Establishing a firmer connection between "emotion" and "reason," Nietzsche talks about "The kingdom of desires out of which logic grew: The gregarious instinct in the background."[94] But even more importantly from the Sartrean persepctive, we should observe that just as the rationalizer chooses his system of reason at the level of the unreflective consciousness, so the lover chooses his beloved.

It is through their use of _language_ that the common phenomenolog-
ical stance of the lover and the rationalizer can best be realized.
Like the love of the lover, the logic of the rationalizer is founded
upon a certain way of using language. Both see language as something
<u>added on</u> to their situation, <u>rather than their situation itself</u>. The
lover fails to realize how his involvement with the Other is based upon
a language trap made up of "literal meanings," as such meanings have
been manifested in his inauthentic choice. The lover believes that his
involvement with the Other is <u>independent</u> of the language he <u>chooses</u>
to use in expressing this involvement. In a similar way, the ration-
alizer sees his knowledge, his conclusions etc. as independent of any
mediation of personal choice. But again, Sartre stresses the following
characteristics of language and its relation to the Other:

> Language is not a phenomenon added on to being-for-others.
> It _is_ originally being-for-others; that is, it is the fact
> that a subjectivity experiences itself as an object for
> the Other. In a universe of pure objects language could
> **under no** circumstances have been "invented" since it pre-
> supposes an original relation to another subject. . . .
> [L]anguage . . . is already given in the recognition of
> the Other. I <u>am</u> language. . . . [Language] forms part of
> the <u>human condition</u>; it is originally the proof which a
> for-itself can make of its being-for-others.[95]

Also like the rationalizer, the mediation of the Other for the lover
comes primarily in the form of an <u>inner</u> Other. For both the lover and
the rationalizer, mediation of the Other comes primarily in the form
of a Me rather than a You. They are both basically <u>self persuaders</u>.
Goethe has observed that the lover does not really love the Other,
rather what he loves is <u>his own idea</u> of the Other, i.e., he loves himself
or his Me.[96] In a corresponding way, the positivistic scientist does
not actually <u>experience</u> phenomena, rather he experiences <u>his own idea</u>
of phenomena, as these "phenomena" are presented through the ruse of

literal meanings. As we explained in Chapter Three, the rationalizer is turned toward an <u>introversion</u>. And just as the self consciousness (or shame) of the lover culminates in the pure introversion of masochism, so the self consciousness of the rationalizer culminates in the pure introversion of logic. At bottom then, the similarity between the lover and the rationalizer is founded upon a similarity in their views of language--a similarity in both practice and conception. Both treat language as an <u>a priori</u> abstraction that exists independently of self choice.

Though we will come back to the objectivist, perhaps we can make his characteristic way of handling language more clear if at this point we bring up the subjectivist communicator for contrast. Sartre says the second attitude toward the Other is made up of indifference, desire, hate and sadism. As a refined form of subjectivism, each of these has as its result an enervation of the Other. The subjectivist wants to destroy or abolish the conscious choice of his interlocutor, and concomitant with this desire he will have or try to develop the rhetorical techniques to achieve this. Sartre says of the subjectivist: "He demands freedom (which for him means freedom to kill) and communication among men (when he seeks to manifest to others his own narrow and profound experience of non-communication)."[97] It will not be our concern here to list or categorize the panoply of techniques used by the subjectivist communicator. But as Sartre says, he will usually make a skillful use of "the concept-tools of his period."[98] He will know what phrases or ideas to invoke in order to achieve the desired <u>identifications</u>. This attitude of the subjectivist communicator toward the Other is usually not difficult to recognize, certainly not in its extreme

forms. One prominent feature of this communicator's demeanor that we would like to stress is his <u>lack of vulnerability</u>. In contrast to the objectivist, the subjectivist tries to escape his freedom with an attempt to make himself unsusceptible to the Other, failing to realize how even his indifference is itself a reaction to the Other. Sartre says that with the indifference of subjectivism " . . . I brush against 'people' as I brush against a wall. . . . I do not even imagine that they can <u>look at</u> me."[99] The subjectivists' lack of susceptibility to the Other, along with his resulting aplomb, contributes toward a further objectification of the Other. As a subjectivist facing the Other, Sartre says:

> I am reassured, I am self-confident; that is, I am in
> no way conscious of the fact that the Other's look can
> fix my possibilities and my body. I am in a state of
> the very opposite of what we call <u>shyness</u> or <u>timidity</u>.
> I am at ease; I am not embarrassed by myself, for I am
> not <u>outside</u>; I do not feel myself alienated. This state
> of <u>blindness</u> can be maintained for a long time, as long
> as my fundamental bad faith desires; it can be extended—
> with relapses—over several years, over a whole life;
> there are men who die without—save for brief and ter-
> rifying flashes of illumination—ever having suspected
> what the <u>Other</u> is. [100]

Like the objectivist, the subjectivist has lost the awareness of his freedom. Both have lost their ability to make metaphors and a sense of the <u>contingency</u> of their being. The subjectivist has lost his sense of contingency in the <u>absoluteness</u> of his self confidence. Since he does not expose himself to the look of the Other, the subjectivist never <u>doubts</u>. In contrast, it would seem that the objectivist may be someone who doubts himself <u>too much</u>, since meaning and necessity are dictatorially imposed upon him by the Other. But in another sense we will explain shortly, the objectivist also is someone who has lost his ability to doubt.

Perhaps we could get a better handle on our subjectivist and objectivist communicators if we were to note their correspondence with some contemporary notions of mental illness. There are some parallels that the subjectivist and objectivist communicators share with psychopathy, schizophrenia, and depressive psychosis, as these pathologies[101] are explained by Ernest Becker. According to Becker, the psychopath is a person without a sense of guilt or culpability. He never feels the pangs of self consciousness or embarrassment. He does not feel guilt "because there is no reason for it in the situation as he sees it. He does not imagine that he has to give an account of himself. . . . The psychopath has too little self-consciousness, precisely because his action seems to have been too readily facilitated for him."[102] The psychopath cannot allow himself to feel challenged by the Other. He does not experience guilt because he is not outside of himself; he is not exposed to the look and the redefinition of his self imposable by the Other. While the psychopath approaches omnipotence and feels no sense of limit, the schizophrenic, in contrast, feels too much limit or too little possibility in his social situation. "The schizophrenic has too much self-consciousness because he has no manipulatory power."[103] To compensate for a lack of social success, the schizophrenic cultivates an inflation of internal fantasies. According to Becker, these fantasies create symbolic possibilities that deny the feeling of limitation in the real world. Becker also compares schizophrenia to depressive psychosis by noting this contrast:

> [While] the schizophrenic is not enough built into his world . . . the depressive, on the other hand, is built into his world too solidly, too overwhelmingly. . . .
> Depressive psychosis is the extreme on the continuum of too much necessity, that is, too much finitude, too much limitation by the body and the behaviors of the person in the real world, and not enough freedom of the inner self, of inner symbolic possibility.[104]

In the most general way, this is how Becker relates mental ill-
ness to problems of language, symbolism, and communication. But what
can our phenomenology of language make of these pathologies? That is,
how would these pathologies be located within the phenomenology of lan-
guage we have thus far developed? Let us briefly consider this matter
with a primary view toward giving a general placement to these pathologies
within our phenomenology of language, or understanding their phenomeno-
logical structure (rather than carrying out an independent analysis of
these pathologies by themselves). We will then also have a better
understanding of our own three communicative manners.

"The sanity of the mind," Coleridge summarily said, "is between
superstition with fanaticism on the one hand, and enthusiasm with indif-
ference and a diseased slowness to action on the other."[105] This
delusional fanaticism of Coleridge is a quality common to psychopathy
and subjectivism in general. Further, we think there is an obvious
phenomenological foundation for psychopathy in the subjectivist communi-
cative manner. There are other characteristics of psychopathy that
suggest its genesis from subjectivism. Typical of the subjectivist, the
psychopath keeps himself out of risky situations vis-a-vis the Other.
Also, he keeps himself well deluded with the absolutism of his self
confidence. From our phenomenological perspective on language and
logic, it is this absolutism that is of paramount significance to us.
To backtrack for a moment to put this absolutism in focus, we have said
that subjectivism comes to its apex in the fanaticism of sadism. Up to
this point we have only very tacitly suggested a close relationship
between logic and the activity of the sexual organs. But we now want
to consider the specific role of logic in the sexual activity of symbolic
creatures, particularly as this activity is developed in the fanaticism

of the sadist. We have explained how the logic of identity or tautology is based upon the identifications developed through social relations. We are thus suggesting that the absolutism of the psychopath (as subjectivist) is founded upon the same inclination or form of self lie as that of the sadist, and more importantly, that this inclination or self lie is carried out through the development and sophistication or purification of analytical skills. We could better understand the psychopath if we were to consider his absolutism or dogmatism as a form of cerebral orgasm. As the genitals of the sadistic copulator reach for orgasm, so the speech of the psychopath (as subjectivist) reaches for tautology, all within the single movement of the for-itself. Just as the sadist's sexual intercourse culminates in the turgescence of orgasm, so does the social discourse of the psychopath culminate in the turgescence of tautology. What we call cerebral orgasm consists linguistically of the perfect connection between subject and predicate, a connection which, if I may remind you again, is formed through the social process of identification. Through the magic of identification, two things become one in the idea. Through the deceptive instrument known as the intellect (Nietzsche), the predicate is absorbed by its subject. Cerebral orgasm consists of this perfect logic in its complete extirpation of doubt and the metaphors of perception. In our last two chapters we explained the fictitious character of logic and identity, and how speech reaches its climax in just these tautologies or rhetorical absolutes. Generally, there will always be this parallel of speech and sex which is based upon the development of logic. In a logical sense, linguistically and sexually there is nowhere else to go after this orgasm of speech and the genitals. Here is the culmination of both the sex act and the speech act.

Let us now turn back to the objectivist and his relation with logic and psychopathology. In his own discussion of psychopathology, Becker contrasts the schizophrenic with the psychopath. While the psychopath is overflowing with confidence and is typically an "overdoer," the schizophrenic typically does not even have the confidence necessary for initiating action. He cannot project himself into the world, or generally he cannot do anything assertive. The problem of Becker's schizophrenic is phenomenologically based upon objectivism or masochism. This is not to say that the schizophrenic is identical with the masochist. But whenever the schizophrenic is able to work up an interest in sex or social interaction, his interest or involvement will typically be based upon the phenomenological stance of masochism. However, without the ebullient self confidence of the subjectivist just described, we need to ask how even the person of the phenomenology of mind of the masochist is able to reach the <u>absolutism</u> that is identical with (and therefore necessary for) sexual orgasm or the cerebral orgasm of tautology? If cerebral orgasm and sexual orgasm are based upon the same movement of the for-itself, then we should expect a person who is able to reach one of these kinds of orgasm to be able to reach the other. But, <u>how is the masochist</u>, <u>through the use of language,</u> <u>able to</u> <u>create this ruse of necessity or identity that is phenomenologically</u> <u>required for symbolic creatures to attain orgasm</u>? Our phenomenological inquiry into language suggests that there is no difference between the sadist and masochist in their use of logic to structure language. That is, both the sadist and masochist strive for a deductive compulsion and the feeling that they are <u>forced</u> into their course of action. They have no freedom or <u>choice</u>. Where the sadist and masochist differ is in whom

they have as their addressee in creating this compulsion. While the
necessity of the sadist is based upon the language used in an I addressing
a You, the necessity of the masochist is based upon the language used
in an I addressing a Me. The sadist victimizes a You, the masochist,
a Me. Why is this victimage so important? Because only through vic-
timage (irrelevant of whether the victim is a You or a Me) can a speaker
energize language or the speech act. As Burke says, "perfect victimage
relates to the 'entelechial' principle natural to the genius of language."[106]
As the sadist seeks the perfect fiction or perfect victimage in a You,
so the masochist seeks these in a Me.

The sadist and masochist both drive for the perfect determinism,
or in Sartre's sense, the perfect escape from freedom. Sadism and maso-
chism could themselves be considered as the perfect fictions or illu-
sions. Let me put before us again the very crucial principle developed
through Nietzsche in Chapter Three, and that underwrites much of our
discussion here: Logical thinking produces the model example of the
perfect fiction and the perfect rhetoric. (If the reader does not have
a good handle on this principle, or our grounds for maintaining it, he
might find it useful to review the second half of Chapter Three.) The
sadist and the masochist are the most logical of thinkers. They are
the masters who produce the best fiction and the most persuasive rhetoric.
While the subjectivist is typically a master of external rhetoric (a
politician or orator if you like), the masochist is typically a master
of internal rhetoric (e.g. a Raskolnikov). Usually we think of the
symbolic astuteness of the leader or "persuader" as surpassing that of
the follower or "victim." We are going to question shortly whether this
must be so, or whether the idea of persuasion as we ordinarily understand

it (on the basis of positivistic epistemologies) is even possible. But
as a present general observation, let us agree that as a "leader" de-
velops on the basis of his language skills in an I-You rhetoric, so a
"follower" develops on the basis of his language skills in an I-Me
rhetoric. Mead also touches on the notion of the Me-person as a follower,
but he doesn't seem to harvest the full inferential yield of this idea.[107]
Mead does realize, though, how in the internal rhetoric of the objectivist
the Me incorporates the I.

With the schizophrenic's inflated inner fantasy, the addressee
of his language tends to be a Me rather than a You. Like the masochist
described above, Becker stresses how "the schizophrenic is not enough
built into his world." Working from some ideas of Nietzsche in Chapter
Three, we suggested that while the psychopath is the person for whom
an excess of words and communication is directed at others, the schizo-
phrenic is the person for whom an excess of words and communication is
directed at himself. One important point of contrast we would like to
draw from this earlier observation is that while Becker and some others
seem to think that the quality of communication is the prime determinant
in mental illness, Nietzsche implies that quantity is the prime determi-
nant. In Nietzsche, the "sick soul" is one who subjects himself to an
excess of logic and communication, and thereby surrenders to his "herd
nature." Our depiction of the subjectivist's and objectivist's communi-
cative manners would generally seem to support this view of Nietzsche:
With more communication comes more being-for-the-Other. There is much
talk these days of a decrease in the quality of communication. This
is apparent in the pervasive concern with communication problems--"en-
counter groups," "rap sessions," etc. We would like to suggest that this

decrease in the quality of communication is in part due to an increase
in the quantity of communication in the form of facts, data, informa-
tion, etc. The prolific quantity of modern communication exacerbates
the development of subjectivism and objectivism. Anyone who has care-
fully observed the stormy encounters of George and Martha in Albee's
Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf? must confess to a perfectly balanced
equivocation if he attempts to assess the authenticity of their com-
munication in terms of its quality. We mean that by way of a principally
qualitative approach, it is impossible to tell if George and Martha are
each others greatest weakness or greatest strength. The exhaustion
and exasperation that often makes up the bulk of experience in such
worn out and worn thin relationships seems to be due principally to an
excess quantity of communication. Through the amount of words that
George and Martha are continually pouring on each other, they could not
help but to become ensnared in each other's facticity. Through such large
quantities of communication self identities become firmly set and inter-
twined with each other, thereby making redundant thought patterns like
double binds and tautology more likely to emerge. This is not to say
that quality can have no affect on quantity, or that by decreasing quan-
tity we would always increase quality. Our main point here is to note
how the chances of language rising to tautology or rhetorical absolutes
(in any social unit--family, nation etc.) increases over a period of
time with protracted communicative encounters.

On the whole, this observation about quantity is born out by the
history of speech itself, and the seemingly invariable trend of language's
evolution toward the perfect fiction or perfect rhetoric of analyticity.
According to Heidegger, this evolution of language toward analyticity

seems especially accelerated in Western languages. In _The Story of Language_, Mario Pei also notes how the historical development of English "tends toward an analytic state." He goes on to point out how this transition to analytic structures is a process apparent in all the white Western languages, except those of the Slavic group.[108] Analytic thought always includes the resolving of ideas into more parts or _more words_. The current vogue for analytic thinking--facts that speak for themselves, computer information systems, etc.--is the result of a prolonged evolution of great volumes of thinking and speaking. And it seems to be the view of both Nietzsche and Heidegger that this increase in _quantity_ is largely responsible for a decrease in _quality_. For it is _quantity_ of communication (as produced through _analysis_) that seems to be the main incubator servicing the growth of _necessity_ within language and thought. Maybe when considered in this context we could better understand Thoreau's remark that the best of friends say little and seldom see each other, or Lao-tse's observation that one who speaks doesn't know, and one who knows doesn't need to speak.

This same _excess_ of language and communication is also evident in Becker's depressive psychosis. Becker says this person "is built into his world too solidly, too overwhelmingly;" he experiences "_too much necessity_."[109] In the sense of Nietzsche, too much necessity means too much language and communication. But then, this brings us to another crucial point where our phenomenology of language would differ with Becker. If one experiences too much necessity, he could never be built into the world too solidly. For as we explained earlier, _there is no necessity to being-in-itself_. Being-in-itself is simply the being that is; it is neither "derived from the possible nor reduced to the

necessary."[110] In depressive psychosis, the individual is built too
solidly into his own fictions and illusions, much in the same way as
Becker says of the schizophrenic. Only by this turning inward toward
his own fictions and illusions can the depressive psychotic arrive at
a feeling of too much necessity. We would also disagree with Becker then
that the schizophrenic, by turning inward, increases his symbolic pos-
sibilities. By turning inward to what Nietzsche calls the inner world
of error and self deception, the schizophrenic eliminates the metaphors
of perception and unconcealment (Heidegger) in favor of logic and con-
cepts. Turning inward then is not a means of illuminating possibilities
(as Becker says of the schizophrenic), but of eliminating them. The
turn inward is basically a turn from poetry to rhetoric. And we want
to stress the role of language in these phenomenological movements since,
as Nietzsche says, "'Inner experience' only enters consciousness when
it has found a language which the individual can understand."[111] We
could not have this inner experience, or even mental illness itself,
without language and its bad conscience.

Actually, our above discussion points to how all three of
Becker's psychopathologies (psychopathy, schizophrenia and depressive
psychosis), like sado-masochism, are based upon too much necessity or
the introversion of logic and rhetoric. And though the psychopath may
seem to deal primarily with a You or an outer Other, we would still de-
scribe the net result of his project as an introversion. When any com-
municator reaches for necessity, he must in some way deny the poetry or
metaphors of perception and affirm the logic or the rhetoric of conscious-
ness. From the perspective of our phenomenology of language, the dif-
ferences among these three psychopathologies is based primarily on the

varieties or styles of self lies that each uses in attempting to <u>escape</u> <u>freedom</u> and to <u>reach necessity</u>. While the schizophrenic achieves this necessity through the language used in an I addressing a Me, and the psychopath through the language used in an I addressing a You, the depressive psychotic uses both. Becker rightly observes how the depressive psychotic becomes involved in all kinds of social affairs (much like the psychopath), and yet he experiences "a bogging down in the demands of others"[112] (much like the schizophrenic). Psychopathy, schizophrenia, depressive psychosis--in the sense of Nietzsche or our phenomenology of language these are merely three ways of consummating or bringing to perfection one's skill in logic or rhetoric. Such a skill is perfected when one has made the perfect forfeiture of his freedom by removing everything irrational. Again, let us recall Chesterton that human beings are insane not when they loose their reason, but when they loose everything <u>except</u> their reason.

With this above understanding of <u>too much language</u> and communication as a chief phenomenological characteristic of mental illness (especially as such illnesses relate to sado-masochism), we would like to go further and point to <u>masturbation</u> as a symbolic phenomenon common to mental illness and sado-masochism. By <u>masturbation</u> here, it should be clear that we are not talking about this form of sexual activity alone, but more particularly about the form of <u>symbolic activity</u> upon which, we believe, such sexual activity is based. In its most basic sense, <u>masturbation is self deception</u>. Masturbation is a sexual activity performed through a certain kind of symbolic activity. The opposing ontological categories of sadism and masochism take shape in part through this symbolic activity of masturbation. We have explained how the

sadist and masochist are idealists (introverts to Nietzsche) who have

withdrawn themselves from experiencing the metaphors of perception.

They have achieved this withdrawal through a logical manipulation of

symbols, whereby they arrive at the ideology of literal meanings.

Becker rightly says "Since everything that makes man human is contained

in his symbolic self, his whole human existence depends on symbolic

satisfactions."[113] As it manifests itself in tautology or the logic

of self identity, masturbation is the end result in the effort to

achieve this symbolic satisfaction. Logic then, we wish to suggest,

has its most direct sexual parallel in masturbation.

In his book Self and Others, R. D. Laing says "Masturbation

counterfeits intercourse [or discourse] as intercourse [or discourse]

counterfeits masturbation."[114] Masturbation is based upon the excesses

of word play described by Nietzsche. Within this excessive word play,

the pollution of the for-itself through language reflects the pollution

of the Other, while the pollution of the Other through language reflects

the pollution of the for-itself. In this way, masturbation goes hand-

in-hand with communication. We could then reconstitute Laing's proposi-

tion to read: Masturbation counterfeits sado-masochism as sado-masochism

counterfeits masturbation. Masturbation is the sexual concomitant of

rhetorical absolutes and the rhetoric of consciousness. When masturba-

tion is brought to it's conclusion the result is sexual orgasm; when

the speech process is brought to its conclusion the result is the cere-

bral orgasm of tautology. From the phenomenological point of view, let

us consider logic as the masturbatic mind play of speech. Logic is based

upon a form of psychological or linguistic activity best defined as

masturbation.

Two common definitions of <u>masturbation</u> likely to be found in any dictionary are "self pollution" and "uncompleted coitus." Linguistically speaking, tautology is the ultimate in this self pollution, since in tautology a speaker's concepts come back to redound or recoil only upon themselves. Through such mind play, the masturbator denies the metaphors of perception. His logic or concepts cannot take him beyond the already existing ideology of literal meanings. And "uncompleted coitus" here would be synonymous with uncompleted sentence. That is, a sentence would be poetically uncompleted when it lacked an authentic metaphor of perception as its predicate, or when the sentence did not go beyond itself in an attempt to incorporate experience. This inability to <u>get beyond himself</u> through the imagination or conscious choice is also the problem par excellence of the sado-masochist. Because he is caught up in the ideology of literal meanings instead of the tactile metaphors of perception, the sado-masochist does not actually (or authentically) copulate with the Other; rather, <u>he copulates with his own idea of the Other</u>, i.e., he copulates with his own self. And though the sadist and masochist have different addressees (a You and a Me), their analytical or rhetorical attitude toward language is the same. Both aim at achieving a logic of identity or an introversion in the sense of Nietzsche through the masturbatic mind play of speech. How then would we summarize the relation of masturbation to sado-masochism? The same symbolic foundation that holds up masturbation also supports sado-masochism. But whereas sado-masochism takes place between two (or more) persons, masturbation takes place within one. <u>Sado-masochism and masturbation are two sides of the same coin, exactly as interpersonal and intrapersonal communication are the two sides of language itself.</u>

To produce language, the interpersonal dynamics of sado-masochism must overflow their structure into the intrapersonal communication of masturbation, while the intrapersonal dynamics of masturbation must overflow their structure into the interpersonal communication of sado-masochism. These dynamics of sado-masochism and masturbation, along with their overflowing into each other, is identical with the language process itself.

There is one more observation we wish to make on these matters; it pertains to the history of masturbation and its relation to mental illness. Though many modern psychiatrists have criticized the idea, it would seem to us that the abandoned notion of "masturbatory insanity" may have some validity to it after all. Thomas Szasz makes the criticism of masturbatory insanity that any intelligent reader would expect to be made of it.[115] And in the round we would agree with Szasz's attack on psychiatrists of the past few centuries who have misused this notion. But with a reconsideration of masturbatory insanity on the basis of these above phenomenological considerations of language and logic, it would seem the idea may have some validity when it is attentively or phenomenologically weighed. Like the psychopath, schizophrenic and depressive psychotic, the masturbator's imagination has been tied up by too much necessity or the introversion of logic and rhetoric. Moreover, it is the very phenomenological structure of masturbation that to us seems at least similar and even identical to the introversion of logic and rhetoric.

And though masturbation was regarded as a gravely reprehensible moral offense in the two or three centuries before our own, we find it curious that the ancients gave no great significance to it. It is

especially strange that the Bible makes no reference to masturbation.

After all, subsequent Judeo-Christian ethics regarded masturbation as

a heinous moral infraction.[116] We would like to suggest that perhaps

masturbation did not exist before or during the period of time covered

by the Old Testament. The late appearance of masturbation as a moral

offense may well be because masturbation (as it is understood today as

"self pollution" etc.) could not have been practiced in this earlier time.

Without the development of tautological logic we have described, the

masturbator would have no way of symbolically forcing or coercing him-

self, or of reaching the level of abstraction or necessity required for

the culmination of his act. We are saying that masturbation requires

a certain kind of self communication, or a certain relationship between

the I and its Me, and that this relationship had not yet developed during

the period of time covered by the Old Testament. During this period,

the experiential or phenomenological framework for the masturbatic act

had probably not yet evolved. Not until the development of tautological

logic (e.g. as in the syllogisms of Aristotle) was there laid down the

symbolic foundations necessary for carrying out the masturbatic act.

And of course sado-masochism would not have been practiced either. Be-

cause of the similarity to their phenomenological structure, it would

seem to us that both masturbation and sado-masochism required a certain

level of symbolic development unique to human beings of the past two

or three millennia. Whatever the case here, our notion of logic as the

masturbatic mind play of speech is scarcely something that is going

to be proven using the method of any historical inquiry--no matter how

shrewdly such a method is applied. What is required for understanding

how logic is the masturbatic mind play of speech is an immediate affir-

mation of vision. And the most we can do here is to try and clear the way for such a vision.

With this above phenomenological structure of social and self relations, we can see how through sado-masochism and masturbation inauthentic communicators work at augmenting the self lie or bad faith of each other. Each makes it easier for the Other to perfect his own fiction or rhetoric. But if masturbation is the co-foundation of the language or communication process, there seems to be some question as to how it would be possible for any one person (e.g. the sadist) to per-suade or affect another, since masturbation is founded upon self persua-sion. We need to be more specific as to how sado-masochism and mastur-bation are related in the persuasive or the self persuasive process. Can human beings persuade each other, or do they always persuade them-selves? Let us briefly try to clarify this relation by considering a particular communicative situation where the symbolic dynamics of sado-masochism and masturbation seem to be operating at a strong force. Any-one who has ever witnessed a Billy Graham crusade would have to admit to the talent of Graham as an orator, whatever they may think of the truth value of his message. Pointing to the subjectivist tendencies of the orator and the objectivist tendencies of the masochist, Becker observes: "Dictators, revivalists, and sadists know that people like to be lashed with accusations of their own basic unworthiness because it reflects how they truly feel about themselves. The sadist doesn't create a masochist; he finds him ready-made."[117] But even if the maso-chist does make himself as Becker says, there does seem to be a way in which an orator like Graham encourages this submission through a variety of things that he says and does.

One example of such activity that seems particularly demonstrative of Sartre's communication theory takes place when Graham stares intrepidly at his audience, points his finger at them, and demandingly says: "Will _you_ be ready when Christ calls? I want each of you to ask yourself that." There occurs here a persuasion that is based upon the inducement of shame and embarrassment in the audience or those who are _looked at_. The very aim of such a persuader (whether he can admit it to himself or not) is to produce this shame and embarrassment, or to deflate the confidence that his listeners might ordinarily have in their own situations. Graham helps to produce this feeling when by asking his question in the way that he does he urges his audience to turn inward. From the phenomenological point of view, the important result here is just this _turning inward_, or this _making an I address its Me_. Only by turning inward are human beings made susceptible to the analytic pull of ideas and concepts. This turning inward produces essentially the ontological structure of objectivism or masochism we have described. In this condition of shame and embarrassment, the audience member becomes absorbed in his self reflection. Shame opens him up or exposes him. As Becker says, "shame allows the full social searchlight to penetrate one's inner recesses."[118] One of the most prominent characteristics of feeling shame and embarrassment is just this absorption in one's self. The shamed or embarrassed person experiences a painful awareness of himself; he can sense only his own guilt. The persuasion of a Billy Graham is _consummated_ the moment his listeners take this glance _inward_, or the moment each I turns to address its Me. The moment a listener asks himself if he'll be ready when Christ calls, the speaker has snagged him in facticity--even if the listener answers "yes." With this

turning inward, resistance to the speaker and the other parts of his message (making contributions, making a "commitment to Christ" etc.) are largely nullified.

Some philosophers like Nietzsche have considered these shame producing communications as the most inhumane way human beings have of relating to each other. Whatever the ethical merit or truth value of Graham's message, the communication process through which this message is presented has essentially a dehumanizing effect on its participants. But more toward our present point, we need to ask who is responsible for inducing this shame? Should we say the sadist is persuading the masochist, or should we say like Becker that the sadist finds the masochist ready-made? Does the masochist maybe persuade the sadist to persuade him? This issue of persuasion versus self persuasion is obviously of great significance to the student of rhetoric and persuasion. But on the basis of our phenomenology of communication there seems to be a deeply rooted confusion over who is persuading and who is being persuaded. This confusion is compounded when we add Sartre's view that human beings are always free. One communicator then could never actually determine anything for another.

Let us try to make this point more clearly. In most conventional theories of communication, the "persuader" is someone who stands to "gain" if his attempts at persuasion are successful. We could then say that in most theories of communication defining "gain" would be a prerequisite for identifying the persuader; or, we cannot assign the role "persuader" without also assigning the quality "gainer." But it should be remembered that in our phenomenology there are no ontological indications of truth or value, and defining "gain" or "loss" would mean

positing a truth or value against which "gain" or "loss" could be measured. In understanding persuasion from a phenomenological rather than a positivist's epistemological perspective, explicating an *a priori* truth or value is not possible, since in phenomenology our very purpose is to discern the process through which such truths or values are themselves established for a paricular speaking community. (As we use the expression here, an *a priori* truth or value would be one thought to exist *prior* to the act of speaking as a literal meaning.) From the phenomenological perspective then, it is difficult to label one communicator as "the persuader" and the other as "the persuaded," since to do so we would have to adopt an epistemology or axiology capable of making these gain-loss distinctions.

If a communicator attempts to persuade or to let himself be persuaded, he must adopt an end or goal toward which his efforts would direct him. As we explained in Chapter Four, through intentionality speech moves toward its *telos*. While for the subjectivist this *telos* tends to be located in a You, for the objectivist it tends to be located in a Me. To carry out the act of speaking, a speaker must recognize a *telos* or purpose which he feels obliged to fulfill--a *telos* or purpose which through bad faith comes to function as a *determinism*. The mechanics involved in persuasion are totally derived from these mechanics of *determinism*. In asking who is persuading whom, we are asking *who is determining for whom?* To identify a *real* persuader would then be to identify a *real* determinism. But as we went to great lengths to explain at the beginning of this chapter, there can be no determinisms in the human reality; human beings are unqualifiedly free. On the basis of our phenomenology of communication then, it seems the most we could say about

the persuasion at a Billy Graham crusade is that the participants in-
volved in such a communicative event are involved in a form of inau-
thenticity co-relative upon each Other. Each uses the Other as a means
for denying his own freedom and contingency. "The persuader" and
"the persuaded," whomever one might think them to be in this or any
communicative event, depart hand-in-hand from the metaphors of per-
ception or the authenticity of the human reality. But though they may
depart hand-in-hand (e.g. as in the case of the sadist and masochist),
they still depart ultimately on their own through the self deludedness of
masturbatic mind play that is endued in the attempt to deny freedom
through the literal meanings of language.

A third type of communicative manner or speaker disposition is
that of the authentic communicator. Unlike the first two communicative
manners, the manner of the authentic communicator is not automatically
given to us as users of language. Moreover, based upon our phenomenology
of language, such an attitude could be only most tenuously attainable,
if it is attainable at all. With our above observations on language and
its relation with masturbation and sado-masochism, how could such com-
munication even be possible? All language usage is based upon an attempt
to synthesize the in-itself with the for-itself, or to bring facticity
into consciousness. All language directed at the Other can serve only
to objectify him, and conversely, the Other's language can serve only
to infect me with facticity. Sartre says:

> Everything which may be said of me in my relations with
> the Other applies to him as well. While I attempt to
> free myself from the hold of the Other, the Other is
> trying to free himself from mine; while I seek to enslave
> the Other, the Other seeks to enslave me. We are by no
> means dealing with unilateral relations with an object-
> in-itself, but with reciprocal and moving relations.[119]

Because of the interminable <u>conflict</u> at the foundation of our relation-
ship with the Other, Sartre concludes that people are each other's hell,
and his play <u>No Exit</u> is even a dramatized statement of this belief.
Man is "a hopeless passion" in a hopeless situation. He says:

> [T]he only relation of person to person is that which
> binds the torturer and his victim; <u>at the same time</u>
> this conception is the search for communication through
> the conflicts and the deviated affirmation of absolute
> non-communication.[120]

Each person needs the Other, yet the Other is his cause of distress.
This paradoxical aspect of how human beings relate to each other was
summed up well in Arthur Schopenhauer's parable of the porcupines:

> On a cold winter day, a group of porcupines huddled
> together closely to save themselves by their mutual
> warmth from freezing. But soon they felt the mutual
> quills and drew apart. Whenever the need for warmth
> brought them closer together again, this second evil
> was repeated, so that they were tossed back and forth
> between these two kinds of suffering until they dis-
> covered a moderate distance that proved most tolerable.--
> Thus the need for company, born of the emptiness and
> monotony inside them drives men together; but their many
> revolting qualities and intolerable faults repel them
> again. The medium distance that they finally discover
> and that makes association possible is politeness and
> good manners.[121]

Both Schopenhauer and Sartre make communication sound like a sick-bed
where human beings roll restlessly from side to side, hardly ever finding
a point where they can experience any extended relief. A communicator
could not be authentic without experiencing his own freedom and this
pain or <u>anguish</u> that is always a part of this freedom. Such a communi-
cator would also acknowledge and respect the freedom of the Other. Bad
faith is always the result of attempting to believe or persuade. Belief
results in bad faith because of an I in its rhetorical involvement with
a Me, while persuasion results in bad faith because of an I in its
rhetorical involvement with a You. On respecting the freedom of the

Other and oneself, Schopenhauer says: "A man who has some heat in himself prefers to remain outside, where he will neither prick other people nor get pricked himself."[122] Sartre, however, claims that such respect for the Other's freedom, and one's own, is not possible. A communicator must always "prick" himself and the Other.

> [R]espect for the Other's freedom is an empty word;
> even if we could assume the project of respecting this
> freedom, each attitude which we adopted with respect
> to the Other would be a violation of that freedom which
> we claim to respect. The extreme attitude which would
> be given as a total indifference toward the Other is not a
> solution either. We are already thrown in the world in
> the face of the Other; our upsurge is a free limitation of
> his freedom and nothing--not even suicide--can change this
> original situation.[123]

Sartre again comes to the dismal conclusion that "Whatever I may do for the Other's freedom . . . my efforts are reduced to treating the Other as an instrument."[124] It seems that the resolution of the conflict of two freedoms can come about only by each being made an object for the Other. The resolution of this conflict cannot depend upon any reason or truth, since as was described before, reason and truth are the outcome of such a conflict, not the determinants. This means that authenticity, if it is possible, cannot be automatically achieved or presumed; rather, authenticity must be worked for through the risk of communicative encounters that always entail the demise of the Other's freedom and one's own. Sartre says:

> Authenticity and individuality have to be earned: I
> shall be my own authenticity only if under the influ-
> ence of the call of conscience I launch out toward
> death with a resolute-decision as toward my own most
> peculiar possibility. At this moment I reveal myself
> to myself in authenticity, and I raise others along
> with myself toward the authentic.[125]

If there is ever going to be an understanding of the veridical or authentic character of the speech message, it must be based upon an

understanding of the phenomenology of social relations outlined above.
It must be understood how in any communicative situation, the phenome-
nology of social relations will calibrate the scales for reason and
truth. A prerequisite for an authentic communicative event would be an
acknowledgement of the tendencies toward subjectivism and objectivism
that produce this reason and truth, along with a perspicuous recogni-
tion of exactly what parts these tendencies are playing in the thinking,
speaking and listening of the participating interlocutors in such a
communicative event. In an authentic communicative event, each speaker
would have an eminently clear consciousness of the human reality and
his relation to this reality through conscious choice and the meta-
phors of perception. Authentic communication, it seems, would involve
a resignation on the part of the speaker that he could not free him-
self from the hold of the Other, nor the Other from him. It would in-
volve a refocusing of his awareness of the Other and himself on the
basis of this resignation. The authentic communicator then is willing
to live with the anguish resulting from the perception of his contingency
in relation to the Other. He is willing to accept his own symbolic
universe as something less than inevitable. And though he realizes the
impossibility of achieving a perfectly authentic relationship, he still
remains impavidly immersed in the communication process. In contrast,
the inauthentic communicators of subjectivism and objectivism will always
fearfully withdraw from the social process, and they will always try to
make appear as necessary those things that are actually nothing more
than collections of contingencies or metaphors of perception.

Toward the end of Being and Nothingness, Sartre equates his
theory of freedom as conscious choice with Kierkegaard's irony. He says

authentic communication would involve an ironic or playful attitude toward the Other:

> Play, like Kierkegaard's irony, releases subjectivity.
> What is play indeed if not an activity of which man
> is the first origin, for which man himself sets the
> rules, and which has no consequences except according
> to the rules posited? As soon as a man apprehends him-
> self as free and wishes to use his freedom, a freedom,
> by the way, which could just as well be his anguish,
> then his activity is play.[126]

It is interesting that Kenneth Burke ends up giving this same elevated role to irony and social play, even though he does not begin his communicative inquiries from a perspective that is ordinarily thought of as phenomenological. For both Burke and Sartre, irony is not just one among many figures of speech. Both consider a sense of irony to be at the foundation of an authentic social existence. Burke says we cannot communicate maturely or authentically "until we are spontaneously at home in irony."[127] In perhaps the most perceptive summation of how the ironic or authentic communicator sees himself in relation to the Other, Burke says:

> True irony, humble irony, is based upon a sense of fun-
> damental kinship with the enemy, as one needs him, is
> indebted to him, is not merely outside him as an observer
> but contains him within, being consubstantial with him.[128]

But this ironic attitude is not a common attitude in communicative encounters. In contemporary American society with its focus on ejaculation, competition, "looking out for number one" etc., it is probably the untypical communicator who feels Burke's "fundamental kinship with the enemy." Kierkegaard notes how the ironic attitude is both a healthiness and a sickness; it is "an endemic fever which but few individuals contract, and even fewer overcome."[129] For both Burke and Sartre irony involves a certain attitude or way of relating to the Other and one's self.

As Sartre identifies irony with freedom or conscious choice, so Burke identifies irony with drama. For Burke irony promotes a "Dramatistic" attitude in human relations, rather than a "Scientistic" (which we equated in Chapter Two with ideological). By promoting the conscious choice of Sartre, we can also think of irony as an antidote to the ideology of literal meanings. Unfortunately, Being and Nothingness does not develop any detailed account of how irony is related to or the inspiration for the authentic speech process. But the significance of irony to authentic speech and our phenomenology of language at large will be taken up again in the last part of our study.

F. Language Pathologies

Based upon our discussion of how language is involved in the human situation, it should be able to be seen how the self is language and language is the self. "I am language"[130] says Sartre, and it is language that makes me what I am. Because of this identity of language and self, aberrations of self should be understood as aberrations of language, and vice versa. But we might also keep in mind our earlier explained view that since the self is based upon language, it is itself an aberration. From the phenomenological perspective, language pathologies are identical with person pathologies. In this section we will look at two kinds of such pathologies. First we will consider mental illness, then we will consider what are usually recognized as speech pathologies. I want to stress very strongly though that it is not our purpose here to give an exhaustive analysis to these two huge subjects; rather, it is our purpose to show how mental illness and speech pathology are to be placed or located within the phenomenology of language.

We would hope then to be able to provide a basis for further explorations. Though in our last section we have already given this theoretical longitude and latitude to mental illness, we want also to suggest how mental illness is to be related to aphasia within the phenomenology of language.

As these matters have been explained up to this point, it is the literal meaning that is the typical failure of language. The literal meaning is the result when the metaphors of poetry have withered into the logic of rhetoric. Like literal meanings, person pathologies are the result of abandoning one's freedom or of choosing not to choose. Person pathologies are the result of a loss of courage to assume one's freedom. Sartre's development of existential psychoanalysis is an effort to deal with these person or language pathologies. He considers the conscious choosing which dissolves self deception to be discoverable on the basis of existential psychoanalysis. The task of making choice conscious involves uncovering what Sartre calls the "original project," or what we explained in Chapter Three as the initial choice which had been covered up or buried within rational argument in the plays of Euripides. The original choice or project is what "decides the attitude of the person when confronted with logic and principles."[131] The significance that any logic or principles can have can come only after or within the context of the original choice or project. Put summarily then, the goal of existential psychoanalysis is to uncover the original project, and to thereby make choice conscious and recognizable as one's own.

Sartre says the notion of original choice has the same significance to existential psychoanalysis that the notion of the complex has to Freudian or empirical psychoanalysis. And just as the Freudian or empirical psychoanalyst seeks to uncover or determine complexes, so the existential

psychoanalyst seeks to uncover or determine <u>original choice</u>. Comparing

the two, Sartre says:

> Empirical psychoanalysis and existential psychoanalysis
> both search within an existing situation for a fundamental
> attitude which can not be expressed by simple, logical
> definitions because it is prior to all logic, and which
> requires reconstruction according to the laws of specific
> syntheses. Empirical psychoanalysis seeks to determine the
> <u>complex</u>, the very name of which indicates the polyvalence
> of all the meanings which are referred back to it. Existen-
> tial psychoanalysis seeks to determine the <u>original choice</u>.
> This original choice operating in the face of the world and
> being a choice of position in the world is total like the
> complex, it is prior to logic like the complex.[132]

Through out much of <u>Being and Nothingness</u>, Sartre stresses how the human

reality defines itself by the ends it pursues, and particularly by the

inauthentic way it chooses these ends. The personality or self is the

unification of these inauthentic choices or experiences carried out

through the use of language as rhetoric. But as we explained earlier,

such unification is actually a metaphorical activity or an engagement

in free choice, since a personality or self does <u>not</u> organize its experi-

ences or make its choice on the basis of any <u>prior</u> principles. It is

here that we get to Sartre's principal complaint about Freudian or em-

pirical psychoanalysis. When like the Freudian or empirical psychoana-

lysts we consider the <u>desires</u> or <u>instincts</u> of a self or personality as

being <u>prior</u> to conscious choice, we must always end up "assuming the

priority of the abstract over the concrete."[133] In the sense of our

phenomenology of language, this means the Freudian or empirical psy-

choanalyst assumes the reality of the rhetorical over the poetic, or

the fiction and illusion over the metaphor. Through the ruse of literal

meanings, <u>desires</u> or <u>instincts</u> (along with the self or personality in

which they are thought to inhere) come to take on an existence of their

own, for <u>both</u> the therapist and the client. Only through an existential

psychoanalysis that seeks to uncover an <u>original choice</u>, instead of a
psychological state, can we then penetrate or disassemble this pillory
of literal meanings that is keeping the client from his freedom. The
aim of existential psychoanalysis is to unlock the pillory of <u>determinism</u>
(in this case, <u>desires</u> and <u>instincts</u>) that is held in place by a misuse
of language.

Working through this same line of thought, Becker suggests that
we are not talking about illnesses here, rather we are talking about
a way of life that is based upon a style of using language. He says:
"Instead of asking 'Why does the patient feel so humiliatingly guilty?'
the question should be: 'What is the patient trying to accomplish <u>with</u>
<u>this particular language?</u>'"[134] The answer: he is trying to relieve
himself of his freedom. Through his particular use of language, he has
attempted to relinquish symbolic control of his life, which is only to
say that he will no longer recognize language as being based upon meta-
phor. This leads Becker to point to a similarity between being emotion-
ally sick and cognitively wrong. Like Sartre, he thinks "in a symbolic
animal the bind on action is due to a suppression of symbolic choice,
and not to a repression of instinctual need."[135] To understand how a
symbolic animal has its personality or self shaped and historicized
through language, we must understand how an I interacts with its Me and
You, or in Sartre's terms, we must discern how a for-itself is allowing
itself to be infected with facticity. Such constructions as, for
instance, the Freudian <u>libido</u>, can make sense <u>only after</u> we have under-
stood these communicative dynamics which created it. As we explained
earlier, it is <u>only after</u> contact with the Other that "desires" or
"instincts" can arise. Sartre says:

[E]mpirical psychoanalysis has decided upon its own
irreducible instead of allowing this to make itself
known in a self-evident intuition. The libido . . .
does not appear to us as being beforehand the irreducible
limit of the investigation. . . . .
. . . . [R]ejecting equally the theory
of malleable clay and that of the bundle of drives, we
will discover the individual person in the initial project
which constitutes him. . . . .
. . . . In our research, we will be guided by
this principle: to stop only in the presence of evident
irreducibility; that is, never to believe that we have
reached the initial project until the projected end appears
as the very being of the subject under consideration.[136]

Instinct, desire, libido--these ideas do not really allow us to get the

best handle possible on the phenomenological situation of the living

communicator.

Another citadel concept of Freudianism that Sartre rejects is

that of the unconscious. Put tersely, Sartre's argument against the

unconscious goes like this: Being-in-itself (or nonconscious being)

and being-for-itself (or nothingness or conscious being) are at per-

petual odds. An entity cannot be both in-itself and for-itself, or

both something and nothing. A structure such as the unconscious would

have to be both in-itself and for-itself. Therefore, a structure such

as the unconscious is ontologically impossible. Now, a quick rejection

of the unconscious as with this deductive dart may seem to involve some

special pleading for those not sufficiently charmed by Sartrean ontology.

But there are other considerations to make in considering the implausi-

bility of the Freudian unconscious. Sartre says the notion of the

unconscious implies that lies or self deception exist on their own

without a lier or deceiver. The person who represses something out of

awareness into the unconscious must first have been conscious of it in

order to repress it. And the Freudian therapist fails to ask who is

telling this lie or who is causing this repression. But existential

psychoanalysis uncovers the liar when it uncovers the original pro-
ject. By uncovering the original project, existential psychoanalysis
exposes the primary source of self deception or bad faith. Sartre says:

> [Freudian] psychoanalysis substitutes for the notion of
> bad faith, the idea of a lie without a liar; it allows
> me to understand how it is possible for me to be lied to
> without lying to myself . . . [I]t replaces the duality of
> the deceiver and the deceived, the essential condition of
> the lie, by that of the "id" and the "ego."[137]

The very idea of the Freudian unconscious then undermines the communi-
cative dynamics of bad faith. The notion of the Freudian unconscious
presupposes what has not yet happened, and what can only happen through
the masturbatic mind play of logic in intrapersonal communication.
With such a construct as the Freudian unconscious then, self deception
and even human beings themselves (as we have understood them in our
study) are not possible. On the basis of our own phenomenology of lan-
guage, it should be clear that for us also the unconscious is not just
a given. As it has been used in our study, the idea of the unconscious
corresponds roughly to Sartre's idea of language itself. Through out
our study we have stressed how the unconscious develops only through
the use of language as rhetoric. Particularly, the unconscious develops
in the process of an I addressing a Me or a You. In assuming an uncon-
scious, it would seem the Freudian psychoanalyst would also have to
presuppose an abstract language and logic that precedes the act of
speaking. Like his counterpart the modern linguist, the Freudian psy-
choanalyst elevates la langue above la parole. Assuming an unconscious
at the start, as the Freudian psychoanalyst does, obscures the poetic
and rhetorical roots of language, because it doesn't allow us to clearly
see how the unconscious and its rhetorical superstructure develop through
the communicative encounter.

But in this short section of Being and Nothingness called
"Existential Psychoanalysis," Sartre does little to clarify what this
therapy would look like in practice, and he says even less about the
sort of tactics and strategies an analyst might use in uncovering the
original project or choice. In one of his more explicit statements on
this therapy's exposure of bad faith, he says:

> Its point of departure is experience; its pillar of
> support is the fundamental, pre-ontological compre-
> hension which man has of the human person. Although
> the majority of people can well ignore the indications
> contained in a gesture, a word, a sign and can look
> with scorn on the revelation which they carry, each
> human individual nevertheless possesses a priori the
> meaning of the revelatory value of these manifestations
> and is capable of deciphering them, at least if he is
> aided and guided by a helping hand.[138]

As a helping hand, the therapist must discover the significant symbols
or rhetorical absolutes of the client. Then, in a much more difficult
undertaking, he must help the client understand how these significant
symbols or rhetorical absolutes are the result of a free choice.
Sartre stresses the aim of the therapist is always "to discover a
choice and not a state."[139] Using some of our earlier ideas, we would
explain the aim of the therapist as being to help the client under-
stand how his free speech (whether directed toward a Me or You) rises
to literal meaning and tautology. The therapist must show the client
how his language has come to have an existence of its own through the
ruse of rational thought. When caught in the idealism of logic and
literal meanings, a speaker does not possess language, rather it is
language that possesses him. But when the speaker or client comes to
realize that he possesses language, or that he creates and is in control
of language, he is then able to realize how he creates and is in control
of his own personal situation. Because the speaker or client is able

to recapture a sense of his own _intentionality_, he is able to assume
responsibility for himself.

Sartre seems to largely approve of the _methods_ of empirical
psychoanalysis. He says "its method is better than its principles."[140]
Because of its method, empirical psychoanalysis is often on the
threshold of making existential discoveries when, for example, it un-
covers _complexes_. But it is never able to completely unmask these.
Empirical psychoanalysis always stops short of discovering _original_
choice, and so it must as long as it recognizes instincts and desires
as having an existence of their own. But one important characteristic
that might distinguish the demeanor or the manner of the existential psy-
choanalyst toward his client from that of the Freudian is that Sartre
stresses how his is a humane therapy. In a letter to R. D. Laing he says:

> Like you, I believe that one cannot understand psycho-
> logical disturbances _from the outside_, on the basis of
> a positivistic determinism, or reconstruct them with a
> combination of concepts that remain outside the illness
> as lived and experienced. I also believe that one can-
> not study, let alone cure, a neurosis without a funda-
> mental respect for the person of the patient, without a
> constant effort to grasp the basic situation and to relive
> it, without an attempt to rediscover the response of the
> person to that situation, and--like you, I think--I regard
> mental illness as the 'way out' that the free organism, in
> its total unity, invents in order to be able to live through
> an intolerable situation.[141]

The existential psychoanalyst is not merely outside as a passive observer.
He is _not_ concerned with applying a set of scientific concepts that are
extrinsic to the illness. Such a therapist cannot remain passively out-
side the client if he is to help him understand how he is being held
prisoner by his own symbolic constructions created through an I-Me and
I-You rhetoric. To help unlock this pillory of logic and literal
meanings, to help the client find the "way out" through metaphor and
conscious choice, the therapist must become _involved_. And in clarifying

the nature of this involvement, therapists like Laing pick up where our own discussion leaves off. However, even thirty-five years after _Being and Nothingness_ and all that has been written about existential psycho-analysis, Sartre's observation of the early forties that "This psycho-analysis has not yet found its Freud."[142] still seems to hold.

But there is another kind of language pathology that we would like to briefly discuss in the remaining pages of this chapter. This other aspect of language pathology is _aphasia_. Some phenomenologists, for instance Merleau-Ponty, may find it interesting to question whether aphasia ought to be made a subdivision of mental illness, or if mental illness should be considered a species of aphasia. We will briefly sketch out some similarities between aphasia and mental illness, as these similarities are explainable through the phenomenology of language. In his book _Speaking_ (_La Parole_), Georges Gusdorf summarizes the phenomenological characteristics of aphasia this way:

> An aphasiac, in whom the mechanisms of speech are affected,
> is not simply deprived of a certain number of words, and
> incapable of correctly designating them. This aspect of
> his illness, long considered primary, is in fact only sec-
> ondary. The aphasiac is a man in whom the linguistic func-
> tion is breaking down; the whole intellectual structuring of
> existence within him is in the process of collapsing. He
> loses the sense of the unity and identity of an object. In
> a fragmented and incoherent world, he is captive of the con-
> crete situation, condemned to a kind of vegetable life.
> Therefore, properly speaking, there are no illnesses of lan-
> guage, but only personality disorders. The patient finds
> himself divorced from human reality, and so to speak, fallen
> away from that world into which the emergence of speech had
> caused him to enter.[143]

We should quickly add to Gusdorf's observations, though, that just as language disorders are personality disorders, so personality disorders can be viewed as language disorders, since "I _am_ language" (Sartre). Indeed, language disorder is the factor common to aphasia and mental illness.

Merleau-Ponty suggests the emotionally sick person should be compared to the aphasiac (or vice versa) because of the type of speech problem faced by both. He says what is significantly common to mental illness and aphasia is that in both cases "The subject no longer has the impression that he coincides with his own speech."[144] In both cases, the subject has the impression that language exists on its own as an independent abstraction or as a collection of literal meanings. We have explained how the mentally ill person loses the impression of coinciding with his own speech (i.e., his own metaphors) through the ruse of rational thought and literal meanings. For both the aphasiac and the mentally ill person, language has become much more severely abstract. In their attempts to speak, both the aphasiac and the mentally ill person try to realize language as a purely intellectual or purely articulatory phenomenon. They do not know how to allow their speech to become infused with experience (or perhaps as Heidegger would say here, infused with being). But, as Merleau-Ponty says: "Language is attained not as an articulatory phenomenon, but as an element of a linguistic game. In aphasia it is not the innate instrument that is lost, but the possibility of using it in certain cases."[145] To clarify his claim that the aphasiac has not lost the innate instrument of speech, Merleau-Ponty gives as an example a child who is not yet capable of producing "r" sounds in regular communicative encounters, but is still able to onomatopoetically produce "r" sounds when mimicking, for instance, the starting of a car motor.[146] In an exactly parallel way, the aphasiac is able to produce basic sounds (phonemes), but he is not able to organize them into minimum meaningful units (morphemes), as such minimum meaningful units would be defined or recognized by a particular speaking community. Merleau-Ponty

gives an example of a patient who is not capable of using "no" in regular communicative encounters. But when the patient is pushed far enough to say the word "no," he will finally blurt-out "no, I just cannot say that word." In consideration of examples like these, Merleau-Ponty concludes " . . . the aphasiac is not someone who no longer speaks, but rather someone who speaks less or in another fashion. He remembers a word in one situation and not in another."[147] For Merleau-Ponty, aphasia seems to be a problem of poor socialization; it is a problem of the patient not being able to take part in the language game of his particular speaking community. The aphasiac is not someone who has been dealt out of this language game, rather he is someone who has lost the skill to play the cards dealt him.

We don't propose that there will be no objections to be raised to Merleau-Ponty's account of aphasia, especially those that might be pressed from a "physiological" point of view. In an interview with the author (3/19/79), Professor Audrey Holland conveyed the widely accepted view that aphasia is primarily a physiological malady. She even thinks that "Where you cannot find physical malfunctioning there cannot be aphasia." The aphasiac is not, as Merleau-Ponty seems to imply, "electively mute." However, Merleau-Ponty's general challenge to the physiological point of view seems to have evolved from this premise:

> In proportion to its development, the clinical analysis of aphasia (loss of speech, related to a disorder of the speech organs) has shown that the classical interpretations were false. The verbal image is not a brain trace [my italics]: the central nervous system is not a storehouse of images. It is a center endowed with the organization of movements. It is only the locus of a function.[148]

From these considerations, Merleau-Ponty reaches his postulate that aphasia is an intellectual disorder. And remember that for us intellectual or logical functions are based in social or communicative

functions. They are a part of what Nietzsche calls the "gregarious instinct."[149] The aphasiac has not lost the elements of language; he has lost the function of being able to experience these elements as they are ordinarily conveyed in social or communicative contexts. And as phenomenologists of language, we are primarily concerned with clarifying the experiential dimensions of these functions. Moving on the level of the language theorist rather than language user, Merleau-Ponty would perhaps want to explore how "physiological" descriptions of brain functions are only "metaphorical" descriptions of phenomenological activity. But whatever the actual physiological circumstances of the aphasiac, there is still a basic phenomenological dimension of aphasia, as there is to language usage in general. That is, the aphasiac is undergoing an experience with language, and one of our concerns would be to depict this aphasic experience.

But of even more direct concern to our own phenomenology of language is how a theory of language based upon poetry and rhetoric is to make sense of aphasia. On the basis of the phenomenology of language we have thus far developed, where does aphasia stand? Working from some ideas developed by Kurt Goldstein in Language and Language Disturbances (New York: Grune & Stratton, 1948), Merleau-Ponty posits the idea of a "two-functioned language."[150] First, there is "a concrete language, whose role would be to respond to actual situations; [and second] a categorical language, which considers the word in itself as a purely abstract entity and which responds to fictitious situations." While the concrete language has to do with the instrumentalities of speech like basic sounds, the categorical or abstract language is a propositional or rational language. Though Merleau-Ponty uses terms different from our own to label his two levels of language, it is

significant that the position and function of his concrete and cate-
gorical levels corresponds exactly to the poetic and rhetorical functions
of language we have been depicting through out our study. At bottom,
poetry is a concrete language that responds to actual situations, while
rhetoric is the means of creating identities or the fictitious similari-
ties that allow things to be grouped into categories. In spite of the
perceptiveness of Merleau-Ponty's (or Goldstein's) distinction, we choose
here to stay with the poetic-rhetoric formula because of the longer
standing it has had in language inquiry, though admittingly the full sig-
nificance of poetic and rhetoric is seldom realized. Also, if we might
step out of character for a moment to invoke the principle of parsimony
in Ockham's razor, the poetic-rhetoric formula seems more readily ap-
plicable to a wider range of communicative activity--literature, oratory,
prayer, interpersonal etc.

Now according to Merleau-Ponty, the aphasiac is a speaker who
has trouble achieving an "osmosis"[151] of the categorical (or rhetorical)
and concrete (or poetic) functions of language. Regarding his trouble
with the rhetorical function of language, the aphasiac is a speaker who
is unable to order his perceptions around traditional or socially
accepted patterns of organization. In demonstration of this point,
Merleau-Ponty cites Goldstein's example[152] of an aphasiac asked to order
a group of objects according to a fundamental color. Though the aphasiac
could not organize the objects on the basis of this particular ordering
principle, he went on through his own initiative to organize these same
objects according to their degree of brightness. It seems then that
the aphasiac's problem is not that he can't organize experiences, but
that he can't carry out or implement patterns of organization that have

been developed through I-You rhetorics. Pressing here some considera-
tions of Nietzsche, we would observe that the aphasiac is someone who
has trouble seeing the <u>identities</u> among collections of things that
others see. He has not been able to adopt the <u>identification</u> process
that always greases the movement of thought between two or more persons.
This is not to say the aphasiac is <u>wrong</u>, since as Nietzsche would be
quick to add, such identities exist only in and through the fictions of
language and logic, anyway. As a speaker who has trouble with the
rhetorical function of language, the aphasiac cannot adopt the prevailing
categories or the prevailing fictions or illusions.

Because he has such a problem with the rhetorical aspects of
language, does this mean we think the aphasiac is primarily a poet?
No, however the aphasiac does have some penchants of the poet. He may
sometimes <u>seem</u> to perceive certain metaphors of perception that haven't
registered in sharp focus for the prosaically oriented perceiver as in
the above example. When we use the word <u>prosaic</u> here, we use it to refer
both to prose or rhetoric, and to something unimaginative, commonplace,
etc. There is a connection between the aphasiac and the work of the
theatre artist Peter Brook. In the tradition of <u>Finnegan's Wake</u>,
the <u>Orghast</u>[153] of Brook develops a largely incomprehensible language
that is supposedly created from the poet's dream world. The salad of
sounds voiced by Brook's actors has a lack of structure comparable to
the speech of the aphasiac, though, it too may have a certain <u>internal</u>
validity. More recently, Arthur Kopit, in his play <u>Wings</u> (aired on
National Public Radio 11/26/77), conveys the inner world of the aphasiac.
In a Joycean way, the play depicts the aphasiac's surrealistic stream
of consciousness. The listener of the play sees things from the per-
spective of the aphasiac's inner world. From our phenomenological

perspective, it is interesting to note how the method of surrealism in Kopit's play and the effects of aphasia mix in a seamless whole. Though this is a matter we will take up again in Chapter Seven, we will want it to be understood how the work of the surrealist artist is in some ways the aesthetic corollary of aphasia, since the project of the surrealist is racked with the same poetic inadequacies of aphasia.

What are these inadequacies?

On first look it may seem that we think the aphasiac is a speaker in whom the metaphors of perception have not coagulated into the generally current or accepted literal meanings. This, in turn, may even perversely suggest that the aphasiac is only exercising Nietzsche's "will to power" or that he is even an "overman." But even much more so than the typical user of language, the aphasiac is a speaker who has forgotten that the metaphors of perception are metaphors. The aphasiac disregards the noema as noema. We explained how the exercising of the will to power involves a consciousness of illusion as illusion. Illusions must be formed and then recognized as such. It is this recognition of illusion as illusion or this consciousness of illusion that the aphasiac lacks. If the aphasiac were aware of his illusions as illusions, he would not find it so difficult to shift via identification to the prevailing illusions of his speaking community. We should also note that if the speaking community were more flexible or more aware of the origins of its own speech in poetry and rhetoric, it conversely might find the speech of the aphasiac or the art of the surrealist less bizarre. The aphasiac's malady is not one different in kind from the speech problem that affects every speaking subject to some extent. The aphasiac's problem is different in its degree, and in his particular selection of fictions or illusions.

If we could again look to the history of speech, particularly as it relates to language and perception, perhaps more light could be shed on what we mean by the poetic inadequacies of the aphasiac. These poetic inadequacies are to be related to the aphasiac's rhetorical inadequacies described above. Merleau-Ponty says:

> The patient's inability to classify is linked to a transformation of his own perception. Whereas the normal subject is capable of immediate organization of his perceptual field according to the lines of force, there is, on the contrary, a dispersal of this field in the patient. The failure of the categorical attitude is, or implies, a change in the structuring of perception. Behind the act of designation, there is no distinct intellectual operation: the categorical function is incarnated in the word, giving it its physiognomy. When it fails, one has the impression that the word has been "emptied," that it has lost "what rendered it appropriate to the act of designation" (Goldstein).[154]

If we relate Merleau-Ponty's observation to our earlier discussion of Heidegger and the Greeks, we can see more clearly how the perceptual and language process must have been radically different before Aristotle gave a formal development to the crafts of classifying and categorizing. The development of categorical syllogisms etc. involved a profound change in the way human beings think and speak. With Aristotle there was a culmination in the evolution of language toward logic, abstractions, categories, etc., that thereafter became more ingrained and widespread in speech. As we recall Heidegger on these matters, it was exactly with the rise of this Aristotelian influence that the speech process became severed from the concrete. If we apply Heidegger's understanding of language and perception in conjunction with Merleau-Ponty's to the history of speech pathology we get some puzzling results. Should we say that before Aristotle aphasia could not have existed, since what is ordinarily regarded as normal language (in part the making of categories and identities) had not yet developed? Recall

how Nietzsche implies that the "sick soul" is a distinctly modern development. Or, should we perhaps say that everyone before Aristotle was aphasic since their thought and speech did not exhibit the well honed categories and classifications that characterize the language of modern speech. On this latter question, recall that Julien Jaynes considered everyone before the first millennium as psychologically ill. There are other difficult questions that arise here, and I don't propose that we will wholly resolve them. But let us make a few more observations to at least put these matters in their best phenomenological focus.

We explained how the attempt to make classifications, designations etc. is to involve oneself in the rhetorical functioning of language, and that this feature of language developed rapidly during the first millennium B.C. Merleau-Ponty notes how there is a lack of color and style to the aphasiac's speech--characteristics which since the florid discourse of Gorgias have been associated with the rhetorical functioning of language. But since he does not pick up on these styles of expression that are prevalent in his own speaking community, does this mean the aphasiac fails to move through the rhetorical or social milieu that nurtures language development? Merleau-Ponty answers yes because he thinks "language is a totality of instruments for our relationships with people."[155] There is an inherent relationship between language and the development of social relations. But can the failure to develop language always be blamed on a failure to develop social contacts? Merleau-Ponty wants to answer yes to this question also, except in cases of anarthria (a congenital disability that impedes the development of the motor skills necessary for speech). The aphasiac's

inability to experience such social relations is the crucial factor

of his malady. Merleau-Ponty says:

> [T]he normal subject would be the one who would not
> really consent to becoming himself except in contact
> with other people, who would recognize the enrichment
> that comes from discussion. The abnormal subject would
> be the one who would refuse this dialectic of the self.
> He would persist in considering language as only a kind
> of abstract logic [my italics].156

Here then is the poetic inadequacy that contributes to aphasia. The

aphasiac is unable to achieve an authentic dialogue between his I and

Me or between his I and a You. Because he considers language as an

abstract logic, he cannot experience the metaphors of perception that

enliven and authenticate speech. Regarding the aphasiac's treatment of

language as an abstract logic, we should again recall Nietzsche's obser-

vation that logical reasoning embodies the perfect fiction. But how

does the aphasiac regard language as an abstract logic? Obviously, if

we consider logic as the basis of language in the manner of some Anglo-

American philosophers and linguists we could not get anywhere with this

question. Only when we consider logic as a form of introversion (like

Nietzsche) or as a form of masturbatic mind play can we really further

understand the aphasiac's problem of treating language as an abstract

logic.

In his attempt to speak, the aphasiac has trouble making an au-

thentic attachment of a predicate to a subject in the construction of

sentences. Because such relations for him are already frozen in tau-

tology (again, we mean what is phenomenologically experienced as tau-

tology), the aphasiac typically has trouble with plurals, with combining

words into new phrases, and other synthesizing activities of thought

that rely more heavily on metaphor and the imagination. On the basis

of our phenomonology of language, we would expect the aphasiac to have
less trouble with signification or designation, where he is asked to
match up a single word with a single object. Because the aphasiac is
so securely locked up in his logic or hallucination, he cannot intro-
duce to himself the alternative metaphors of perception necessary for
combining words into new phrases etc. In the sense of Sartre, the
aphasiac cannot rediscover choice or find the "way out." Since his lan-
guage has taken on an excessively literal quality, the aphasiac's world
is set in an inflexible logic. Literal meanings always involve a sus-
pension of belief in one's ability to choose.

We cannot understate the importance here of understanding hal-
lucination or illusion in the phenomenological sense, as opposed to the
sense of positivistic science. Merleau-Ponty's understanding of hal-
lucination or illusion is comparable to Nietzsche's. With as much argu-
mentive force (though not quite as much disdain), Merleau-Ponty rejects
the "classical theory of hallucination"[157] which says hallucination or
illusion is founded upon a transcending of factual or literal meanings.
Like Nietzsche, Merleau-Ponty contends that hallucination or illusion
is founded upon language itself. If people did not speak we would have
no hallucinations or illusions. But on the other hand, if we had no
hallucinations or illusions, people could not speak. He says:

> Speech must be considered as a total structure, a system
> by which one can attain communication with others. Hal-
> lucination is not a relationship between subject and ob-
> ject; it is a relationship of being: I exist through
> language in a relationship with others.[158]

The hallucinator then is not someone who sees a wrong relationship be-
tween himself and an object. Rather, the hallucinator is someone who
denies communication and the nature of language as a social construction.
The hallucinator is someone who denies his metaphors of perception and

tends to see only literal meanings. Phenomenologically, hallucinations do not transcend facts or literal meanings; phenomenologically, hallucinations are facts and literal meanings. In essence, the hallucinator is someone who sees language as an abstract logic or as something only in his brain. Merleau-Ponty says:

> [Hallucination is] a question of understanding the mechanism according to which the subject grasps speech as something that comes from other people. . . . . [In hallucination, the] subject has the impression that people are speaking to him through his brain. He has the impression that he is hearing "the language of thought." The sensorial phenomenon has completely disappeared. This is a question of mental speech which is nothing else but accentuated interior language.[159]

Here the phenomenological structure of aphasia is put in its clearest relief. With his hallucination, the aphasiac has lost the sensorial or poetic element that gives life to language as speech. In retaining only the physiognomy of the word, he retains only the rhetoric. Through his introversion the aphasiac has severed perception from language, thereby reducing language to a mere abstraction or hallucination. Living his life in this introversion gives the aphasiac the impression that "people are speaking to him through his brain."

We can take the phenomenological structure of aphasia then and compare it to the other communication infirmities we have depicted in this chapter. Like the sado-masochist and the masturbator, the aphasiac partakes in the general failure of language as logic and literal meanings (even though in the case of the aphasiac we admit this phenomenological state of affairs is usually triggered by a physiological mishap). Like the sado-masochist and the masturbator, the aphasiac has lost touch with the living activity of speech as metaphor. Through the ruse of logic and literal meanings, the experience each of these communicators has

with language is based upon a feeling that <u>the Other is speaking to them</u>

<u>through their brain</u>. And with this degree of perfection in their illu-

sion, there can be no consciousness of illusion <u>as</u> illusion. Logic

is this perfect fiction that always immolates its illusory status.

Having lost the poetic or sensorial element of authentic speech, none

of these communicators is able to integrate the poetry that gives lan-

guage its life expression with the rhetoric that makes language an ef-

fective instrument for imposing order on the world. Like Merleau-Ponty

says of the aphasiac, the sado-masochist and masturbator are not able

to achieve an "osmosis" of the two functions of language. Hence, all

are left with the bad faith of Sartre or the perfect and inpenetrable

fictions or illusions of Nietzsche.

VI. MARXISM AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SOCIAL RELATIONS

<u>Logic</u> is the <u>money</u> of the mind.--Karl Marx[1]

As for the United States, they say with a straight face,
"We do not have class struggle here."--Maurice Merleau-Ponty[2]

The perfect frame of a man is the perfect frame of a
state.--Samuel Taylor Coleridge[3]

In <u>Being and Nothingness</u>, Sartre begins his study of communica-
tion with an analysis of intrapersonal and interpersonal communication.
Then, toward the end of his study he moves outward to larger social or
communicative units. Following his lead, this chapter will try to mark
out the phenomenological ideas useful for understanding these larger so-
cietal aspects of communication. While in our last chapter we worked
out what might be considered as a phenomenologist's <u>psychology</u> of commu-
nication, this chapter will work out what could be correspondingly con-
sidered as a phenomenologist's <u>sociology</u> of communication.

Criticism is often directed at <u>Being and Nothingness</u> for not
giving enough consideration to environmental conditioning, especially
as it tends to "ignore" such factors in its theory of freedom. <u>Being
and Nothingness</u> rejects the Marxist doctrine of giving priority to the
object over the subject. In his later work, <u>Critique of Dialectical
Reason</u>,[4] Sartre responds to this criticism by trying to reconcile exis-
tentialism with Marxism. He attempts to show that existentialism is
the living center of Marxism, and that Marxism can be a valid account
of the historical or communication process only when it recognizes the
way in which society is made up of independently functioning individ-
uals. However, even though Sartre claims to be a Marxist in this later

work, our discussion in the present chapter will still center around the works of Marx himself, particularly The German Ideology.[5] Preferring to rely less on Sartre's interpretations in the Critique, we will try to show how Marx himself is to be related to our phenomenology of language. The phenomenological foundations of the sociology of communication receive their most perceptive formulation in the work of Marx, though, of course, we don't mean that Marx himself must be considered as a phenomenologist in the sense of Husserl and his followers.

This ongoing dispute between Marxism and existential-phenomenology is laid out in detail by George Novack in his anthology Existentialism Versus Marxism (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1966). Because he puts the word "versus" between existentialism and Marxism, it should be obvious that Novack does not find these philosophies compatible. One of the contributors to Novack's anthology, Georg Lukacs, engages in an extensive argument to show that Sartre and his existentialism can not be reconciled with Marxism. It is not our purpose to squarely challenge Lukacs on this point. Also, we don't mean to imply that there are no differences between Marxism (as it is orthodoxically stated by Lukacs) and our own phenomenology. For our own purpose, we want to think of Marxism as primarily a system or model for interpersonal communication, while existentialism is primarily a system or model for intrapersonal communication. Summarily put, our view is this: As interpersonal and intrapersonal communication are the two sides of the same language coin, so are Marxism and existentialism the two sides of the same philosophy. In the way that Marxism pertains basically to I-You communication, so existentialism pertains basically to I-Me communication. And as sadomasochism is the primary distortion of the former, so masturbation is

the primary distortion of the latter. Even then if Marxism and existentialism are irreconcilable, we still must talk about them collectively if we are going to talk about language and communication. Language can not be considered as the product of interpersonal or intrapersonal communication alone. I take Erich Fromm to be expressing a relationship of Marxism to existentialism comparable to our own when he says "Marx's philosophy constitutes a spiritual existentialism in a secular language."[6] But however Marxists like Lukacs and Novack are to decide the relationship between Marxism and existentialism, Marxism still has a role to play in our phenomenology of language, and in this chapter we will accede to this role. It is not our primary purpose then to show that orthodox Marxism is compatible with existentialism.

Ordinarily Marx is not thought of as a language or communication theorist. Though Burke and some others have made much of Marx's observations on communication[7] or what Marx calls the forms of intercourse, Marx is not usually thought of as working within the poetic or rhetorical tradition. Marx is usually thought of as primarily a political philosopher or perhaps as an economist because of the importance he imputes to what he calls the forces of production. It is the productive forces of a society that regulate the way human beings see themselves and others. Marx stresses the forces of production as the conceptual common denominator for understanding the prevailing system of human relations that structured any social organization during any phase of history (e.g., as in the feudal, the merchantile or the capitalist). Of all Marx's important ideas, the forces of production seems to be the most central to contemporary Marxism. Typically the Marxist believes that if he understands how the forces of production are at work in any social

organization, he is then able to understand anything else about that society--like the forms of consciousness, division of labor, alienation, hierarchy, ideology, and of special concern to us, the forms of inter-course. The forces of production is thought to determine hierarchy, ideology, etc., and in the course of this chapter we will discuss the interrelationships of all of these. But what we presently wish to stress is this: for the orthodox Marxist the way people communicate is a direct reflection of the way they produce, and distortions or pathologies in communication will therefore be reducible to distortions or pathologies in production.

But though the forces of production was no doubt a central idea to Marx, we wish to give special emphasis in this chapter to the forms of intercourse. We want it to be understood how the forms of inter-course is a cynosural concept for understanding the phenomenology of social relations, and perhaps even Marxism as a whole. Specifically, we want to examine the role of the forms of intercourse in the social construction of reality. This, in turn, means an examination of the forms of intercourse in its relation to class consciousness, division of labor, alienation, hierarchy, ideology and other sociologically sig-nificant ideas. By understanding how the forms of intercourse is related to these other important notions of Marx, we will better understand its significance to Marxism and the phenomenology of social relations. At bottom, Marxism must be understood as a theory of communication. It is a theory of communication. It is a theory of human relations and how such relations are constructed within and by society.

Let us first make some introductory observations on the relation of the forms of intercourse to the forces of production. Though the

forces of production is no doubt a concept of supreme importance to Marx, it is unfortunate that his interpreters have not given to the forms of intercourse a recognition of comparable significance. Marx himself said that "[Production] presupposes the intercourse [Verkehr] of individuals with one another. The form of this intercourse is again determined by production."[8] Seeming to attach a greater significance to the forms of intercourse than some other interpreters, the editors of Marx's Moscow edition note that "In The German Ideology the word 'Verkehr' is used in a very wide sense, encompassing the material and spiritual intercourse of individuals, social groups and entire countries." They go on to note that Verkehrsform (form of intercourse), Verkehrsweise (mode of intercourse), Verkehrsverhältnisse (relations or conditions of intercourse), and Produktions und Verkehrsverhältnisse (relations of production and intercourse) were all concepts used by Marx to explain the "relations of production."[9] This leaves the observer of communicative matters with the impression that for at least the early Marx of The German Ideology the forms of intercourse was a concept of comparable significance to the forces of production. However, the Moscow editors also note that during this early period these concepts had not yet taken their full or mature shape. Nevertheless, we would like to stress that if the forces of production "presuppose" the intercourse of individuals, as Marx says, then it would seem that communication is antecedent to the forces of production in at least some sense. Also, it doesn't seem that people could start producing until they at least started communicating. If A is to exploit B, then A must interact with B prior to or perhaps in the very act of exploiting. Marx also says there is a form of intercourse corresponding to each "definite stage of development of the

productive forces. The relation of the productive forces to the form of intercourse, is the relation of the form of intercourse to the occupation or activity of the individuals."[10] We will see how the kind of work a person does (with his hands or with symbols) also enters into how he communicates.

We will return to this matter of how the forms of intercourse is to be related to the forces of production, but let us at least tentatively agree that there is a direct connection between the way people communicate and the way they produce. At this point though, it is necessary to expand the horizons of our argument by considering how the forms of intercourse is to be related to ideology and class consciousness.

It is difficult to say precisely when class consciousness became an important concept for understanding how human beings relate to each other and to their society. Class consciousness has not always existed and yet it did not appear suddenly; rather, it grew out of the historical evolution of human beings and their social organizations. Through out his writings, Marx stresses the connection industry and production have with the awareness of one's class situation. In The Class Struggles in France, for instance, he says "it is just this industrial revolution which has everywhere produced clarity in class relations."[11] But to more fully understand how Marx sees class consciousness, we must go back to his more theoretical writings like The German Ideology. Talking about the essence of his materialist based theory of history, Marx declares "Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life."[12] In some ways this proposition might be considered as the linch pin that holds together the whole of Marxist theory. Lukacs says "the fundamental tenet"[13] of the method of Marx is that consciousness is socially determined.

This often cited principle of Marx means that consciousness is socially constructed or communicatively conferred on individuals or groups of individuals through the forms of intercourse and forces of production. Only by communicating with others can any kind of personal or group identity evolve. In an Invitation to Sociology, Peter Berger has given his own summarizing expression to this principle by noting that "in a sociological perspective, identity is socially bestowed, socially sustained and socially transformed."[14]

Turning this principle on its head, we could observe that if consciousness determined life (rather than vice versa), then the substance of consciousness (i.e., ideology) would be more important in the study of history than the material conditions that actually shape human relations. If consciousness determined life, then the study of history would be (or then perhaps should be) the study of ideology, rather than the study of material conditions. Describing the early stages of the process through which social life created consciousness, Marx says "The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life."[15] At this early point in history, the forces of production and societies themselves were at a fairly low stage of evolution. Division of labor had not yet developed to any significant level, and more importantly here, ideas or ideology had not yet developed. At this early stage in history, persons were still in touch with the material things themselves, rather than with the surrogate realities of ideas and words. In the sense of Heidegger, this is the period of time before the grammarians had analytically divided up language, or before being had been interpreted as idea. Ideas

were not yet able to stand in the place of being. Persons at this stage
of history were still in contact with what Marx calls "their real life-
process," rather than "the ideological reflexes and echoes [i.e., words]
of this life-process."[16] Through the development of language and/or
consciousness, persons lost hold of this pristine and innocent life
process. With the rise of ideas and words, persons became able to con-
template only the ideas or the "echoes" of material things rather than
the things themselves.

Like Nietzsche, Marx recognizes what we identified earlier as
the rhetoric of consciousness, i.e., the kaleidoscope of ideas and
words that blocks one's perception of Dionysian reality or the material
real life process. For Nietzsche, the rhetoric of consciousness is the
metaphors of perception that have coagulated into literal meanings or
an intractable self. Noting this same connection or identity of lan-
guage and consciousness, Marx says:

> Language is as old as consciousness, language is practical
> consciousness that exists also for other men, and for that
> reason alone it really exists for me personally as well;
> language, like consciousness, only arises from the need,
> the necessity, of intercourse with other men.[17]

And let us remind the reader that in The Gay Science Nietzsche said:

> Consciousness has developed only under the pressure of the
> need for communication; that from the start it was needed
> and useful only between human beings (particularly between
> those who commanded and those who obeyed); and that it also
> developed only in proportion to the degree of this utility.
> Consciousness is really only a net of communication between
> human beings; it is only as such that it had to develop.[18]

According to Nietzsche and Marx, this rhetoric of consciousness developed
in proportion to hierarchy and the division of labor. With the develop-
ment of specialized languages and the esoteric vocabularies of certain
occupations, there came a separation between those who command and those

who obey. There occurred a breaking down or atomization of life activities. One man became a leader while another became a follower, and eventually, one man became an owner while another became a laborer. And while Nietzsche says this communication developed in proportion to "bad conscience" or guilt, Marx says it developed in proportion to "class consciousness" or "false consciousness."

The significance of class consciousness to our phenomenology of communication is further clarified in Being and Nothingness. Sartre speaks of society as being made up of an oppressing class and an oppressed class, or what he calls a We-subject and an Us-object. He considers this We-subject and Us-object to be built upon or to be the sociological extention of the sado-masochistic tendencies that are indigenous to the interpersonal communication process.[19] The We-subject and the Us-object are founded upon two radically different forms of social experience. The "we" denotes a way of organizing experiences or of using language that is to be phenomenologically contrasted with the "us." Sartre says the "'we'. . . . is identical with the plural of the 'I.' . . . The 'we' includes a plurality of subjectivities which recognize one another as subjectivities."[20] Those of the We-subject perspective must have a sense of reality different from those of the Us-object perspective, since "the 'we' in 'We are looking at them' cannot be on the same ontological plane as the 'us' in 'They are looking at us.'"[21] The Us-object perspective involves the perception of oneself as a member of a community in shame. Consequently, these persons are primarily concerned with recovering their pride. Sartre says "The 'Us' here refers to an experience of being objects in common."[22] And as there is the above grammatical parallel between the "we" and the "I," so there is the same parallel between the

"us" and the "me." As Sartre explains, "In the sentence, 'They are look-ing at me,' I want to indicate that I experience myself as an object for others, as an alienated Me."[23] As an extension of the communicative dynamics involved in the creation of individual shame, the experience of the Us-object can be developed only through the look of the Other. "We are 'Us' only in the eyes of Others, and it is in terms of the Other's look that we assume ourselves as 'Us.'"[24] What Marx refers to as "class consciousness" or "false consciousness" then, is based upon or is iden-tical with this perception of being objects in common in the form of an Us-object. Relating this thesis to some sociologically identifiable characters, Sartre says:

> The "master," the "feudal lord," the "bourgeois," the
> "capitalist" all appear not only as powerful people
> who command but in addition . . . as those who are out-
> side the oppressed community and for whom this community
> exists. It is therefore for them and in their freedom
> that the reality of the oppressed class is going to exist.
> They cause it to be born by their look. . . . .
> . . . . Thus the
> oppressed class finds its class unity in the knowledge
> which the oppressing class has of it, and the appearance
> among the oppressed class of class consciousness corre-
> sponds to the assumption in shame of an Us-object.[25]

For Sartre then, class consciousness evolves out of a feeling of individ-ual shame through which the hierarchical organization of society becomes expressed collectively as an Us-object. There comes to exist then a hierarchy or social order that has been shaped through the forms of intercourse. And with this firmly established crucible of meanings or values, it becomes difficult for many and impossible for most to think and speak without participating in the bad faith of this hierarchy or system of order. Through the development of such forms of intercourse, speech tends to rise in abstraction and to become separated from the material real life process. Language becomes phenomenologically

experienced as literal meanings or as a form of logic, and speakers then cannot use language without subjecting themselves to this bad faith of language as rhetoric.

We explained in our last chapter how this hierarchy or its crucible of meaning is based upon the ability of one person (or now a class of persons) to make definitions for other persons. Definitions are formed through the social intercourse of victim and victimizer. For Marx, the development of these definitions is synonymous with the development of ideology. With the unfolding of the capabilities or possibilities of ideology through the rhetoric of consciousness, ideas become the standard for what is real, rather than the material things themselves. There is a shift away from material things to ideas, or as Marx says, there is an "ascending" into ideology—brought on by changes in the forms of intercourse and forces of production. As Heidegger associates this ascension into ideology with Platonic metaphysics and Aristotelian logic, Marxists tend to associate it with developments in industry. And as we move through this chapter we will see how through our phenomenological perspective there is no incompatibility between these. Marx also associates this ascension with Platonic metaphysics, while Heidegger also associates this ascension with technology. In Marx's view, it is the aim of the modern materialist philosopher to come down from the Platonic heaven of Ideas and to put an end to the "theoretical bubble blowing" that characterizes ruling class thinking and speaking. "In direct contrast to German philosophy [or ruling class philosophy in general] which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven."[26] The materialist philosopher begins with the things themselves, rather than the ideas and "echoes" (or words) of these things. Marx sums up

his view of ruling class phildsophy as a <u>linguistically based</u> ideology

this way:

> For philosophers, one of the most difficult tasks is to
> descend from the world of thought to the actual world.
> <u>Language</u> is the immediate actuality of thought. Just as
> philosophers have given thought an independent existence,
> so they had to <u>make language into an independent realm</u>
> [my italics]. This is the secret of philosophical lan-
> guage, in which thoughts in the form of words have their
> own content. The problem of descending from the world
> of thoughts to the actual world is turned into the prob-
> lem of descending from language to life. . . . [The] ex-
> clusive, systematic occupation with these thoughts on the
> part of ideologists and philosophers, and hence the sys-
> tematisation of these thoughts, is a consequence of divi-
> sion of labour. . . . The philosophers would only have to
> dissolve their language into ordinary language, from which
> it is abstracted, to recognize it as the distorted language
> of the actual world, and to realize that <u>neither thoughts</u>
> <u>nor language in themselves form a realm of their own</u> [my
> italics].²⁷

Because of language, particularly a <u>misuse</u> of language, ideas

are able to gain an <u>apparent</u> existence of their own as literal meanings.

But language is not to be understood as just a <u>cause</u> here, for it is

at once the result and the ongoing forming device for ideology and con-

sciousness. Language is able to produce ideology and consciousness be-

cause it produces a certain <u>unawareness</u> of being. Again, just as

Heidegger contends that modern language and its users have lost hold of

reality by interpreting being as idea, so Marx contends that modern lan-

guage and its users have lost hold of the material real life process.

We wish to stress this point because of the huge philosophical differences

that are usually thought to separate Heidegger from Marx. But even if

Heidegger is a political antipode to Marx, there is this poignant sim-

ilarity to their views of language--i.e., when language is considered

<u>phenomenologically</u>. Perhaps working from this initial similarity, other

points of correspondence could be found between the antagonistic bodies

of thought Heidegger and Marx are usually thought to represent.

We define ideology as the attempted fixation of the material

real life process in ideas. Ideology is the fixation of this real life

process in ideas through the process of constructing literal meanings

we have described. As applied to our phenomenology of language, both

Heidegger and Marx are saying that with the rise of ideology the experi-

ence of the real life process became frozen in symbols as literal mean-

ings. There is an exact similarity between what Heidegger and Marx

mean by ideology and what we mean by literal meanings. In both ideology

and literal meanings, speakers make language into "a visibility of things

that are already-there" (Heidegger), or they "make language into an in-

dependent realm" even though "neither thoughts nor language in themselves

form a realm of their own" (Marx). In the sense of Nietzsche or Merleau-

Ponty, ideology is to be equated with illusion or hallucination. These

three distortions of reality (ideology, illusion and hallucination) are

not the result of a logically wrong relationship, but of a denial of

authentic communication. As in the communication pathologies of the

last chapter, the ideologist has the impression that the Other speaks

to him through his brain. He denies that he coincides with his own speech

or metaphors, since he sees only literal meanings that "exist on their

own." Ideology is a means by which words use speakers, rather than, as

in metaphor, speakers make use of words. On this point, Burke notes:

> An "ideology" is like a spirit taking up its abode in a
> body: it makes that body hop around in certain ways; and
> that same body would have hopped around in different ways
> had a different ideology happened to inhabit it.[28]

In the Sartrean view (as for Burke), ideology is a determinism produced

through an ensnarement in the facticity of the Other. Like the illusions

or hallucinations of literal meanings, ideology is a set of self sus-
taining ideas that prohibit a looking back upon themselves to question
themselves. These ideas are perfectly secure in their logic. The ide-
ologist cannot look back upon the experience or metaphors of perception
from which ideas derive. He cannot become aware of his ideas as illu-
sions since he cannot look back upon the real life world from which he
has "ascended" (Marx). And it seems the higher up the ladder of abstrac-
tion he goes or the closer he gets to tautology and the perfect fictions
of logic or rhetoric, the harder it is for him to look back without per-
sonal pain or severe disorientation.

As to the factors that lead to the development of ideology and
class consciousness, Marx says it is only through the forms of inter-
course or forces of production indigenous to capitalist society that
ideology and class consciousness can evolve. For the purpose of explain-
ing his view, let us call this beginning of consciousness incipient con-
sciousness, which is to be distinguished from the later development of
class consciousness. Marx believes that as men became alienated from
their work through the division of labor, incipient consciousness grew
within the womb of the forms of intercourse. But it was only with the
rise of capitalism in fifteenth century Italy[29] that incipient conscious-
ness and division of labor had evolved to a point where class conscious-
ness could arise. Marx thought the worker could become class conscious
only when he became aware of himself as a thing to be sold. Only when
a worker is able to sell himself for money can he become sufficiently
alienated from his work and aware of himself as an object. Marx held
that class consciousness, division of labor, and alienation reached their
highest pitch under capitalism. He says the festering pimple of history

comes to a head in the hostility and degradation experienced by modern man under capitalism. Whether or not then a society has reached this stage of class consciousness is determined, according to Marx, by its position on this scale in the evolution of the forces of production. He says "economic categories are only abstract expressions of these actual relations [these productive relations] and only remain true while these relations exist."[30]

With these new considerations of class consciousness and ideology before us, let us return to the question of how the concept of the forces of production is to be related to the forms of intercourse. Clearly the later Marx thought that the limits of discourse to both create and assuage human conflict were shaped by the life world created and sustained by the capitalist mode of production. According to this view, capitalism precludes from the start achieving any cooperation through communication. Under capitalism all communication is coercive. Marx would specify capitalist society as the one social organization where speech works chiefly as a weapon for competition. But Burke makes an interesting challenge to Marx on this point. We bring up Burke's view here because of its agreement with our view of conflict developed in Chapter Five, and because Burke addresses himself specifically to this point. In Burke there is no equivocation or uncertainty on this point. He says: the forms of intercourse determine the forces of production. In the view of Burke (and Sartre in Being and Nothingness), conflict is the central feature of the communication process, while economic factors are just one of the subsidiary conflicts intrinsic to the communication process. Burke makes the study of economics a part of the study of language as rhetoric. He says: "The 'pecuniary' motive, we contend, should

be analyzed as a special case of the linguistic motive."[31] Reversing the view of the orthodox Marxist, Burke contends the forces of production are _presupposed_ within the forms of intercourse, and the relation of the forms of intercourse to the productive forces, is the relation of the productive forces not just to the occupation of the individual, but to the totality of his life experiences, especially as those experiences take shape through _symbolic_ activity. Man is not only a working animal, he is also and primarily a social or communicative animal. Marx's notions of class consciousness and ideology cannot be derived or excised from work situations alone. Ants and bees have specialization and regimentation of their work forces, yet they have no class consciousness and ideology. There must be some additional quality to human beings, then, --some other quality of their life world that makes possible this development of class consciousness and ideology. What is this other quality? Burke says "The 'invidious' aspects of class arise from the nature of man not as a 'class animal,' but as a 'classifying animal.'"[32] Ideology also arises from the nature of man as a classifying or categorizing animal. As we explained earlier through Nietzsche, all ideas are arrived at by equating the unequal. Man the classifying animal is able to make classifications and categories only by equating the unequal, which always involves negating the individual metaphors of perception. In this way, both ideology and consciousness arise through the symbolic process.

But must the work of Marx (especially in The German Ideology) be interpreted in such a narrow fashion so as to preclude a fundamental importance to the forms of intercourse? A reader who interprets Marx in the narrow sense (i.e. the orthodox Marxist who would tell us that the forces of production strictly determine the forms of intercourse)

would have us think that human conflict could be permanently resolved through a rebellion that secured economic equality. On the basis of our phenomenology of language, this view severely and unfairly <u>limits</u> the role of communication in human conflict, while it severely and unfairly <u>extends</u> the role of economics. In Chapter Five we went to considerable length to explain how the most basic struggle in the world is for the power to make definitions--of people, situations, etc. If this is so, then it would seem that <u>it is not what people communicate about</u> (e.g. economics, sex, etc.) <u>that is the source of human conflict, rather it is the process of communication itself that is by its nature friction producing.</u> The struggle in the world then is for symbols. The struggle in the world is for money and sex only insofar as these things are themselves symbols. The struggles of politics, economics and sex are struggles that always and must take place within the social body of language. We should thus give the same ontological status to economic <u>drives</u> that Sartre gives to sexual <u>desire</u>. That is, monetary and sexual desire can arise only <u>after</u> a particular communicative encounter has coated them with a meaning that "certifies" them as desirable. Symbolic or communicative matters then <u>precede</u> economic (Marx) and sexual (Freud) considerations in the understanding of human conflict. Burke summarizes his argument this way:

> [T]he human mind, as the organ of a symbol-using animal,
> is "prior" to any <u>particular</u> property structure--and in
> this sense the laws of symbols are prior to economic laws.
> Out of his symbols, man has developed all his inventions.
> Hence, why should not their symbolic origin remain con-
> cealed in them?[33]

With Burke, the phenomenologist of language must conclude that class conflicts, along with the ideology upon which they are based, spring

more nascently from communicative circumstances than from economic.

Our orthodox Marxist readers may wish to make the point that by putting the forms of intercourse above or even on a par with the forces of production, we are in conflict with dialectical materialism. This may be so, but then, language cannot be explained by dialectical materialism alone, just as class consciousness and ideology cannot be explained by economic considerations alone. Also, there is a difference in purpose between dialectical materialism and the phenomenology of language that should be noted. Like positivistic science, the purpose of dialectical materialism is to tell us the truth about whatever happens to be the focus of its inquiry. Both are basically theories of knowledge. They focus on the Kantian question "What can I know?" instead of the Nietzschean question "Why do I need to know?" On the other hand, the purpose of our phenomenology of language is to describe the way we experience language in relation to logic, ideology, consciousness, sex, economics, etc. Our phenomenology of language is not a statement about what is, rather it is a descriptive account of how we use language in thinking and speaking about what "is," and is. Though our phenomenology of language may be closer in some respects to dialectical materialism than to positivistic science, it neither fully supports nor fully denies these above aspects of dialectical materialism. It is primarily a different line of inquiry.

We will come back to this matter shortly, but let us first expand the framework of our discussion even more so that we might better understand the relation of our phenomenology of language to dialectical materialism.

Lukacs says "class consciousness implies a class-conditioned

<u>unconsciousness</u> of ones own socio-historical and economic condition."

He says "Between a 'thinking' slave and an 'unconscious' slave there is
no real distinction to be drawn in an objective social sense." He also
quotes Engels saying the basis of capitalist society is "a natural law
that is founded on the unconsciousness of those involved in it."[34] There
is a necessary role played by the forms of intercourse in the shaping
of this "unconsciousness." As we explained earlier, Marx believes that
life determines consciousness or that consciousness is socially construct-
ed. Through the experiences human beings have with each other, <u>both</u>
consciousness and unconsciousness develop. Erich Fromm explains Marx's
view of consciousness and unconsciousness this way:

> Consciousness is a social phenomenon; for Marx it is mostly
> false consciousness, the work of the forces of repression.
> The unconscious, like consciousness, is also a social
> phenomenon, determined by the "social filter" which . . .
> consists mainly of a) language, b) logic and c) social
> taboos; it is covered up by ideologies (rationalizations)
> which are subjectively experienced as being true, when in
> reality they are nothing but socially produced and shared
> fictions.[35]

While for Freud a person's character is based upon his libidinal organ-
ization, for Marx the organization of the individual character is based
upon society's socio-economic structure. The class conditioned uncon-
sciousness of the Marxist has little to do with the libidinal organiza-
tion of an individual. Here, the Marxist is much closer to our phenome-
nology of language than is the scientifically oriented Freudian. Concrete
material relations (which for the orthodox Marxist include <u>both</u> the
forces of production and forms of intercourse) are always at the founda-
tion of how individuals relate to themselves and others.

When these concrete material relations evolve beyond a certain
point on the industrial scale, class consciousness arises. Because of a

change in the forces of production and the forms of intercourse, the
concrete relations that once resulted in only an incipient consciousness
are now resulting in class consciousness. A change in the forces of
production, along with the forms of intercourse "presupposed" by it,
has resulted in the division of society into an oppressed class and an
oppressing class. There is no longer a way of communicating then that
is common to all. Society has been polarized into those who command
and those who obey, or those who manage production and those who produce.
When society becomes divided into an oppressed class and an oppressing
class, the former has become an object of the latter. Class conscious-
ness, or this "unconsciousness" as Engels calls it, is the result of
feeling as a dehumanized object or feeling alienated by the life world
created by the oppressing class in the form of its ideology. There is
an objectivity or unconsciousness that has been _imposed_ on the oppressed
class by the oppressing class, and the oppressing class has achieved
this _imposition_ by its control of the forces of production and the forms
of intercourse. In the Marxist account, the capitalist is not only the
person who dominates and exercises authority, he is also the person _for_
whom and _by whom_ the society exists. The oppressed class lacks a sense
of self determination because it does not participate in decision making
processes. The project of the ruling class becomes unwillingly and
often unwittingly the project of the working class, since the oppressed
class does not freely choose the directions of its own efforts.

The oppressed class exists through the privilege of _choice_ exer-
cised by the ruling class. That is, the working class exists as an op-
pressed class because it exercises no choice of its own. Here also is
the sense in which class consciousness might be thought of as a collective

unconsciousness. Class consciousness is produced by the alienation or
estrangement from self initiated purpose felt by the oppressed class.
In this situation, the worker's free possibilities become extinguished
by the instruments of production. The worker who performs his task in
the absence of free choice becomes a determined instrument much like
the machine upon which he works. Work becomes alienating when it does
not express the free choice of the worker. But alienation is not just
the separation of man from his work, it is also the separation of human
beings from each other. Marx says:

> A direct consequence of the alienation of man from the
> product of his labor, from his life activity and from
> his species life is that man is alienated from other
> men. When man confronts himself, he also confronts
> other men. What is true of man's relationship to his
> work, to the product of his work and to himself, is
> also true of his relationship to other men, to their
> labor and to the objects of their labor.
>   In general, the statement that man is alienated
> from his species life means that each man is alienated
> from others, and that each of the others is likewise
> alienated from human life.[36]

It is important to realize that Marx does not find work itself alienating.
Considered by itself work is not irksome. Work is a cause of weariness
and disgust only under capitalism where it is inhumane and undignified.
Only under capitalism does work become what the Bible calls "the curse
of Adam."

Alienation then is Marx's term for this process whereby human
beings become estranged from their life world, that is, separated from
their work and other human beings. We should think of alienation here
as a lack of authentic communication. With alienation there is no com-
munication that contributes to the growth and development of the commu-
nicator's humanity. Because of the alienation that Marx thinks is

intrinsic to capitalist patterns of communication, human beings cannot interact in a cooperative way.[37] We can gain some further insight on how existentialism is to be related to Marxism, if we consider how each views this concept of _authentic communication_. It is in their views of authentic communication that we might put in clearest relief the relation between existentialism and Marxism. Existentialism says give us better individuals and we will have better societies. Marxism says give us better societies and we will have better individuals. First, we should note that these two viewpoints are _subcontraries_, not the contradictories orthodox Marxists and some others are predisposed to think. It is not necessary to reject one in favor of the other. To achieve authentic communication both existentialism and Marxism urge their adherents to what we think is fair to call _a poetic way of life_, i.e., a way of living that is in touch with the material real life process. Marxism thinks the most direct route to this goal would be through the dissolution of the rhetoric in I-You or more particularly We-subject Us-object relations. Such a dissolution would break up or disperse the binding force of ideology. In contrast, existentialism thinks the most direct route to this goal would be through the dissolution of the rhetoric of the self or in I-Me relations. As Marxism then stresses the primacy of interpersonal communication, so existentialism stresses the primacy of intrapersonal communication. But as I said before, our phenomenology of language takes no position on which of these levels of communication is more important or primary. Again, interpersonal and intrapersonal communication are the two sides of the social process of language, or the two sides of the _same_ language coin. While Marxism stresses an interpersonal _freedom_, existentialism stresses a _freedom_ from within.

The early Sartre's doctrine of freedom as conscious choice is not a complete theory of freedom. It does not deal with what Americans usually refer to as "personal liberties." While _Being and Nothingness_ outlines what might ordinarily be understood as a psychological theory of freedom, Marxism seeks a political freedom. It is a mistake to think that these two kinds of freedom are unrelated or do not need to be considered collectively when discussing the range of poetry and rhetoric. As the realization of this first kind of freedom comes in the skillful management of intrapersonal communication, so the realization of this second kind of freedom comes in the skillful management of interpersonal or public communication. The realization of this second freedom, of course, involves the skills of more than one person. But our point here is that these two kinds of freedom are inextricably involved--involved in the same way as intra and interpersonal communication. And together these form the social body of language. Also on this matter, we should be aware that both Marxists and existentialists make efforts to "reach the other side" or other level of communication from where their theories begin. The Sartre of _Being and Nothingness_ suggests how one's personal freedom can be limted by the _outer_ Other. And sounding like theoreticians of _internal_ rhetoric, Marx says "Freedom is the conscious acceptance of necessity,"[38] while Engels says "Freedom is the recognition of necessity."[39] These remarks of Marx and Engels remind us of the "proto-fascist" (Lukacs) Nietzsche who said freedom is the conscious acceptance of (or recognition of) illusion, i.e., necessity.

But if existentialism and Marxism are to make a collective sense, it would seem that some way must be found of bridging what is often considered as the "idealism" of the former with the "materialism" of the

latter. Lukacs outright rejects such a bridging. He says there is only

materialism and idealism, and no "third way."[40] Even if we were to ac-

cept Lukac's pronouncement of existentialism as "idealistic" (though,

we don't because of the focus existentialism gives to such notions as

the metaphors of perception), I wish to stress that it is not necessary

for our phenomenology of language to enter into a debate of idealism

versus materialism. On this issue let us note that on the basis of our

descriptive study of language we can identity two tendencies in speech

or language usage: This first tendency of speech or language usage is

toward materialism, and we call this tendency poetry. This second tend-

ency of speech or language usage is toward idealism, and we call this

tendency rhetoric. When Lukacs says there is no "third way," we would

argue that language itself, as a synthesis of poetry and rhetoric, is

this third way. The major mistake Marx and Lukacs make in their language

theory is in their supposing that language can be explained by material-

ism alone. Marx says that consciousness arises from contradictions

within the material world. And since Marx identifies language with con-

sciousness, I presume he would say that language arises likewise. But

there are no contradictions (or necessity) to being-in-itself or material

reality. This is simply the being that is. Contradictions are not

"pictures of reality" (Wittgenstein). Before there can be contradictions

(or necessity), there must first be the mediation of ideas or symbols,

i.e., rhetorical constructs. Only the development of language as rhetoric

makes possible the development of logical thinking (i.e., contradictions

etc.). As Nietzsche says, we cannot even think, let alone speak, if not

under the control of language as rhetoric. Marx seems to sense no im-

possibility or even implausibility to doing completely away with ideology

or rhetoric. In this respect, of the language theorists we have dis-
cussed Marx comes closest (uncomfortably for him) to the purist Heidegger.
Regarding the difficulty of purifying language, Marx says a speaker
"would only [my italics] have to dissolve" his specialized language
"into ordinary language,"[41] as if then we would be done with rhetoric
and ideology. Though such a dissolution would, no doubt, help to re-
lieve language of its rhetorical character, our discussions in Chapters
Three and Five have made it clear that rhetoric is not to be that easily
extricated from the fabric of language (since it is itself a part of
the fabric). Marx's notion of an exclusively materialistically based
language then is untenable. For the reader with an inquisitiveness for
communicative matters, Marx is not specific enough about what he means
by "the material intercourse of men." He does say that "The materialist
conception of the world signifies simply the conception of nature as it
is without any foreign addition."[42] To us though, this would mean the
world as it is without any rhetoric, which must also mean, without any
language or human beings themselves.

Since language in its essential sense is both poetry and rhetoric,
there cannot be the purely materialistically based language Marx every-
where supposes but no where clarifies. On the other hand, Marx is also
unclear as to what he thinks capitalist communication looks like. He
says there is a particular form of intercourse (i.e., capitalist inter-
course) that is responsible for the development of class consciousness,
ideology, alienation, etc., but through out The German Ideology he does
little to give an explicit characterization to this form of intercourse.
Marx does little more than to say that the forces of production "presup-
pose" a certain form of intercourse. It is exactly at this point that

our discussion in Chapter Five might fill out or complete the communi-

cation theory of Marx. Based upon our discussion in the last chapter,

a fairly certain observation we can make about Marx's view of the capi-

talist form of intercourse is that it is hierarchical and dehumanizing.

Without too much chance for dispute, we can say that he sees conflict

as the chief characteristic of the capitalist form of intercourse. Such

communication tends to be dogmatic and inflexible. These characteristics

of dogmatism and inflexibility are qualities that themselves develop

through a misuse of language. Such characteristics of communication are

the result of trying to raise language to logic through rhetoric. At

the center of the capitalist form of intercourse is a lack of respect

for one's interlocutor. The principal aim of such a communicator becomes

to overwhelm his interlocutor through shrewd merchantry. We should re-

mind Marx though that these characteristics of capitalist discourse are

much the same as what we described in Chapter Five as characteristics

of communication in general. Conflict, as manifested in the struggle

to make definitions, seems to be a characteristic of all communication.

When each for-itself extends itself into the world through the material-

ity of body and speech, conflict and the struggle to make definitions

seem to be an inescapable result. Perhaps what we should say is that

under capitalism these propensities for conflict and struggle become

exaggerated. Capitalism only exacerbates what Sartre takes to be an

already hopeless situation. Capitalism extends the boundaries of the

conflict and struggle of the original communicative encounter by adding

to it an economic dimension.

We can better understand how Marx sees the capitalist form of

intercourse by an examination of his concept of alienation. Put most

directly, Marx claims that alienation is a result of the capitalist

form of intercourse, or perhaps is itself identical with the form of

communication under capitalism. But even if alienation is a product

of the form of communication under capitalism, it doesn't seem that al-

ienation is a result producible only under capitalism. Based upon our

discussion in Chapter Five, it would seem that any severe perversion of

competition (not just economic) would produce alienation. But it is

still Marx's view that with the evolution of the forces of production

came corresponding modifications in the structure of consciousness. As

incipient consciousness evolved into class consciousness, so competition

evolved into ossified patterns of exploitation. According to Marx, it

is the oppressing class' treatment of the oppressed class as an object

that forces the latter to perceive themselves as such. Lukacs says

"'alienation' when taken to its logical conclusion is identical with

objectification."[43] We should also note that alienation is not felt by

the working class alone. On this point Marx says:

> The property-owning class and the class of the proletariat
> represent the same human self-alienation. But the former
> feels at home in this self-alienation and feels itself con-
> firmed by it; it recognizes alienation as its own instrument
> and in it possesses the semblance of a human existence. The
> latter feels itself destroyed by this alienation and sees in
> it its own impotence and the reality of an inhuman existence.[44]

Since alienation is a communication pathology, it must be experienced

by the oppressing class too. As a perversion of the social process, it

will affect all who participate in such a process, even if it is felt

by each individual or class of individuals in their own way.

As Sartre thinks of the lack of conscious choice as the central

feature of bad faith, so we might think of the lack of conscious choice

as the central feature of Marx's alienation. Both the oppressing class

person and the oppressed class person are alienated because they no
longer experience the metaphors of perception. Absolute alienation is
the absolute disregarding of the noema as noema. These metaphors or
noemata have been forgotten or disregarded because of the edifice of
meaning (i.e., the ideology) imposed by the ruling class. Alienation
is the "emotional" component of class consciousness. Ontologically or
phenomenologically, alienation is the estrangement from the material
real life process felt in aggregation by the members of each class. We
might think of the alienation of each class as a collective bad faith
(Sartre) or as a collective unconscious or repression (Freud). But al-
ienation, according to Marx, is also the dominant feeling of the indi-
vidual in life under capitalism. As Marx thinks of capitalism as the
sickness of modern society, so he thinks of alienation as the sickness
of modern man. Some contemporary psychiatrists have made much of the
idea of alienation and its relation to mental illness. Jordan Scher,
for instance, considers alienation as a precondition for schizophrenia,
though he stresses that alienation is not identical with schizophrenia.
He says schizophrenia arises out of a "progressive massing"[45] of the
features of alienation. And what are these features of alienation? For
Scher, the alienated person is someone out of joint with the world. He
does not communicate or participate in his social structure. Scher says:

> Alienation, the nonparticipant or limited participant state,
> is the most manifest example of out-of-phase, or disrhythmic,
> experience. Alienated man is man out of rhythm with the world,
> so that he does not participate in proportion that he does not
> feel the rhythmical surging going on around him.[46]

Though Marx would in part agree with Scher, he would hasten to add that
in life under capitalism it is not possible for man to be in rhythm with
his nature. Marx would say that in life under capitalism the social

world itself is out of rhythm with man, and it is hard for one man in an orchestra to play his tune at a rhythm different from the rest.

A more direct appropriation of Marx's notion of alienation to psychiatry has been made by Erich Fromm. Fromm says the different forms of mental illness should be regarded as variations on this single theme of alienation. Building more directly upon this view of Marx, Fromm says "In the widest sense, every neurosis can be considered an outcome of alienation; this is so because neurosis is characterized by the fact that one passion (for instance, for money, power, women, etc.) becomes dominant and separate from the total personality, thus becoming the ruler of the person."[47] Fromm wants psychiatry to consider how transference, dependence, depression, idol worship etc. are "direct expressions of, or compensation for, alienation."[48] It would take us too far abroad to detail how alienation breathes its effects into each of these. Very generally though, let us observe that alienation involves an atomizing or splintering of the whole person, which is much the same phenomenological effect (i.e., a breaking down into parts) of analytic thought itself. The alienated person does not experience himself as a giver of meaning to his perceptions since the social order of which he is a member has usurped this responsibility from him. Through its use of language as firmly set literal meanings, the social order presents to the individual a world that has been already looked at, thereby excluding the individual from the creative activity of assigning meaning to his own perceptions. Alienation means a separation from what it is to be a human being, which is to say it is a separation from conscious choice and the ability to make metaphors. And the significance of conscious choice and the making of metaphors to psychopathology was outlined in our last

chapter. Though social existence is itself a bane to the realization

of freedom, the social or communicative system under capitalism, along

with its presupposed hierarchy and division of labor, seems to make this

fragmentation of the personality and diminution of conscious choice a

more poignant feature of life.

If the alienation felt by the oppressing class is of a different

form from that felt by the oppressed class, then we should expect to see

certain forms of psychopathologies as characteristic of each class. In

The Revolution in Psychiatry, Ernest Becker explains that a connection

between socio-economic class and the distribution of particular kinds of

mental illness is now generally accepted. He says:

> It now seems generally agreed that depression occurs more
> frequently among persons with cohesive family groupings;
> • ... in higher socio-economic statuses; in highly tradi-
> tionalized groups; and among professionals.
> Schizophrenia, on the other hand, presents a radi-
> cally different epidemiological picture. It occurs more
> among men than women; in the lower socio-economic brackets;
> among dislocated peoples--that is, generally where group
> membership and identifications are weakest.[49]

Becker's observation of how each class exhibits definite types of mental

illness should be seen as the logical extention of the sado-masochistic

and We-subject Us-object structure sketched out through our last two

chapters. We should expect that depression would be most prevalent

among members of the oppressing class, since it is most likely to occur

in those who have "close identification with others,"[50] or strong I-You

rhetorics. Of course these are only generalizations, and it should be

noted that no nosological or epidemiological pattern is absolutely set.

On the basis of our discussion in Chapter Five, we might expect to see

psychopathy as the typical character disorder of the oppressing class.

But the fanaticism of the psychopath is just as likely to be a part of

the character disorder of the revolutionist, the terrorist, the gangster--those who are often directly opposed to the oppressing class. In contrast to the fanaticism of the dominating over-doer, depressive psychosis tends to be more prevalent in persons who have a supine acceptance of the status quo. The depressive psychotic has a certain suspension or diminution of sensibility of how he can be creatively involved in his communication or social activity. Becker says "These are all people who feel that they should find their situation acceptable--but who somehow do not."[51] By their own standards or professed sense of what is of value, they are successful people, yet they often lack a sense of fulfillment or are struck by a feeling of ennui.[52] Far from feeling confirmed by his social environment, the schizophrenic is stunned by the threat of the Other, and therefore cannot reach outside himself. As we explained in Chapter Five, all three of these psychopathologies are based upon a mismanagement of language and experience that brings on a feeling of too much necessity. And in all three cases it is a form of alienation (or a form of separation from the metaphors of perception) that sets up the distancing from the material real life process, and thereby makes possible the development of the rhetorical fictions of logical necessity.

Ordinarily, economics and psychology are not considered to be disciplines with an intimate connection, especially by the "specialists" in each of these fields. To try to cement the connection between economics and psychology, Erich Fromm has developed the notion of "social character." He thinks different kinds of psychopathologies should be understood as different contortions of this social character. And those at the top of the socio-economic pyramid are likely to form different social characters from those at the bottom. He says:

> The concept of <u>social character</u>, refers to the matrix of
> the character structure <u>common to a group</u>. It assumes
> that the fundamental factor in the formation of the "social
> character" is <u>the practice of life as it is constituted by</u>
> <u>the mode of production and the resulting social stratifi-</u>
> <u>cation. The "social character" is that particular structure</u>
> <u>of psychic energy which is molded by any given society so as</u>
> <u>to be useful for the functioning of that particular society.</u>
> • <u>The</u>
> <u>social character is the intermediary between the ideas and</u>
> <u>ideals prevalent in a society.</u>[53]

Fromm's concept of social character allows him to deal with important

questions not treated adequately by Freud--specifically, questions that

concern the formulative effects of environment on mental illness. For

Freud, the mechanistically based libido theory was the organizing prin-

ciple of character. Guided by Marx, Fromm offers a sociologically based

revision of Freud. While for Freud character is based upon each indi-

vidual's libidinal organization, for Marx and Fromm the organization of

the individual character is based upon society's socio-economic structure.

Marx himself had never worked out a theory of individual psy-

chology, at least not explicitly. A problem faced by a Marxist therapist

like Fromm is interpreting the significance of Marx for psychiatry at

large. In carrying out this exegetical task, Fromm receives criticism

from both orthodox Marxists[54] and those to his other side. A typically

expressed objection to Fromm's Marxist psychology that comes from this

other side is in <u>Being Mentally Ill: A Sociological Theory</u>. Its author,

Thomas J. Scheff, says:

> [T]he interesting feature of Marx's theory was the manner
> in which it disregared the motivations of the individuals in-
> volved. For the capitalists, for example, it did not matter
> whether they were humanitarian or not, for the development of
> the capitalist system. A capitalist, who, for humane reasons,
> refused to expropriate the workers, would himself be expro-
> priated by other capitalists. Marx and his followers felt·
> that they had evolved a theory that was independent of the
> psychology of individuals.[55]

We wish to clarify that it wasn't that Marx's theory was "independent" of individuals, but rather that he seems to have felt that a theory of individual psychology could be plausible only insofar as it meets certain minimum requirements of social reality. The capitalist who refused to expropriate the workers would no longer be a capitalist in Marx's sense. What we should say is that in Scheff's example there is a "capitalist" who doesn't want to be a capitalist, but because of the distressingly severe competition of his social system he cannot avoid it. Again, as Marx says, social existence determines individual consciousness. But it seems to us that Marx's point against Scheff could be sharpened by a consideration of intrapersonal communication. Marx might well have said to Scheff that as capitalism requires deception and abuse of others, so it requires deception and abuse of oneself. Here again is where our communication theory in Chapter Five would round out and complete Marx. Through a comparison of I-You and I-Me rhetorics, we showed that the way human beings betrayed and oppressed themselves is based upon the same phenomenological structure as the way they betray and oppress others. It is not, then, that Marx ignored individuals, rather he did not give a completed analysis of the phenomenological structure of communication. Against Scheff's example, Marx would say that an individual cannot be both a capitalist (socially) and a humanitarian (individually), because of the connection between inter and intrapersonal communication (a connection Marx seemed to realize, if only implicitly). To be a capitalist for Marx is to be a cause of alienation and a perverting force in social and communicative relations. Under capitalism Marx says:

> Every man speculates upon creating a new need in another in
> order to force him to a new sacrifice, to place him in a new

> dependence, and to entice him into a new kind of pleasure
> and thereby economic ruin. Everyone tries to establish
> over others an <u>alien</u> power in order to find there the sat-
> isfaction of his own egotistical need. . ·. . Every new
> product is a new <u>potentiality</u> of mutual deceit and robbery.
> . . . Every product is a bait by means of which the indi-
> vidual tries to entice the essence of the other person,
> his money. Every real or potential need is a weakness
> which will draw the bird into the lime.[56]

For Marx, Scheff's expression of a humanitarian capitalist would be a

contradiction in terms. As a producer of alienation and shame in the

Other, Marx thinks the capitalist must always be considered as anti-

humane.

But in spite of these painful effects of alienation described

above, we should still see alienation as a form of salutary suffering.

It is only through a profound sense of alienation that individuals and

societies might come to grips with themselves. In a letter to an asso-

ciate, Arnold Ruge, Marx says the "reform of consciousness consists <u>only</u>

in allowing the world access to its own consciousness, that is, one

must awaken the world from its dream of itself."[57] Marx considered al-

ienation as having the potential to cause this "awakening" or to be the

goading force behind a change in the social order. In an often cited

passage, he says "The demand to give up the illusions about its condi-

tion is the demand to give up a condition which needs illusions."[58]

From the communicative point of view, we want to understand the alien-

ation and its consequent change in the social order as the <u>culmination</u>

of a communication breakdown. In the absolute noncommunication of alien-

ation, a social system would collapse because through the entelechial

principle of language it would be forced to discover new means of social

intercourse, though, unlike Marx, it is not obvious to us that such a

large scale breakdown is imminent. Only by discovering new ways of

communicating, as would for Marx be reflected in changing the capitalist mode of production, could alienation be overcome. The force of alienation for inducing change and bringing about a more humane social order is expressed by Fromm this way:

> The sickness [of alienation] can be cured only when it reaches its peak; only the totally alienated man can overcome the alienation--he is forced to overcome his alienation since he cannot live as a totally alienated man and remain sane. Socialism is the answer; it is a society in which man becomes the conscious subject of history, experiences himself as the subject of his powers and thus emancipates himself from the bondage to things and circumstances.[59]

In an optimism that isn't wholly warranted to us, Engels seems to go even further than Fromm when he claims in the Principles of Communism that the new social order "will do away with competition and replace it by association."[60] We cannot accept Engel's optimism since competition and hierarchy, as these have been described in our study, are not founded in economic circumstances alone. The cleavage of individuals and classes of individuals could be bridged only by removing both the alienating forces of production and the forms of communication from which they developed or are at least conjugally involved. And as we also explained, such extirpation of rhetoric or ideology from the communication process would not be possible.

But there is another important concept of Marx that has been lurking in the background of our present discussion. This important concept which also explains alienation, or at least the industrial process whereby alienation happens, is the division of labor. In the Principles of Communism, Engels says "Classes came into existence through the division of labour."[61] And Marx says that "definite individuals who are productively active in a definite way enter into definite social and

political relations."[62] We, of course, would amend Marx's observation by saying that definite individuals who are communicatively active in definite and inflexible ways will enter into definite kinds or modes of productive activity. Closer to our view, Marx says the division of labor is the result of men being "conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these."[63] Division of labor is the industrial concomitant of alienation and the ways of communicating that reflect man's estrangement from the material real life process. The original paradigm for specialization and the division of labor seems to have been formulated by Plato in his Republic. In Plato's state there are those who are privileged and those who are not. There are those who have "Knowledge" or access to the Ideas and those who do not. Marx sees capitalist society as being divided in much the same way. In the capitalist hierarchy, there are leaders or the idealistic bourgeois who specialize in the manipulation of symbols or "Knowledge" because they deal exclusively with Ideas or Universals. In contrast to these symbol specialists are the workers who specialize in Particulars or in the making and movement of individual goods. The lower class in Plato's state and Marx's capitalist society have no access to the Ideas or Universals. This domain is reserved for the ruling class or symbol specialists.

Still each of these groups is involved in a phenomenological or ontological function that is mounted against each other. Each of these groups is involved in a function that perverts the ontology of their social being. And again, both of these classes experience alienation because of a contortion of the material real life process, though each experiences this alienation in its own way. Neither of these groups,

as formed in the We-subject Us-object ontology, is concerned with the whole human being. Engels observes how in such social situations each person tends to develop "only one of his abilities at the expense of all others, knows only one branch, or only a branch of a branch of production as a whole."[64] As we explained in Chapter Three, some literary theorists like Nietzsche and Lukacs charge that Plato's idealistic philosophy brought on the demise of tragic poetry in ancient Greece. Setting the stage for all subsequent idealistic philosophy, Plato's idealism, and the specialization it inured, destroyed the notion of the whole human being necessary for high level poetic achievement. It seems that Marx is thinking particularly of Plato (and Hegel) when he talks about the need to descend from the world of thoughts and language (as rhetoric) to the actual world of the material real life process. Plato's philosophy destroyed poetry because it made language lose its hold on this material real life process. Plato's idealism, along with its assumed theory of language, atomized the whole human being, making one a worker and another a symbol specialist. And Marx specifically observes how idealism and the division of labor are "hostile to certain branches of spiritual production, for example, art and poetry."[65] But we will have more to say about art and poetry in our next chapter.

In his Phenomenology of Language (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1965), Remy Kwant makes a distinction between language used for grasping and language used for pointing. This distinction is of use to us for contrasting the ways of using language characteristic of the worker and symbol specialist. Kwant contrasts grasping and pointing as two different ways of distilling the meaning of something. By grasping, as the worker does, persons can enter into a more direct contact with

material reality. To some extent, the worker's use of language is based
upon his immediate presence before the things themselves. However, this
doesn't mean that the worker is having an authentic or fully poetic ex-
perience with his occupation, since the language or the meaning to what
he does has already been given to his task by the symbol specialist.
Moreover, the things upon which he works are typically not the result
of his own design or creativity. What the worker does has already been
looked at. In contrast, the pointing of the symbol specialist is lack-
ing in even this truncated experience of the material reality. Kwant
notes how "Pointing is even unthinkable unless there is a distance be-
tween the pointer and that which is pointed at."[66] Also, pointing gives
to (or presupposes) a continued and independent existence to meaning.
That is, pointing is based upon an ideology of literal meanings, or the
practice of giving priority to words over things. After he assumes a
distance between the idea or word and the thing, the pointer makes the
former more important than the latter. On the other hand, grasping
does not give a continued and independent existence to meaning, but is
itself (in the case of the worker) subject to this meaning. Still,
overall, we should think of grasping as exhibiting language tendencies
more plausibly associated with what we mean by poetry, while pointing
shows tendencies more plausibly associated with what we mean by rhetoric.
With the process of grasping, speech is rooted in practice, while in
pointing speech is rooted in ideas. In his discussion of Marx and speech,
Kwant says:

> Our speaking is uprooted. . . when it is not rooted in
> practice, when it does not give expression to practice.
> By "practice" Marx meant the whole of life as it runs its
> course in reality, no matter how harsh reality is. Practice
> is found, first, in labor, which makes life possible. It is

found also in man's dwelling in common in the world which
his work has made useful. . . . Sometimes man tries to
escape from practice in his speech. This means that he
runs away from reality to dwell in a dream world. His
speaking is meaningless and estranged from reality.
Speaking is meaningful only if it gives expression to
practice and contributes to the latter's development.
It is not in line with Marxist thought to make speech
independent. Marx called uprooted speech "idealistic,"
that is, a flight from reality to ideas.[67]

The division of labor always involves this separation of speech from

practice. Specialization is always linked to having a part (e.g., a

noema that has become an idea) standing for the whole. With the divi-

sion of labor there is an atomizing of the whole of society and the

whole of the individual human being. And while this separation of

classes is based upon a We-subject Us-object dichotomy, the more pri-

mary separation of individuals is based upon the tendencies of subjec-

tivism and objectivism.

Marx also thinks that "the division of labour is necessarily

followed by greater division of labour."[68] For us who see the forms of

intercourse as phenomenologically prior to the forces of production,

this ongoing development of the division of labor is of course based

upon the analytic tendency in speech. Analysis begets analysis. Ana-

lytic thinking and speaking leads to further analytic thinking and

speaking. Describing the process of how the division of labor is goaded

on to further development, Marx says:

A philosopher produces ideas, a poet poems, a clergyman
sermons, a professor compendia and so on. A criminal
produces crimes. . . . The criminal produces not only
crimes but also criminal law, and with this also the
professor who gives lectures on criminal law. . . .
The criminal moreover produces the whole of the police
and of criminal justice, constables, judges, hangmen,
juries, etc.; and all these different lines of business,
which form equally many categories of the social division
of labour, develop different capacities of the human

> spirit, create new needs and new ways of satisfying them. Torture alone has given rise to the most ingenious mechanical inventions, and employed many honourable craftsmen in the production of its instruments.[69]

One might think that because the division of labor tends to "develop different capacities of the human spirit" that it might not be quite as nefarious as Marx proclaims. Also, as George Herbert Mead has noted, "A difference of functions does not preclude a common experience."[70] That is, we can still be human beings even though we may do different jobs. But Mead also says "It is essential that the other members of the community shall be able to enter into the attitude of the laborer in his functions."[71] From the phenomenological perspective on language, this means it is essential for other members of the community to be able to grasp and not just point. Only by performing in an increased range in these functions of language can one authentically participate in this increased range in the functions of the community. But it is exactly this heterogeneity of symbolic experience (for individual persons) that is lacking in the caste organization of modern societies. Why?

To more fully understand the division of labor, we must understand how such division becomes presupposed within the forms of intercourse. The division of labor develops with the evolution of language as rhetoric or ideology. Only with the rise of the sophistication of language can society be divided into symbol specialists or pointers and working people or graspers. We have already explained the relation of language to ideology. Through the development of language as rhetoric, human beings came to lose hold of the material basis of things and the associated life process. With the rise of ideas or words, it became possible to contemplate only these ideas, words or the "echoes" of material things. In this way, language divides people from the real life

process. It is just this inauthentic separation made by a misuse of language and the ideology arising therefrom that brings into existence the division of labor. The division of labor is thus based upon what might be called the rhetoric of division, i.e., the use of language by one person or one class of persons to set themselves off from another person or another class of persons. And this division is nothing apart from the general trend of language toward analyticity explained in our last chapter. As a general rule, we should note that as the analytic element of language becomes more pronounced in a society or speaking community so do hierarchy and the division of labor. Specialists do not just arbitrarily choose analysis over synthesis. The very notion of specialization, or the movement toward specialization, is based upon analysis. Specializations are the result of carrying to an extreme the analytic feature of language. In the case of symbol specialists such as lawyers, economists, psychologists, etc., this phenomenon is called a rhetoric of expertise by Trevor Melia. By rhetoric of expertise is meant the aura of esoteric terms and sayings that each profession surrounds itself with as a means of excluding outsiders, and to guarantee its control over a particular symbolic domain. Through its logicization of language, each profession, as a group of symbol specialists, attempts to move toward its own perfect fiction or illusion by infusing its speech with the force of tautology. A rhetoric of expertise then involves an attempt to deny metaphors by making language stand on its own as an independent abstraction. Paraphrasing Sartre, we could say that a rhetoric of expertise is an attempt to make speech into a language or knowledge which speaks all by itself.

But on whose behalf does this language which speaks all by it-
self speak? A rhetoric of expertise is a tactic or strategy used by the
ruling class to make and sustain certain definitions of persons and
situations. A rhetoric of expertise is an epistemological ploy used by
the ruling class in the struggle to make definitions. In Chapter Five,
we explained how the struggle to make definitions is the impelling move-
ment in the conflict of consciousnesses and the development of language.
Nietzsche also says "the origin of language itself [is] an expression
of power on the part of the rulers."[72] Language itself, as literal
meanings, is based upon the ideas of the ruling class. We should recall
here the famous passage of Marx that ties together ruling class ideas
(e.g., expertise) and the division of labor:

> The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the
> ruling ideas: i.e., the class which is the ruling ma-
> terial force of society, is at the same its ruling
> intellectual force. The class which has the means of
> material production at its disposal, has control at the
> same time over the means of mental production, so that
> thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who
> lack the means of mental production are subject to it.
> . . . [Members of the ruling class] rule also as thinkers,
> as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and
> distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas
> are the ruling ideas of the epoch.[73]

Because the speech of the ruling class has been uprooted from practice,
the ideas that are bred and nurtured in their language tend to have more
reality than the things they are supposed to represent. By making ideas
seem more real than the material life process, the ruling class is able
to entrench its rule by creating standards (of beauty, intelligence and
general being) in which it evaluates itself in a predictably and decep-
tively favorable way. Marx would probably have considered the IQ test
(certainly at its beginning) as an example of such ruling class standards.
In the sense of Thomas Szasz, we could say that the inception of the IQ

test was a struggle for definition where one class defined itself the victor and its adversary the victim. Applying the above principle of Marx, the IQ test is to be seen as an idea of the ruling class that contributes to making this class the ruling intellectual force. At bottom, "the rule of a certain class is only the rule of certain ideas."[74] The hierarchy established by intelligence tests reaffirms and rigidifies the already well developed division between the oppressing and the oppressed class. On the basis of our earlier discussion, I hope it is obvious in this example that the primary concern of our phenomenology of language is not to ask how valid is the hierarchy created by, for instance, IQ tests? Rather, it would be more in line with our purpose to consider how such ideas serve as a means of deception or of constituting the rhetoric of consciousness. Following Burke, we would ask: "Just how does the hierarchic principle work in this particular scheme of equality?"[75] What ever is left after the matter has been placed in this rare acid of skepticism, if anything, would be the grist for the poetry of the material real life process.

By regulating the production and distribution of ideas, the ruling class is able to exclude the oppressed class from certain distinctly ruling class kinds of communication. Sartre says members of the ruling class approach or simultaneously realize one another as subjectivities. The rhetoric of expertise is a means of preserving and reinforcing this kind of communication. There is a rhetoric of expertise at the foundation of what is often taken to be each profession's conspiracy against the public. For instance, in modern courts of law it is nearly impossible for the ordinary citizen to defend himself, even in simple legal proceedings like divorce and bankruptcy. The ordinary citizen does not

speak for himself because through certain adjustments in the court system, more particularly through certain adjustments in the forms of forensic communication designed primarily by the legal profession, it has become nearly impossible for him to do so. He must hire a lawyer or symbol specialist to speak on his behalf. Though such examples as these (divorce, bankruptcy, etc.) are already widely recognized, we mention them here to show how this often expressed argument is to be located in our phenomenology of language. Indeed, such an argument can be based in only a phenomenological approach to communication, since the notion of a rhetoric of expertise can ultimately make sense only in a theory of language that sees logic as the outcome of the speech act, not the antecedent. Here, logic serves as a means of one person or class of persons holding the power of definition over the Other. Marx perceptively notes that "those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it."[76] Ultimately then, such a gatekeeping device as the rhetoric of expertise keeps ordinary citizens from carrying out their civic responsibilities. Only by understanding these corollaries of the division of labor with communication can we make clear its denigrating impact on social existence. The Marxist Bertolt Brecht says "Society cannot share a common communication system so long as it is split into warring classes."[77] A common communication system is not possible where there are those who command the power to make definitions, while others are excluded from such manipulation of symbols. The exclusion of "outsiders" that results from a rhetoric of expertise makes impossible the heterogeneous symbolic experience of the individual necessary for a homogeneous communication system. A common communication system would amount to relieving society of its hierarchy and division of labor.

We began this chapter by explaining Marx's notion that language "only arises from the need, the necessity, of intercourse with other men."[78] One of the most important props in this intercourse or social drama controlled by the ruling class is its _private property_. From the phenomenological perspective, we should think of private property as a form of action, particularly as a form of symbolic or rhetorical action. Marx says "To them [the ruling class] their own social action takes the form of the action of objects."[79] Almost like capital itself, private property is concentrated social force. We want to emphasize that private property, or the concept of _ownership_ in general, would make no sense at all outside or beyond a certain social milieu or communication system. For the ownership of private property is a social or communicative function. As Thorstein Veblen is likely to explain, one doesn't just own things in isolation, rather one is to make his ownership an article of public evidence in certain discreet ways. It is important to recognize that the phenomenon of ownership cannot be explained by material things alone. In understanding the phenomenology of ownership, the material things or the "owned" things are of only secondary importance. Ownership can be explained only as such owned things stand in relation to a socially or communicatively constructed consciousness. Remember that material things, or being-in-itself, is simply the being that _is_. To make something one's private property would then involve an attempt to make a for-itself an in-itself. In _Being and Nothingness_, Sartre says:

> [T]he possesser aims at enjoying his being-in-itself, his being-outside. Through possession I recover an object-being identical with my being-for-others. Consequently the Other can not surprise me; the being which he wishes to bring into the world, which is myself-for-the-Other--this being I already enjoy possessing. This possession is in addition

a _defense against others._ What is mine is myself in a
non-subjective form inasmuch as I am its free foundation.
       We can not insist too strongly on the fact that
. this relation is _symbolic_ and _ideal._[80]

We need to be more clear as to what it means to _possess_ an ob-

ject or to what it is that constitutes the bond between owner and

owned, since, as Sartre says, "it is impossible to _possess_ an object."[81]

Regarding how Americans see private property, Sartre has observed that

Americans are not materialists at all, rather they are _meta_-materialists.

The American "materialist" does not want the thing itself. Instead, he

wants what the thing _stands for_ in his mind and in the mind of his

speaking community, i.e., he wants the idea or the symbol. Private prop-

erty then does not exist as a material possession. Sartre says "It

exists, on the contrary, only as a symbol; it is its symbolism which

gives it its meaning, its coherence, its existence. There can be found

in it no positive enjoyment outside its symbolic value."[82] We stress

then this generalization: _Private property or ownership is an attempt_

to make the idea of a thing stand before the thing itself. It is an

attempt to elevate the abstract above the concrete or the rhetorical

above the poetic. We should think of possession then as a _rhetorization_

of the objects of experience, since private property is nothing more

than an attempt by members of the ruling class to _impose_ their ideational

order on things. It is in the exercise and completion of this attempt

that ownership is a form of symbolic or rhetorical activity. In our

adapted sense of Heidegger, the drive for private property is derivative

of the drive to interpret being as idea.

But what is the purpose behind such a drive for ownership or

possession? Sartre suggests that we understand ownership as a part of

the capitalist's predisposition "to over-come" or to "to conquer and

master." As this predisposition is expressed toward material objects,
ownership is a matter of establishing between person and thing the
relationship of master to slave. In his drive for private property,
the capitalist aims to establish a certain relationship with an object;
he aims to involve himself in a certain drama with an object. (After
considering the matters of the next chapter, we might see it as more
accurate to say the capitalist enters into a melodrama with an object.)
Ownership involves primarily what we called before an I-You rhetoric.
Through a certain manipulation of symbols (in this case money), the
capitalist makes the object or worker submit to him through a monetary
definition of their value. Mead talks about money as a form of conver-
sation.[83] And Burke says "The reductive, abstractive, metaphorical,
analytic, and synthesizing powers of all language find their corre-
spondences in the monetary idiom."[84] When viewed in the context of
our phenomenology of language, it should seem as no coincidence that
capitalism evolved in conjunction with a strong development in the ana-
lytical aspects of language. Capitalism has reached its highest devel-
opment in those countries where the analytical aspects of language have
been esteemed most highly. In The Story of Language, Mario Pei says
"The role of trade in language-formation is more generally underesti-
mated than is the role of language as an auxilliary to trade."[85] We
would switch around Pei's observation slightly, though, and stress the
role of language in the formation of trade. That is, trade itself is
based upon the paradigm of language as social intercourse. As the life
blood of the socio-economic system, all that we can say about money is
in some way based upon the formation of language. The phenomenological
dynamics of money are derivative of those dynamics we described for

language in Chapter Five. Under capitalism, language takes the form of money. That is, under capitalism money talks. Language is social coin, or as Caudwell says, "Words are the money of the ideological marketplace."[86]

More exactly, how are the dynamics of money based upon those of the language dynamics outlined in Chapter Five? The struggle to achieve ownership through money has its paradigm in the struggle to make defi-nitions or literal meanings. To make one's value (of an object or worker's wage, for instance) stand as the value is to make one's metaphor stand as a literal meaning. The struggle for money involves a struggle to make your goods and services seem worth more while your competition tries to make them seem worth less. Paraphrasing an earlier comment of Sartre's, let us say that the mainspring of economic conflict is the effort of each to transform his truth into a monetary value that is recognized by both employer and employee or buyer and seller. And we know that this monetary value can be established only when each becomes and object for the Other. We explained how in non-monetary communicative struggles this process results in a hierarchy of victim and victimizer, and in the abstractions we call literal meanings. In economic struggles this process results in a hierarchy of victim and victimizer also. But in economic struggles the preserver and stabilizer of the newly devel-oped hierarchy is not the literal meaning (or what is not recognized as a literal meaning), rather it is the wage paid to the worker or the price paid for the commodity. We are saying that monetary value has the same phenomenological structure as the literal meaning. Money then does to objects and people just what literal meanings do, i.e., money abstracts and gives an absolute significance to something or someone, thereby ruining the metaphor of perception for someone perceiving this object or this person.

As in the struggle to make definitions or literal meanings in
general, it should be noted that in the struggle between the capitalist
and laborer or buyer and seller, there is an attempt by the participants
in the conflict to make their speech rise to the level of tautology
through their positing of a monetary value. Through the use of his
money (or as we explained in earlier chapters, through the use of glam-
our, grammar, and paradigmatically, logic), the capitalist attempts to
cast a spell of necessity upon the worker. "Logic is the money of the
mind," says Marx, "the speculative thought-value of man and of nature,
their essence indifferent to any real determinate character and thus
unreal; thought which is alienated and abstract and which ignores real
nature and man."[87] In economic conflicts, the struggle for tautology
is manifested in the struggle to define the commodity in terms of a
price or the worker in terms of a wage. As Sartre says, under capitalism
"The truth of a man is his work and his wages."[88] When there is this
identity reached between the worker and his monetary value, the humanity
or metaphorical quality of the worker and his life activity have been
wiped out. With the establishment of the worker's worth through the
ideology or literal meaning of money, the free choice of the worker is
obliterated or disregarded by the capitalist. The capitalist who feels
pride at having defined the worker through his wages reaches tautology
(i.e., the wage) through an I-You rhetoric, while the worker who feels
shame at having such a definition forced upon him reaches tautology
through an I-Me rhetoric. This struggle between capitalist and worker
or buyer and seller often intensifies to produce an effect economists
call inflation. In the sense of our phenomenology of communication,
inflation is the result of an intensification in this struggle to make

definitions of wages and prices through the literal meaning of money. The root cause of inflation is too much competition (not too much government spending which would be only a statistical or superficial associate). Inflation is brought on by the participants in a particular economic system goading each other on to make more severe demands of each other. Inflation is founded on this widespread social disillusionment or lack of confidence.

The result of these struggles for the capitalist is an increase in ownership. These objects which the capitalist possesses (including his employees) are assimilated to his personal identity. Indeed, these are his personal identity. Sartre says "Possession is a magical relation; I am these objects which I possess."[89] Ownership is a social or dramatic function because it is the act of possessing that is at the foundation of the capitalist's personal identity. In capitalist society, we come to know and define someone through the things they own. In contrast, the worker's identity is based upon the fact that someone possesses him. In our last chapter we explained how a personal identity or a self is based upon turning the metaphors of perception into the abstractions of literal meanings. We said the self is the result of human beings wanting to have a nature or essence. Under capitalism, this nature or essence is money. Through the use of logic ("the money of the mind"), perceptions become unified or ordered. The metaphors of perception dry up into a monetary value. The self is the dross of the rapid flow of images and perceptions that become clogged up in the intellect as monetary value. This abstract value of money gives to the self "a fiction of continued existence" (Hume) as one's personal worth. A self results when perceptions become ordered or hierarchialized through

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the pride and shame of the communicative encounter. Under capitalism,
these *same* phenomenological dynamics of pride and shame are expressed
through the social activity that changes the metaphors of perception
into money or private property.

We hope it is clear now that because of the role of money in
its social life, American "materialism" is not able to make contact
with the material things of the real life process. We would be remiss,
though, if we didn't at least mention in the last pages of this chapter
the effects of this ontological inversion for social science and the
general theory of knowledge. The Marxist says the twist or distortion
that capitalism gives to reality always involves positing the idea be-
fore the material reality. Money and the symbolism of ownership always
take precedence over the material real life process. But how does
this tendency to posit the idea before the material reality reveal it-
self in social science? Lukacs says:

> [W]e perceive that there is something highly problem-
> atic in the fact that capitalist society is predis-
> posed to harmonise with scientific method, to constitute
> indeed the social premises of its exactness. . . . [W]hen
> 'science' maintains that the manner in which data imme-
> diately present themselves is an adequate foundation of
> scientific conceptualisation and that the actual form
> of these data is the appropriate starting point for the
> formation of scientific concepts, it thereby takes its
> stand simply and dogmatically on the basis of capitalist
> society. It uncritically accepts the nature of the ob-
> ject as it is given and the laws of that society as the
> unalterable foundation of 'science.'[90]

Both contemporary American lifesmanship, along with its positivistically
and mechanistically oriented social science, are based upon what we
called earlier a rhetorization of the objects of experience. We explained
how through the rise and sophistication in ideas and words, thinkers in
capitalist society became able to contemplate only these ideas and words

or only these "echoes" of material things. This is also the special

problem of the positivistically and mechanistically oriented social

sciences. On these matters Sartre has said:

> The supreme mystification of positivism is that it claims
> to approach social experience without any a priori whereas
> it has decided at the start to deny one of its fundamental
> structures and to replace it by its opposite. It was le-
> gitimate for the natural sciences to free themselves from
> the anthropomorphism which consists in bestowing human
> properties on inanimate objects. But it is perfectly
> absurd to assume by analogy the same scorn for anthro-
> pomorphism where anthropology is concerned.[91]

To put Sartre's observation in sharper focus for us, he means it is

perfectly absurd to scorn anthropomorphism where communication studies

are concerned. For the use of language _always_ involves the bestowing

of human properties (ideas) upon those things about which one speaks.

That is, the use of language _always_ involves rhetoric. Hugh Duncan has

observed how the study of communication theory (as we have been explain-

ing it here) is neglected in American sociology. He says "American

sociologists think poorly about communication because of their 'trained

incapacity' in the use of non-mechanistic models."[92]

As the epistemological arms of capitalism, positivism and mechan-

icalism are a means of coagulating the metaphors of perception into

literal meanings. With the rise of this ideology, the language of

social science then tends to lose hold of the things themselves. In

the positivistic and mechanistic models of social science, the material

real life process is no longer expressed in language. Language here

tends toward abstraction and an _emptying out_ of the real life process.

When this happens, the language of the social scientist is no longer

able to express what a social event _is_, but only what is _thought_ about

it. Caught up in this ideology, language becomes the information, the

data, or the facts that "speak for themselves." In critcizing facts that "speak for themselves," we are not saying that facts have no contribution to make to understanding. It is, rather, our wish to stress that facts come into existence as such only in and through the act of speaking (la parole), which positivism, as an epistemic formulation of la langue, does not recognize. Positivism considers facts by themselves as the only possible objects of knowledge. But, as Sartre retorts, "knowing is not a knowing of ideas but a practical knowing of things."[93] The knowing of positivism is the epistemic reflex of the capitalist tendency to posit the idea before the material reality. With the ideology of positivistic social science, language becomes, in Heidegger's words, "a visibility of things that are already-there."[94] In this way, the ideas of the ruling class (e.g., as in IQ tests) seem to have an existence independent of the minds that produce them. Positivism gives an a priori character to language, thereby immutably fixing social experiences in thought and ideology. Obviously the rhetoric of social science is an area large enough to demand a special study of its own. Though the rhetoric of social science is too large a subject to take up here in any further detail, we wanted to at least give a brief explanation of how such an inquiry might take shape within the phenomenology of language. Following through the communication theory sketched out in this chapter, a phenomenologist's sociology of communication would be one way of dealing with the shortcomings of positivistic and mechanistic approaches to social sciences.

VII. LANGUAGE, LITERATURE AND SOCIETY

[T]he poetic state . . . is what the public is fun-
damentally seeking through love, crime, drugs, war,
or insurrection.--Antonin Artaud[1]

To write the proper thing means at the same time
to feel properly, to think properly and to speak
properly.--G. L. L. Buffon[2]

And as I find measure
In all that I view,
I view it with pleasure
And so myself too.--Goethe[3]

Our phenomenology of language is an _anagogic_ theory of language.
Anagogic is a word with Greek origins which means a bringing up or ele-
vating. As used here, _anagogic_ denotes that language is the product of
inner psychological forces (i.e., intentionality) and the movement of
such forces as they rise in abstraction toward their _telos_ in logic or
rhetoric. We have seen how the phenomenological study of language in-
volves an interpretation of such forces as they manifest themselves in
the logic or rhetoric of economics, sex and other life activities. Only
through such a phenomenological approach to language can we comprehend
the origins of logic in speech (_la parole_), and evaluate the overall
signifcance of logic to thinking and speaking. But as we have explain-
ed in our last two chapters, language is not the product of inner psy-
chological forces or intentionality alone. Language also has a social
dimension through which the _telos_ or logic of speech is able to derive
(in part) its significance as such. To cover both of these areas Kenneth
Burke uses the expression _socioanagogic_.[4] For Burke, the study of the
socioanagogic aspects of communication is primarily the study of the

social mystery of hierarchy. Through a socioanagogic approach to language and communication, we come to understand how the objects of experience (as such objects are handled by logic or rhetoric) come to signify what counts as supreme glory or abject disgrace for a particular speaking community. Perhaps the most important merit of Burke's socioanagogic approach to language is that it points to the centrality of hierarchy in the communication process. Hierarchy is the "entelechial" motive intrinsic to symbol systems, and if there is one quality that has emerged repeatedly through out our study as central to the language theories of Nietzsche, Marx and Sartre, this quality is hierarchy. Whether we talk about religion (e.g., the priest and the sinner), sex (e.g., the sadist and the masochist), logic (e.g., the true and the false), or money (e.g., the capitalist and the laborer), hierarchy and the dibbing-out of glory and disgrace or pride and shame will always come through as central to the language and communication process.

In this chapter we want to examine some questions which inquire about the relationship of the structural principles of art and literature to society and this socioanagogic theory of language. We will sketch out how this phenomenology of language of the past six chapters is to be applied to literary theory and aesthetics generally. Particularly, we would like to explain how epic-tragedy should be considered as the basis of all poetry because of its transformation of what Burke calls the "hierarchical psychosis."[5] We will want it to be understood how epic-tragedy is the literary extention or application of the third or authentic communicative manner described in Chapter Five. How would we go about establishing such a connection? Working from the language perspective, Ernest Becker defines a society as a "symbolic action

system." He says a society is "a structure of statuses and roles, cus-
toms and rules for behavior, designed to serve as a vehicle for earthly
heroism."[6] All of this has been implicit in our past discussion. The
question that then arises is how hierarchy or the view of heroism prev-
alent in a particular speaking community would manifest itself in that
community's art, literature, story telling, etc.? Sometimes this connec-
tion between aesthetics and society has been referred to as the climate
theory of art. In his famous Lectures on Art, Hippolyte Taine said
"Just as there is a physical temperature, which by its variations deter-
mines the appearance of this or that species of plant, so there is a
moral temperature which by its variations determines the appearance of
this or that species of art." And just as we need to study physical
temperature to comprehend the advent of a species of plant, so we need
to study "moral temperature" to comprehend the advent of a species of
art. For "the productions of the human mind, like those of animated
nature, can only be explained by their milieu."[7] A phenomenological
examination of the social body of language is one way we might discern
this "moral temperature" of Taine's. We should consider what kind of
aesthetic climates or forms of intercourse encourage or discourage the
the development of epic-tragedy. Generally, those societies with rig-
idly defined hierarchies (or the hierarchical psychosis as Burke would
say), those societies with high degrees of occupational specialization
(or with ideology as Marx would say), and those societies which value
things other than life itself (or un-Dionysian societies as Nietzsche would
say), will not be able to produce top shelf epic-tragedy. We are saying
that in social organizations where the pressures of hierarchy are most
rabid, epic-tragedy is least likely to develop, and by understanding

<u>hierarchy</u> and how it figures in the social body of language, we can thereby come to understand a dialectical relationship among artistic genres and their associated historical periods.

Though we have packed much into this last paragraph, the general sense of our argument should not be unclear to those who have thought-fully considered the matters of the first six chapters. We will spend the rest of our study trying to clarify the above.

There is a strong tendency among some twentieth century philos-ophers, particularly those of the Anglo-American variety or those who emphasize <u>la langue</u> to the exclusion of <u>la parole</u>, to deny any connection between aesthetics and the form of intercourse characteristic of a par-ticular speaking community. They are even less likely to see the connec-tion between aesthetics and economics seen by Marx. For these philoso-phers, logic is the foundation of language. They consider logic as "the <u>money</u> of the mind" in only a "metaphorical" sense; they would deny or at least not be aware of the <u>phenomenological</u> similarity of logic to money described in our last chapter. Their view is that since language and expression are <u>not</u> ultimately based on a social foundation, <u>there</u> <u>is no social context in which the poem or work of art should be viewed</u> <u>or understood.</u> This view is summarily presented in Clive Bell's famous aesthetic principle that "To appreciate a work of art we need bring with us nothing from life, no knowledge of its ideas and affairs, no famili-arity with its emotions."[8] The argument that social situations influence the poet and are relevant to understanding works of art in general has been popularly referred to as "the intentional fallacy," and as might be expected, it is argued that "the intentional fallacy is a romantic one."[9]

Hunter Mead makes the standard Anglo-American argument for sep-
arating social considerations or Taine's moral temperature from aesthetics,
and a fortiori for separating economics from aesthetics. He says "the
aesthetic 'mood' or attitude is one of detached, disinterested, and im-
personal contemplation. . . . The aesthetic mood represents a pause,
as it were, during which we momentarily suspend this normal cause-and-
effect series."[10] As characterized here, the aesthetic experience has
little to do with intellect or emotion; it involves a wholly unrelated
realm of psychological activity. Also of significance to us, Mead says
there must be a psychical distance maintained between the spectator and
the object in order to insure the right kind of contemplative mood. We
would agree with Mead that a certain kind of psychical distancing is
necessary for the aesthetic experience. But unlike Mead, we wish to
stress that the attainment of this distancing is based upon a certain
kind of management of the dynamics in the social or communicative process.
For instance, when caught up in the dynamics of hierarchy (like the pride
and shame of Chapter Five) as every user of language must be, it would
not be possible to reach Mead's contemplative mood without some adjust-
ment in the ontology of one's social being. We will explain how the
forces and motions of these social dynamics regulate the aesthetic ex-
perience in more detail later.

Mead sums up his view by saying: "In essence, the aesthetic ex-
perience is a pleasurable absorption in the perceptual aspects of phe-
nomena."[11] He says that necessary for achieving this absorption in per-
ception is the detachment of art from moral, emotional, social, politi-
cal, and religious involvement of any kind. Arguing against Tolstoy et al.
that the principle function of art is the expression and communication

of emotion, Mead contends the emotional view lowers art to a tumult of the passions. Mead even sees the ever continent Aristotle as being an exponent of the "emotional theory,"[12] but he says the Philosopher is less open to criticism than other advocates of this position because in the theory of the Poetics emotions are relieved through catharsis when they reach an excessive state. Apparently, Mead sees no value to the emotional stimulation or the charge of psychic energy (cathexis) that is built up in watching a tragedy and then relieved by catharsis. Our phenomenology of language would maintain that this building up and re-lieving of tensions is the life blood of the language or rhetorical and poetic process. Very generally, we would associate rhetoric with cathexis or the building up of this psychic charge (e.g., as in the veiling and unveiling of Sartre), while we would associate poetry with catharsis or a relieving of stimulation and the restoration of phenomenological equilibrium. It is not our view, though, that the artist must always appeal exclusively to the "emotions," or that emotion is the unique area of exploration for the artist. Our present point is only to stress that insofar as the artist and his public are users of language or communica-tion of any form, they will partake of the phenomenological dynamics of communication developed in our earlier chapters, and that the work of the artist will always be shaped in some way by the forms of intercourse characteristic of his speaking community.

Perhaps the oldest detailed version of the climate theory of art is to be found in the dialogues of Plato. As we know, Plato disallowed art in his ideal state, especially tragic art because of its appeal to the emotions or lower part of the soul, rather than to reason. But shortly afterwards in the Poetics, Aristotle separated ethics from

aesthetics, and this distinction made in the _Poetics_ seems to have dom-
inated literary theorizing down into the nineteenth century. It is not
until the literary theorizing of Schiller and Goethe, Hegel and Marx,
Nietzsche and Lukacs, and some others that social considerations are
again brought into aesthetic discussions. Though we may disparage Plato
for saying that poetry is a corrupting force in society, we should still
appreciate his perceptive observation on the intimate connection of these.
Plato was the first to understand in a thorough way the inextricable
connection between social climate and art. He understood that by con-
trolling the climate he could control the output of artistic productions.
He seems to have sensed, even if only tacitly, that by controlling the
forms of intercourse he could make the epic or tragic view of life seem
implausible. It's not just that epic-tragedy did not exist in the Repub-
lic, we wish to emphasize that it could not exist because of the pre-
vailing patterns of communication. Why? Let us recall that in the
Platonic state there is a rigid distinction between classes. The philos-
opher kings are set off from the men of appetite and the men of high
spirit. While these latter two groups concern themselves with the prac-
tical affairs of getting a living and defending the state (what we de-
scribed earlier as the mundane affairs of Particulars), it was only the
philosopher king or symbol specialist with his key of reason who had
access to the world of Ideas or Universals. The Republic is a rigid
hierarchialized state where there is a ruling class specializing in
Ideas or Universals, and a working class which concentrates on the making
and movement of Particular goods and services. The Republic is a soci-
ety of pointers and graspers where each of these language functions.is
carried out by respective class members to the exclusion of the other.

In Plato's Republic there is no role for the whole man, that is, a man who is both a grasper and pointer.

To understand why epic-tragedy or poetry in general cannot exist in such a social climate we must understand some things about the method of poetry. If the phrase "method of poetry" seems offensive or like an inflexible scientific formula, let us hasten to add that we are considering here the social ontology of how poetry happens. That is, what is the process of events unfolding in the poet's mind, or more particularly, how does the poet handle universals and particulars in the production of a poem? On the nature of the method of poetry, Goethe summarily says:

> It makes a great difference whether the poet seeks the
> particular in the universal or whether he sees the uni-
> versal in the particular. The former method gives rise
> to allegory in which the particular has value only as an
> example of the universal. But the latter is really the
> nature of poetry; it expresses the particular without
> thinking of the universal or alluding to it. He who
> grasps this particular vividly also finds the universal
> without realizing it, or not realizing it until later.[13]

As Goethe considers seeing the universal in the particular as the method of poetry, so we would consider seeking the particular in the universal as the method of rhetoric. By seeking the particular in the universal, the speaker makes the idea or the word more real than the things themselves. Searching for the particular in the universal elevates the idea or word to a higher and independent status. By seeking the particular in the universal then, the speaker gives rise to signification or denotation. And while it is typical of rhetoric to give the most importance to ideas or words, it is typical of poetry to give the most importance to the things themselves. By seeing the idea or word in the concrete thing, poetry makes things more important than symbols. By seeing the idea or word in the thing, a speaker dissolves (at least in part) the

idea and even language itself. Here then, we have even another way of understanding our earlier injunction that poetry involves the task of using language against itself. We should also observe that seeing the universal in the particular is a method for producing the concrete language of Merleau-Ponty or the unconcealment of Heidegger. A speaker exposes or unconceals the concrete thing by moving away from the idea toward the thing. In Chapter Four we described this process as Rückfragen or back questioning, that is, the process where the speaker penetrates or gets behind the symbol. In contrast, by seeking the particular in the universal, a speaker makes the thing only a part of or member of a class of things, or in the sense of Heidegger he interprets being as idea. Seeking the particular in the universal supposes an identity of one thing with another thing and thereby gives rise to the categorical language of Merleau-Ponty or what we call rhetoric. As Goethe says, here the individual concrete thing "has value only as an example of the universal" or as an example of a class of things. The contrasting movement of seeing the universal in the particular involves a grasping or practice; it involves an immediate presence before the things themselves. Poetry is always based on an involution of the universal in the particular. In this way, seeing the universal in the particular culminates in the concrete language of unconcealment, while seeking the particular in the universal culminates in ideology of signification or denotation.

Discovering the particular in the universal is the language method of the pointer or symbol specialist. In a hierarchialized society like Plato's Republic, the symbol specialists who control and regulate language usage (through the management of thought patterns--categorizing, classifying, creating identifications, etc.) are not concerned with the grasping

involved in seeing the universal in the particular. In modern industrial
society where the poet is preeminently a symbol specialist, he cannot
see the universal in the particular since he is divorced from practice
and out of touch with concrete things. Poetry for him becomes a matter
of fighting off the boredom of an idle life through attempts to shock
or alarm his audience by recalcitrating convention. All this results
in an abstract "poetry" we will talk about later. And though the lan-
guage usage (and especially the function) of the worker may have some
tendencies toward poetic grasping, the language usage of the worker in
hierarchialized society is still ultimately based upon the pointing of
the ruling class. That is, the worker thinks and speaks using patterns
of organization (categories or classifications) that are ultimately
ruling class ideas. Moreover, the worker in such a society cannot see
the universal in the particular since he has no means of controlling the
process of symbolic production. The worker does not typically have a
publisher, nor does he ordinarily have the know how for initiating sym-
bolic undertakings.

But there is another area of significance for universals and
particulars that we need to explore. We need to concern ourselves with
the way universals and particulars are related to the conscious and the
unconscious. Because poetry and rhetoric stand in different relations
to universals and particulars, they stand in different relations to the
conscious and unconscious. As ideas, universals make up the rhetoric
of consciousness, especially when the speaker does not attempt to see
them in the particular or concrete thing. Consider universals here as
the commonplaces or presuppositions upon which ordinary discourse is
based in a world that has been already looked at. Universals help to

make up the ideas or words from which ordinary discourse picks up and begins to move. As an ontological basis of rhetoric, universals must contribute to the phenomenological blindness of the unconscious. On the other hand, because poetry attempts to see the universal in the particular, it must always aim at penetrating this blindness. In penetrating the idea or the word, poetry penetrates the unconscious. Relating to our point here, Burke has said "Unconscious is to _repression_ as conscious is to _expression_."[14] Following the implications of Burke's observation as it ties in with our own theory, it would seem that the unconscious is comparable primarily to universals in the way that the conscious, particularly conscious choice, is comparable primarily to the individual metaphor of perception. This would mean that poetry aims at or moves toward the _expression_ of conscious choice, while rhetoric aims at or moves toward the _repression_ of the unconscious.

More light is shed on these matters when we carefully consider Goethe's remark that seeking the particular in the universal gives rise to allegory. We maintain that through allegory the metaphors of perception coagulate into literal meanings and the noema comes to _disregard_ its status as noema. In making this claim we are aware that allegory is often closely associated with metaphor. But very significantly, allegory differs from metaphor in its length and its intricacy. If we were to look more closely at the history of the evolution of speech, we may well find that allegory marks the transitional period between speech based primarily on metaphor and speech based primarily on literal meanings. We have in mind here the time frame covered by the Bible and particularly the style of story telling characteristic of the Old Testament. Because of its _length_ and _sophistication_, allegory makes us

forget or disregard the metaphor and noema. This is exactly the same means and effect brought on by literal meanings and theories of knowledge generally. It is the bulk of language in allegory and literal meanings that makes speakers forget the ultimate metaphorical status of their words, and gives to such words an existence of their own. We explained in Chapter Five how an excess of words and communication helps set into motion the rhetoric of analytic thought. Similarly, through a shell game of words, allegory buries in its story (as literal meaning buries in its argument) what existentialists call initial choice, i.e., the point at which rational thought comes in contact with irrationality. Rational thought thus dominates as a closed and self sufficient sphere of interiority. Through the perplexities and entanglements of reason and words, literal meanings and allegory make us forget or disregard the metaphor and noema. In Chapter Three, Nietzsche explained how Euripides killed tragic poetry by allowing his plays to become enmeshed in reason and words. But the point we wish to stress presently is that through the allegory produced by seeking the particular in the universal, language or words also come to seem as though they have an existence of their own, thus resulting in an anti-poetic effect.

An anthropology of language (guided, of course, by our phenomenology) might well show us that allegory is the linguistic (or rhetorical) seed that grew into the literal meaning. Through the use of allegory, the rhetorician became able to get into gear the intellectual machinery necessary for his illusions (Nietzsche), his ideology (Marx), and his hallucinations (Merleau-Ponty). Because of its tendency to sprout into literal meanings, allegory has little or no role to play in poetry (as Goethe suggests), while allegory is in some sense the

starting point for rhetoric. A regular desk dictionary will define allegory as the veiled presentation of something, or the treatment of one subject under the guise of another. Recalling our earlier discussion of clothes and the veiling and unveiling process, we might think of allegory in a corresponding way as the use of words for unveiling in order to veil reality. As a guise or veil, both allegory and clothes work as a repression of reality. Allegory is able to work as a means of repression only because it is based upon a seeking of the particular in the universal and, thereby, like clothes, develop the unconscious. Speaking of Freud, Burke says repression is an unconscious process. Burke cites Freud saying "The essence of repression lies simply in the function of rejecting or keeping something out of consciousness."[15] Burke claims that the unconsciousness is the very locus of motives. As a general rule then, it would seem that to be successful with his persuasion the rhetorician must not penetrate or relieve the repression of the unconscious. He must do what he can to avoid piercing the unconscious if he is to activate the springs of his listener's motivations. Rhetoric then, (whether I-You or I-Me) involves the creation or implementation of repression for the purpose of doing away with freedom. And this repression can be developed either verbally through, for example, allegory, or nonverbally through, for example, clothes, since both act as a veil or guise of reality. From the therapeutic perspective, we can say it is the aim of poetry to relieve this repression or to unveil the guise or self deception of the inhibitions. By performing this function poetry sets us free; by reversing this function rhetoric enslaves.

Poetry could be thought of as identical with therapy when both are being properly practiced. But our most important present point to realize is that because poetry is based upon a _seeing_ of the universal in the particular, it is based upon a method or movement of the mind that dissolves the repression of the unconscious and unveils or unconceals reality.

For there to be poetry, certainly epic-tragedy, the universal and particular must interact in such a way so as to produce unconcealment and a shift of emphasis _away_ from the idea or word to the concrete particular. From a historical perspective, it is significant that epic-tragedy has tended to develop in those socio-aesthetic climates where universals or ideas have not been stridently separated from particulars or language has not been severely abstract, while epic-tragedy and poetry in general have tended to have been stultified in socio-aesthetic climates where universals (as ideas or words) have been kept apart from the concrete real life process. In Chapter Three, we explained how tragedy died out with the development of Platonic philosophy and its Ideas or Universals. Following through the implications of this view, it is understandable and even expected that no great poetry, especially epic-tragedy, would be produced during a period such as the Dark Ages (476-1000). In fact the debate of universals _versus_ particulars is usually considered as the greatest philosophical issue of this period, with the realism inspired by Plato dominating and making an inhospitable climate for poetry. Most philosophers of the Dark Ages took this realist position where a word gives a warrant for or contains the reality of its meaning. In the realism of

the Dark Ages, the structure of words was taken as the structure

of reality.

It was only at the end of the Dark Ages that the doctrine

of universals was challenged seriously by Roscelin (circa 1045-

1120). This philosopher is usually regarded as the founder of

medieval philosophy's early nominalism. According to nominalism,

universals are only words with no objective or independent existence

corresponding to them. Though none of Roscelin's writings remain,

Thomas Gilby says of him in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

> It is certain that Roscelin attacked the dominant
> realism of traditional teaching, doctrina antiqua,
> which read genera and species as existing in re, not
> merely in speech (in voce), and that he was one of
> the moderni to whom all things were individual. He
> is credited with saying that a universal was but a
> flatus vocis, a breathing of a word. . . . [H]owever. . .
> it is unlikely that Roscelin meant a mere sound ef-
> fect; in those days no master of standing would have
> treated a word as a phonetic event without relation to
> an abstract concept.[16]

Though Roscelin was not quite the radical nominalist Nietzsche was,

his philosophy was still at strong variance with the prevailing

view of his time. But even this modest nominalism of Roscelin was

not to remain credible for very long. It was successfully challenged

by his famous student, Peter Abelard. The philosophy of Abelard was

an attempt to mediate the dispute between realism and nominalism.

Describing Abelard's ontology of language, Gilby says:

> For Abelard a thing was always individual. Nev-
> ertheless, a universal did name things which really
> existed, and, consequently, it was not a flatus vocis,
> a sound made from letters and syllables, but a word
> with a content of meaning, vox significativa, which
> he called nomen [name] and, in a revised edition of
> his logic, a sermo [speech].[17]

While Roscelin tended to stress the similarity of voice with speech

(or words), Abelard distinguished voice from speech (or words).

Abelard's view was that speech (or words) = voice + signification. Voice then, by itself, was not able to produce speech. For Abelard, speech always involved the additional activity of signification. And here is the point where Abelard brought in the universal: He says through the process of signification universals denoted things that really exist. The universal signifies or "nominates" particulars among which there is a resemblance. Even though the universal may have its basis in particulars, it still can be said to exist in thought. Like Roscelin, Abelard maintained that a thing was always particular and that collections of things had no shared essence (as in Plato). Abelard's innovation is to say that things can share predicates. Abelard then differs from Roscelin in thinking that the universal is more than just the breathing of a word. But he also differs from his realist predecessors in his attempt to recognize the particular thing.

By adding the phenomenon of signification, Abelard added the semantic dimension to language studies. It is this semanticism and its signification that allows Abelard to say that things can share predicates. In the history of language studies, this shift from the universal as a shared essence to a shared predicate is seen as synonymous with the shift from metaphysics to logic and semantics. Abelard gave an elevated role to logic as the intellectual manager of language. He considered logic as the science of language which was to work in conjunction with the natural sciences. This "shift" from metaphysics to logic and semantics was given even further emphasis by William of Ockham (circa 1285-1349). Ockham's view was that we should look to logic and semantics to show us how to organize

words into scientifically plausible propositions. We should look

to logic and semantics to provide this organization since univer-

sality can be shared through _predicates,_ but not through _essences._

Ernest Moody summarized Ockham's view on the ontology of the uni-

versal this way:

> [U]niversality and community are properties only
> of signs--of language expressions and of the acts
> of thought expressed by them. The problem of uni-
> versals therefore is not a metaphysical problem.
> . . . The problem of individuation is a logical
> problem of showing how general terms are used in
> propositions to refer to individuals signified by
> them; this problem is resolved in terms of quanti-
> fying prefixes and other syncategorematic determinants
> of the referential use of terms in propositions.[18]

We, of course, would agree with Ockham that universality is a

property of signs, though we would add that such categories and

signs are rhetorical constructions. That is, our phenomenology of

language does not accept his semanticist's ontology of signs. To

further explain this elevated role Ockham gives to logic as the

reality of language, we should note his distinction between natural

signs and artificial signs. Natural signs are concepts and come

under the direct management of logic. In contrast, artificial signs

make up words or the discourse of ordinary spoken language. As a

whole, language is a system of artificial signs based upon the

natural signs. Logic teaches us to arrange artificial signs by

arranging the concepts of natural signs. Ockham contends that

natural signs are _not_ dependent upon the initiatory actions of

speakers for their formation and organization, while the artificial

signs of regularly spoken language are so dependent. Here we have

in a rudimentary form the contemporary analytic philosopher's dis-

tinction between language and meta-language. These artificial signs

of Ockham are _subordinated_ to logic and natural signs in the way
that some modern analytic philosophers would put regularly spoken
language in a position of lower rank to meta-language. Here we
also have in rudimentary form the distinction between _la langue_
and _la parole_, with _la langue_ assuming the commanding position.
Through his theory of natural signs, Ockham tries to show that
language exists _apart_ from the act of speaking.

Modern non-phenomenological accounts of language tend to
see this "overthrow" of metaphysics and establishment of logic
as the foundation of language as a great advancement in our under-
standing of the language and communication process. The phenom-
enologist of language sees it as a further impediment. We have
argued against this position enough in our earlier chapters that
the reader by now should be able to anticipate our objections to
Ockham. But let us just briefly summarize our objections in these
three points. First: There can be no laws of speaking or "natural
signs" before one speaks. Such "natural signs" always arise on the
basis of some individual or communal unconscious. Second: The
development of logic as the basis of language was _not_ an abandon-
ment of Platonic realism as Ockham and most analytic philosophers
think; it was, rather, an _amplification_ of it. As Lukacs had per-
ceptively observed, "every pure logic is Platonic: it is thought
released from existence and hence ossified."[19] By moving us further
up the ladder of abstraction, Ockham and Abelard have made us one
step further removed from the concrete particulars of the real life
process. The "shift" from metaphysics to logic was a new kind of
essentialist view of language and a new liability to the poetic

exercising of speech. And third: Refinements in the categorical
aspects of language like Ockham's always accelerate language's
rhetorical propensities. Just like modern semanticists, Ockham
failed to give adequate recognition to social processes and their
role in forming categories or creating identities or resemblances.
He didn't realize that in showing resemblances or identities the
universal always shows a "fiction" (Nietzsche). Ockham also talked
about "imposition"[20] or the act of imposing a name or definition on
an object. But again, he doesn't recognize imposition as the
result of the social or communication process. He doesn't comprehend
imposition as a part of a social struggle to obtrude one's own
definition on reality or to make one a victim and another a victim-
izer. To say that imposition is the result of any logic is only
to say that it is the result of socially created identifications
that reside in the unconscious. Logic develops only with "the
gregarious instinct in the background" (Nietzsche).

Because of this contortion through abstraction, language was
not able to perform as a viable poetic instrument, even during the
later Middle Ages. Speakers were not able to see the universal in
particular as a metaphor, but only as a shared predicate. Dante,
of course, is the one great counter-example to our generalization.
But when we look at the language theory of Dante, it seems that he
doesn't actually exemplify the propensities of his age in the way
that some have suggested. In some very important aspects, Dante's
language theory was unlike that of Ockham and some of his contempo-
raries. For instance, though Dante considered even poetry as highly
rational, this rationality was not based on a theory of natural signs.

In other words, unlike Ockham, his rationality was not based upon
the unconsciousness of logic. Dante seemed much more alert to
the social or rhetorical factors that regulate speech. In his
discussion of the limits of language, he says "any speech in which
each part lends strength to the principle intention may well be said
to come from the workshop of a master rhetorician."[21] It is also
significant to us that Dante considered the vernacular of real
life speech as more fit for poetry than any of the more mature
and specialized or logically and grammatically polished languages.
Burke notes how Dante even deplored the occupational specialization
that went along with specialized languages "--and the higher the
specialized activity, Dante says, the more 'barbarous' its speech."[22]
And in his introduction to Dante's literary criticism, Robert Haller
says "Dante seeks to discover in the purposes of human speech the
principles which have made necessary the rules of grammar and elo-
quence, and to use these principles to evade the rules himself [in
his own poetry] ."[23] In this important sense, Dante's approach to
the study of speech is very comparable to our own. Instead of
postulating rules of language (grammar, syntax etc.) and working
from them, Dante looks first at human speech as it is and asks how
or under the force of what pressures do these rules arise? And how
does one's poetry evade these rules? Dante considered tragedy as
the highest kind of poetry or the best way of evading such rules.
We will shortly see why tragedy is so suitable for this purpose.

It is fair to say that Dante worked to relieve the ideolog-
ical constipation that had bound up the speech process through out
the Middle Ages. Following through and developing this impulse,

the philosophers of the Renaissance turned away from seeing logic as the chief managerial component of speech. The Renaissance is characterized by a shift from logic to rhetoric as the dominant line of language inquiry. In her perceptive study of Renaissance rhetoric, Nancy Struever describes this shift by saying that "the logicized rhetoric of the thirteenth century gives way finally to a rhetoricized logic in the sixteenth century."[24] Since we have claimed through out our study that logic is the same as rhetoric, the reader may well wish to ask what is the difference between a "logicized rhetoric" and a "rhetoricized logic?" We think the answer to this question lies not as much in an examination of the ostensible structuring of language as in an examination of the relationship of conscious choice to language. (Though because of the similarity between the structure of language and the structure of consciousness, a rigidly structured language would of course militate against conscious choice.) It seems a fair generalization to say that language usage in the Renaissance was characterized by what we described in Chapter Five as a conscious choice of predicates. Recall this earlier explained principle: <u>Conscious choice is based upon the ability to see or to be aware of how logic performs as rhetoric, or creates the illusion of necessity in thinking and speaking.</u> In the Renaissance there was this seeing or awareness; in the Middle Ages there was not. In the Renaissance there was a consciousness of logic as rhetoric; in the Middle Ages there was an <u>un</u>consciousness which promoted rhetoric as logic. The language usage of the Middle Ages is characterized by a <u>veiling</u> or <u>repression</u> that, phenomenologically speaking, always involves the presentation of rhetoric as logic. In contrast, Renaissance language usage involved the

self conscious use of reason, or as Nietzsche would say, it involved

a consciousness of illusion as illusion.

An awareness of logic as rhetoric always involves an exposure

to the metaphysical unshelteredness of irrationalism and a world with-

out prefigured definitions or meanings. Chesterton has pointed out

that "The Renaissance was, as much as anything, a revolt from the logic

of the Middle Ages. We speak of the Renaissance as the birth of ra-

tionalism; it was in many ways the birth of irrationalism."[25] The dar-

ingness usually thought to characterize Renaissance life had its source

in a venturesomeness for definition or meaning that permeated its lit-

erature, social intercourse, etc. The Renaissance interest in language

was more diversified and went beyond mere logic. As an educator and

author of many widely used books of the period, we might consider Peter

Ramus as exemplifying this sixteenth century view. Describing Ramus'

view on language and logic, Walter Ong says:

> Ramus treated logic or dialectic as made up of inventio
> (discovery of arguments for any kind of discourse from
> mathematics to poetry) and indicium or dispositio (the
> arrangement of arguments, including for Ramus not only
> syllogism but also method, likewise referable to any
> and all discourse).[26]

for Ramus then, all argumentation was based upon one "art of discourse."

Moreover, this one source of argument is based upon inventio and dispo-

sitio--the first two canons of rhetoric. That mathematics is put on

the same argumentive footing as poetry (inventio) suggests a flexi-

bility of thinking and perceiving that must have been highly implausi-

ble within the structures of medieval language. Here logic is not used

as a means of supinating experience. Struever notes how Renaissance

humanists tried to "embrace the distortive power of language; they

accept the complexity of discourse as an attempt to reflect the com-
plexity of phenomena."[27] In the sense of Nietzsche, this means there
was an effort to capture the irrationality or Dionysian experience of
the metaphors of perception. In the sense of our adapted Husserl, this
means there was an effort to not _disregard_ the noema as noema. As a
general rule, experience was felt to be more important than concepts
and the logic of natural signs. In the Renaissance the "how many angels
can dance on the head of a pin" mentality had in this way been overcome.

In the Italian Renaissance, tragedies were again being written
by Trissino and Giraldi. And parallel with this Renaissance revival
of tragedy were efforts to make operative again the sophistic view of
language. In _The Rhetoric of Tragedy_ (Amherst: University of Massa-
chusetts Press, 1966), C. O. McDonald tries to show how every aspect
of English Renaissance drama, from the smallest consideration of sen-
tence structure to the largest consideration of plot, was molded on the
basis of the sophistic view of language. Plato had all but banned the
sophists from respectable intellectual circles, and the rehabilitation
of the sophists was a rebellion against the Platonic realism that had
since dominated in one variant form or another. Struever says this
"use of rhetorically instead of logically oriented discourse _leads one
to reality through illusion_"[my italics].[28] For us, this means it _leads
one to the concrete particular through the universal_. Such a process
does not wholly _destroy_ the illusions that are always a part of language,
but in the sense of Nietzsche it makes us conscious of the illusion _as_
illusion. Seeing the universal in the particular then leads one to
this consciousness of illusion as illusion. Coleridge suggests the ex-
cellence of Shakespeare's poetry is based precisely upon this ability

to see the universal in the particular. He says:

> It was Shakespeare's prerogative to have the <u>universal</u>
> which is potentially in each <u>particular</u>, opened out to
> him in the <u>homo generalis</u>, <u>not as an abstraction of ob-</u>
> <u>servation</u> [my italics] from a variety of men, but as
> the substance capable of endless modifications, of which
> his own personal existence was but one, and to use <u>this</u>
> <u>one</u> as the eye that beheld the other, and as the tongue
> that could convey the discovery. . . . Shakespeare in
> composing had no <u>I</u> but the <u>I</u> representative.[29]

The characters of Shakespeare are not abstract or divided. This is
because by seeing the universal in the particular, Shakespeare was able
to attain the most lucid levels of unconcealment. By having the uni-
versal opened up to him <u>not as an abstraction</u>, Shakespeare's poetry
involves the most skillful use of language to <u>get behind</u> language and
to reveal the Dionysian universality of the things themselves. In this
way Shakespeare speaks the language of nature.

On the basis of our phenomenology of language, there is some
reason to think that this achievement of Shakespeare's poetry is even
greater than it is ordinarily thought to be. To understand this extra
dimension of Shakespeare's achievement, we must put into sharper focus
what we have been saying about the history of language development and
the cultural or social context in which any user of language finds him-
self. In <u>The Birth of Tragedy</u>, Nietzsche contrasted "tragic cultures"
with "Alexandrian cultures" (i.e., the period of Greek literature be-
ginning around 300 B.C.). Nietzsche thinks of the modern historial
period as being dominated by the tendencies of Alexandrian culture rath-
er than the tragic. He says:

> Our whole modern world is entangled in the net of
> Alexandrian culture. It proposes as its ideal the
> theoretical man equipped with the greatest forces of
> knowledge, and laboring in the service of science, whose
> archetype and progenitor is Socrates. All our educational

> methods originally have this ideal in view. . . . .
> . . . . Let
> us mark this well: the Alexandrian culture, to be
> able to exist permanently, requires a slave class, but
> with its optimistic view of life it denies the neces-
> sity of such a class, and consequently, when its beau-
> tifully seductive and tranquillizing utterances about
> the "dignity of man" and the "dignity of labor" are no
> longer effective, it gradually drifts toward a dreadful
> destruction.[30]

In contrast to Alexandrian culture, Nietzsche says:

> [A tragic culture's] most important characteristic is
> that wisdom takes the place of science as the highest
> end--wisdom that, uninfluenced by the seductive dis-
> tractions of the sciences, turns with unmoved eyes to
> a comprehensive view of the world, and seeks to grasp,
> with sympathetic feelings of love, the eternal suffer-
> ing as its own.[31]

The collapse of tragic culture into Alexandrian culture was based upon

the optimism of science and logic initiated by Socrates in ancient

times, and then further developed by the epistemologically oriented

philosophers of later times. The breakdown of tragic culture led to

what Nietzsche called "the death-leap into the bourgeois drama."[32]

In spite of the literary revival that took place during the

Renaissance, Shakespeare was still a part of (or a language user in)

an Alexandrian culture. It is clear that characters such as Hamlet

and Othello live in a distinctly modern world that has, at least in

part, suffered a cessation of vital poetic functioning. Their world

has lost much of its potential for wholeness and harmony. In this im-

portant sense, Shakespeare's world is different from that of pre-Socratic

writers for whom the challenge of descending from words or ideas to the

concrete particulars of the real life process could not have been as

great. The challenge of creating a means of seeing the universal in

the particular could not have been as great for the speakers in early

societies where language had not been corrupted by having the universal

stand as an _independent_ abstraction. But by the time of Shakespeare

and a society that had an already evolving system of labor division

with pointers and graspers, the writing of poetry had to have been more

difficult. In his own theological way, Dante also seems to have real-

ized a deterioration of communication taking place with the evolution

of society. Discussing Dante's view on the origins and development of

language, Robert Haller says:

> [Dante finds] perfect eloquence in Adam's praise of God,
> and uniformity of speech in human communication such as
> prevailed before the building of the tower of Babel, not
> directed to the purposes of human pride. Rules of gram-
> mar and eloquence are attempts to compensate for the ef-
> fects of human sin.[33]

As a writer "after the fall," Shakespeare faced a stiffer poetic chal-

lenge than earlier communicators. With the development of language as

an _independent_ realm of thought (or in Dante's sense, with the devel-

opment of sin), the perfect communication of Adam is no longer possible.

Dante also notes that the perfect communication of Adam avoided pride

(which also means that the communication of Adam avoided the phenomeno-

logically symmetrical feeling of shame and therefore hierarchy). We

explained in Chapter Five how pride and shame are based upon the col-

lapse of language or communication into the abstractions of logic.

Looking at these considerations collectively, it would seem that perhaps

every "advancement" in the history or evolution of language and commu-

nication seems to have been marked by a refinement or widening of the

separation of the rhetorical from the poetic (or the abstract from the

concrete). And though Ockham, for instance, had given an independent

existence to concrete things (while earlier Platonists had not), he

still widened the hiatus between language and the concrete with his

theory of natural signs. Because of this _same_ exaggeration of analysis

and disintegration of the communication process, Marx was able to rightly observe that the division of labor leads to further division of labor. That is, analysis begets analysis. And because of these same developments of language that made abstractions more aesthetically notorious (more sinful to Dante), it became harder for one to become conscious of illusion as illusion. As language became more logical and abstract, more the means of the introversions of pride and shame, or more the means of Dante's sin, it came closer to Nietzsche's perfect fiction or our own perfect rhetoric--a fiction or rhetoric that is most hard to realize as fiction or rhetoric. Shakespeare, though, was able to overcome much of this.

But in assessing the size of Shakespeare's achievement, we should also point out that tragic poetry could be possible only after this corruption of language and communication, or in Dante's sense, only after there arose the possibility of sin. Tragic poetry can arise only where there is this possibility for rhetoric or sin. In a world like Eden that had a pure potential for wholeness and harmony and no potential for risk and self destruction, there could be no tragic poetry. A poet such as Shakespeare could not have existed before the fall, since the antagonism of poetry and rhetoric had not yet sharpened. And though there is a permeated presence of rhetoric in contemporary linguistic life, along with its alienation from the concrete real life process, it would seem that these difficulties would be much harder to overcome now than for a poet working in Shakespeare's time. When literary theorists sometimes discuss the possibility of there being another Shakespeare, we would like to suggest that they apply their attention to just this consideration. That is, how is it possible for a poet to

surmount the rhetoric and ideology of modern technological society. Burke points to science (the modern form of ideology) as the "purely sadistic motive which usually obscures our understanding of tragedy itself today."[34] But we should also remember that because the potential for impenetrable rhetoric is <u>greater</u> in contemporary linguistic life, so then is the need for tragic poetry to restore a sense of equilibrium. A great cathexis requires a great catharsis. In modern times the project of the tragic poet has become, paradoxically, more needed but less possible to attain. For a poet today to be the equal of Shakespeare, he would then have to be much greater than Shakespeare.

Let us try to make more clear the relation of universals to particulars or words to things, since this will help us to understand not only the nature of poetry, but the relation of tragic poetry to epic. Up to this point we have made no effort to distinguish tragic poetry from epic. The attempt to distinguish tragic poetry from epic is not a recently developed task for the literary-theorist. Northrop Frye says:

> Renaissance critics used to argue about what the greatest form for poetry was, and whether it was epic or tragedy. There is probably no answer to such a question, but one can learn a good deal about literary form by discussing it.[35]

In a general way, though, we think we can offer a plausible answer to this question by suggesting that epic be considered as the ultimate form of poetry "before the fall," while tragedy be considered such "after the fall." In the literary criticism of Lukacs, this distinction comes out fairly clearly. In tracing the evolution of human intellectual and emotional development, Lukacs is struck by the harmonious cosmos of the early Greeks and their epics. For Lukacs, the Homeric

epics are examples of literature "before the fall." The _Iliad_ and _Od-_
yssey were written (or put together) before the formalized separation
of universals from particulars or words from things, and therefore pri-
or also to the rise of alienation and the guilt of bad conscience.
Lukacs says the man of the epic is the perfectly social man. This man
seeks and lives through adventure, but doesn't experience any _risk_ at
estranging himself from the integrated wholeness of his social world.
In the epic, Lukacs says:

> The soul goes out to seek adventure; it lives through
> adventures, but it does not know the real torment of
> seeking and the real danger of finding; such a soul never
> stakes itself; it does not yet know that it can lose it-
> self, it never thinks of having to look for itself.[36]

The hero of the epic does not formulate the challenge of life in the
way characteristic of heroes in later tragic literature. Heroes such
as Hamlet and Othello do indeed know the torment of seeking and the dan-
ger of finding. They also experience a keen risk of losing themselves.
But for the man of the epic, Lukacs says existence and essence are one.
Such a man has not yet sensed his otherness or apartness from the social
group, for he is still living in the pristine homogeneity of man with
nature or society. Ideas and words have not yet been torn apart from
the material real life process. There is no ideology in the sense of
Marx or sin in the sense of Dante. The man of the epic has not yet had
his being wrenched apart by the contradictions set up in language as
analytic thought. From the perspective of our phenomenology of lan-
guage, this also means that the Homeric hero has not yet been exposed
to the possibility of rhetorical corruption. Since he has not yet de-
veloped a sense of otherness, he has not yet evolved a strong sense of
a Me or You--the _telos_ or end of rhetorical discourse.

The notion that in pre-Socratic times speech or literature had not been separated from practice is not wholly unproblematic, we must concede. This matter, however, can receive much illumination if we compare this literature "before the fall" to the literature of our own time. In the remaining part of our study, we will try to give a phenomenological account of modern art and literature and its relation to society. Then we will compare this modern art and literature to epic-tragedy through the type of communication presupposed by each. Remember that our central idea here is that a society's art and literature will in some way be a reflection of the way that society communicates. The form of intercourse of a particular society will have corresponding to it certain kinds of aesthetic inclinations. By understanding the relationship among social climates and their characteristic forms of intercourse, we can understand the relationship among their respective genres. For instance, according to our view we could fully understand the relationship of the historical novel to tragedy only by understanding the relationship of the life world of nineteenth century Europe to that of Classical Greece or the Renaissance. Or, to understand the melodrama of commercial films and television we would look to the form of intercourse that characterizes contemporary America. Besides the melodrama of commercial films and television, we also have in present day America the phenomenon of _experimentalism_ in the theatre. Burke observes how this "experimentalist attitude . . . in the arts is largely an aesthetic reflex of present-day science and its characteristic technological psychosis."[37] This, then, will be the focus of the remainder of our study: Because of the forms of intercourse (social climate, theories of knowledge etc.) that characterize a particular historical pe-

riod, how does there arise the aesthetic inclination to work within one genre rather than another?

Among modern literary critics, these issues of society and literature receive their most original and perceptive formulation in the theorizing of Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805). For this reason much of the upcoming discussion will be based upon the speculations of Schiller. Recognition is usually given to Schiller as being the first to note in a detailed way the direct connection among occupational specialization, the inner workings of the mind (intrapersonal communication), and the interrelatedness of artistic forms. Fredric Jameson says:

> Schiller's profound originality, which will leave its mark on thinkers from Hegel to Freud, was to have . . . transferred the notion of the division of labor, of economic specialization, from the social classes to the inner functioning of the mind, where it assumes the appearance of a hypostasis of one mental function over against the others, a spiritual deformation which is the exact equivalent of the economic alienation in the social world outside.[38]

In his collection of letters, On the Aesthetic Education of Man, Schiller observes how in bureaucratized society the abilities or powers of the mind are separated, and one ability or power becomes developed in exclusion to others. In bureaucratized society, he says:

> [T]he various faculties appear as separate in practice as they are distinguished by the psychologist in theory, and we see not merely individuals, but whole classes of men, developing but one part of their potentialities, while of the rest, as in stunted growths, only vestigial traces remain.[39]

Schiller says this division of faculties did not exist among the early Greeks. He seems to think of their poetry and way of life as having a rhetorical virginity. The early Greeks had a naive simplicity since during this period "Poetry had not as yet coquetted with wit."[40] But the development of hierarchialized society, along with its occupational

specialization etc., brought about profoundly disastrous changes to this socio-aesthetic climate. Schiller says:

> It was civilization itself which inflicted this wound upon modern man. Once the increase of empirical knowledge, and more exact modes of thought, made sharper divisions between the sciences inevitable, and once the increasing complex machinery of State necessitated a more rigorous separation of ranks and occupations, then the inner unity of human nature was severed too, and a disastrous conflict set its harmonious powers at variance. The intuitive and speculative understanding now withdrew in hostility to take up positions in their respective fields, whose frontiers they now began to guard with jealous mistrust; and with this confining of our activity to a particular sphere we have given ourselves a master within, who not infrequently ends by suppressing the rest of our potentialities. While in one a riotous imagination ravages the hard-won fruits of the intellect, in another the spirit of abstraction stifles the fire at which the heart should have warmed itself and the imagination been kindled.[41]

Schiller considered epic as the highpoint of art and the central feature of the aesthetic process. But through the above described evolution in society, the aesthetic process moved away from a frame of mind (individual and social) capable of producing epics. For Schiller, the epic offered the quintessential expression of the poetic state which he called Gemütsfreiheit. One of Schiller's commentators, E. L. Stahl, offers a succinct definition of Gemütsfreiheit as "a state of equipoise where the mind is freed from the stress of moral as well as emotional compulsion."[42] We might recall here Hunter Mead's definition of the "aesthetic mood" offered at the beginning of this chapter. On first look, it may seem that Mead is a follower of Schiller because of his characterization of the act of beholding the aesthetic object, because of the detachment from practical affairs he stresses etc. But the important difference to keep in mind here is that for Schiller (and us) the poetic state of Gemütsfreiheit is the result of engaging in communication in a certain

way (with a Me or a You); it is not a result of avoiding communication (as Mead seems to imply). All of Schiller's observations on aesthetics presume some active social or communicative context. E. L. Stahl notes that all of Schiller's philosophical writings "deal with aesthetic problems as an integral part of the wider subject of culture."[43]

Schiller divides art or the aesthetic inclinations of social man into two opposing impulses. If we were to translate these two opposing impulses of Schiller into the phenomenology of language, they might roughly be equated with a tendency to grasp or to point. Schiller thought that the tendency of any one of these dispositions to dominate linguistic life resulted in coercion, and that freedom is based upon a harmonious integration of these contrasting impulses of linguistic life. In his notion of Gemütsfreiheit, Schiller wants to pull together these two aspects of speaking man whose unity has been lost through occupational specialization and its presupposed contortions in the forms of intercourse. In his handling of language then (and how this theory of language relates to artistic forms), Schiller notes two extremes which deviate from the poetic state of Gemütsfreiheit. He calls these two extremes the "rhetorical" and the "prosaic." It is important to stress that these two extremes are not empty speculations of Schiller's. They are based upon a phenomenological examination of his own creativity. In a letter to Goethe, Schiller expresses "a certain fear of falling"[44] into these extremes while working on his Wallenstein. We can quickly and summarily describe Schiller's aesthetics of language and how the "rhetorical" and the "prosaic" are to be contrasted with this diagram:

GEMUTSFREIHEIT

RHETORICAL_____X_____PROSAIC

1. Too far from
   object.

2. Turgid and
   unclear.

3. Hollow idealistic
   stylization.

1. Too close to
   object.

2. Excessively ob-
   vious.

3. Petty pseudo-
   realism.

Just how these characteristics of the "rhetorical" and the "prosaic"
reveal themselves in works of literature will become clearer as we go
along. But we should first restress an important aspect of what Schil-
ler means by distancing himself from an object of experience in an aes-
thetically valid way. As the reader may recall, Hunter Mead also makes
the point about the observer keeping a certain distance from the object.
But again, he fails to acknowledge how the dynamics of communication
are involved in the keeping and letting go of this distance. In writing
Wallenstein, Schiller says he experienced an "anxious effort to preserve
the proximity of the object."[45] If too far from or too close to the ob-
ject, the speaker or writer ends up with words that merely denote or
signify, i.e., words that have emptied the metaphors of perception. To
some extent there is a parallel here to the style of language usage Marx
would say is characteristic of the capitalist and laborer. The division
of labor (along with the form of intercourse presupposed by it) forces
the speech of some too close to objects, while it forces the speech of
others too far away. A speaker is able to keep Schiller's poetic prox-
imity only by discovering the universal in the particular.

It is at this point that Lukacs picks up on Schiller's aesthet-
ics of language and uses it to comprehend the literary situation of the
twentieth century. The "rhetorical" and "prosaic" extremes of Schiller

lead to (or are the basis of) what we consider as an abstract subjectivism and an abstract objectivism. Both of these are attempts to deny the poetry of concrete experience. Lukacs says that naturalism is the result of a writer's attempt to work in an abstract objectivism, while formalism is the product of a writer's effort to work in an abstract subjectivism. Both naturalism and formalism are attempts to ignore history and the social process of language we have discussed. Social realism is the name Lukacs gives to works of literature that recognize or give account for the social construction of reality along with the material real life process. We can diagrammatically express Lukacs' anatomy of artistic forms and how they derive from Schiller's aesthetics of language this way:

RHETORICAL	GEMUTSFREIHEIT	PROSAIC
FORMALISM	SOCIAL REALISM	NATURALISM
1. Concentrates on inner life.	1. Tries to reveal dialectical interplay of inner and outer.	1. Concentrates on outer life.
2. Tends to portray the mere mental states of characters.	2. Tends to portray typical features.	2. Tends toward a finical portrayal of detail.
3. E.g., Beckett, Kafka and Joyce.	3. E.g., Shakespeare and Goethe, Balzac and Tolstoy.	3. E.g., Zola and Ibsen.

The derivation of this anatomy of artistic forms from Schiller's aesthetics of language is obvious. Even though when Schiller was working (at the end of the eighteenth century) naturalism and formalism had not yet developed to the extremes they were to in subsequent literature, it is much to his credit to have sensed these contortions or vulnerabilities of the artistic process long before Zola and Ibsen or Beckett and Kafka penned their first works. But for us there is an even more im-

portant source of derivation for these artistic forms. We wish to stress that naturalism, formalism and social realism are to be understood here as <u>the aesthetic or literary extentions of our three communicative manners</u> outlined in Chapter Five. Abstract objectivism is based upon the communicative manner or rhetoric of the objectivist, while abstract subjectivism is based upon the communicative manner or rhetoric of the subjectivist. Naturalist and formalist artists are led to their respective abstractions through the communication process described earlier. So even though these terms (naturalism, formalism and social realism) may be new to our discussion, the phenomenological structures of the communicative attitudes that underlay them have already been explained. We think we can give a new validity to this anatomy of literary forms by showing how they have their foundations in communication. We are suggesting that styles of literature be understood as styles of visualizing the Other (whether a Me or You) and the characteristic way of communicating with that Other. In evaluating the poetic merit of naturalism and formalism, we should inquire as to how or in what fashion they pursue the mediation of the Other. According to our phenomenology of language, naturalism and formalism are the two kinds of bad faith as they are manifested in literary productions.

Both naturalism and formalism exercise a strong presence in the artistic undertakings of contemporary America. Very briefly, naturalism is the view that human beings are mechanistically determined. As the literary demonstration of objectivism, naturalism attempts to show how human beings have little or no control over their situation. Based upon what we described earlier as an <u>essentialist</u> view of language, naturalism tends to see language as something <u>added on</u> to a situation,

rather than the situation itself. Here, it is believed that language is not created through the act of speaking, but that language is objectively set in advance by the rules of grammar and logic. The naturalist assumes language as made up of literal meanings. Since under naturalism language is seen as being based upon la langue rather than la parole, language becomes robbed of its power of poetic animation. The naturalist's use of language tends to emphasize detailed descriptions that reproduce their subject matter with a photographic accuracy. He presupposes a fundamental distinction between language used to convey facts and language used to evaluate or give opinions about the significance of such facts. In the novels of Zola, these tendencies were brought to a head. Describing how these propensities toward the fact finding of abstract objectivism are exaggerated in the novels of Zola at the expense of underplaying the social process of communication, Fredric Jameson says:

> It is as if, in the works of Zola, the idea, the pre-
> conceived theory, intervened between the work of art
> and the reality to be presented: Zola already knows
> what the basic structure of society is, and this is
> his weakness. For him the basic raw material, the
> professions, the socially determined character types
> are already established in advance: this is to say
> that he has succumbed to the temptation of abstract
> thought, to the mirage of some static, objective
> knowledge of society. Implicitly he has admitted
> the superiority of positivism and science over mere
> imagination.[46]

Zola photographically describes in a static fashion the way he thinks social reality is, rather than trying to expose the communicative dynamics or social life processes that make it that way. The function of man as a creator and explainer of events is overlooked, or even worse, it is disguised.

Lukacs says that in Zola's novels "skillful description remains merely an inset in the novel itself."[47] Zola remains outside as an <u>ob server</u> rather than inside as a <u>participant</u>. Lukacs adds:

> This contradistinction of living through experiences as against observing them is not accidental. It is rooted in different basic attitudes toward <u>life</u>, toward important social problems, and not merely toward methods of artistic mastery of the plot or definite parts of the plot.[48]

Lukacs thinks that under the pressures of capitalist division of labor there evolved the phenomenon of the <u>professional writer</u>. Because the naturalist writer is separated from the material real life process, he tends toward <u>observing</u> rather than <u>participating</u>. Only through a <u>withdrawal</u> from the metaphors of perception in the real life process into abstraction can this attitude of the naturalist writer be possible. Also, Lukacs notes how in the novels of Zola life is often depicted in its most sordid aspects of war and poverty. Naturalism in general tends to give vivid depictions to violence and human suffering. Lukacs observes how under naturalism "The cult of the inner life appears as a privilege of the upper classes of society, in contrast to the brutal earthy conflicts of the lower classes." Naturalism gives voice to the "plebeian tendencies"[49] that, as we shall see, are eschewed by formalism.

Though naturalism is a view of literature that grew out of nineteenth century science, its tendencies are still overwhelmingly present in contemporary books, and especially in the melodrama of commercial films and television. As a manifestation of naturalism, the <u>truth</u> in melodrama is always <u>a given</u>. We will explain later how in melodrama there is an effort to avoid the social processes through which truth is established. Often such films feature upper class heroes whose

glamorous and fast moving lives are held up as objects of envy and em-
ulation. Melodrama shows in detail the phenomenon of social privilege,
but never in a critical way. In melodrama there is never any attempt
to penetrate the collective unconsciousness involved in sustaining the
prevailing social order. And if we were to analyze contemporary socio-
economic patterns of entertainment consumption, we would find naturalism
(or its contemporary offshoots) as the characteristic mode of entertain-
ment for the lower classes. With its lucid portrayal of violence and
suffering over which the sufferers have no control, it would seem to
us that the recent string of "disaster movies" should be understood as
having their origins in naturalism. But though contemporary melodrama
may have its artistic origins in naturalism, it has gone considerably
beyond naturalism in its contortion of the artistic process. While on
the subject of contemporary media, we should also note that American
"news" reporting could be considered as the journalistic extention of
naturalism. Like naturalism in literature, this naturalism in journal-
ism tends to imitate the scientific method. It concerns itself with a
finical portrayal of facts and details--facts and details that are not
seen as being mediated by personal choice. In the fashion of science,
American journalism attempts to give us "the facts," without alluding to
what it takes to be the moral or religious concepts of opinion. The
facts "speak for themselves" here with an extra measure of authority.
When Walter Cronkite ends his newscast with his famous epigraph "And
that's the way it is . . ." we are left with the impression that every-
thing that has been said is perfectly true, while anything that might
be added would be redundant. And local "Eyewitness News" casts run
these tendencies to even further extremes. Here there is even more

undeserved confidence in the certainty of what is being reported. Yet, when after the poetically and rhetorically sensitive viewer has been bombarded with facts and data about local fires, automobile crashes etc., he is always left with the feeling that he has not been informed in a civically relevant fashion. Though there is a plethora of information, there is never any more than a paucity of understanding. Naturalism produces a low grade of civically useful information because it does nothing to reveal the social or communicative dynamics that elevate perceptions and opinions to the status of facts.

To the other side of this abstract objectivism of naturalism is the abstract subjectivism of formalism. While naturalism attempts to deny the subjective by creating an abstract objectivism, formalism attempts to deny the concrete through an abstract subjectivism. Formalism attempts to dissolve or transmute the real into subjectivity. Lukacs thinks of formalism as a distinctly upper class form of symbolic activity. While the lower class narcoticizes itself with the melodrama of commercial films and television, formalism tends to be the means by which the upper class toys with its own form of alienation and despair. When we use the term formalism, we are referring generally to abstract art or various other avant-garde movements. Historically, two of the most significant and representative strains of formalism are symbolism and surrealism. Symbolism was a movement begun in France during the later part of the nineteenth century. Very basically, the aim of the symbolists was to express or suggest ideas or emotions by symbols. The symbolists aimed at conveying impressions through suggestion, rather than giving a direct or explicit statement. Like the phenomenologist of language, the symbolist realized that when impressions are given a

verbal expression that is too direct or explicit they will tend to rise
to level of rigid conceptual constructions. And the symbolists wanted to
avoid these distorted simplicities of conceptual thought or what we de-
scribed earler as the _inescapable_ analytic aspects of speech. As we
will see, part of the mistake of the symbolists (and formalists gener-
ally) is to believe that language and communication can be completely
purged of rhetoric and ideology. Generally, symbolism was a revolt a-
gainst the excessive rigidities of naturalism and science. It tended
to see the _imagination_ not just as the most important reality but as
the _only_ reality.[50]

Moving on much the same phenomenological plane was the movement
of surrealism founded by André Breton in the 1920's. Like symbolism,
surrealism found its major source of inspiration in the French writer
Charles Baudelaire (1821-1867). As the first to search for symbolic
correspondences among sensory images, Baudelaire established a theme
that was central to both symbolism and surrealism. But coming thirty
or forty years later, surrealism was able to embellish its theoretical
foundations with the discoveries of Freud. Influenced by the psychoan-
alytic theory of dreams and the unconscious, surrealists attempted to
give a pure expression of the imagination as they saw it arising out of
the irrationality of dreams and the unconscious. Unlike our phenomenol-
ogy of language, surrealism seems to take conscious choice as a function
of _reason_, while it takes dreams and the unconscious to be associated
with the irrational. Recall though that for Nietzsche and us logic it-
self is the product of the Apollinian world of _dreams_. So if an artist-
communicator wanted to present _us_ with the essence of the dreamworld he
should put before us perhaps a tautology or mathematical equation, not

something wildly irrational. In trying to give expression to what it takes to be an _irrational_ unconscious, surrealism puts before its audiences startling and sometimes alarming combinations of incongruent elements as, for example, in the paintings of Salvador Dali.

This heritage of symbolism and surrealism comes to a head in the language theories of theatre artists Antonin Artaud and Peter Brook. Picking up on some of these laudable goals of the symbolists and surrealists, Artaud condemned "the lucidities of speech and its analytics"[51] which obfuscate the poetic process. Echoing complaints of Nietzsche and others, Artaud laments the "excessive logical intellectualism" (p. 50) of Western languages. He repines "the impotences of speech" (p. 95) that has become inflexible through intellectually cramped meanings. He rejects the typically Western and especially positivistic view of language "as a completed stage of thought which is lost at the moment of its own exteriorization" (p. 70). Like our phenomenology of language, Artaud wants to give to words "approximately the importance they have in dreams" (p. 94). To give language this surreal quality, Artaud thinks we have "to get the iron collar off its neck, in short, to return to the etymological origins of speech which, in the midst of abstract concepts, always evoke a concrete element" (p. 101). He says "all words, once spoken, are dead and function only at the moment when they are uttered" (p. 75). Sounding much like our earlir criticism of literal meanings, Artaud claims "the obsession with the defined word which says everything ends up in [a] withering of words" (p. 118) which says nothing. Instead, "let words be heard in their sonority rather than be exclusively taken for what they mean grammatically" (p. 119). This _attempt_ to emphasize _la parole_ over _la langue_ is a theme Artaud shares with our phenomenology

of language and a theme that runs through out his thinking on language. More particularly, for Artaud this emphasizing of la parole over la langue involves an attempt "to break through language in order to touch life" (p. 13). And from this notion arises the essential question of Artaud's art: How can we recover the impulse to life which language has caused us to lose?

Artaud's attempt "to break through language in order to touch life" could be seen as a variation on our earlier definition of poetry as an attempt to use language against itself. But how do we break through language in order to touch life, or how do we use language against itself? At this point there arises an enormous difference between Artaud and our phenomenology of language which we will be taking up in some detail. While the phenomenologist of language thinks this can be done only by working through his own existing language (i.e., by seeing the universal in the particular), Artaud thinks it is necessary for the theatre artist to develop his own language. Artaud's view is that only by developing his own language can he break away from a nefarious intellectual subjugation and attain "a directly communicative language" (p. 107). Also unlike our phenomenology of language, Artaud believes there is more poetic merit (or more poetic potential) in the communication of the body than in the communication of words. Therefore his new theatre language would give an elevated role to mime. He says:

> It is a matter of substituting for the spoken language
> a different language of nature, whose expressive possi-
> bilities will be equal to verbal language, but whose
> source will be tapped at a point still deeper, more re-
> mote from thought.
>   The grammar of this new language is still to be
> found. Gesture is its material and its wits; and, if you
> will, its alpha and omega. It springs from the necessity
> of speech more than from speech already formed. But

> finding an impasse in speech, it returns spontaneously
> to gesture. . . . It retraces poetically the path that
> has culminated in the creation of language (p. 110).

Like our phenomenology of language, Artaud gives primacy to nonverbal

communication over verbal. But he recognizes no ubiquitous rhetorical

component to this communication of gestures. He neglects that his po-

etic path always has a rhetorical lane.

To carry out his poetic project, Artaud thinks the modern poet

requires:

> . . . the visual language of objects, movements, attitudes,
> and gestures, but on condition that their meanings, their
> physiognomies, their combinations be carried out to the point
> of becoming signs, making a kind of alphabet out of these
> signs. Once aware of this language in space, language of
> sounds, cries, lights, onomatopoeia, the theater must organ-
> ize it into veritable hieroglyphs, with the help of charac-
> ters and objects, and make use of their symbolism and inter-
> connections in relation to all organs and on all levels.
> The question, then, for the theater, is to create a
> metaphysics of speech, gesture, and expression, in order to
> rescue it from its servitude to psychology and "human inter-
> est" (p. 90).

Artaud's new "physical language" is to have "natural signs" for its

foundation, rather than words. Unlike the connection between words and

their objects, Artaud thinks the connection between a "natural sign"

and its movement, attitude or gesture is direct or immanent. As Mer-

leau-Ponty says, "The meaning of a gesture . . . is not behind it, it

is intermingled with the structure of the world outlined by the ges-

ture."[52] Gestural expression does not make one _think_ of a certain feel-

ing, it is the feeling itself. Like Artaud, Merleau-Ponty urges that

language and communication "be put back into this current of inter-

course."[53] Artaud understands a "natural sign," then, not just as the

mere intellectual reflex of an experience (as a word is), but as the

experience itself. There is "a secret psychic impulse which is Speech

before words" (p. 60). This "secret psychic impulse" consists of the
"low hum of instinctual matters" (p. 60). Artaud says "these spiritual
signs have a precise meaning which strikes us only intuitively but with
enough violence to make useless any translation into logical discursive
language" (p. 54). Such a language of natural signs (which apparently
are both spiritual and concrete) "can claim the same intellectual ef-
ficacy as the spoken language" (p. 69). Artaud believes all this will
help to make language ultimately more concrete. Some may think that
Artaud is sounding like the Marx of The German Ideology when he calls
for a "spiritual descent" (p. 50) back to the concrete, or like Heideg-
ger when he calls for a "return to the etymological origins of speech"
(p. 101) as a means of attaining the concrete. The question we will have
to answer though is whether Artaud's language formula is indeed a for-
mula for the concrete?

Guided by many of these above speculations of Artaud, Peter
Brook attempted to develop a special language for the theatre. Feeling
the same urgencies as Artaud, Brook observed that writers of today "seem
unable to make ideas and images collide through words with Elizabethan
force."[54] Like Artaud, he wanted to expand the role of nonverbal com-
munication in theatre arts, since "words have either become debased
or actors have become imprisoned by them."[55] He believed that the rem-
edy for this problem is to deny the artistic validity of any of the reg-
ularly spoken languages, and to develop a special aesthetically purified
language that would be better able to capture a sense of the irrational.
Brook claimed that "By using language illogically, by introducing the
ridiculous in speech and the fantastic in behaviour, an author of the
Theatre of the Absurd opens up for himself another vocabulary."[56] A

theatre piece called Orghast was the result of Brook's efforts to work
in an aesthetically purified language. Literary critic Margaret Croy-
den described Brook's Orghast as "an experiment in pure communica-
tion."[57] This new artistic language devised especially for Orghast had
no words from regularly spoken languages, since it was supposed to have
been created soley from the "dream world" of the poet. Intellectual
activity was not supposed to be a precondition for understanding Brook's
ersatz language, since in Orghast the listener was supposed to directly
or acoustically feel the sound and the meaning. In this language, it-
self called "Orghast," sounds were supposed to have an intrinsic mean-
ing revealed to the listener by their "sonic essences."[58] Croyden says
"Brook maintained that the language was created to reach the secret,
hidden emotional life of human consciousness." In his interview with
Croyden, Brook said he was looking for a language "that transcends na-
tionality, and the cultural and social forms that already exist. We
wanted to put on stage language that is identical with the feeling be-
hind the language which, when spoken properly, would evoke the intend-
ed emotional effect. A language that could hit the spectator directly
and emotionally."[59]

As interesting as the idea of Brook's new language itself are
the circumstances under which it was presented. Such matters are of
special concern from the point of view of the rhetorical theorist. The
performance of Orghast took place in a remote section of Iran in the
middle of the night. A deep sense of mystery surrounded the perform-
ance. Taking place outdoors by the light of fires, the actors worked
up on cliffs and down in pits while the audience roved about to follow
the action. Describing her own experience of hearing the language of

Orghast in this spellbinding setting, Croyden says:

> The sound of the language—its rhythms, tone, and texture
> as it reverberates and echoes all over the mountains—is
> virile and austere, yet touched with pity and human suffer-
> ing. The actors, speaking with totally new vocal techniques,
> produce a symphony of sound and word which underscores their
> international composition, and evokes the lost memory of the
> comingling of tongues. Hard "or," "gr," "tr," soft "sh"
> sounds, and the five vowels, sliding from one to the other
> to blend into one word, transport the listener to Oriental-
> African-Semitic-Greek-Persian worlds, or perhaps to a time
> when language was magic and primordial. Actors speak in un-
> predictable inflections; they also chant, incant, wail, cry,
> and moan; they make the most extraordinary sounds, but always
> in combination with Orghast words.[60]

But in spite of this initial excitement over the language of Orghast

and its ability to recapture what she took to be a certain poetic magic,

Croyden admits to the language's becoming blasé once the listener be-

comes accustomed to it. She says though Orghast was "at first startling

and moving, [it] grew familiar and even ordinary."[61] It would seem to

us that Croyden's experience of listening to Orghast may not be that

unlike the experience of any perceptive person listening to perhaps any

unfamiliar language. For instance, what linguistically curious speaker

of English would not be struck by the rigorous pronunciation of German

or the euphony of French upon hearing them for the first time? And up-

on subsequent exposure, wouldn't these languages also lose some of their

startling incipient effects?

But there are much more serious problems with the language the-

ories of Brook and Artaud. Though we find the speculations of Brook

and Artaud phenomenologically interesting (perhaps more so than those

of naturalism), we wish to question whether there are any gains to be

made for poetry by following the paths that have just been described.

For both Brook and Artaud, it seems that language is to be explained

primarily as a form of private mystery, rather than as a social phe-

nomenon. Language and communication seem to be presumed as having o-

riginated totally in the pure expression of the individual, rather than

as having·at least in part some roots in communal interaction. The

sense of mystery here extends even to the circumstances surrounding the

production of Orghast·itself. Croyden tells us·that Brook directed his

Orghast "as if it were sacred art," and his retinue of followers "re-

ceived it as if it were an epiphany."[62] ·From the perspective of our

phenomenology of language, there can be discerned a virile rhetorical

character to the presentation of Brook's work that must have overwhelmed

any of its residual poetic merit. ·Wherever there is mystery, Burke

would, of course, tell us to be on the look out for hierarchy. Mystery

can be a part of communication only where people are in some way divided

into superiors and inferiors. Mystery then, in a larger sense, is also

closely associated with class distinctions and their ideology. Obvi-

ously, the Marxist would view with suspicion any speech that has been

so severely uprooted from practice and the material real life process.

Whatever claims the formalist poet may make about descending to the con-

crete, we wish to show how this poet is preeminently a symbol special-

ist.

The intention of the formalist poet also contributes to his dis-

tinction as a rhetorician. Brook talks about his new language evoking

an intended emotional effect. Recalling an earlier injunction made a-

bout the nature of poetry by Mill, it would seem that Brook is more con-

cerned about language that is to be heard rather than overheard. But

even allowing that poetry might be able in some aesthetic validity to

evoke an intended emotional effect, in the case of Brook and Artaud we

must question the nature of this "effect." It would seem to us that

the phenomenological structure of this "effect" is extremely rhetorical
in its nature. Artaud even talks about hypnotizing and inducing a
trance in the spectator. He says "I propose to treat the spectators
like the snakecharmer's subjects" (p. 81). It is difficult to see how
such activity could produce the poetic state in an audience--the goal
Artaud claims for his work. Barbara Paul describes Brook's theatre as
"the kind of pretentious, self flattering theater that is not nearly so
interested in its audience as it claims to be."[63] And though John Heil-
pern in his new book, Conference of the Birds (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Mer-
ril, 1978), has much sympathy with the goals of Brook's troupe, he por-
trays the members as having a largely self-centered nature. Though it
is not our purpose here to offer psychological analysis of individual
persons, let us observe that as a general rule when human beings have
trouble participating in the prevailing symbol system or its form of
intercourse, we should be on watch for personal/social problems--prob-
lems that lead to a withdrawal from the social process and a subsequent
highly idealized form of speech (as in Orghast). The poetic theory of
such artists leads to what Lukacs calls the "characteristically modern-
ist schizophrenia."[64] Such anomalous speech is a personalized expres-
sion of alienation, or more particularly, a means for attempting to deal
with such alienation.

Such poetry can develop only when an elite group has assumed
the proprietorship of the symbolic domain for itself and has separated
itself from the concrete conditions of the real life process. The Marx-
ist would rightly stress how such poetry can develop only when society
has reached a certain level in the division of labor. Tying together
these ideas about vapid artistry and the division of labor, Christopher

Caudwell says:

> The increasing division of labour, which includes also
> its increasing organization, seems to produce a movement
> of poetry away from concrete living, so that art appears
> to be in opposition to work, a creation of leisure. The
> poet is typically now the solitary individual; his expres-
> sion, the lyric. The division of labour has led to a class
> society, in which consciousness has gathered at the pole of
> the ruling class, whose rule eventually produces the condi-
> tions for idleness. Hence art ultimately is separated from
> work, with disastrous results to both, which can only be
> healed by the ending of classes. But meanwhile the move-
> ment has given rise to a rich development of technique.[65]

The development of technique, the poet as solitary individual, and the

effusiveness of lyrical expression, are all salient characteristics of

the work of Brook and Artaud, and formalist literature generally. In

such literature there is frequently intense personal emotion expressed

in a rhapsodic unrestrained manner. Along with this exaggerated expres-

sion of feelings of internal stress, the characters in formalist liter-

ature tend to be solitary and uncommunicative. Formalist literature

does not typically study the social relations of human beings. Artaud

even outrightly rejects "psychology." Under formalism, Lukacs says

"Man . . . is by nature solitary, asocial, unable to enter into relation-

ships with other human beings."[66] Formalist literature is strongly in-

clined toward an exploration of this isolation, much as it seems the

inclination of a child to pick at a sore. But where does this isolation

of the formalist artist come from? Again, alienation seems to be one

of the most important shaping influences for the formalist artist. But

though this symbol specialist of the ruling class suffers from aliena-

tion, it is (as Marx observed earlier) not the kind of alienation expe-

rienced by the working class. In an effort to deal with his own partic-

ular kind of alienation, this symbol specialist exercises a new leger-

demain of symbols (i.e., his poems) which in the end only exacerbates
the original estrangement of his speech from practice. This type of
alienation and its associated symbolism is at the foundation of the
cult language of Brook and the literary products of other formalist
writers. Regarding the cause of his isolation and the focus of formal-
ist literary works upon such social disintegration, Lukacs suggests that
"The individual, retreating into himself in despair at the cruelty of
the age, may experience an intoxicated fascination with his forlorn con-
dition."[67] This fascination with his alienation produces the atomized
or fragmented characters that often make up the subject matter of for-
malist literature. In such literature Lukacs says "Man is reduced to
a sequence of unrelated experiential fragments; he is as inexplicable
to others as to himself."[68] In the classic of the formalist theatre,
Beckett's Waiting for Godot, we see sullen ill-tempered characters
dragged along in a glowering alienation which neither they nor their
typically attending audience can fully comprehend. In Godot, as in the
works of formalist literature generally, plot tends to be disregarded
and sallow characters seem to have no more than a vague and ghostly
presence. Lukacs also observes how in formalism there is "a fascination
with morbid eccentricity. Eccentricity becomes the necessary complement
of the average; and this polarity is held to exhaust human potential-
ity."[69] That is, formalism presumes that only by being "different" or
separated from society can one be an "individual." Lukacs seems to be
referring to the same kind of "individuality" appealed to in the selling
of products that "set one apart from the crowd" etc. According to
Lukacs, this drive toward eccentric individuality in formalist art is
the same animating force behind the asocial "individuality" of capital-

ist society at large. In formalist literature, he says this "fascina-
tion with morbid eccentricity" leads to a "cultivation of the exotic"
and "a glorification of the abnormal."[70] This whole process, which
Lukacs says typifies life under capitalism, culminates in the schizo-
phrenic-like characters that populate formalist literature. It even
seems that achieving some form of psychopathology is the most important
aim or result of the asocial processes of formalist literature.

As we explained in Chapter Five, psychopathology is based upon
a lack or denial of authentic communication. In formalism there is a
disintegration of the personality based upon a disintegration of these
social processes of language. The denial of authentic communication
among the characters in such works leads to a disintegration of language
and the self. On first look, it may seem that this denial or disinte-
gration of the self may be a poetically positive event, since we de-
scribed the self earlier as essentially a rhetorical creation. Also,
it may seem on first look that in destroying language the formalist is
only implementing our poetic formula of using language against itself.
These are tricky charges to assess, especially since, in his own way,
the formalist does try to use language against itself. But we think
we can answer these charges by developing more fully our account of au-
thentic communication begun in Chapter Five. Let us begin to answer
these charges by noting that the formalist (especially with his exper-
imental method) tends to be guided by a scientific-like spirit of dis-
covery (rather than creation). Brook and his actors are likely to talk
about "finding the essential self" or "uncovering the real self," as if
the self existed under language or apart from language. Formalist art-
ists see themselves engaged in a task of "discovering a hidden self,"

as if the self were something other than a linguistic or rhetorical
creation. The net result of this formalist process is a new self even
more definitely and intractably set in language as rhetoric. This for-
malist process then leads ultimately to a rhetorical roboration of the
self and its fictive existence. In their laudable attempts to deny
language as rhetoric, formalist artists fail to realize how they there-
by outrightly _deny_ the self (i.e., the authentic self as fiction) and
do not thereby "uncover a real self." The formalist artist fails to
realize how he exists **only as a fiction** in and through his own speech.
This disintegration of the self (i.e., the authentic self as fiction)
and the social processes of real life speech then further leads to the
disintegration of plot that characterizes formalist literature.

As we can see, there is much of phenomenological significance
in the language theories of Brook and Artaud. But still, we think that
overall there is little to augment the poetic enterprise. Though there
are some new insights here on the relationship of "natural signs" to
the communication process (an improvement over Ockham), this does not
result in an increased merit for their poetic theory. Why? A further
consideration of the phenomenology of authentic communication must lead
us to deny the contention of Brook and Artaud that nonverbal communica-
tion is more authentic or poetically perfect than verbal. When we de-
scend to the "natural signs" of nonverbal communication, we no doubt
do come closer to the etymological origins of speech as Artaud says.
And Artaud's contribution to the phenomenology of language is his per-
ceptive depiction of this descent. But when we descend to the "natural
signs" of nonverbal communication, do we always thereby come closer to
the authenticity of _conscious choice_? This is the question that must

be answered in assessing the aesthetic or poetic merit of the theories of Brook and Artaud. Our answer, of course, is that we <u>do not</u> come closer to the authenticity of conscious choice by fetishizing nonverbal communication. Based upon our discussion of <u>the look</u> and grace or the obscene in Chapter Five, it is clear that nonverbal communication has at least the same potential for rhetoric and hierarchy as verbal language. Indeed, we explained how the rhetoric and hierarchy of verbal language is sprouted from nonverbal communication. Our point is simply this: Everything that is rhetorical or unpoetic in verbal language is present also in nonverbal communication to the same degree of force or "corruption." There is no fresh poetic innocence to be gained by the formalist artist in giving a poetic primacy to nonverbal communication. The poetic act receives no extra measure of amplification by concentrating on the movements of the body. Because gestures (just like speech itself) are the product of intentionality, they too move toward a <u>telos</u> or logic. The analytic aspects of language are always at least <u>latent</u> within the projection of the for-itself through intentionality, whether that project is verbal or nonverbal. Every movement of intentionality culminates in a <u>telos</u> or logic, and the mistake of the formalist artist is to believe that in focusing on nonverbal communication he can <u>prevent</u> intentionality (<u>entelechy</u> for Burke) from unfolding its life impulse toward logic or <u>telos</u>. In his quest for <u>pure</u> poetic expression, the formalist ends up with the deception of denying the <u>inescapable</u> rhetorical dimension of language and communication.

Let us put before the reader a principle that has been lurking in the background through out much of our discussion: <u>Any outright attempt to deny rhetoric will always end up with a deception which para-</u>

doxically involves a rhetoric claiming not to be a rhetoric. Moreover, it would seem that this paradox is the phenomenological axis upon which all rhetoric turns. In his failure to acknowledge rhetoric as an omni-active element in language and communication, the formalist stumbles at the first step toward authenticity, i.e., to acknowledge his inauthenticity. How does this failure come about? In their theories of poetry, neither Brook nor Artaud make any consideration of hierarchy and the unpoetic effects arising therefrom. To use language against itself (or to take its collar off as Artaud says), will always involve an attempt to make us conscious of, or to in some way, transform the entelechial principle of hierarchy. But since Brook and Artaud make no consideration of the social processes of language, they cannot implement this sine qua non of the poetic effort. In the language theories of Brook and Artaud, there is no attempt to consider language as the result or product of people acting together. But as Sartre says, a person living by himself outside the social processes of communication could never have invented language. To participate in any language then is to participate in the hierarchy or social processes of its speaking community. We could not dissolve this hierarchy by discovering a more "real" language (as we could not dissolve the fictive self by discovering a "real" one). On the basis of our phenomenology of language, it would seem that a speaker or poet could only partially relieve hierarchy, and then he could achieve that only by using the language in which the hierarchy was created. A speaker of English who acquires German, for instance, does not uproot the semantic and particularly the axiological foundations upon which his original language is founded. More to the mark, our point is this: A speaker or poet can create authenticity only in the language

in which he risks inauthenticity. And though a speaker may learn any number of new languages, his being or self is in essentially only one language. A person can live in only one language at a time.

Because the potential for hierarchy is as great in nonverbal communication as in verbal, the potential for illusion is also as great. We look upon the method that formalism uses to abandon or overthrow illusion with great suspicion, since it makes no mention of dialogue. The formalist makes no effort to achieve dialogue between his I and a You. In Chapter Five, we explained how dialogue is the chief and evidently sole partial palliative for illusion. Dialogue is the only alternative to the tautological interactions of I-Me and I-You rhetorics. Like the naturalist or scientific theories of language, the experiments in communication conducted by Brook and Artaud aimed at an absolute overthrow of illusion through the discovery of "natural signs." Brook says "What he [Artaud] wanted in his search for holiness was absolute."[71] Artaud thought that once he had organized body language into hieroglyphs he would then have captured the ultimate nature of poetry, in the same way that some scientists feel as though they can capture the ultimate nature of physical processes with literal meanings. The resulting phenomenological effects of Artaud's natural signs and his inferred hieroglyphs are also, in the same way, a presumption of language as an abstract logic and its diminution of the sensorial element of authentic speech. The goal of pure and absolute expression of the formalist leads to an abstract subjectivism in the way that the pure and absolute communication of the scientist leads to an abstract objectivism. Through artificial manipulations of language, each attempts to do away with illusions that are always a part of real life speech. But these tactics of the formal-

ist and naturalist can lead only to an _intensification_ of illusion, never an amelioration.

Especially relevant here is Nietzsche's view that _we don't ever completely do away with illusion_. For wherever there are people interacting there will be illusion. But though the poet cannot completely abandon or overthrow illusion, he can work toward becoming conscious of illusion _as_ illusion. In an exactly parallel way, the poet can use language against itself by becoming conscious of its metaphorical foundation, but he cannot do away with language (or illusion) itself. From the standpoint of making poetic gains in communication, there is no sense to the poet abandoning language in order to abandon illusion. Working from Nietzsche, we think the principle question the poet should ask himself is this: _How can I use my existing language in such a way so as not to hide illusion from conscious recognition?_ The Sartrean version of this question would be how can I use language in such a way so as not to hide _conscious choice_ from myself or the Other? And since rhetoric is the _omniactive_ element of language and communication, this can be no easy task. Because there can be no complete overthrow of illusion (through either language or nonverbal communication), there can be no perfect poetry or "absolute holiness." But poetry can _approach_ perfection as it leaves behind ideology and transforms the socially developed hierarchical psychosis and makes us conscious of illusion as illusion. Here then is the basic challenge of poetry; here is the trick of using language against itself or of taking the collar off language's neck. Since illusion is _always_ based upon the corruptions of social interaction, or more precisely a _lack_ of authentic communication, we can nurture conscious choice or the consciousness of illusion as illu-

sion _only_ through the _dialogue_ of authentic communication. By using

language against itself or by seeing the universal in the particular

(Goethe), the speaker does not destroy language in the way the formalist

does; rather, he _reawakens_ or gives special emphasis to the poetic na-

ture or origins of language. By seeing the universal in the particular

(or by seeing the word in the concrete thing), the speaker doesn't de-

stroy the universal (or word), rather he _opens up_ (Coleridge) or _uncon-
ceals_ (Heidegger) the experience through the word. With this understand-

ing of the "method" of poetry, the challenge of poetic or authentic com-

munication then becomes not to do away with real life speech, but to

make this speech _perform_ in such a way so as to resist having the word

stand in place of the thing, or to resist the coagulation of metaphors

of perception into literal meanings.

Sartre says that language is founded upon choice or freedom.

But this choice or freedom cannot be formalized or have its limits set

in the way naturalists and especially formalists try to do. Only be-

cause formalism has no sense of freedom as conscious choice does it al-

ways rebelliously challenge traditional limits and standards. But as

Nietzsche says in _The Will to Power_: "Convention is a condition of great

art, _not_ an obstacle to it." And in _The Gay Science_:

> [I]t is the weak characters without power over themselves
> that _hate_ the constraint of style. They feel that if this
> bitter and evil constraint were imposed upon them they would
> be demeaned; they become slaves as soon as they serve. Such
> spirits--and they may be of the first rank--are always out
> to shape and interpret their environment as _free_ nature:
> wild, arbitrary, fantastic, disorderly, and surprising.[72]

Sartre also sees a poorly developed sense of freedom in abstract or

formalist literature. He even defines such literature as having

". . . not yet acquired the full view of its essence, when it has merely

set up the principle of its formal autonomy."[73] What is meant here is that formalist literature attempts to set up an abstract or formalized view of freedom (rather than a living freedom as conscious choice) that is supposed to exist _independently_ of the social situation of which, we believe, it is inextricably a part. In this way abstract or formalist art always remains estranged or _alienated_ from the concrete real life process. Sartre says "the literature of a given age is alienated when it has not arrived at the explicit consciousness of its autonomy and when it submits to the temporal powers or to an ideology."[74] In a general way, we could say that formalist freedom is based upon a Freudian, or Marx may say, a capitalist view of autonomy. Like Freud in _Civilization and its Discontents_, the formalist believes that society has everywhere set up obstacles that block his creativity and freedom of personal expression. Confronted with this alienation, the formalist mistakenly feels that he can be free or give expression to himself only by _overcoming_ or setting himself above and apart from a society that is always trying to hold him in check. But in the end, such activity only compounds his alienation. The formalist gives emphasis to what might be called a _freedom from_ rather than a _freedom toward_ or freedom considered as a _social relation._ A Marxist would note that it is a part of the "bourgeois" tradition to seek only a _freedom from._ Moving in the same flow of argument, Sartre observes how the surrealist borrows his methods from the "bourgeois" state of mind. He even goes so far as to suggest that these artists and their esoteric expressions might further be compared to a secret society on the model of the Ku Klux Klan.

In surrealism, and formalist art generally, there is a wide spread tendency to deceive through a fresh show of exertion. Sartre

says "As the surrealist has deprived himself of the means of planning an enterprise, his activity is reduced to impulsions in the immediate."[75] In the work of Brook, this tendency is revealed by his need to have a new word in order to experience a new metaphor of perception. In this way, again, it would seem that for Brook the word is more important than the experience. The formalist values impulse to the exclusion of consistency. And because of his excitement for this groundless novelty of expression, creativity becomes reduced to a revolt against constriction. But it should be clear from our discussion in Chapter Five that novelty of expression is only peripherally related to authentic speech. Theoretically speaking, there is no necessary connection between the conscious chosing of predicates and such neologistic activity. But Brook still thinks that he can destroy the illusion and discover the experience by using a fresh word, rather than becoming conscious of the illusion as illusion. This makes for a general feeling among formalists that only by owning the word can they own the experience. Parenthetically, we should note how this phenomenon of owning the word or the word as a form of private property has much to do with the recent sucess of "Transcendental Meditation" in Western societies. In some ways, the meditator's handling of his mantra is comparable to the formalist's handling of language. The meditator gains his metaphysical relief by first denying the social process of language, and then by placing himself on or in the sonic essence of his mantra. The meditator mistakenly thinks of himself as being in a zone that precedes language. But there is even another kind of deception here. It would seem to us that any word or symbol for which the buyer pays several hundred dollars cannot help but to have a special significance for him (perhaps as it

must have cost the followers of Brook a similar economic outlay to travel to a remote part of Iran just to hear his esoteric language). It is not solely the <u>sonic essence</u> of the <u>mantra</u> that promotes metaphysical relief, then, but also the very idea of having one's own word as a form of <u>private property</u>. We described in Chapter Six how the whole phenomenon of private property is based upon one's desire to enter into a drama with an object as <u>symbol</u>. In the same way, the meditator enters into a drama with his purchased symbol or <u>mantra</u>. And the meditator is reluctant to share his <u>mantra</u> for the same reason that other <u>owners</u> of private property do not wish to share their's, i.e., sharing would diminish the symbol's or <u>mantra's</u> curious power for self induced mystification. Sharing could severely limit the potential for private drama.

The practice of TM has another characteristic in common with both formalism and naturalism, i.e., the denial of the dialogical process of communication. So important is this characteristic that we could even summarize the connection between formalism and naturalism by saying that both deny dialogue. Both deny that speaking is a two-sided act and that as communicators they live within the social body of language. Because it is based upon the <u>pure</u> expression of the I, there is an attempt in formalism to make speech into the <u>monologue of tautology</u>. In naturalism, the <u>monologue of tautology</u> results by denying the I and elevating the Me. (By <u>monologue of tautology</u>, we mean the attempt by speakers to work out the implications of a <u>single</u> idea. In this sense, monologue can make up the conversation of two persons or a whole society.) Since the naturalist sees his Me as primary, he sees little responsibility for making metaphors. Since he is primarily a passive receiver of already (unconsciously) shaped information, metaphors

to him are just feigned products of the imagination. Having the sex-
ual predisposition of the masochist, the naturalist puts his Me up
front as something to be determined. The masochist does not assert
himself in the face of the Other because doing so would destroy the
look of the Other which he wishes to assimilate. In a strategy involv-
ing the same communicative dynamics, the naturalist cannot confront the
absolutism of his facts. Having the sexual predisposition of the sad-
ist, the formalist wants to deny that his I must interact with a Me.
Having to admit that his I interacts with a Me would result in self con-
sciousness and guilt. For the formalist to admit that his I interacts
with a Me would result in a _stain_ on the absolute holiness of his pure
expression. Also like the sadist, the formalist wants to deny a chance
for the Other (as You) to affect him. He then closes himself off to
the input of the Other. In disregarding dialogue between the I and Me
or I and You, the formalist and naturalist deny communication in gener-
al. In denying the dialogue of authentic communication, the naturalist
arrives at the facts that speak for themselves, while the formalist ar-
rives at Artaud's absolute holiness of expression. According to Sartre,
all this is done primarily with a view toward _escaping freedom_. Both
the naturalist and formalist want to be moved in their speech by a
force that they do not recognize as their own, i.e., a force that be-
lies conscious chosing.

Most basically then, formalism and naturalism are two ways of
using language where the communicator attempts to deny the pitch and
yaw of dialogue. With this above understanding of formalism and natu-
ralism as a background, we want to turn now to a literary genre that
not only allows for but is actually based upon the dialogue of authen-

tic communication. As we explained earlier, the most original and per-
ceptive formulation of the relation of literature to social processes
is in the literary theorizing of Friedrich Schiller. Though formalism
and naturalism developed only a little over a century ago, Schiller had
already explained in the eighteenth century the vulnerabilities of the
the artistic process which were to be exploited later by formalism and
naturalism. Having explained these twentieth century artistic modes of
formalism and naturalism and their communicative underpinnings, we will
then pick up again on Schiller's insights of how the language of the
social real life process manifests itself in literature. As we also
explained earlier, for Schiller epic is the highpoint of art and the
form of writing that is most representative of the poetic state of
Gemütsfreiheit. We agree with Schiller on this point, but add that it
is highly questionable as to whether there can be such literature "after
the fall." We will try to disentangle this matter further as we go a-
long. But it should at least be obvious that authentic communication
in an alienated world (i.e., a world "after the fall") must at least
attempt to achieve some dialectic of the abstract and the concrete.
In the phenomenological situation of the modern world, authentic com-
munication cannot be concerned exclusively with pointing or grasping.

Schiller speaks of the aesthetic life of man as containing a
"sensuous drive" and a "formal drive."[76] As explained by Schiller, this
sense drive and form drive seems comparable to the concrete and categor-
ical languages of Merleau-Ponty, or our own division of poetry and rhet-
oric. As language is an "osmosis" of these two functions for us, so
art is the semipermeable membrane of the sense drive and form drive for
Schiller. Describing their interaction, Schiller says these drives in-

voke a "reciprocal action of such a kind that the activity of the one
both gives rise to, and sets limits to, the activity of the other, and
in which each in itself achieves its highest manifestation precisely
by reason of the other being active."[77] Schiller's explanation of aes-
thetic activity is based upon the structures and dynamics in this strug-
gle of faculties and functions. Regarding how these structures and dy-
namicics relate to the study of poetry and rhetoric, Schiller is inter-
ested in how form and content come to establish associations with prose
and verse. For instance, he is puzzled over how a composition written
in prose can be stretched to create a poetic atmosphere. Prose is the
typically employed verbal vehicle for communications usually considered
as utilitarian--communications that involve signifying, demonstrating,
explaining, insulting, begging etc. In considering the relation between
prose and verse, Sartre mistakenly says "there is nothing in common be-
tween these two acts of writing."[78] But since poetry in its own way
can also be used at least to explain and demonstrate, there must be a
point where prose and verse merge. In Goethe's novel Wilhelm Meister,
Schiller observes a specific example of this merging. In the text of
Meister, Schiller sees a composition in prose being stretched to attain
a poetic effect. He says:

> The form of Meister, like the form of the novel in general,
> is simply not poetic; it lies entirely within the sphere
> of the understanding, submits to all its demands and shares
> all its limitations. But because it is a truly poetic
> spirit which made use of this form and expressed its most
> poetic states in this form, the result is a strange oscil-
> lation between a prosaic and poetic atmosphere for which
> I do not know the correct term. I would like to say that
> Meister (i.e., the novel) lacks a certain poetic boldness
> because, as a novel, it seeks always to satisfy the under-
> standing and, again, it lacks a true explicitness (for
> which, however, it arouses to some extent the demand),
> because it is born of a poetic spirit.[79]

In <u>Wilhelm Meister</u> then, composition in prose takes on the quality of verse in terms of effect. Though written in prose, the text of this novel always seems on the threshold of bursting into verse.

And conversely, Schiller is curious as to how metrical composition can be stretched to create a prosaic atmosphere. For instance, he observes how "the platitude never comes to light so much as when it is expressed in verse style."[80] This principle seems evident in the simplistic poeticizing of consumer goods in American advertizements (e.g., "Fill it to the rim, with Brim.") and in some of the exhortations of folk knowledge (e.g., "A stitch in time saves nine," or "Walk a mile in my shoes."). Here poetry has certainly reached its low point. Why? Schiller says "verse absolutely requires relations with the imagination."[81] In regular prosaic composition, this energy of the imagination is typically sapped by the incisiveness of analytic thought. Schiller says "The preponderance of the analytic faculty must . . . of necessity, deprive the imagination of its energy and warmth."[82] The imagination is what gives creative thought its movement--prose being the typical verbal vehicle for slow imaginative movement, verse the typical verbal vehicle for fast imaginative movement. But in spite of its metrical quality, some language just cannot be poetic because of its prosification of the imagination. A poet expressing a platitude in verse comes upon the same effect as the pilot whose airplane is approaching stall speed. Like the pilot in his airplane, the poet has to keep his imagination moving. He must keep going his imagination to sustain the dynamic tension or reciprocal activity of the form drive with the sense drive. When this dynamic tension or interplay fails, the poet-pilot crashes, either through the lethargic stalled imagination

of naturalism, or by veering off in a tailspin to produce the disori-
enting or unintelligible works of formalism.

But what is of present interest to us is how a poet such as
Goethe is able to make the incisiveness of prose rise to the level of
verse (in terms of effect). There is another salient characteristic
of poetry, something else that gives to Meister its infusion of poetic
atmosphere. This other characteristic is Meister's status as an epic.
In rising to the level of epic, Meister becomes infused with the phe-
nomenological structure of poetry. In a letter to Goethe describing
the poetic primacy of epic (even in relation to tragedy), Schiller
says:

> [B]etween poetry as genus and species there arises a
> delightful conflict which is always very ingenious in
> nature as well as in art. The art of poetry as such
> makes everything sensibly present and thus obliges even
> the epic poet to represent events in this way, on con-
> dition only that their past character should not be ef-
> faced. The art of poetry as such gives everything present
> a past character, removes everything proximate (by present-
> ing it on the plane of the ideal), and thus obliges the
> dramatist to hold at a distance from us the individual re-
> ality which breaks in upon us and to provide the spirit
> with a poetic freedom with respect to the material. In
> its highest character then tragedy will always tend to
> rise to the character of epic and will become poetry only
> in this way. In the same way, the epic poem will tend to
> descend to drama and only in this way will it completely
> fulfil the concept of its poetic species. This is just
> what makes both of them poetic works, draws them togeth-
> er. . . . The true task of art is precisely to prevent
> this mutual tending toward each other from degenerating
> into a mixture and confusion of limits. In general, the
> highpoint of art is always to reconcile character and beau-
> ty, purity and plenitude, unity and universality, etc.[83]

In other words, for Schiller the epic offered a mood or state of mind
that was identical with or came closest to Gemütsfreiheit. And tragedy,
along with other forms of poetry, are deserving of the name poetry on-
ly as they rise to this epic status.

In order to explain more clearly the epic's cynosural function
in poetry generally, and why other forms of poetry have trouble rising
to this poetic state, we must turn again to our concept of socio-aes-
thetic climate. When explaining the achievement of Shakespeare earlier,
we introduced Schiller's account of how the evolution of society steered
the aesthetic process away from the concrete particulars of sense expe-
rience. Schiller notes: "In its striving after inalienable possessions
in the realm of ideas, the spirit of speculation could do no other than
become a stranger to the world of sense, and lose sight of matter for
the sake of form."[84] The socio-occupational specializations of modern
society destroyed the concrete real life process and made the epic state
(particularly the form of intercourse presumed by the epic state) unat-
tainable. To again put into focus Schiller's view of the poetically
corruptive influences of modern society, we will refer to the aesthetic
letters. Describing the evolution from the concrete to the abstract,
he says:

> [L]ittle by little the concrete life of the Individual
> is destroyed in order that the abstract idea of the Whole
> may drag out its sorry existence, and the State remains
> for ever a stranger to its citizens since at no point
> does it ever make contact with their feeling. Forced to
> resort to classification [i.e., the categorical language
> of rhetoric] in order to cope with the variety of its
> citizens, and never to get an impression of humanity ex-
> cept through representation at second hand, the governing
> section ends up by losing sight of them altogether, con-
> fusing their concrete reality with a mere construct of
> the intellect. . . . .
> . . . . Everlastingly chained to a single little
> fragment of the Whole, man himself develops into nothing
> but a fragment; everlastingly in his ear the monotonous
> sound of the wheel that he turns, he never develops the
> harmony of his being, and instead of putting the stamp
> of humanity upon his own nature, he becomes nothing more
> than the imprint of his occupation or of his specialized
> knowledge.[85]

If the aesthetic shortcomings of modern art and literature
are ever to be put in their clearest relief, there must be an under-
standing of this above social situation and its characteristic form
of intercourse. For it is these structures upon which formalism and
and naturalism are based. Schiller believes it is the modern socio-
aesthetic climate that causes the general problems surrounding artistic
forms. The modern socio-aesthetic climate is what causes art to vacil-
late between hollow idealistic stylization (or the "rhetorical" extreme
of formalism) and a petty pseudo-realism (or the "prosaic" extreme of
naturalism). Working from these ideas of Schiller (and Marx), Lukacs
argues that the capitalist economic system gives the purest expression
to this fragmentation and division of functions. Through the division
of society into pointers and graspers, formalism and naturalism devel-
oped as the aesthetic extentions of these characteristic ways of sym-
bol handling. Much of contemporary American aesthetic activity tends
to be polarized along this rift. While there is an elite class that
seems to gather around formalist literature and especially painting,
the rest of the population guided by its "plebeian tendencies" (Lukacs)
soothes itself to unconsciousness or unawareness with police yarns,
medical stories and the other melodramatic fare of commercial films
and television. "[T]he surrealists," says Sartre, "have no readers
in the proletariat."[86]

In contrast to formalists and naturalists, writers of epic-
tragedy aim at a social realism. Observing a general principle of
story telling, Lukacs says "Only through deeds do people become inter-
esting to one another. Only through deeds do they become worthy of
poetic portrayal."[87] We need to ask then what distinguishes the deeds

of characters in epic-tragedy from other forms of story telling? To
the extent that a character embodies a social realism, he will <u>not</u> be
of interest because of melodramatic qualities like winning fame, money,
capturing wrong doers etc.; nor will he be of interest because of some
eccentricity or peculiarity of conduct. In epic-tragedy a character
will be of interest because he is <u>both</u> individual and typical, and be-
cause he, thereby, achieves a dialectical unity of the concrete and
abstract. In the sense of our phenomenology of language, such a char-
acter is based upon a unification of poetry and rhetoric within the
wholeness of language. The sense of self of the character in epic-
tragedy then differs from the self in formalist literature (in a way
we will detail shortly). Because he is neither just a pointer nor just
a grasper, he is able to achieve a unity of personal expression with
social communication. In epic-tragedy, the chief character is individ-
ual <u>without</u> being eccentric or asocial. Lukacs says:

> The literature of realism, aiming at a truthful re-
> flection of reality, must demonstrate both the con-
> crete and abstract potentialities of human beings in
> extreme situations. . . . .
> . . . . Here, individuals embodying vio-
> lent and extraordinary passions are still within the
> range of a socially normal typology (Shakespeare, Bal-
> zac, Stendhal). For, in this literature, the average
> man is simply a dimmer reflection of the contradictions
> always existing in man and society; eccentricity is a
> socially conditioned distortion.[88]

While the characters of <u>both</u> melodrama and formalist literature stand
out because of their <u>eccentricity</u>, the character of epic-tragedy
stands out <u>only</u> because he embodies an <u>intensification</u> of the contra-
dictions of the average individual. Because melodrama and formalism
deny the <u>typical</u>, they must have recourse to the abnormal. As melo-
drama then seems to make a fetish out of crime, so formalism with its

psychologically contorted characters fetishizes mental pathology. But Lukacs says "the epic and the tragedy know neither crime nor madness."[89] As an _intensification_ of the contradictions that are always a part of man and his communicative world, the characters of epic-tragedy can be neither sick nor criminal.

But what kind of writers and societies produce this literature of social realism? According to Lukacs, there are three great periods of social realism. They occurred in ancient Greece, during the Renaissance, and during the early nineteenth century. Among the writers he considers as having strong inclinations toward social realism are the Greek tragedians, Shakespeare, Goethe, Balzac and Tolstoy. Individuality and typicality seem to be the binary ingredients often made use of in these writer's character recipes. But because they are writers from different historical periods, which therefore had different dominating ideas held in place by the dominating logic or rhetoric of their time, each had to achieve this social realism in a manner reflective of his time. That is, social realist literature will always be based on achieving a unity of the abstract with the concrete, but the challenge of achieving this unity presents itself in different ways in different historical periods. We described earlier how with the severe abstractive character of modern thinking and speaking (and the language upon which they are based), it would be difficult for a poet even as great as Shakespeare to achieve such a unity. But while to achieve this unity the poet must work with the abstractions or language of his own day, the achievement of such a unity is what allows him at the same time to transcend his historical period. Coleridge suggests that Shakespeare's ability to give this paradoxical prominence to individuality

and typicality or universality is what makes him a timeless poet.

Coleridge says:

> I know no character in his plays, (unless Pistol be an
> exception) which can be called the mere portrait of an
> individual: while the reader feels all the satisfaction
> arising from individuality, yet that very individual is
> a sort of class character, and this circumstance renders
> Shakespeare the poet of all ages.[90]

By giving focus to those aspects of character that do not occupy the

top of any single hierarchy (as we usually see in the eccentric char-

acters in melodrama), Shakespeare's characters transcend the time pe-

riod delineated by their own social hierarchy and achieve a universal-

ity. In this way epic-tragedy leads not exactly to a transcending of

the hierarchical psychosis (for that is not an option available to sym-

bolic creatures), but to a transformation of the hierarchical psychosis

where poetic unconcealment paradoxically neutralizes the deductive co-

ercions of language without destroying the coherence of the world. Or

in the sense of Nietzsche, such poetry leads not to the destruction

of illusion, but to the consciousness of illusion as illusion. Achiev-

ing this universality, as social realism does, is one of the character-

istics that sets off timeless literature from timely. And because for-

malism and naturalism avoid this concrete typicality in favor of ab-

stract particularity, they are not able to convey this timeless trans-

hierarchical quality essential to poetry. Because formalism is based

upon an individuality incited by eccentricity, its characters usually

end up in a pathological isolation. And under naturalism, Lukacs says

"The individual traits of people simply coexist and are described one

after the other instead of being intertwined and thus revealing the

complete living oneness of an individual in his most diverse manifes-

tations."[91] Unlike such writers as Shakespeare, modern writers are

not able to show a poetic connection between the inner lives of typi-
cal individuals and concrete situations. In consequence, Lukacs says
"When the artistic literature of some period cannot show the correla-
tion between the abundant inner life of the typical figures of [the]
period and their actions, the interest of the public turns toward this
abstractly schematic substitute."[92]

In the comparison of epic-tragedy to other literary genres,
what emerges as most significant to our phenomenology of language is
a work's characteristic treatment of hierarchy and heroism. That is,
what kinds of deeds does a work have its characters perform in order
to make them interesting? As a general rule, the kind of hierarchy
and heroism portrayed in literature is typical of the socio-aesthetic
climate in which the literature grew, and it would not be implausible
to think of a society as basically a tragic society (cf., Nietzsche)
or melodramatic society on the basis of an analysis of how such a so-
ciety handles hierarchy and heroism. The most important single factor
that separates the melodrama of modern society from epic-tragedy is
the characteristic way that each of these addresses themselves to her-
oism and the psychosis of hierarchy. In the study of literature, just
like communication in general, our phenomenology of language is acutely
aware of hierarchy and heroism. A literary criticism based upon our
phenomenology of language would concern itself with showing how hier-
archy and heroism emerge on the basis of adjustments (or aberrations)
of the language and perceptual processes depicted through out our
study. The phenomenon of heroism implies or assumes much about both
public forms of communication and intrapersonal communication, and
especially how these two forms of communication relate to each other.

For instance, it is difficult for an individual to have a form of intercourse in his I-Me communication that is radically different from the form of I-You communication that dominates his social world. The lack of _dialogue_ at either of these levels of communication militates against the possibility of dialogue in the other. Because of the shaping influence of I-You communication, individuals are led to accept the prevailing or socially validated form of heroism.

Lukacs observes that the problem of modern melodrama is that it cannot develop a positive and active hero in the way that, for instance, the epics of Homer do.[93] The common motif of melodrama always assumes a character molded in his purpose by a single principle or hierarchy of values. In melodrama, a hero will never attempt to free himself from his social situation, except through asocial or pathological expressions of eccentricity. In such literature, audiences empathetically watch their heroes (who carry the banner of the audience's ideology) devastate their enemies in a triumph of "good" over "evil." They empathetically watch the _climb_ of their heroes out of indigence, nonrecognition, or certain doom, to a state of wealth or power, great visibility and victory. It is this _climb_ that characterizes the hero melodrama and serves as a basis for audience identification. This same mode of appeal is used each week to draw millions to watch football games etc. But always underlying the competition of melodrama is the gruff notion that no one is ever one-up unless someone else is one-down; no one is ever a winner unless someone else is a loser. Typically though, melodrama does not concentrate on the loser (except only insofar as there must be a loser discreetly in the background in order for there to be a winner). Most of the melodrama of commercial films and

television tries to _avoid_ the loser. It seems only a critic like Thorstein Veblen would have the crassitude to observe that the notion of some getting ahead is _always_ based on the notion of others getting behind. By far the most important difference between malodrama and epic-tragedy is that while the former will not only always include but have its plot energized by this _hierarchical psychosis_, epic-tragedy will try to overcome the social hiatus between winning and losing. In the sense of our phenomenology of language, this means that epic-tragedy _tries to achieve communication_ while melodrama _denies communication_. From our perspective the most perfect summarization of the differences between melodrama and tragedy is in this incisive statement by Robert Heilman:

> In melodrama, man is seen in his strength or in his weakness; in tragedy, in both his strength and his weakness at once. In melodrama, he is victorious or he is defeated; in tragedy, he experiences defeat in victory, or victory in defeat. In melodrama, man is simply guilty or simply innocent; in tragedy, his guilt and his innocence coexist. In melodrama, man's will is broken, or it conquers; in tragedy, it is tempered in the suffering that comes with, or brings about, new knowledge.[94]

Epic-tragedy then does not produce the absolute (i.e., abstract) winners or losers of the sort that characterize melodrama. By absolute or abstract characters, we mean winners or losers who are so trenchantly separated from concrete experience or so thoroughly swept up in the self deludedness and totality of logic that they (and the audiences with whom they identify) can see themselves as _only_ winners or _only_ losers. In essence, this is the literature of bad faith.

Melodrama is able to achieve this absoluteness or abstraction only because of changes in the structure of heroism made possible in turn by the development of the hierarchical psychosis. And the evo-

lution of literary forms from the epic-tragic to the melodramatic is
further based upon changes in the forms of intercourse that make up
the socio-aesthetic climate. Following through on a notion of Heideg-
ger, it could be said that melodrama is the form of story telling based
on the interpretation of being as idea. While the animating force of
discourse in melodrama is rhetorical, in epic-tragedy this force is
largely poetic. In tragedy, language is used against itself, while in
melodrama language is used only to presume a reality that exists ab-
stractly apart from the winners and losers who are subject to it. In
terms of some of our earlier chapters, this is only to say that melo-
drama assumes language as literal meanings while tragedy does not.
Atillio Favorini says "Tragedy is the structure of destruction."[95]
What is painfully destroyed in tragedy is the self of the hero. To
understand the phenomenological dynamics of this destruction, we should
again recall our discussion in Chapter Five where we described the self
as a linguistically created and sustained entity. Only through language
as rhetoric or literal meanings is the self able to have "a fiction of
continued existence" (Hume). Since for us the self is a rhetorically
created and sustained entity, a destruction of the self would involve
a destruction of language as rhetoric. And herein lies the principle
poetic merit of the tragic play as it uses language against itself.
Avoiding the epistemological and ontological onus usually assumed by
the formalist, the tragic hero does not "discover a true self" or "un-
cover a real self" etc.; rather, he is enjoined by the social process of
destroying his existing self with the tacit hope of creating a new one.

In discussing the theory of tragedy, traditional literary crit-
icism going back to Aristotle has made frequent references to hamartia

or the tragic flaw. This flaw is usually considered as a defect in the character or self of the hero. When considered in the context of our phenomenology of language, we wish to stress that this defect is not to be seen as a unique or idiosyncratic characteristic of the tragic hero. Hamartia, or the tragic flaw, is only a consequent of one's being a social or symbolic creature in a world characterized by bad faith. This defect, then, is inherent in the tragic hero by virtue of his being a user of language and of having a self constructed out of such language. Of course, this is not to say that the tragic hero is free from responsibility in his demise. Because of his hubris, the tragic hero has come to disregard (Husserl) or forget (Nietzsche) the poetic limits of his language or life situation. Here, hubris and hamartia are two sides of the same human reality as are freedom and determinism. Through the unfolding of a certain series of events (involving both hubris and hamartia), the tragic hero experiences the painful destruction of the language as literal meanings that had constituted his old self. The pain of the destruction of this old self is based upon the alienation experienced in the rejection of the prevailing linguistic or social status quo and the anguish involved in the experience of conscious choice as the tragic hero is forced to give birth to new metaphors of perception. The anguish the tragic hero experiences then is the anguish of freedom. Through a recognition (anagnorisis) or penetration of his illusion, the tragic hero discovers conscious choice or becomes conscious of his illusion as illusion. The literal meanings or the things he had been taking for granted through out the story must now be let go. The poetic vision of his fictive real life situation which had been obfuscated by the blindness of lit-

eral meanings has now been realized. Through his pain, the tragic hero has paid the price of the self deception (hubris) involved in having not faced his freedom earlier. The eruption of this self deception had formed the foundation for his tragic situation.

We should note also that since tragedy focuses our attention primarily on this destruction of the self, moral evaluations will tend to be outside its scope. To comprehend (i.e., accept) any particular moral evaluations, a user of language must be intellectually and emotionally assimilated in the particular ideology or hierarchy that structures the language. It is exactly this assimilation that tragedy works against. Because melodrama supposes an audience that is already situated in its language in just this way, it tends to focus on the guilt and innocence or rightness and wrongness of its character's activities (a guilt and innocence or rightness and wrongness that is determined simply by measuring a character's action against the speaking community's moral system). In contrast, tragedy focuses attention on the disintegration of an individual or his moral-semantic system. And such a disintegration contributes to the audience's being purified of ideology to the extent that they are able to empathetically project themselves into the character and his situation. This purification of ideology is the phenomenological equivalent of the Aristotelian cathar-sis. And herein lies the poetic superiority of tragedy over melodrama.

From the perspective of our phenomenology of language, we would point to irony as the function that allows the tragic hero to move toward this trans-moral or trans-rhetorical level. With the evolution of his story, the tragic character becomes a divided character. Tragic irony is able to come about because divided or discrepant meanings

(as the hero perceives his old circumstances in comparison to his new) have been attached to significant events by the hero. Through a sudden or unexpected reversal of his circumstances (peripeteia), or more exactly, a sudden or unexpected redefinition of his circumstances, the hero must face the distinctly poetic challenge of bridging the gap between discrepant meanings. But though the tragic hero is a divided character (divided by a semantic schism), he is also a character with a strong insistence for wholeness. Indeed, it is this insistence for wholeness that makes him a tragic hero. Irony then becomes the metaphysical adhesive that holds together these discrepant meanings. A sense of irony gives a continuity to the character as he raises his consciousness of illusion and moves from the meaning and identity of one life world to the meaning and identity of another. Though this expression of irony is usually tacit, it doesn't need to be. But the more explicit this expression of irony, the closer tragedy moves toward comedy. But because of this irony (whether explicit or implicit), tragedy involves both personal growth and destruction. In this way, tragedy is to be seen as an intensification of the language or life process itself. But the further growth of the tragic hero cannot be any more than discreetly suggested in the story. (And hence, tragic heroes usually die.) For the restoration of form and order is more characteristic of melodrama than of tragedy (since the restoration of form and order is more characteristic of rhetoric than of poetry).

Based upon this above analysis, it is fair to say that the tragic hero experiences both the conscious choice of Sartre and the consciousness of illusion as illusion of Nietzsche. Also, it is fair to say that this phenomenological movement or development of the tragic

hero gets its poetic propulsion from irony. Through the development
of irony, the tragic hero is able to acquire a habitually temperate
attitude toward freedom. His illusions, or rather the rhetorical ef-
fects of his illusions, have been disarmed by the fact that they are
now consciously recognized as illusions. This new phenomenological
posture of illusion (brought on by irony) gives to the hero of tragedy
a different flavor or fettle from the hero of melodrama. To the lethar-
gic viewer who may come to a tragic play equipped with no more than mel-
odramatic sensibilities, the tragic hero may even seem as an antihero.
The tragic hero has broken away (or perhaps been ejected) from the pre-
vailing social order and its commonly held meanings. This separation
or estrangement serves both as an impetus toward his pain and his dis-
covery of conscious choice. The connection between pain and creation
(or conscious choice) seems to have always had a special significance
for existentialists. Nietzsche even goes to the extreme of saying that
life itself is good (i.e., poetic) only because it is painful. But
perhaps the most lucid connection of pain, conscious choice and hero-
ism is made by Ernest Becker when he summarily says:

> Everything painful and sobering in what psychoanalytic
> genius and religious genius have discovered about man
> revolves around the terror of admitting what one is do-
> ing to earn his self-esteem. This is why human heroics
> is a blind drivenness that burns people up; in passionate
> people, a screaming for glory as uncritical and reflexive
> as the howling of a dog. . . . .
> . . . . The question that becomes then
> the most important one that man can put to himself is
> simply this: how conscious is he of what he is doing to
> earn his feeling of heroism?[96]

In melodrama, this "screaming for glory" remains "as uncritical and re-
flexive as the howling of a dog;" in tragedy, it does not. The sober-
ing consciousness of what the tragic character is doing to earn a feel-

ing of heroism bleeds through to him in a perspicuous suffering and distress. It should not be forgotten, though, that only an original attitude of vanity or drive for worldly glory (hubris) could bring on such a crash. The tragic character's demand for meaning and worldly glory brings on his defeat, but because he discovers conscious choice in his defeat, it is, as Heilman aptly says, a defeat in victory or victory in defeat. The hero system of melodrama, along with melodramatic society at large, seem always to urge against this risk and self confrontation that characterize tragedy. To destroy the sharp separation of winners and losers portrayed in the melodrama of sado-masochistic society would be to destroy its language. Moreover, it would be to destroy the society itself.

With this general clarification of how tragic poetry is to be located in our phenomenology of language, let us again turn to the epic to examine its way of portraying heroism. Schiller considers epic as a purer form of poetry than tragedy, and that tragedy becomes poetry only as it rises to epic. If Schiller is right, then according to our own literary theory one should expect a more profound transformation of the hierarchical psychosis under epic than under tragedy. We have explained the tragic hero's sense of pain involved in the disintegration of his self or personal identity. In this sense of his pain and suffering, Lukacs says the tragic hero is to be contrasted with the epic hero, since the latter "does not know the real torment of seeking" or "does not yet know that it can lose itself."[97] In the epics of Homer (and according to Lukacs these are the only true epics), human beings have not yet suffered the alienation that makes possible a tragic or ironic reconciliation to life. In a world where existence has not

yet been severed from essence, there are no discrepant meanings or se-
mantic schisms which can be given an ironic focus. It would seem then
that the epic poet would not be able to use irony as a poetic propel-
lant. In what he takes to be the perfect social existence of epic
man, Lukacs goes so far as to say that the problems of hierarchy do not
even arise.[98] And if we can accept the language theory of Heidegger,
along with the more recent work in this area by Julien Jaynes, it is
obvious that the thinking and speaking of the immediate pre-Socratic
period was much unlike our own (in terms of logic and style of connect-
ing predicates to subjects).

But though the civilization of pre-Socratic Greece was not
racked with the alienation and class consciousness of subsequent in-
dustrial societies, there must have been at least what we called ear-
lier an incipient consciousness, since wherever there is language there
must be some kind of consciousness. Perhaps it was the mitigating cir-
cumstance of not having a rhetoric of consciousness in full bloom that
allowed the early Greeks to produce an epic such as the Iliad, while
other later ages have not. Like Lukacs, others have thought that the
epics of Homer do not contain heroes of the tragic sort described above.
Arthur Schopenhauer says "In the whole of Homer, no really nobleminded
character is presented in my opinion, though there are several who are
good and honest."[99] But simply because there was language during the
immediate pre-Socratic period, there must have been the potential for
alienation and the challenge for poetry to overcome it. A quick look
at some telling events in the Iliad will allow us to see that though
there was no inveterate alienation of Achilles from his community, he
is still not quite the perfectly social man that Lukacs would expect

us to see. It is Achilles desire to become the greatest Trojan war-
rior, and this desire is finally fulfilled when he defeats Hector in
battle. But in a symbolic action that all but negates his victory,
Achilles gives up his prize, the body of Hector. In one of the ear-
lier books of the _Iliad_, we see Achilles estranged from his community
because a prize slave girl had been taken from him by his superiors.
At the end of the _Iliad_ though, we see him give up even his greatest
prize--Hector. By giving into the gods (his fate) and giving up his
pride and reward for victory, Achilles learns compassion and develops
a philosophical humility. He learns, as he tells Priam, "You must en-
dure and not be broken hearted." Achilles also comes to renounce ab-
solutes; he learns that his own importance is not in being called the
greatest Trojan warrior, but in enduring the process of life itself.
It even seems as though he has acquired something of the tragic vision
of life when he says "men are wretched things and the gods . . . have
woven sorrow into the very pattern of our lives." Achilles then be-
comes a hero--even a tragic hero--because he has lived through a se-
ries of events that have involved both personal growth and destruction.
In the events depicted in the _Iliad_, Achilles develops a more edifying
relationship with the community and with himself. Through his person-
al risk, Achilles develops the dialogue of I-Me and I-You communication.
In the sense of Sartre he seems to have rediscovered choice, since at
the end of the _Iliad_ the events of his life are no longer regulated by
a fanatically held honor code. His "screaming for glory" no longer
seems "as uncritical and reflexive as the howling of a dog" (Becker).

There can be no heroism of this sort in a perfect world "before
the fall" or before the rise of a rhetoric of consciousness. Earlier

in this chapter we explained how we might see an added dimension to
the achievement of Shakespeare because of his ability to write such
poetry in a "fallen world," or a world that has made "the death-leap
into bourgeois drama" (Nietzsche). Our point, again: Though epic may
be a purer form of poetry as Schiller and Lukacs suggest, its achieve-
ments may not be as great as tragedy since it did not have to wrestle
with a fully developed rhetoric of consciousness. The incipient rhet-
oric of consciousness in pre-Socratic times was not a rhetoric with a
well developed analytic muscle. This means that even though Achilles
does achieve the personal growth and development we described, he still
is not saddled with the alienation and overwhelming collapse that
threatened later tragic figures, even those in Greek tragedy. Unlike
Lukacs then, we tend to believe that there must have been some "fal-
len-ness" in pre-Socratic times in order for there to be poetry or the
potential for poetry, but that this "fallen-ness" was different from that
which stimulated the achievements of some later tragic poets. In his
analysis of this problem, Lukacs seems to think that the development
of rhetoric (hierarchy, alienation etc.) must always lead to a demise
of poetry. But we need to understand rhetoric not only as a means of
destroying poetry, but as a means of _inciting_ poetic energy. Only be-
cause language is largely rhetorical does it hold the possibility of
a recrudescence of poetic life. With the hyper-development of rhetoric
in modern thinking and speaking, though, Lukacs is right to question
the feasibility of there being such renewed poetic activity. With the
modern socio-aesthetic climate and its presupposed form of intercourse,
Lukacs asks how can there be a refluent rhetoric that flows back into
concrete language so as to instigate poetic achievement?

To demonstrate the difficulty of creating poetry in the modern era, it is instructive to examine in terms of the above ideas the heroes that take shape in the poetic efforts of Goethe. First, Goethe notes (as reported by Lukacs) that moderns are rarely sucessful with the epic, simply because they have no listeners. Because of a full blooming rhetoric of consciousness and its associated forms of communicating, it is difficult for listeners to make the phenomenological adjustments necessary for grasping the epic. Hence, because of the modern socio-aesthetic climate it could be said that the epic is no longer a viable artistic form. Anyone who has read Goethe's novel <u>Wilhelm Meister</u> and applied the considerations of the above theory can understand the un-popularity of the epic form, and the difficulty of achieving sucess with it in the modern socio-aesthetic climate. In spite of what Schiller thinks of as the book's epic dimensions, the book obviously does not capture what for most readers is the snap and excitement of modern life. And of course quick paced story telling is even much more impor-tant in the twentieth century than it was in the eighteenth and nine-teenth. <u>Wilhelm Meister</u> is a set of companion novels involving first the early years of Meister's life (his apprenticeship), then his later years (or journeymanship). Here Goethe describes the maturing of a man in a way much like we think epic-tragedy typically describes the person-al development of its heroes. The first part deals with a young man caught up in the whirlpool of his passions and ineptitudes. Susanne Howe summarizes the action and form of the book in this way:

> The idea that inspired the name and the story of Goethe's
> hero, Wilhelm Meister--the idea that living is an art which
> may be learned and that the young person passes through
> stages of an apprenticeship in learning it, until he be-
> comes a "Master"--is one which has had a long and complex
> history in the novels of two nations, Germany and England.

> They are preeminently the novels of youth. The adolescent
> hero of the typical "apprentice" novel sets out on his way
> through the world, meets with reverses usually due to his
> own temperament, falls in with various guides and counsel-
> lors, makes many false starts in choosing his friends, his
> wife, and his life work, and finally adjusts himself in
> some way to the demands of his time and environment by
> finding a sphere of action in which he may work effective-
> ly. This is the apprenticeship pattern in the barest pos-
> sible outline.[100]

Eventually, Meister does acquire these skills of life. But it is where

he ends up with these that is likely to seem so objectionable (or surely

uninteresting) to the modern reader. Meister becomes resigned to a so-

ber and dutiful existence that is likely to seem more like an _emascula-_

tion to the modern reader than a positive gain. Meister is certainly

no winner in the melodramatic sense. And guided by the polar logic of

his hierarchical and melodramatic sensibilities, it seems the modern

reader can think only of winners who achieve positive and absolute

victories, and losers who succumb to ignominious defeats. Further-

more, it would seem to us that any modern reader who could empathize

or identify with Goethe's hero must feel at least partly out of place

in his own society, along with its ways of communicating.

In Goethe's novel, _Elective Affinities_, the life of the heroine

Ottilie is also characterized by what for the modern reader is no more

than a bland sense of duty. Ottilie seems to think it her primary

task to make herself content in moderate conditions. And even though

she has suffered a series of personal setbacks, Ottilie still consid-

ers it essential that she be turned outward and _communicative_. This

social involvement is untypical of the melodramatic loser who with

his resentment tends to withdraw through an intensified I-Me rhetoric.

Describing the necessity of social activity and its role in her life,

Ottilie says:

> Solitude would not give me the resource for which I
> wish. . . . The one true and valuable resource is to
> be looked for where we can be active and useful; all
> the self-denials and all the penances on earth will
> fail to deliver us from an evil-omened destiny, if
> it be determined to persecute us. Let me sit in idle-
> ness and serve as a spectacle for the world, and it
> will overpower me and crush me. But find me some
> peaceful employment, where I can go steadily and un-
> weariedly on doing my duty, and I shall be able to
> bear the eyes of men, when I need not shrink under
> the eyes of God.[101]

It is difficult to envision any popular contemporary author promulgat-

ing heroes of such bland and banal proportions. Heroes like these of

Goethe's come across as flat and trite because they are not persons of

"action" in the contemporary sense. Since the heroes of epic-tragedy

are not typically involved in crime and vice, pursuit and capture,

shock and thrill, economic rip-off etc., they are implicitly uninter-

esting to modern audiences. And though these themes (crime and vice

etc.) make up the most enduring fundamental structures of literature,

when they are treated melodramatically (as such material seems to be

naturally inclined to be treated), they cannot contain the structure

of _action_ in the sense of our phenomenology of language.

By _action_, our phenomenology means _deeds which are expressive_

of poetic activity. And while we reserve the term _action_ for poetic

activity, we would use the term _mechanical movement_ to describe the

"action" of melodrama. More precisely, by _action_ we mean a particular

way of engaging the metaphors of perception (Nietzsche), a particular

way of choosing (Sartre), or a particular way of "interweaving" per-

ception with the act of speaking (Heidegger). The nearly always mis-

understood Dionysian action and sensualness of Nietzsche refers pri-

marily to _a style of structuring experience_, and not to the content of

mechanical movements structured in an _a priori_ way by language as an abstraction or literal meaning. It is only a heavily logicized and semanticized view of language (and the world view presupposed by it) that allows contemporary audiences to see Buck Rogers, James Bond and Dirty Harry as men of action. In contrast, the untypical poeticized view of action of our phenomenology allows Nietzsche to consider the "slow to act" Hamlet as the ultimate Dionysian man of _action_. From the phenomenological perspective, _action_ refers to the activity of the imagination as it is engaged in the dialogue of authentic communication. In literature, _action_ refers to the growth and destruction of the linguistically created self, as this growth and destruction takes place in the heroes of epic-tragedy. In his rediscovery of conscious choice, the hero of epic-tragedy is a person for whom the metaphors of perception come through in their pristine freshness and sensualness. Such a hero becomes a user of language whose perceptions are "interwoven" with the act of speaking. And though he is incited by hierarchy and the drive for glory, it is not with the blind drivenness of Becker's howling dog. From the phenomenological perspective, the creativity of real life _action_ is to be guaged by the quality of dialogue between an I and a Me or an I and a You. Properly considered then, it seems that epic-tragedy is the _only_ literary form where there can be _action_.

Contemporary story telling sometimes makes an effort to reach for this quality of dialogue and action, though only with very limited sucess. For it seems that the hierarchical psychosis and its unconscious drive for glory must always be injected to sustain the interest of melodramatically oriented audiences. The recent sucessful film _Rocky_ is sometimes described as a "modern epic." _Rocky_ is the story

of a "third rate" boxer who at the end of an unsucessful career is
given one more chance to make a climb to the top. In some ways, Rocky
is a character worthy of the admiration the audience readily gives him.
In early parts of the film, we see him engage in kind acts that show
him to be a "decent guy." We see Rocky show concern for youngsters,
and while working as a strong-arm for a loan-shark we see him refuse
to break the thumb of a man who has been remiss in making his payment.
And as slight as these acts may seem, they are significant indications
of amiabilty given Rocky's social situation. But these kind acts seem
to have no more than a subsidiary role in making Rocky a plausible
hero (to his melodramatically oriented audience) and the film a box
office sucess. What is most responsible for arousing the interest of
the audience is the situation that allows for the possibility of Rocky
rising out of indigence and nonrecognition, and especially the way
this possibility is handled in the story itself. In these ways Rocky
leans strongly toward melodrama. Through a freak set of circumstances,
Rocky is given a chance to fulfill the American dream. In a nearly
random way, he is selected to fight the champion. It is his "good luck"
that gives Rocky this chance to show everyone that he's "not just an-
other bum from the neighborhood." Because of Rocky being given this
big chance, one American film critic observed "Rocky gives us all
hope." Then, during the championship fight, cheers come from the film
audience as Rocky throws each punch. Some in the film audience even
stand up to shout "kill" slogans and shake their fists. Whatever hope
this audience derived from Rocky, it doesn't seem to be a hope based
on an appeal to their better instincts.

We don't mean to condemn what is usually thought of as one of the best films to come out of Hollywood in recent years. Relatively speaking, we think Rocky is one of the better films of the popular commercial type. What we wish to have clearly understood here is how it is the nature of poetry to transform the hierarchical psychosis, and that this most important principle of artistry is seldom clearly perceived by contemporary writers, film makers and the public at large. We admit, and have even argued to show, that there can be no perfect poetry. But poetry approaches perfection when it transforms the hierarchical psychosis. And this transformation occurs when poetry uses language against itself by seeking the universal in the particular. To the extent that a piece of communication achieves this transformation, it sets us free by making us conscious or aware of our situation as human beings.

Although the hierarchical psychosis is the bane of poetry, when it is properly apprehended it is the energizing force of art and life itself. According to Goethe, it is not even possible to write a tragic poem "without a lively pathological interest."[102] Without the challenge of the hierarchical psychosis, literature and life itself would come to an end. In What is Literature? Sartre perceptively summarizes this point. He says:

> In a society without classes, without dictatorship, and without stability, literature would come to an end by becoming conscious of itself; it would understand that form and content, public and subject, are identical, that the formal freedom of saying and the material freedom of doing complete each other, that it best manifests the subjectivity of the person when it translates most deeply collective needs and, reciprocally, that its function is to express the concrete universal to the concrete universal and that its end is to appeal to the freedom of men so that they may realize and maintain the reign of human freedom. To be

> sure, this is utopian. It is possible to conceive this
> society, but we have no practical means at our disposal
> of realizing it. It has allowed us to perceive the con-
> ditions under which literature might manifest itself in
> its fullness and purity.[103]

It probably is not necessary to worry about literature coming to an

end because of it becoming too conscious of itself. If contemporary

poets must worry about something, they need to be concerned with the

subtle ways in which they allow themselves to be overwhelmed by the psy-

chosis of hierarchy. Rhetoric and its hierarchical psychosis cannot

be done away with, even if like some formalist artists we are to do

away with language itself. But it is still the goal of literature to

take on or to let itself be incited in a movement against this psycho-

sis. The excellence of human beings, along with their literature and

societies, is to be measured by the sorts of efforts they mount in try-

ing to transform or become conscious of the hierarchical psychosis.

Because of the ever presence of this psychosis, it is necessary to be

always on the alert to the ways it creates inhumanity in religion, art,

science, economics, sex etc. None of the philosophers we have talked

about have given sufficient explicit consideration to rhetoric, which

provides the very basis for this psychosis and the dimensions of its

continued participation in our thinking and speaking. But by appro-

priating and reorienting some of their ideas, we have tried to offer

some new and better ways for marking out the areas of poetry and rhet-

oric, and especially in defining and showing what to look for in iden-

tifying these two basic elements of language. We hope we have given

some better insight on how a phenomenology of language might help us

at tuning in to that certain pitch of mind most resonant of poetry and

rhetoric that could serve the growth and development of individuals

and their social orders.

We often hear that language is not a viable instrument for human expression (e.g., by some formalists) or communication (e.g., by some analytic philosophers), and in this study we surely have not underplayed the shortcomings of language for performing in these areas. However, it still seems to us that language can function as an adequate vehicle for effective expression and communication. By effective, we mean expression and communication that are not aimed at canceling out or denying each other. While the formalist tends to sacrifice the clarity of communication for the sake of individual expression, the naturalist tends to sacrifice individual expression for the sake of a deceptive clarity. It must be realized, though, that language by its nature cannot exclude either expression or communication. As the product of a socially constructed consciousness, users of language cannot deny its roots in collectivity. And as the product of individual speakers, users of language cannot deny the power of personal expression. If not trying to exclude expression or communication makes language imperfect or difficult to use, it is only because human existence is itself imperfect and difficult. Speaking is a "catch-22" proposition because life itself is such. Only by uniting expression with communication in conscious acts of speaking and listening can effective use be made of language. This fundamental ambivalence of language must be accepted then--not only accepted, but lived with in an attitude of engaging alertness. Only by actively seeking this reconciliation can communicators possibly avoid disrupting the unity of vital speech. The rules of language cannot be absolutely set, either through the intellectual approach of the grammarians and logicians, or through the

idealistic aesthetics of Brook and Artaud. Language is founded upon the act of speaking, which, for better or worse, is also the shaper of its forms. Language and its forms unfold according to the social laws embedded in living speech. Where the poet differs from other communicators is in his realization that he cannot avoid this social growth and development of the language process. He knows he can never get to the point where he can rest on his oars and settle for a literal meaning; he knows he must always keep paddling his way through the metaphors of perception that make up the flow of language or life. The poet also knows that no matter how carefully he weaves the words of his speech, reality in the end will somehow always slip through his net with the culmination of each speech act in the telos of logic or rhetoric. His task then becomes to weave a new net with each act of speaking. Authentic speech involves a total engagement in this crea- tive and destructive process of language or life. Poetry and rhetoric are born in this entanglement of creativity and destruction. As the product of this entanglement, language can serve both as man's great- est strength and his greatest weakness.

PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE FOUR MASTER TROPES

In his New Science Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) plotted out the evolution of language and thought through four master tropes: metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche and irony. He held that all tropes are reducible to these four.[1] Furthermore, he considered these four master tropes as not mere figures of speech, but as four ways of summarizing the way societies conceive of language and life. We are interested in these four master tropes because they seem to be a thumbnail way of covering the full range of the phenomenological experiences of language. Each of these is indicative of a certain form of experience with language. Briefly put, the life process of language begins with the naivete of metaphor, evolves through the alienation of metonymy and synecdoche, and hopefully reaches the maturity of irony. And though Vico described this as the process of language evolution for societies, to us it seems just as applicable to individuals. Taken sequentially, the four master tropes can be roughly equated with the process of the speech act outlined in our study.

Vico's line of language inquiry was not typical of the style of language investigations carried out during the Enlightenment. But his approach does have some strong correspondences with our own phenomenology of language. Vico was one of the few scholars of his day to see a direct connection between the way people communicate and the way they think. Vico also thought it important to realize the connection between literary achievement and the social character of language, though he did not develop this connection as clearly as Schiller. He saw the origins

of language as resting ultimately upon poetry, rather than upon logic or reason. He thought the two common errors of grammarians and other scientists of speech were to think ". . . that prose speech is proper speech and that poetic speech is improper; and that prose speech came first and afterward speech in verse."[2] Holding such unorthodox views as these during the Age of Reason, it is understandable that Vico a-chieved no great recognition. Struever says that the style of language inquiry of the Renaissance was to "culminate in the eccentric philology of Vico's New Science."[3] But being too late for the Renaissance and too early for the Romantics, Vico's ideas on language remained largely unconsidered.

In this brief exposition, we would like to sketch out the rela-tionship of the four master tropes to our phenomenology of language. And though we will not proselytize the detailed views of Vico here, we do wish to recognize his originality in this area. There is much that has been written about these four tropes, especially metaphor and irony. We cannot hope to give full consideration to the latest work of Ricoeur on metaphor or Booth on irony, but what we can hope to do is to show how these tropes are to be placed in our phenomenology of language.

We have had much to say about metaphor through out this study. In order to comprehend what Vico and some others have considered as the metaphorical beginnings of speech, we should refer again to Chapter Two's depiction of some of the historical aspects involved in the evo-lution of the speech process. Working from some ideas of Heidegger, we explained how in pre-Aristotelian times the connection between onoma (noun) and rhēma (verb) was different from that of subsequent times. The chief difference was that in the earlier period rhēma also denoted

the _act of speaking_. Because of an "inner bond" (Heidegger) between

onoma and _rhēma_, earlier speakers were more immersed in experience or

what Nietzsche calls the "metaphors of perception." With the develop-

ment of grammar and logic though, language lost this "interweaving"

(Heidegger) with the act of speaking. Men were no longer able to ex-

perience being, since now being was interpreted as _idea_. Being was

made to exist in an _a priori_ way through the literal meanings of lan-

guage. In this new disregard for the act of speaking, Heidegger says

language became "a visibility of things that are already-there." Very

simply then, we are saying that before the development of literal mean-

ings and the interpretation of being as idea, speech was based upon

metaphor. The new interpretation of being as idea led to the evolution

of language from a metaphorical foundation to one based upon literal

meanings, or what Vico refers to as metonymy and synecdoche.[4]

While in Chapter Two we charted out a **historical** or anthropo-

logical explanation of how speech was originally based upon metaphor

(metaphor in our sense--not Heidegger's), in Chapter Five we explained

how the development of speech in the ontological and phenomenological

life process of each individual is based upon metaphor. As in Chapter

Two where literal meanings were explained as the result of interpreting

being as idea, in Chapter Five literal meanings were explained as the

product of what Sartre calls the "unreflective consciousness" or of

"choosing not to choose." The language of each individual is ultimate-

ly based upon the _free choice_ of metaphor, though this free choice is

usually difficult to realize for the modern speaker caught up in the

labyrinths of analytic thought. In a proposition such as "the sea is

blue," the predicate _blue_ is usually taken as a literal meaning. But

when this proposition is formulated by the child for the first time, the predicate _blue_ is better (or more easily) understood as a metaphor. We suggested that the child struggling to say "the sea is _blue_" could be compared to the mature poet saying "the sea is _life_." Both the child and the poet are struggling to associate predicates that are on the horizon of their fields of meaning. In Chapter Five we explained how metaphorical expression gains or loses its form of predication within the limits of each speaker's own choices.

There is a similarity between the small child and the young society in their practice of speech as metaphor. In this particular practice of speech, young individuals and young societies differ from more developed individuals and societies. Because these latter individuals and societies have well developed edifices of literal or unconscious meanings, metaphor is usually thought of as coming _after_ rather than _before_ the literal meaning. This mistaken transposition of meanings gives rise to the numerous _tension theories_ of metaphor used by nearly every literary theorist. Here, a metaphorical predicate is one _in tension_ with the established literal meaning. Going back to Aristotle, metaphorical speech involved giving a thing a name which _belongs_ to something else. Burke says "Metaphor is a device for seeing something _in terms_ of something else."[5] And though Burke is careful not to say which term is correct or which term _belongs,_ to view something _in terms_ of something else is to put it _in tension_ with this something else. Such tension theories of metaphor became viable and, we can suppose, valid accounts of metaphor, but only _after_ the development of literal meanings. For in young individuals and in the life of early societies there is/was nothing with which the metaphor could be _in_

tension. In the life of the modern individual beyond childhood and in later societies, metaphor becomes considered as a special mode of imaginative speech. And though metaphor had always been an imaginative mode of speech, only in language under the reign of literal meanings (what we will explain as metonymy and synecdoche) does metaphor become a special or anomalous form of expression. Paul Ziff even describes metaphor as a form of "deviant discourse."[6] With the development of literal meanings in the later lives of individuals and societies, metaphor became the language of the poet as a "dreamer" and the language of the rhetorician as a "liar." The poet and the liar are now those speakers who go beyond or deviate from literal meanings. Northrop Frye directs our attention to the Norwegian word digter which is supposed to mean both poet and liar. But Frye's account of why there is this similarity between poet and liar is misdirected. He says: "The apparently unique privilege of ignoring facts has given the poet his traditional reputation as a licensed liar, and explains why so many words denoting literary structure, 'fable,' 'fiction,' 'myth,' and the like, have a secondary sense of untruth."[7] Frye's analysis mistakenly presumes that a language of facts (or literal meanings) precedes the poetic act. But poetry doesn't "ignore" the facts so much as it is just simply the use of language prior to the development of any facts. Guided by analyses like those of Frye, users of metaphor are now thought of as liars, hallucinators etc. In language under the reign of facts and literal meanings, the liar and the hallucinator are speakers who see a wrong relationship between a word and object, rather than (as Merleau-Ponty says) speakers who deny the dialogue of authentic communication.

As we have been presuming up to this point, the notion of speech or language as being based upon literal meanings is phenomeno- logically equatable to the notion of speech or language being based upon metonymy and synecdoche. Metonymy is a figure of speech that in- volves the use of the name of one thing for that of another, e.g., "the pill" for "oral contraceptive." Synecdoche involves using a part to stand for the whole, e.g., the speaker who talks about his "wheels" when speaking of his "car." In the application of these tropes, Burke notes: "For metonymy we could substitute reduction; For synecdoche we could substitute representation."[8] For our purpose, metonymy and syn- ecdoche are to be considered together, since both are uses of language based upon the paradigm of signification or denotation, rather than unconcealment. Burke goes on to explain how language usage in contem- porary science is built upon metonymy and synecdoche.[9] We can consid- er both the language usage of science and ideology as exaggerations of metonymy and synecdoche. Modern semanticism and its theory of language usage also thinks of (or presupposes) language in this way. The seman- ticist S. I. Hayakawa says language is a map of the territory. Here, the word is reduced (metonymy) to a map, and the map represents (syn- ecdoche) the territory. In this way, all substitution theories of lan- guage (i.e., theories that feature signification or denotation) can be considered as being based upon metonymy and synecdoche.

Also of phenomenological significance, we should note that in metonymy and synecdoche the idea will tend to end up standing in for or eclipsing the experience. Borrowing Nietzsche's expression, we can describe metonymy and synecdoche as "the congelation and coagulation of a metaphor [of perception]."[10] Vico says with the development of

metonymy and synecdoche "vast imaginations shrank and the power of ab-
straction grew," and there was "a cloak of learning [drawn] over the
prevailing ignorance."[11] Language based upon metaphor evolved into
language based upon metonymy and synecdoche as Plato and others elevat-
ed "the real" from the particular to the Idea or abstraction. Unlike
metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche then tend not to refer to or point
toward reality, but to a zone beyond. Here, language is no longer a
way of moving toward the world or of transcending itself toward the
things spoken about. The phenomena of reduction and representation
(of having one thing stand for another) leads to having one thing (a
word) stand for many different things by hallucinating a similarity a-
mong such things. (Cf., Nietzsche's example of the leaf, p. 80.) In
this way, metonymy and synecdoche lead to a logic of identity which in
turn is based on a rhetoric of identification. With language under
the control of metonymy and synecdoche, speakers became the instruments
of things that "had to be said" because of the pull of the unconscious
and its logical necessity. In contrast to metaphor (and as we will
see, irony), metonymy and synecdoche provide the basis for language as
ideology and its alienation. Because they tend to close off the possi-
bility of new experiences and unconcealment, metonymy and synecdoche
may be considered as the primary tropes of language as rhetoric (as
metaphor is the primary trope of language as poetry).

Of course, metaphor is still present where language usage is
based upon metonymy and synecdoche. But where the metaphorical predi-
cate is in tension with the established literal meaning, the imagina-
tion can no longer function as the primary agent in linguistic and per-
ceptual activity. With language under the reign of metonymy and syn-

ecdoche, metaphor appears as a rebellious outbreak of fantasy. Where language usage is based upon metonymy and synecdoche, metaphor appears like a shooting star. It briefly lights up the horizon in our field of meaning, but then in the end yields to the darkness of literal meaning. In language usage under the control of metonymy and synecdoche, metaphorical expression is an act of impertinence that _momentarily_ unsettles a settled field of meaning.

Guided and goaded by metonymy and synecdoche, the language usage of modern scientists and artists tends to draw as stark a contrast as possible between literal meaning and metaphor. Following this same bifurcation, ordinary speech, like science, tends to adhere to the line of literal meanings. In both the language of science and ordinary speech, there is a strong tendency to _avoid_ giving the imagination (which produces metaphor) a valid and viable outlet. That is, the imagination is presumed to have no role at all in day-to-day discourse and its information transfer, fact finding etc. This _denial_ of the imagination results in a _repression_ in the sense of Freud. A pervasive problem of contemporary society is how it construes the imagination and its role in our communicative lives. Modern communicators are often charged with a _lack_ of imagination. Based upon our study, it would seem that these communicators may not lack imagination (for we believe the poetry of the imagination always participates in some way in all symbolic constructions), so much as they _think poorly_ about the role of the imagination in day-to-day speech. In their _repression_ of the imagination, they are not able to have any imagination about the imagination. For the modern communicator whose language usage is based upon metonymy and synecdoche, the use of the imagination seems to always involve

departing as far as possible from the prevailing literal meanings of his speaking community. For the modern communicator, to be imagina- tive always means to be different. Under these circumstances, exer- cising the imagination becomes equated with anomalous expression, equat- ed with what Lukacs calls the pathology of eccentric or asocial in- dividuality, and equated with other general acts of semantic insolence. This mistaken attitude about the imagination and its role in communica- tion has led to the genesis of the theatre of the absurd and other for- malist art movements. Moreover, if we were to investigate the matter more closely, we would find that this trenchant separation of the imagi- nation from regular day-to-day communication is at the basis of discus- sions on psychic phenomena, of the occult and its films like The Exor- cist and The Amityville Horror, of "science fiction" and its films like Close Encounters of the Third Kind--all of this because the imagination is forbidden participation or is not given a valid and viable outlet or role in day-to-day communication. As Freud speaks of the sex in- stinct always manifesting itself, we say the same about the imagination always manifesting itself in speech. That is, the imagination will al- ways express itself in the speech of symbolic creatures, but when com- municators try to repress the imagination as in language usage based upon metonymy and synecdoche, the imagination will then appear in mu- tated or sublimated forms like science fiction, the occult, the theatre of the absurd etc. We do not deny then that the work of the formalist artist, the occultist etc. involves some form of expression of the im- agination. Our point is simply that if day-to-day communication was not so firmly planted in metonymy and synecdoche, the imagination would not then be forced to reveal itself in these kinky and anomalous

ways. Through out our study, we have stressed how the poetic exercis-
ing of the imagination involves more a certain style of perception (as
in Heidegger and Nietzsche) or a certain style of choosing (Sartre),
than it involves the prosaic disregarding of the prosaic that we see
in the theatre of the absurd, the occult etc.

But how, we might now ask, can the imagination express itself
in a way that does not involve its trenchant separation from day-to-day
communication? Presupposed in this question are other questions such
as these: What would be the form of language and communication that
both recognized the metaphorical foundations of speech and acknowledged
man's alienated status as expressed in metonymy and synecdoche? And,
what is the form of language and communication that recognizes both
the poetic origins of language along with its rhetorical sophistica-
tions? In trying to briefly answer these questions, our primary aim
is not to be prescriptive; rather, it is to continue our description
of language's phenomenological evolution. Obviously societies and their
languages cannot evolve backwards to their metaphorical foundations any-
more than an adult can again become a child. It seems to us that irony
may be the most plausible way for modern communicators to both recog-
nize the metaphorical origins of language, and to cope with the aliena-
tion of abstract language. Through out most of the history of poetry
and rhetoric, irony was considered as just one among many figures of
speech. But beginning with the Renaissance, and especially, the Roman-
tic period, irony had a widening involvement in literary theory and com-
munication. It was typical of Romantic theorists to consider irony as
not just another figure of speech. Early Romantic theorists like Karl
Solger (1780-1819) and Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829) thought of irony

not just as a way of giving form to literary works, but as the very
ignition spark of creative life. They seem to have sensed that in the
modern rhetorical world irony could give rise to authentic communica-
tion because of the way it combined wit, jest and enthusiasm with po-
etic earnestness.

But among the Romantics the most explicit and forceful state-
ment about the effects of irony on communication was made by Soren Kier-
kegaard in The Concept of Irony.[12] In a carefully detailed study (which
unfortunately is one of his less frequently read books), Kierkegaard
shows irony as a standpoint from which to view social life. He explains
irony as a way of relating oneself to the world and of shaping percep-
tions in communicative encounters. Quoting with approval his nemesis
Hegel, Kierkegaard says "irony is a particular mode of behaviour be-
tween one person and another" (though it is not clear how much irony
Kierkegaard felt in his relationship to Hegel).[13] As a way of shaping
experience and regulating communication, irony is more than a mere fig-
ure of speech. Only when irony is considered as just another idea
(rather than as a means for shaping experiences that are to become
ideas) is it reduced to a figure of speech. More specifically though,
what is it that allows irony to rise to this total perspective on lan-
guage and communication? Burke notes that "For irony we could substi-
tute dialectic."[14] Burke thinks of "ironic ambiguity [as] the dramatic
equivalent of a dialectic movement."[15] Kierkegaard also speaks of "a
dialectic born of irony."[16] And what are the elements of this dialec-
tic? For us this dialectic born of irony is given birth in the ex-
change or cross fertilization of poetry and rhetoric (as poetry and
rhetoric have been explained in our study). Basically, irony is a

means of simultaneously creating phenomenological <u>distance</u> and <u>presence</u>, especially as distance and presence were explained as reduction and Rückfragen in Chapter Four. Because it involves <u>both</u> distance and presence, we suggest that irony is synonymous with the fullest vivacity and dynamics of the speech act. Irony includes both the phenomenological push and pull of the speech process. In this way, irony becomes a means of shifting from the metaphors of poetry to the metonymy and synecdoche of rhetoric (or back), without forgetting or disregarding the metaphor or noema. Only because irony does not hide or forget the original metaphors of perception can a critic like David Kaufer correctly say that irony is a form of "lying that gives itself away."[17] In our sense, this is only to say that irony is rhetoric that can become poetry. Irony is a means, or perhaps a style, of connecting the different metaphors of perception in an ideology that gets dissolved in an ironic <u>shift</u>. The corrosive effects of irony upon ideology are well known. Kierkegaard says irony is employed against a person "suffering from some fixed idea."[18] And regarding the effects of irony on epistemology in general, he says "The first potency of irony lies in formulating a theory of knowledge which annihilates itself."[19]

As metaphor and irony appear in history and in experience, they have a certain congruence. Comparing metaphor and irony, Wayne Booth says "The history of metaphor would in fact make an interesting parallel with that of irony, since metaphor has also ranged from a minute rhetorical device, one among many, to an imperialistic world conqueror."[20] But when we consider the phenomenological structure of the evolution of speech, it seems apparent that metaphor developed <u>before</u> ideology (metonymy and synecdoche) while irony developed only <u>after</u>. As a method

of dissolving or at least corroding ideology, irony presuppose aliena-
tion; metaphor does not. This may be the most important difference
between metaphor and irony. Irony is metaphor that presupposes the
psychological discoloring of alienation. Irony could not have developed
until speakers had accumulated, at least in rudimentary form, the expe-
rience of the three other master tropes. Irony also presupposes a high
degree of self reflection or the dialogue of a well develpoed I and Me.
The metaphorically based speech of pre-metonymy and pre-synecdoche was
not based upon this self reflection. This gave to earlier metaphorical
meanings a stronger figurative translucence. Because Homer's epics
were written before the development of this self reflection, they con-
tain little or no irony. But even modern users of metaphor (i.e., those
rebelling against literal meanings), seem to eschew this self reflection
or dialogue of irony. The modern unironic user of metaphor (e.g., the
modern artist) attempts to recover the poetic image merely by suspend-
ing the literal meaning. In contrast, the ironist recovers the poetic
image by going through the literal meaning. This process of going
through the literal meaning (a meaning which was built in conjunction
with the ironist's I and Me) is what produces the self reflection of
irony. In other words, irony sets into motion again the social proc-
esses that produce meaning. In the process of going through the literal
meaning, irony is able to capture in a newer and higher synthesis the
images that precede literal meaning.

The biologist's concept of atavism seems to be suggestive of some
important observations when studying the etymology of irony in relation
to the other three tropes. As related to irony, atavism involves the
reappearance of characteristics not present in the intervening genera-

tions of metonymy and synecdoche. As we said before, the development
of irony _after_ metonymy and synecdoche makes it a language experience
that presupposes alienation. Irony would be possible as a widespread
communicative attitude only in societies that had well developed edi-
fices of meaning, particularly the logic or ideology involved in sus-
taining such meaning. Only where there is such a logic or ideology can
there be felt the discrepant meanings that are mended or at least nego-
tiated by the ironic process. In going through this logic or ideology,
irony produces a rebirth of metaphor in the conjuration and conjugality
of the imagination with the ideologically and psychologically charged
history of the communicator's experiences. In simpler terms, irony is
born through the love making of poetry with rhetoric. And this is what
we mean when we say that irony is a _dialectic_ born of poetry and rheto-
ric. Vico even seems to see history itself as a dialectic of poetry
with rational thought (what we call rhetoric).

But where irony comes through to us most clearly as a basis for
authentic communication is in its corrosion or dissolution of hierarchy.
We can very generally contrast irony with humor by noting that while
humor augments or solidifies the hierarchical psychosis, irony corrodes
or dissolves it. There can be humor only where there is hierarchy.
The hierarchical psychosis gets its comedic manifestation in humor.
On the last page of _The Concept of Irony_, Kierkegaard distinguishes be-
tween irony and humor by observing that humor is antihumane while irony
is not. Irony is humane because as a total perspective it can rise to
or unconceal hidden levels of consensus. Though with its insinuations
it may seem that irony has a strong tendency to produce _divisions_ among
communicators, in irony this division is ultimately comprehended by a

a higher unification. And while irony tends to both divide and unite (or to divide in order to unite), humor tends only to divide. Why? According to Kiekegaard, humor cuts more deeply into the positive and negative than does irony. By relating this to Burke, we can quickly get a handle on the significance of Kierkegaard's observation. In the Burkean sense, to say that humor works in the service of the positive and negative is to say that it works in the service of hierarchy (as in the sublime and the ridiculous). By giving amplification to the positive and negative, humor gives amplification to rhetoric. In describing how humor brings out the positive and negative, Kierkegaard says:

> Humour contains a much deeper scepticism than irony, for here it is not finitude but sinfulness that everything turns upon. The scepticism of humour relates to the scepticism of irony as ignorance relates to the old thesis: credo quia absurdum [I believe by virtue of the absurd]; but humour also contains a much deeper positivity than irony, for it does not move itself in humanistic determinations but in the anthropic determinations; it does not find repose in making man human, but in making man God-Man.[21]

In humor, communicators allow themselves to become unconsciously ensconced within a single perspective. To the extent that humor allows for alternative perspectives it cannot be funny, or at least then it cannot be humor. To the extent that something is comic and involves a transfer of perspectives, it will be based in irony. Considered phenomenologically, humor will always be based in ideology, while irony always involves an attempt to work around or through ideology. Kierkegaard says "Humour in its conceptual determination is a polemical moment."[22] If we were to look for the sexual or economic analogues to this "polemical moment" of humor, we would look to such social structures as are in sado-masochism, or maybe the Marxist would direct our

attention to capitalism itself. The phenomenological structure of sado-masochism and life under capitalism offer the experiential framework for humor (rather than irony). In the manifestation of humor in sex relations, the sadist taunts the masochist with insulting gibes. In the manifestation of humor in economic relations, the capitalist directs the same derision toward the laborer or consumer. Under capitalism, consumers are often embarrassed into buying things through advertizements that make fun of persons for having old cars and old clothes, or they are abashed for not doing something the "new way" etc. Perhaps this latter form of humor has received its most telling example in the character of "Freddy the Freeloader." In matters of sex, economics and the whole pale of human relations, humor then is a means of developing or accenting the gap between superior and inferior. Some forms of humor (e.g., slapstick with its knockabout methods) even border on violence. Because of its comedic congruence with hierarchy, we would also expect humor to be more typically an element of melodrama than of tragedy.

It is not being suggested here that there is not sometimes a thin line between irony and humor. But this thin line of separation is not in comedic theory, but in comedic practice. Even "Freddy the Freeloader" emanates a certain irony or humanity. Theoretically speaking, though, irony comes closest to humor in sarcasm. But even sarcasm is not based on the smugness of a well cemented hierarchy. The sneering and cutting remarks of sarcasm erase the complacently proper attitude that characterizes strict humor, thereby making both opposing communicators more conscious of their ability to make definitions. In contrast, a situation that contains humor (i.e., has its semantic limits

shaped by humor) is not up for redefinition in the way it is when irony
(or even sarcasm) dominates. While humor then tends to exist among un-
equals, irony tends to exist amomg equals, or to be the very means of
equalizing. In his book Communication and Social Order, Hugh Duncan
has made this point about the social function of irony as clearly as
anyone. Duncan says "Ironical address cannot be made to inferiors or
superiors,"[23] and that when one person addresses another through irony
he is insisting that he be regarded as an equal. Duncan goes on: "The
air of detachment, of playfulness so characteristic of irony disturbs
a superior, for he is not sure if his majesty is believed."[24] And:
"Where there are great gaps between classes or conditions of life, irony
fails," or gives way to humor. "Irony is a kind of complicity among
equals." It involves a tacit partnership between two unlikely allies
as they transcend the prevailing ideology. This is the sense in which
Burke says irony "is based upon a sense of fundamental kinship with the
enemy."[26] Because irony is a total perspective in relating to the Other,
Duncan thinks it "keeps society flexible and open to change." He says
"The only social certainty offered by the ironist is the certainty of
open and free discussion."[27] For these reasons, then, Duncan believes
we should think of irony as a paricular mode of behavior of an individ-
ual toward his community.

Moving from the social (I-You) level of communication to the
intrapersonal (I-Me) level, we think it's also important to note the
corrosive effects of irony upon the self. In our study, we explained
how the self is given "a fiction of continued existence" (Hume) through
language as literal meanings or rhetoric. But when language and commu-
nication are practiced under the sponsorship of metonymy and synecdoche,

this fiction is not recognized as fiction. Irony is needed to reverse this illusory process of metonymy and synecdoche. Irony moves us toward a consciousness of illusion as illusion. In irony, the _self_ as an absolute clearly defined entity is suspended, since in irony there can be no conception of language as an independent ideology of literal meanings. For these reasons the ironist may seem as a person whose direction or purpose is not as clearly defined as the ideologue's. At times the ironist may even seem like a person who has lost his anchor in the world. Kierkegaard says "The ironic personality is . . . merely the outline of a personality." But as Kierkegaard also says: "Still, one cannot blame the ironist because he finds it so difficult to become something, for it is not easy to choose when one has such an enormous range of possibilities."[28] In another important way though, the ironist is similar to other persons. The ironist does _not_ differ from others in the sense of the isolated eccentricity of the formalist artist. Kierkegaard says "the ironist acquires a certain similarity to the thoroughly prosaic person, except that he retains the negative freedom whereby he stands poetically creating above himself."[29] The ultimate poetic consequent of the ironist's inner dialogue, then, results not in _eccentric_ choices but _conscious_ choices.

This dialogue of the ironist's I-Me communication is a reflection of his I-You relations. Among the chief characteristics of ironic communication (both inner and outer) is a deliberate _contingency_. In ironic communication, a proposition will always refuse to stay at the level of tautology or literal meaning. Whatever the analytic pull of logic, in ironic communication a predicate is never attached to its subject except in a tongue in cheek way. This does not mean though

that ironic speech has been completely purged of logic or rhetoric, for if it were so purged we would be left with pure metaphor. Irony does not destroy rhetoric or the idea so much as it shows the dispro-portion (Kierkegaard) between the idea and the experience. By show-ing such a disproportion in his usage of language, the ironist ap-proaches our definition of poetry as the practice of using language against itself. In showing this disproportion, irony leads to change through a modification of ideas. It leads to the recognition of the idea as fiction and to subsequent acknowledgment of alternative meta-phors of perception. For these reasons, a well placed ironic jolt will always leave one with the feeling that the concepts or ideas he is cur-rently using to understand the world are strongly inappropriate. Irony then sets us free by forcing us to choose other metaphors of perception. Kierkegaard says "The ironist raises the individual out of immediate existence, and this is his emancipating function; but thereafter he lets him hover like the coffin of Mohammed, which according to legend, is suspended between two magnets--attraction and repulsion."[30] In this way, irony does not force the listener to accept a certain point of view; rather, irony tends to leave the listener in a limbo where he must make a decision for himself. By showing the disproportion between the idea and the experience (as is done in ironic communication), the imagination of the listener is jounced into shaking off the rhetorical effects of literal meanings. In the sense of Merleau-Ponty, we could say that the listener of an ironic message thereby loses the impression that the Other is "speaking to him through his brain."

As a leadership strategy, this "emancipating function" of irony may be considered by some as less than desirable for effective rule.

Communication based upon irony does not typically result in decisive
or absolute decisions. If irony frequently reels its ambiguous head
during the course of a long dispute, there is often the feeling at the
end that not much of "substance" or "content" has been gained. There
is sometimes a feeling among the disputants that they have been run-
ning their arguments on a treadmill. Exaggerating this effect, Kierke-
gaard says such arguers ". . . stand facing each other like the two
bald men who, after a lengthly quarrel, finally found a comb."[31] Iro-
ny sometimes then produces in communicators a feeling of infinite noth-
ingness. After such communication all that is left of the truth is
its ironic cullings. But if irony doesn't leave us with the truth or
with decisions based upon a biting decisiveness, what positive quality
then does it leave us? In spite of these nihilistic effects, irony
still seems able to produce a deeper alacrity and a generally higher
degree of authentic social confidence, than do the clear cut positive
and negative assertions of any ideology. Because irony gets a firmer
grip on the thread of life, it is able to knit a stronger social fab-
ric by creating an atmosphere of enthusiastic and even cheerful par-
ticipation. Irony also seems to promote that certain attitude of mod-
eration necessary for the democratic state and the maintenance of
healthy interpersonal relations. When shrewedly practiced, irony can
even be an effective tactic for disarming the arguments of extremists.
But even more than exposing the falseness of logic and ideology, irony
leads us to realize the importance of communication itself. Social
existence is an ongoing process that communicators must work at if
they are to prevent it from slipping into an atrophying logic and ide-

ology.   Through the practice of irony, the goal in communicating be-

comes the way and the way becomes the goal.

10/6/79

NOTES

PREFACE

[1]For an overview of Saussure's distinction between la langue and la parole, see Jonathan Culler's Ferdinand de Saussure (New York: Penguin Books, 1977), pp. 22-29.

I. INTRODUCTION

[1]Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 331-332.

[2]Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 82.

[3]Ibid., p. 83.

[4]Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics (New York: Anchor Books, 1961), p. 83.

[5]Among contemporary theorists to stress the fundamentality of poetic and rhetoric are Kenneth Burke, Paul Campbell, and Harold Zyskind. See respectively Language as Symbolic Action (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), "Poetic-Rhetorical, Philosophical and Scientific Discourse" in Philosophy and Rhetoric (Winter 1973), and Zyskind's review of Rhetorical Dimensions in Criticism by Donald C. Bryant in Philosophy and Rhetoric (Fall 1974).

[6]S. I. Hayakawa, Language in Thought and Action (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc. 1964).

[7]See Bertrand Russell's "Introduction" to Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (New York: Humanities Press, 1961). I hope the reader will not be confused by the placing of Bertrand Russell and S. I. Hayakawa in the same slot, so to speak. Though there may be great differences between them in their concern and approach to the matters of language, from the perspective of our phenomenology of language their similarities are much more important than their differences.

[8]Paul Ricoeur, "Husserl and Wittgenstein on Language," Phenomenology and Existentialism (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 217.

[9]See particularly Burke's Language as Symbolic Action.

[10]Hayakawa, p. 30.

[11]Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 52.

[12]Benjamin Lee Whorf, Language, Thought, and Reality (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1956), p. 235.

[13]John B. Carrol, ed., Language, Thought, and Reality.

[14]For the most forceful statement of this protest against the poetic inadequacies of modern language, see Antonin Artaud's The Theater and its Double (New York: Grove Press Inc., 1958).

[15]See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology (New York: International Publishers, 1970), p. 51.

[16]On words as "terministic screens," see Language as Symbolic Action, pp. 44-62.

[17]George H. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934).

[18]Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), p. 145.

[19]Wordsworth quoted by S. T. Coleridge in The Portable Coleridge (New York: Viking Press, 1950), p. 552.

[20]Jordan Scher, "Mind as Participation," Theories of Mind (New York: Free Press, 1962), pp. 354-375.

[21]For a description of Brook's work, see Margaret Croyden's Lunatics, Lovers and Poets (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1974), pp. 229-285.

[22]Rudolf Carnap, Philosophical Foundations of Physics (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1966), pp. 115-121.

[23]J. W. Goethe, Goethe's World View (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1963), p. 183.

[24]Georg Lukacs, "Existentialism or Marxism?," Existentialism Versus Marxism (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1966), pp. 134-153.

(Notes: pp. 20-25)

II. THE RISE OF GRAMMAR
AND DECLINE OF POETIC EXPERIENCE

[1]Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, Speech and Reality (Norwich: Argo Books, 1970), p. 18.

[2]Soren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965), p. 227.

[3]See Giambattista Vico, The New Science of Giambattista Vico (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970).

[4]Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Essay on the Origin of Languages," On the Origin of Language (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1966), p. 68.

[5]Johann Gottfried Herder, "Essay on the Origin of Language," On the Origin of Language (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1966), p. 159.

[6]Ibid., p. 148.

[7]Ibid., pp. 152-153.

[8]Hamann quoted by Henry Hatfield in Goethe: A Critical Introduction (New York: New Direction Books, 1963), p. 23.

[9]Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), p. 74.

[10]Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics (New York: Anchor Books, 1961), p. 22.

[11]Ibid., p. 42.

[12]Ibid., p. 42.

[13]Nietzsche quoted by Heidegger in An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 29.

[14]Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 66.

[15]Ibid., p. 44.

[16]Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 132. Heidegger uses "Being" (capital "B") when he is talking more generally about the Being of being or the objectivity of the object.

[17]Lewis Mumford, The Transformations of Man (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 2.

(Notes: pp. 26-34)

[18]Heidegger, _An Introduction to Metaphysics_, p. 86.

[19]Ibid., pp. 159-161.

[20]Ibid., p. 160.

[21]Martin Heidegger, _On the Way to Language_ (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 115.

[22]Heidegger, _An Introduction to Metaphysics_, pp. 43-44.

[23]Herder, p. 132.

[24]Vico, p. 109.

[25]Heidegger, _An Introduction to Metaphysics_, p. 47.

[26]Ibid., p. 47.

[27]Ibid., p. 47.

[28]Ibid., p. 47.

[29]Ibid., p. 47.

[30]Ibid., p. 48.

[31]Ibid., p. 48.

[32]Ibid., p. 48.

[33]Ibid., p. 55.

[34]Ibid., p. 42.

[35]Ibid., p. 54.

[36]Ibid., p. 56.

[37]Ibid., p. 56.

[38]Ibid., p. 50.

[39]Ibid., p. 57.

[40]Ibid., p. 52.

[41]Ibid., p. 52.

[42]Remy Kwant, _Phenomenology of Expression_ (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), p. 23.

[43]Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 57.

[44]Ibid., p. 47.

[45]Noam Chomsky, Syntactic Structures (The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1957), p. 45.

[46]Noam Chomsky, Language and Mind (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World Inc., 1968), pp. 14-16. Actually Chomsky borrows this distinction between surface structure and deep structure from the theory of grammar developed by the Port Royal philosophers of the seventeenth century.

[47]But while Bloomfield considers language as a form of learned behavior, Chomsky, of course, rejects behaviorism. On what is thought of as structuralism in linguistics (by linguists), see Leonard Bloomfield's Language (New York: H. Holt and Co., 1933).

[48]S. T. Coleridge, The Portable Coleridge (New York: Viking Press, 1950), p. 545.

[49]Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 57.

[50]Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 73.

[51]Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 77.

[52]Anyone supportive of the view stated in Julien Jaynes' recent book, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1976), will find this suggestion unsettling. Jaynes considers consciousness to have developed in the exact period we are suggesting that the unconscious developed. How this matter is to be understood in terms of our phenomenology of language will become clearer as we go along.

[53]Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 48.

[54]Ibid., p. 168.

[55]Since it is typically considered as a cousin of metaphor, we usually think of simile as an imaginative comparison rather than a logical one. But because of simile's association with the "is" as in "is as," or because of its stating of a direct resemance or quasi-identity, simile should be seen as having more in common (phenomenologically) with literal meaning than with metaphor. The "is" as in "is as" presupposes something definite and fixed.

[56]Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 332.

(Notes: pp. 41-49)

[57]George L. Trager and Joshua Whatmough, "Language," _Encyclopaedia Britannica_, 1971.

[58]Erich Fromm, _Beyond the Chains of Illusion_ (New York: Pocket Books Inc., 1962), p. 129.

[59]Ibid., pp. 129-130.

[60]Ibid., p. 130.

[61]Kenneth Burke, _Language as Symbolic Action_ (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), pp. 44-45.

[62]Heidegger, _An Introduction to Metaphysics_, p. 24.

[63]Burke, pp. 54-55.

[64]Heidegger, _Poetry, Language, Thought_, p. 24. Burke is driving toward this same point (p. 368) when he says "instead of treating words (in ontological realism) as the signs of things, we would maintain (in linguistic realism) that 'Things Are the Signs of Words.'"

[65]Heidegger, _An Introduction to Metaphysics_, p. 61.

[66]Ibid., p. 63.

[67]Martin Heidegger, _What is Called Thinking_? (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 10.

[68]Ibid., p. 10.

[69]Heidegger, _An Introduction to Metaphysics_, p. 50.

[70]Ibid., pp. 11-12.

[71]Ibid., p. 13.

[72]Ibid., p. 12.

[73]Ibid., p. 51.

[74]Ibid., p. 160.

[75]Ibid., p. 108.

[76]Ibid., p. 102.

[77]Ibid., p. 155.

[78]Ibid., p. 153.

(Notes: pp. 50-57)

[79]Heidegger, _An Introduction to Metaphysics_, p. 79.

[80]J. W. Goethe, _Goethe's World View_ (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1963), p. 31.

[81]Ibid., p. 69.

[82]Heidegger, _What is Called Thinking?_, p. 113.

[83]Ibid., p. 130.

[84]J. Glenn Gray, trans., _What is Called Thinking?_, p. xii.

[85]Heidegger, _What is Called Thinking?_, p. 135.

[86]Heidegger, _On the Way to Language_, p. 72.

[87]Heidegger, _What is Called Thinking?_, pp. 168, 171, and 178.

[88]Ibid., p. 159.

[89]Ibid., p. 154.

[90]Ibid., p. 155.

[91]Ibid., p. 155.

[92]Ibid., p. 178.

[93]Ibid., p. 203.

[94]Ibid., p. 203.

[95]Ibid., p. 203.

[96]Ibid., p. 203.

[97]Ibid., p. 197.

[98]Ibid., p. 168.

[99]Ibid., p. 211.

[100]Ibid., p. 210.

[101]Ibid., p. 210.

[102]Ibid., p. 242.

[103]Heidegger, _On the Way to Language_, p. 22.

(Notes: pp. 57-65)

104Jean-Paul Sartre, _Being and Nothingness_ (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966), p. 332. Sartre says "Heidegger's being-with is not the clear and distinct position of an individual confronting another individual."

105Georg Lukacs, "The Ideology of Modernism," _Marxism and Human Liberation_ (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1973), p. 281.

106Kenneth Burke, _A Rhetoric of Motives_ (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 88.

107Frye, p. 331.

III. LANGUAGE AS MUSIC AND IDEOLOGY

1Dante quoted by Ernesto Grassi in "Can Rhetoric Provide a New Basis for Philosophizing? The Humanist Tradition," _Philosophy and Rhetoric_ (Winter 1978), p. 10.

2Maurice Merleau-Ponty, _Consciousness and the Acquistion of Language_ (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 77.

3See Friedrich Nietzsche's _The Gay Science_ (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), p. 300, and his _Beyond Good and Evil_ (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1955), p. 22.

4Friedrich Nietzsche, _The Birth of Tragedy_ (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), p. 33.

5Ibid., p. 36.

6Ibid., p. 33.

7On identification, see Kenneth Burke's _A Rhetoric of Motives_ (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 55-59.

8Nietzsche, _The Birth of Tragedy_, pp. 80 and 67.

9Nietzsche's criticism of theatre that has abandoned aesthetic experience for the sake of engaging in rational thought seems to have been widely adopted in the contemporary experimental theatre. However, this does not mean that Nietzsche would have had much sympathy for the contemporary "mimo-manics" of the experimental theatre. Nietzsche says "I am essentially anti-theatrical." In conflict with most contemporary theatre artists, Nietzsche says "_the stage_

should not become the master of the arts." The Philosophy
of Nietzsche (New York: Mentor Books, 1965), p. 279. In
Chapter Seven, we will give more details on the aesthetic
shortcomings of the experimental theatre when it is viewed
in terms of our phenomenology of language.

[10]Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 84.

[11]Ibid., p. 35.

[12]Ibid., p. 60.

[13]Ibid., p. 91.

[14]Ibid., p. 60.

[15]Ibid., p. 106.

[16]Ibid., pp. 72 and 80.

[17]Ibid., p. 90.

[18]Ibid., p. 86.

[19]Ibid., p. 91.

[20]Ibid., pp. 83-84. More than just denying the "beauty"
of logic, in The Will to Power (New York: Russell and Russell
Inc., 1964) Nietzsche takes the view that "Logic provides a
state which is next of kin to ugliness: heaviness, blunt-
ness." He opposes logic with "the godly agility of the danc-
er" (p. 253).

[21]Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 84.

[22]Ibid., p. 77.

[23]See especially the second chapter of Friedrich Solmsen's
Intellectual Experiments of the Greek Enlightenment (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

[24]Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. xii. Nietzsche seems
to consider Christianity as a "K-Mart" version of the Platon-
ic forms. Christianity is based upon the paradigmatic style
of linguistic distortion developed in Platonism, though pack-
aged in a way more suitable to the intellectual limits of the
"herd." For Nietzsche, gods are linguistically created and
sustained entities. And he says "I fear we shall never be
rid of God, so long as we stil believe in grammar." The
Twilight of the Idols (New York: Russell and Russell Inc.,
1964), p. 22.

(Notes: pp. 68-75)

[25]Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 97. Like Heidegger, Nietzsche seems to think that philosophy came to an end with Socrates. He says "The real philosophers of Greece are those before Socrates. . . . I [see] only one original figure in those that came after: a late arrival but necessarily the last--the nihilist Pyrrho." The Will to Power (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 240-241.

[26]Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 135.

[27]Ibid., p. 75.

[28]Richard Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953), p. 58.

[29]Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 88.

[30]Ibid., p. 54.

[31]Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Essay on the Origin of Languages," On the Origin of Language (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1966).

[32]Ibid., p. 69.

[33]Ibid., pp. 68-69.

[34]Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 55.

[35]Ibid., p. 55.

[36]Ibid., p. 100.

[37]Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power (New York: Russell and Russell Inc., 1964), p. 25.

[38]Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 102.

[39]Nietzsche, The Will to Power, p. 254.

[40]Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 53.

[41]Ibid., p. 40.

[42]Ibid., p. 54.

[43]Ibid., pp. 107 and 103.

[44]Ibid., p. 92.

[45]Nietzsche, The Gay Science, p. 139.

(Notes: pp. 75-82)

[46]Friedrich Nietzsche, The Joyful Wisdom (New York: Russell and Russell Inc., 1964), p. 298. This same book is translated by Walter Kaufmann as The Gay Science.

[47]Nietzsche, The Will to Power, p. 8.

[48]Christopher Caudwell; Illusion and Reality (New York: International Publishers, 1973), p. 270.

[49]Ibid., p. 271. More fully, the Marxist Caudwell says "Harmony is the feeling of men, of a man conscious of himself as an individual, living in a world where the interweaving lives of society reflect the orchestral pageant of growing and developing nature." Harmony is the feeling of a communion of individuals; rhythm is the feeling of the isolated individual.

[50]George Kennedy, The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 122.

[51]"Nietzsche and His Doctrine of Conscious Illusion" is a section in Hans Vaihinger's famous work The Philosophy of 'As if' (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd., 1935), pp. 341-362.

[52]Ruediger H. Grimm, Nietzsche's Theory of Knowledge (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1977).

[53]Nietzsche, The Will to Power, p. 38.

[54]Grimm, p. 25.

[55]Nietzsche, The Will to Power, p. 7.

[56]Nietzsche quoted by Hans Vaihinger, p. 358.

[57]Nietzsche, The Will to Power, p. 7.

[58]Nietzsche, The Philosophy of Nietzsche, pp. 507-508.

[59]Nietzsche quoted by Hans Vaihinger, p. 351.

[60]Nietzsche quoted by Hans Vaihinger, p. 342.

[61]Nietzsche, The Joyful Wisdom, p. 299.

[62]Nietzsche, The Will to Power, p. 38. He says that in rational thought we are coerced with "the cold knife-thrust of the syllogism."

[63]Nietzsche, The Philosophy of Nietzsche, p. 512.

(Notes: pp. 82-89)

[64]Grimm, p. 109.

[65]Nietzsche quoted by Hans Vaihinger, pp. 344-345.

[66]Nietzsche quoted by Hans Vaihinger, p. 345.

[67]Nietzsche, The Philosophy of Nietzsche, p. 513.

[68]Ibid., pp. 509-510.

[69]Ibid., p. 507.

[70]Ibid., p. 510.

[71]Ibid., p. 509.

[72]Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics (New York: Anchor Books, 1961), p. 52.

[73]Nietzsche, The Philosophy of Nietzsche, p. 508.

[74]Ibid., p. 511.

[75]Nietzsche's view as explained by Grimm, p. 102.

[76]Nietzsche, The Will to Power, p. 37.

[77]Ibid., p. 28.

[78]Ibid., p. 25.

[79]Nietzsche, The Philosophy of Nietzsche, p. 508.

[80]Nietzsche quoted by Hans Vaihinger, p. 356. For Nietzsche's most extended discussion of logic and its status as a fiction, see The Will to Power, pp. 26-28.

[81]Nietzsche quoted by Hans Vaihinger, p. 348.

[82]Nietzsche, The Philosophy of Nietzsche, pp. 507 and 509.

[83]Nietzsche quoted by Hans Vaihinger, p. 351.

[84]Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Critcism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 123.

[85]Rudolf Carnap, Philosophical Foundations of Physics (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1966), p. 59.

[86]Nietzsche quoted by Hans Vaihinger, p. 349.

[87]Nietzsche quoted by Hans Vaihinger, pp. 349 and 355.

[88]G. K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy (New York: John Lane Co., 1921), p. 32.

[89]Nietzsche quoted by Hans Vaihinger, p. 358.

[90]Nietzsche quoted by Hans Vaihinger, p. 346.

[91]Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 63.

[92]I. A. Richards quoted by Warren Shibles in his Essays on Metaphor (Whitewater, Wisconsin: The Language Press, 1972), p. iv.

[93]Nietzsche, The Philosophy of Nietzsche, p. 514.

[94]Nietzsche quoted by Hans Vaihinger, pp. 352 and 358.

[95]Nietzsche quoted by Hans Vaihinger, p. 344. Nietzsche defends the sophists against Plato's attack by saying they were the "Jews" of ancient Athens.

[96]Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, pp. 12-13.

[97]Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), p. 152.

[98]In Nietzsche's later philosophy, the notion of the "will to power" occupies roughly the position held by the Dionysian urge in the early philosophy.

[99]Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 29.

[100]Nietzsche, The Gay Science, p. 298.

[101]For Nietzsche's fullest description of "bad conscience," see the "Second Essay" in On the Genealogy of Morals.

[102]Nietzsche, The Gay Science, p. 298.

[103]Nietzsche, The Philosophy of Nietzsche, p. 508.

[104]Nietzsche, The Will to Power, p. 38.

[105]Nietzsche, The Gay Science, pp. 298-299.

[106]Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, p. 140.

[107]Nietzsche, The Gay Science, p. 299.

[108]Though our own view of language and consciousness will
become clearer as we move through this study, we would still
like to presently suggest that a large step could be taken
toward understanding the difference between Nietzsche's and
Jaynes' views of consciousness if we were to carefully inte-
grate their theories with Kenneth Burke's view of conscious-
ness and its relation to words as "terministic screens."
(On words as "terministic screens;" see Language as Symbolic
Action [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966],
pp. 44-62.) Burke says there are always two sides to words
as "terministic screens." On one side of the screen is a
selection of reality while on the other side is a deflection
of reality. By setting into focus things we are to see, and
setting out of focus things we are not to see, words function
as selections and deflections of reality. Because of their
shaping of our awarenesses and unawarenesses, words as "ter-
ministic screens" determine the very structure of the con-
scious and the unconscious. And this is so as much for Jaynes'
early "bicameral man" as it is for modern man. The difference
is that in modern times these "terministic screens" of Burke's
are higher or more developed, thereby making the boundary be-
tween the conscious and the unconscious more trenchant. The
development of language made certain things more visible, but
only at the expense of making certain other things less vis-
ible. From the perspective of our phenomenology of language,
these terms (conscious and unconscious) are not used in a
wholly plausible way by Jaynes. The conscious and unconscious
are mental acts that are always relative to each other. Be-
cause of the role played by language as "terministic screens,"
the conscious and unconscious can exist in the mental makeup
of a person only when they are dually present. The important
point then is this: With the development and sophistication
of language there came not only a shift from the unconscious
to the conscious (as in Jaynes), but more significantly there
came a sharper polarity between the conscious and unconscious.
With the rise of clarity and precision in language, there came
both more incisive selections and more incisive deflections of
reality. By considering this equivocal nature of clear and
precise language in its relation to the conscious and uncon-
scious, we can better see how Jaynes could see the develop-
ment of "hypostatic words" (words that give substance) as ev-
idence marking the growth of consciousness, while in Chapter
Two we suggested how the development of infinitives and sub-
stantives (or hypostatic words) brought on the development
of an unconscious. Or putting this same difference another
way, as Jaynes thinks that human beings became more conscious
with the development of rational thought, Nietzsche thinks
they became less conscious. While Jaynes would say that mod-
ern human beings have generally overcome the god voices that
spoke to and controlled the early "bicameral man," Nietzsche
would say that we still have these god voices because we

still have language (and have had these god voices just as
long as we have had language). In modern language usage the
god voice is the voice of the <u>literal meaning</u>. From Nie-
tzsche's point of view and our own, Jaynes doesn't give e-
nough attention to how thinking is controlled or coerced by
the delusive rational thought of language. He doesn't con-
sider how through the development and sophistication of lan-
guage there came not only new possibilities for freedom, but
also, and especially, new possibilities for enslavement (i.e.,
an unconscious or repression in the sense of Freud). What-
ever the merit of Jaynes' overall argument, on the matters of
language and consciousness we find Nietzsche giving a more
complete phenomenological accounting. Nietzsche's descrip-
tion is more adequate because his notion of consciousness
implies an unconsciousness. There are always two sides to
consciousness and language or words as "terministic screens."
Summarizing the <u>experience</u> of consciousness and its two sides,
Nietzsche says "[Consciousness] kisses us as it bites."

[109]Nietzsche, <u>The Birth of Tragedy</u>, p. 54.

[110]Nietzsche, <u>The Will to Power</u>, p. 253.

[111]Ibid., p. 253.

[112]Nietzsche, <u>The Birth of Tragedy</u>, p. 33.

[113]On <u>ressentiment</u>, see <u>On the Genealogy of Morals</u>, espe-
cially pp. 36-39. <u>Ressentiment</u> gives birth to the socially
created values that bind together the leader and follower or
victimizer and victim.

[114]Nietzsche quoted by Walter Kaufmann in "Friedrich Nie-
tzsche," <u>The Encyclopedia of Philosophy</u> (New York: Macmillan
Publishing Co., Inc., 1967).

[115]Nietzsche, <u>The Will to Power</u>, p. 50.

[116]Though this shift from <u>la parole</u> to <u>la langue</u> was marked
out by theoreticians for the first time only during the nine-
teenth century, it should be clear that in actual language
practice or usage this shift took place with the development
of philosophy itself.

IV.   PERCEPTION AND THE ANALYTIC STRUCTURE OF LANGUAGE

[1]Maurice Merleau-Ponty, <u>Signs</u> (Evanston: Northwestern Uni-
versity Press, 1964), p. 69.

[2]Ibid., p. 138.

(Notes: pp. 103-111)

[3]Merleau-Ponty, Signs, p. 84.

[4]Ibid., p. 85.

[5]Edmund Husserl, Ideas (New York: Collier Books, 1962). See particularly pp. 235-259.

[6]Johann Gottfried Herder, "Essay on the Origin of Language," On the Origin of Language (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1966), pp. 115-116.

[7]Husserl, Ideas, p. 238.

[8]Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 721.

[9]Aron Gurwitsch, "Husserl's Theory of the Intentionality of Consciousness in Historical Perspective," Phenomenology and Existentialism (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 45.

[10]Husserl, Ideas, p. 262.

[11]Ibid., p. 273.

[12]Gurwitsch, "Husserl in Perspective," p. 53.

[13]Ibid., p. 53.

[14]Ibid., p. 53.

[15]Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, p. 724.

[16]Richard Schmitt, "Phenomenology," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1967).

[17]Ibid., p. 141.

[18]Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, p. 107.

[19]Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics (New York: Anchor Books, 1961), p. 52.

[20]Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth: The Texas Christian University Press, 1976), p. 59.

[21]Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1957), p. 15.

(Notes: pp. 112-122)

[22]José Ortega y Gasset, The Dehumanization of Art (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 14-19.

[23]Husserl, Ideas, p. 272.

[24]Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 98.

[25]Husserl, Ideas, pp. 277-278.

[26]Ibid., p. 278.

[27]Gurwitsch, "Husserl in Perspective," pp. 36-41.

[28]David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (London: Oxford University Press, 1888), p. 188.

[29]Ibid., p. 211.

[30]Ibid., p. 205.

[31]Ibid., p. 205.

[32]S. T. Coleridge, The Portable Coleridge (New York: Viking Press, 1950), p. 516.

[33]Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, p. 165. Most modern analytic philosophers who believe that all necessity is logical necessity would agree with Hume on this point. At variance with this view, Julien Jaynes mistakenly says "the rules of logic . . . are an external standard of truth, not the way the mind works" (p. 390). In contrast, for Nietzsche the rules of logic are strictly internal. Moreover, Nietzsche might even say that logic is the only way the mind works.

[34]Gurwitsch, "Husserl in Perspective," p. 43.

[35]Ibid., p. 49.

[36]Husserl, Ideas, pp. 266-267.

[37]Ibid., p. 263.

[38]Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), p. 41.

[39]Husserl, Ideas, p. 260.

[40]By traditional notions of consciousness, we mean particularly the Cartesian and most subsequent views which seem to be based upon the one dimensional character of Cartesian con-

sciousness. It is not clear whether Julian Jaynes should be considered traditional in this sense. Though Jaynes doesn't use the term <u>intentionality</u>, he does have a well developed sense of consciousness interacting with the world.

[41]Paul Ricoeur, "Husserl and Wittgenstein on Language," <u>Phe nomenology and Existentialism</u> (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), pp. 207-217.

[42]Ibid., p. 209.

[43]By now it should be obvious to anyone familiar with John L. Austin's <u>How to Do Things with Words</u> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962) and John R. Searle's <u>Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language</u> (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969) that the concept of <u>speech act</u> in our phenomenology of language is not to be directly related to these more academically established accounts. While it might be interesting for us to tangentially explore how the the concepts of the "locutionary act" (putting forth an utterance or structure of words), the "illocutionary act" (e.g., asserting, denying, greeting, warning etc.), and the "perlocutionary act" (producing an effect by uttering words) are involved in speaking, the present account of the speech act is to be understood within the context of our phenomenology of language. Though these above concepts (locutionary act etc.) may denote activity involved in speaking, they do not (as described by their promulgators) relate directly to our phenomenological description of the speech act.

[44]Ricoeur, "Husserl and Wittgenstein on Language," p. 209.

[45]Northrop Frye, <u>Anatomy of Criticism</u> (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 329.

[46]Ricoeur, "Husserl and Wittgenstein on Language," p. 209.

[47]David Pears, <u>Ludwig Wittgenstein</u> (New York: Viking Press, 1970), p. 100.

[48]Ludwig Wittgenstein, <u>Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus</u> (New York: Humanities Press, 1961), 4.462.

[49]Ibid., 6.37.

[50]Ricoeur, "Husserl and Wittgenstein on Language," p. 209.

[51]Wittgenstein, <u>Tractatus</u>, 3.318 and 3.314.

[52]Ibid., 3.25.

[53]Pears, <u>Ludwig Wittgenstein</u>, p. 56.

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[54]Ricoeur, "Husserl and Wittgenstein on Language," p. 212.

[55]Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 157.

[56]Ricoeur, "Husserl and Wittgenstein on Language," p. 212.

[57]Ibid., p. 212.

[58]Ibid., p. 213.

[59]Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, pp. 658 and 656-657.

[60]Ricoeur, "Husserl and Wittgenstein on Language," p. 213.

[61]Ibid., p. 214.

[62]Pears, Ludwig Wittgenstein, pp. 3-4.

[63]Ibid., p. 179.

[64]Ricoeur, "Husserl and Wittgenstein on Language," p. 216.

[65]Georges Gusdorf, Speaking (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965), p. 40.

[66]Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 4.463.

[67]Nietzsche quoted by Hans Vaihinger in The Philosophy of 'As if' (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd., 1935), p. 356.

[68]Richard Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953), p. 212.

[69]Ibid., p. 212.

[70]Kenneth Burke, Language as Symbolic Action (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), p. 55.

V. THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF COMMUNICATION

[1]Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Signs (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 115.

[2]Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), p. 26.

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[3]Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), p. 220.

[4]Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966), p. 29.

[5]Ibid., p. 29.

[6]Ibid., p. 29.

[7]Kenneth Burke, Language as Symbolic Action (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), p. 9.

[8]Kierkegaard quoted by Ernest Becker in The Denial of Death (New York: The Free Press, 1973), p. 92.

[9]Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 596.

[10]Ibid., pp. 527 and 731.

[11]Ibid., p. 804.

[12]Ibid., p. 564.

[13]Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, p. 345.

[14]Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), p. 9.

[15]Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 666.

[16]Ibid., p. 664.

[17]Ibid., p. 61.

[18]See I. A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1936); Richard Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953); Philip Wheelwright, Metaphor and Reality (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962); Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth: The Texas Christian University Press, 1976); Max Black, Models and Metaphors (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962).

[19]Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), p. 74.

[20]Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, p. 75.

[21]Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 664.

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[22]Ibid., p. 657.

[23]Ibid., pp. 663, 661, 664, and 663.

[24]Aristotle, Rhetoric and Poetics (New York: The Modern Library, 1954), p. 255.

[25]Sartre quoted by Herbert Spiegelberg in The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 475.

[26]George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self, and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), pp. 13, 17, and 14.

[27]Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Essay on the Origin of Languages," On the Origin of Language (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1966), p. 6.

[28]Ibid., p. 7.

[29]Ibid., p. 8.

[30]Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, p. 30.

[31]Martin Heidegger, What is Called Thinking? (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 16.

[32]Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, pp. 308 and 340.

[33]Mario Pei, The Story of Language (New York: Mentor Books, 1949), p. 199.

[34]Julian Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1976), p. 173.

[35]Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 543.

[36]Ibid., p. 486.

[37]Ibid., p. 487.

[38]Ibid., p. 384.

[39]Ibid., p. 386.

[40]Ibid., p. 485.

[41]Ibid., p. 352.

[42]Ibid., p. 350.

[43]Ibid., p. 356.

[44]Ibid., p. 356.

[45]Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, p. 161.

[46]See, for example, Language as Symbolic Action, pp. 420 and 453.

[47]Ibid., p. 421.

[48]Ibid., p. 421.

[49]Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 486.

[50]Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, p. 423. The Philosophy of Literary Form, p. 281.

[51]Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, p. 423.

[52]Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 519.

[53]Ibid., p. 521.

[54]John Flügel, Psychology of Clothes (London: Hogarth Press, 1930), p. 27.

[55]Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 520.

[56]Ibid., pp. 520-521.

[57]Ibid., p. 487.

[58]Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), pp. 183, 184, 186, and 197.

[59]Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, p. 426.

[60]Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 527.

[61]Ibid., p. 527. Sartre says there is also a third attitude--hate. But for the purpose of validly simplifying our discussion, we will consider hate as being subsumed by sadism.

[62]Ibid., p. 527.

[63]Becker, The Denial of Death, pp. 247 and 186.

[64]Ibid., p. 244.

(Notes: pp. 178-189)

[65]Sartre, _Being and Nothingness_, p. 322.

[66]G. W. F. Hegel, _The Phenomenology of Mind_ (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1949), pp. 232-233.

[67]Merleau-Ponty, _Signs_, p. 16.

[68]Mead, _Mind, Self, and Society_, p. 74.

[69]Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, _The Social Construction of Reality_ (New York: Anchor Books, 1967), p. 108.

[70]Thomas Szasz, _The Second Sin_ (New York: Anchor Books, 1973), pp. 21-22.

[71]Mead, _Mind, Self, and Society_, p. 283.

[72]Sartre, _Being and Nothingness_, pp. 511-512.

[73]Ibid., p. 384.

[74]David Hume, _A Treatise of Human Nature_ (London: Oxford University Press, 1888), pp. 207 and 252.

[75]Ernest Becker, "The Self as a Locus of Linguistic Causality," _Life as Theater_ (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1974), pp. 59 and 62.

[76]Ibid., p. 58.

[77]Ibid., p. 59.

[78]Sartre, _Being and Nothingness_, p. 156.

[79]Merleau-Ponty, _Phenomenology of Perception_, p. 196. In the second part of this passage Merleau-Ponty is quoting the noted physician and speech pathologist, Kurt Goldstein. The italics are Merleau-Ponty's.

[80]Remy Kwant, _Phenomenology of Expression_ (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), p. 23.

[81]By _consubstantiality_, Burke means the joining together of two substances through the rhetorical process of _identification_. See _A Rhetoric of Motives_ (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 21.

[82]Ibid., p. 38.

[83]Hoyt Hudson, "Rhetoric and Poetry," _The Quarterly Journal of Speech Education_ (April 1924), p. 144.

[84]Merleau-Ponty, _Signs_, p. xv.

[85]Ibid., p. 19.

[86]Ibid., p. 19.

[87]Ibid., p. 19.

[88]Maurice Merleau-Ponty, _Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language_ (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 68.

[89]Jean-Paul Sartre, _Search for a Method_ (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), p. 33.

[90]Sartre, _Being and Nothingness_, p. 484.

[91]Ibid., p. 478.

[92]Ibid., pp. 479-480, and 481.

[93]Friedrich Nietzsche, _The Joyful Wisdom_ (New York: Russell and Russell Inc., 1964), p. 298.

[94]Friedrich Nietzsche, _The Will to Power_ (New York: Russell and Russell Inc., 1964), p. 27.

[95]Sartre, _Being and Nothingness_, pp. 485-486.

[96]J. W. Goethe, _Goethe's World View_ (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1963), p. 145.

[97]Sartre, _Search for a Method_, p. 114.

[98]Ibid., p. 115.

[99]Sartre, _Being and Nothingness_, p. 495.

[100]Ibid., p. 496.

[101]The word "pathologies" may be slightly misleading here, since Becker considers schizophrenia etc. more as forms of stupidity than as diseases. Our discussion will not be inconsistent with Becker's on this point.

[102]Ernest Becker, _The Revolution in Psychiatry_ (New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 102-103.

[103]Ibid., p. 102.

[104]Becker, _The Denial of Death_, p. 78.

[105]S. T. Coleridge, The Portable Coleridge (New York: Viking Press, 1950), p. 448.

[106]Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, p. 139.

[107]See Mind, Self, and Society, p. 200.

[108]Pei, The Story of Language, pp. 248 and 283.

[109]Becker, The Denial of Death, p. 78.

[110]Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 29.

[111]Nietzsche, The Will to Power, p. 11.

[112]Becker, The Denial of Death, p. 78.

[113]Becker, The Revolution in Psychiatry, p. 41.

[114]R. D. Laing, Self and Others (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1971), p. 59.

[115]See Szasz's The Manufacture of Madness (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1970), pp. 180-206.

[116]Though the Bible says nothing about masturbation, it does relate the story of Onan. But as Szasz explains the matter: "Although onanism is a synonym for masturbation, Onan's crime was not masturbation" (Manufacture, p. 181). Onan had been commanded by his father to produce a son with the widow of his brother. But as the Bible says, "knowing that the children should not be his, when he went in to his brother's wife, spilled his seed on the ground." Szasz concludes that "Onan's act was not masturbation but coitus interruptus, withdrawal of the penis from the vagina before ejaculation. His crime was not 'self-abuse' or sexual self-satisfaction" (Manufacture, p. 182), but a refusal to comply with the command of his authorities.

[117]Becker, The Denial of Death, p. 154.

[118]Becker, The Revolution in Psychiatry, p. 195.

[119]Sartre, Being and Nothingness, pp. 474-475.

[120]Sartre, Search for a Method, p. 115.

[121]Schopenhauer quoted by Walter Kaufmann in Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), p. 134.

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[122]Arthur Schopenhauer, <u>Essays of Arthur Schopenhauer</u> (New York: A. L. Burt, 1892), p. 390.

[123]Sartre, <u>Being and Nothingness</u>, p. 531.

[124]Ibid., p. 531.

[125]Ibid., p. 332.

[126]Ibid., p. 741.

[127]Burke, <u>Language as Symbolic Action</u>, p. 12.

[128]Kenneth Burke, <u>A Grammar of Motives</u> (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 514.

[129]Soren Kierkegaard, <u>The Concept of Irony</u> (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965), p. 114.

[130]Sartre, <u>Being and Nothingness</u>, p. 485.

[131]Ibid., p. 728.

[132]Ibid., p. 728.

[133]Ibid., p. 718.

[134]Becker, <u>The Revolution in Psychiatry</u>, pp. 115-116.

[135]Ibid., p. 207.

[136]Sartre, <u>Being and Nothingness</u>, pp. 730, 720, and 721.

[137]Ibid., p. 92.

[138]Ibid., pp. 726-727.

[139]Ibid., p. 732.

[140]Ibid., p. 732.

[141]Jean-Paul Sartre's "Foreword" to R. D. Laing's and D. G. Cooper's <u>Reason and Violence</u> (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), p. 6.

[142]Sartre, <u>Being and Nothingness</u>, p. 734.

[143]Georges Gusdorf, <u>Speaking</u> (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965), pp. 8-9.

[144]Merleau-Ponty, <u>Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language</u>, pp. 66-67.

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[145]Ibid., p. 25.

[146]Ibid., p. 24.

[147]Ibid., p. 69.

[148]Ibid., p. 69.

[149]Nietzsche, The Will to Power, p. 27.

[150]See Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language, pp. 69-70. Merleau-Ponty is not the only phenomenologist to make use of the ideas of Kurt Goldstein. Alfred Schutz's "Language, Language Disturbances, and the Texture of Consciousness" in Social Research (1950) was "inspired" by the work of Goldstein.

[151]Merleau-Ponty, Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language, p. 74.

[152]Ibid., p. 70.

[153]For a well developed description of Brook's theatre piece, Orghast, see Margaret Croyden's Lunatics, Lovers and Poets (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1974), pp. 260-275.

[154]Merleau-Ponty, Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language, pp. 72-73.

[155]Ibid., p. 73.

[156]Ibid., p. 69.

[157]Ibid., p. 68.

[158]Ibid., p. 68.

[159]Ibid., pp. 65-66.

VI. MARXISM AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SOCIAL RELATIONS

[1]Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts," Marx's Concept of Man (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1961), p. 174.

[2]Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Signs (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 270.

[3]S. T. Coleridge, <u>The Portable Coleridge</u> (New York: Viking Press, 1950), p. 389.

[4]Jean-Paul Sartre, <u>Critique of Dialectical Reason</u> (London: Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1976).

[5]See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, <u>Selected Works</u> in three volumes (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969).

[6]Erich Fromm, <u>Marx's Concept of Man</u> (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1961), p. 5. The most telling statement by Marx that suggests him to be a phenomenologist in our sense occurs in the opening lines of <u>The German Ideology</u> where he says: "The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism--that of Feuerbach included--is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the <u>object</u> or of <u>contemplation</u>, but not as <u>human sensuous activity, practice</u>, not subjectively. Hence it happened that the <u>active</u> side, in contradistinction to materialism, was developed by idealism--but only abstractly, since, of course, idealism does not know real, sensuous activity as such" (<u>Selected Works</u>, Vol. I, p. 13). In this passage then, Marx stresses how materialism must be understood <u>subjectively</u>, and that, moreover, the very problem with these other "materialisms" (e.g., positivism) is that they do not incorporate <u>subjective practice</u>, and hence lead to the diminution of sensorial phenomena. These other "materialisms" lead to the "hallucinations" of Merleau-Ponty, the "illusions" of Nietzsche, or to what our phenomenology of language more generically refers to as the idealism of literal meanings. In these other "materialisms," human beings have the impression that they are hearing "the language of thought," or that the Other is speaking to them through their brain (Merleau-Ponty).

[7]See particularly Burke's <u>A Rhetoric of Motives</u> (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 101-110.

[8]Marx and Engels, <u>Selected Works</u>, Vol. I, p. 20.

[9]Ibid., Vol. I, p. 534.

[10]Ibid., Vol. I, p. 69.

[11]Ibid., Vol. I, p. 192.

[12]Ibid., Vol. I, p. 25.

[13]Georg Lukacs, <u>History and Class Consciousness</u> (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971), p. 249.

[14]Peter Berger, <u>Invitation to Sociology</u> (New York: Anchor Books, 1961), p. 98.

[15]Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Vol. I, pp. 24-25.

[16]Ibid., Vol. I, p. 25.

[17]Ibid., Vol. I, p. 32.

[18]Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), p. 298.

[19]In Language as Symbolic Action (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), Burke also notes that "All sociopolitical relationships are expressible in terms of intimate, personal relationships--and these in turn are reducible to analogous sexual relationships. For instance, a general condition of conflict between classes can be stated in terms of private conflicts between individuals. And these in turn might be 'dramatized' by expression in some such sexual terms as seduction, rape, or sadism" (p. 226).

[20]Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966), p. 535.

[21]Ibid., p. 537.

[22]Ibid., p. 537.

[23]Ibid., p. 537.

[24]Ibid., p. 547.

[25]Ibid., pp. 544-545. For Sartre and us (unlike Marx), the oppressing class in a given social order need not be made up exclusively of capitalists or the bourgeois. There will be an oppressing class wherever there is hierarchy, and there will be hierarchy wherever there is language or people acting together.

[26]Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 25.

[27]Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology (New York: International Publishers, 1970), p. 118.

[28]Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, p. 6.

[29]Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 103.

[30]Ibid., Vol. I, p. 522.

[31]Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 129.

[32]Ibid., pp. 282-283.

[33]Ibid., p. 136.

[34]Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, pp. 52, 169, and 133.

[35]Erich Fromm, "The Application of Humanist Psychoanalysis to Marx's Theory," Socialist Humanism: An International Symposium (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1965), p. 218.

[36]Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts," p. 103.

[37]We should note this distinction between alienation and the existentialist's concept of dread or anguish: Existential dread or anguish can be felt prior to communicative encounters; alienation cannot. Anguish is the initial pre-communicative experience of existence. Alienation is the result of chronic failures in the attempt to communicate. This failure to communicate, though, can redound or augment one's feeling of dread or anguish. At bottom, alienation is a profound disruption in the ontology of social being. But as Sartre thinks of anguish as a result of the tension between being and nothingness, so Marx thinks of alienation as the result of "the opposition of in-itself and for-itself" ("Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts," p. 175).

[38]Marx quoted by Lewis Mumford in The Transformations of Man (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 130.

[39]Engels quoted by Christopher Caudwell in Illusion and Reality (New York: International Publishers, 1973), p. 8.

[40]Georg Lukacs, "Existentialism or Marxism?," Existentialism Versus Marxism (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1966), p. 135.

[41]Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 118.

[42]Marx quoted by Jean-Paul Sartre in Search for a Method (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), p. 32.

[43]Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. xxiii.

[44]Marx quoted by Lukacs in History and Class Consciousness, p. 149.

[45]Jordan M. Scher, "Mind as Participation," Theories of Mind (New York: The Free Press, 1962), p. 369.

[46]Ibid., pp. 355-356. Scher goes on to claim that "Alienation . . . is the initial and natural state of man" (p. 371). Neither Marx nor our phenomenology of language would agree with Scher on this point. Anguish is "the initial and natural

state of man," not alienation. Alienation is <u>not</u> pre-communicative as Scher's analysis implies, but arises from or is synonymous with the failure of communication.

[47]Erich Fromm, <u>Beyond the Chains of Illusion</u> (New York: Pocket Books Inc., 1962), pp. 59-60.

[48]Ibid., p. 59.

[49]Ernest Becker, <u>The Revolution in Psychiatry</u> (New York: The Free Press, 1964), p. 129.

[50]Ibid., p. 129.

[51]Ibid., pp. 129-130.

[52]For the author, these features of human behavior are suggestive of the characters that populate Ingmar Bergman films, and, I think, to some extent account for the narrow range of appeal of his films. Bergman's characters are always vexed by psychological problems. But these characters are nearly always well-heeled middle class people who by ordinary standards should find their situation acceptable. And just as there are few working class characters in his films, so there are few characters who would be diagnosed as schizophrenic. Besides the fact that the taciturn catatonic may not feature a good dramatic persona, there is also the consideration that the schizophrenic is not likely to be tied up in the style of knots that Bergman's audience is likely to be bound by, or predisposed to be bound by. Therefore, Bergman's characters are almost always articulate and engaging people with above average facility in I-You rhetoric. These matters of art and social environment will be considered more carefully in our next chapter.

[53]Fromm, "The Application of Humanist Psychoanalysis to Marx's Theory," pp. 210 and 212.

[54]For strong criticism of Fromm from the viewpoint of the orthodox Marxist, see George Novack, ed., <u>Existentialism Versus Marxism</u>, pp. 48-49.

[55]Thomas J. Scheff, <u>Being Mentally Ill: A Sociological Theory</u> (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1966), p. 15.

[56]Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts," pp. 140-141.

[57]Marx quoted by Richard W. Wilkie in "Karl Marx on Rhetoric," <u>Philosophy and Rhetoric</u> (Fall 1976), p. 234. We equate Marx saying the world must be awakened from its dream of itself with Nietzsche's exhortation that one must become conscious of illusion <u>as</u> illusion.

[58]Marx quoted by Erich Fromm in Marx's Concept of Man, p. xxiii. Marx also notes that we can never completely do away with illusions. However, we find this position to be at variance with his suggestion that we could do away with ideology or rhetoric.

[59]Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, pp. 50-51.

[60]Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 88.

[61]Ibid., Vol. I, p. 92.

[62]Ibid., Vol. I, p. 24.

[63]Ibid., Vol. I, p. 25.

[64]Ibid., Vol. I, p. 93.

[65]Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, On Literature and Art (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 141.

[66]Remy Kwant, Phenomenology of Language (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1965), p. 59.

[67]Ibid., p. 31. But Kwant goes on to criticize Marxism, noting that it is hard to conceive of another system where speech is more in the hands of theory and less in the hands of practice than in Marxism itself. This criticism should be kept in mind as potentially applicable to our own phenomenology of language. I point this out to the reader as a caution against our own study being taken to "literally."

[68]Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 170.

[69]Marx and Engels, On Literature and Art, pp. 154-155.

[70]George H. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), p. 325.

[71]Ibid., p. 325.

[72]Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), p. 26.

[73]Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 47.

[74]Ibid., Vol. I, p. 49.

[75]Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 141.

[76]Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 47.

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[77]Bertolt Brecht, <u>Brecht on Theatre</u> (New York: Hill and Wang, 1964), p. 196.

[78]Marx and Engels, <u>Selected Works</u>, Vol. I, p. 32.

[79]Marx quoted by Lukacs in <u>History and Class Consciousness</u>, p. 128.

[80]Sartre, <u>Being and Nothingness</u>, p. 755.

[81]Ibid., p. 756.

[82]Ibid., p. 756.

[83]Mead, p. 292.

[84]Burke, <u>A Rhetoric of Motives</u>, p. 129.

[85]Mario Pei, <u>The Story of Language</u> (New York: Mentor Books, 1949), p. 191.

[86]Caudwell, p. 159.

[87]Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts," p. 174. We should point out here the similarity of Marx's view of <u>logic</u> to Nietzsche's. As Nietzsche considers logic as a "fiction," Marx considers it as "unreal." Again though, we would amend Marx's notion slightly to say <u>money is logic</u> (or money is language as rhetoric), instead of saying logic is money. <u>Language</u> is the original abstraction, and thus ontologically and anthropologically <u>precedes</u> money. It therefore makes more sense to see money as a development of language (as rhetoric or logic), than to see logic as an extention or development of money.

[88]Jean-Paul Sartre, <u>Search for a Method</u> (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), p. xxiv.

[89]Sartre, <u>Being and Nothingness</u>, p. 755.

[90]Lukacs, <u>History and Class Consciousness</u>, p. 7.

[91]Sartre, <u>Search for a Method</u>, pp. 156-157.

[92]Hugh Duncan, <u>Symbols in Society</u> (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 5.

[93]Sartre, <u>Search for a Method</u>, p. 33.

[94]Martin Heidegger, <u>An Introduction to Metaphysics</u> (New York: Anchor Books, 1961), p. 52.

VII. LANGUAGE, LITERATURE AND SOCIETY

[1]Antonin Artaud, The Theater and Its Double (New York: Grove Press Inc., 1958), p. 12.

[2]Buffon quoted by Georg Lukacs in "Idea and Form in Literature," Marxism and Human Liberation (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1973), p. 125.

[3]J. W. Goethe, Goethe's World View (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1963), p. 193.

[4]See Kenneth Burke's A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 212-221. In Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), Northrop Frye defines anagogic as "Relating to literature as a total order of words" (p. 365).

[5]The notion of the "hierarchical psychosis" runs through out Burke's thinking on language. See particularly Language as Symbolic Action (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).

[6]Ernest Becker, The Denial of Death (New York: The Free Press, 1973), p. 4.

[7]Hippolyte Taine, Lectures on Art (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1971), pp. 33 and 34.

[8]Clive Bell, Art (London: Chatto and Windus, 1914), p. 25.

[9]William K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley, "The Intentional Fallacy," Problems in Aesthetics (New York: Macmillan Co., 1959), p. 277. Wimsatt and Beardsley argue that the intentions of the poet or artist, especially as these may have been formed by social influences, are not relevant to the comprehension of the poem or work of art.

[10]Hunter Mead, An Introduction to Aesthetics (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1952), p. 13.

[11]Ibid., p. 29.

[12]See pp. 206-217 for Mead's discussion of Aristotle's theory of emotional catharsis.

[13]Goethe quoted by Georg Lukacs in Goethe and His Age (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1969), p. 75.

[14]Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, p. 77.

[15]Ibid., p. 76.

[16]Thomas Gilby, "Roscelin," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967). As we recall our discussion in Chapter Three though, Nietzsche considers both the sound and the word as individual metaphors, and he does not require that they be theoretically related to abstract concepts. For Nietzsche, it is only in the process of self deception that the individual metaphor becomes a universal or concept (or poetry becomes rhetoric).

[17]Thomas Gilby, "Peter Abelard," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967).

[18]Ernest A. Moody, "William of Ockham," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967).

[19]Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971), p. 203.

[20]William of Ockham, Philosophical Writings (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1964), pp. 60-62.

[21]Dante, Literary Criticism of Dante Alighieri (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1973), p. 89.

[22]Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, p. 260.

[23]Robert S. Haller, ed., Literary Criticism of Dante Alighieri, p. xxiv.

[24]Nancy S. Struever, The Language of History in the Renaissance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 44.

[25]G. K. Chesterton quoted in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazzette, 1 January 1979, p. 18.

[26]Walter J. Ong, "Peter Ramus," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967).

[27]Struever, p. 88.

[28]Ibid., p. 77.

[29]S. T. Coleridge, The Portable Coleridge (New York: Viking Press, 1950), p. 411.

[30]Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), pp. 110 and 111. It isn't clear whether he derived the idea from Nietzsche, but Antonin Artaud also condemns Alexandrian culture for adversely affecting poetic ac-

tivity. He symbolically declares "The library at Alexandria can be burnt down" (The Theater and Its Double, p. 10). We will have more to say about Artaud's aesthetics of language shortly.

[31]Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 112. Nietzsche also talks about a "Buddhistic culture" (p. 110), though he doesn't clarify what he means by this.

[32]Ibid., p. 91. Some may wish to question whether the Renaissance was a poetically improved civilization when compared to the Middle Ages. Nietzsche doesn't explicitly say that the Renaissance was a "tragic culture," though he approvingly cites the historian Jakob Burckhardt's favorable estimate of the Renaissance. But it is also clear that in Nietzsche's mind the civilization of the Renaissance did not reach the high level attained by the Greeks. Moreover, it is sometimes argued that this revitalization of the Renaissance affected only a small part of the whole European population. This may be so, but even if there were not widespread poetic improvements made in the social system of feudalism, there was still a fundamental shift in the direction of prevailing thought. Specifically, there was a new concern for the social process of communication. Making this same point, Struever cites as an example the philosopher Poggio who developed "a sensitivity to the presence of lawless discourse" (p. 165). Even more, Poggio "analyzes the growth of tyranny in terms of the decline in communication" (p. 166). "Poggio connects the failure of communication with the failure of community" (p. 167). Such an insight would have been difficult or impossible to achieve during the Middle Ages, and is even still out of reach to many contemporary social scientists. In any case, such thinking as Poggio's is a first step, though by no means the last, toward trying to cope with the logic or rhetoric of the hierarchical psychosis. But even with this shift exemplified by philosophers like Poggio, the Renaissance did not fully relieve the rhetorical effects of Alexandrian culture.

[33]Robert S. Haller, ed., Literary Criticism of Dante Alighieri, pp. xxiv-xxv.

[34]Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 16.

[35]Frye, p. 326.

[36]Georg Lukacs, The Theory of the Novel (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971), p. 30.

[37]Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, p. 42.

[38]Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 87.

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[39]Friedrich Schiller, <u>On the Aesthetic Education of Man</u> (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 33.

[40]Ibid., p. 31.

[41]Ibid., pp. 33-35.

[42]E. L. Stahl, <u>Friedrich Schiller's Drama: Theory and Practice</u> (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954), p. 68.

[43]Ibid., p. 50.

[44]Schiller quoted by Lukacs in <u>Goethe and His Age</u>, p. 90.

[45]Ibid., p. 90.

[46]Jameson, pp. 194-195.

[47]Georg Lukacs, "Idea and Form in Literature," <u>Marxism and Human Liberation</u> (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1973), p. 110.

[48]Ibid., p. 113.

[49]Georg Lukacs, "Dostoevsky," <u>Marxism and Human Liberation</u> (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1973), pp. 192 and 193.

[50]Some poets usually considered as symbolists are Rimbaud, Verlaine and Mallarmé. For a more detailed account of symbolism, see Anna Balakian's <u>The Symbolist Movement</u> (New York: New York University Press, 1977).

[51]Antonin Artaud, <u>The Theater and Its Double</u> (New York: Grove Press Inc., 1958), p. 71. All quotations of Artaud in the next few pages are taken from this, his most widely circulated collection of essays.

[52]Maurice Merleau-Ponty, <u>Phenomenology of Perception</u> (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 186.

[53]Ibid., p. 187.

[54]Peter Brook, <u>The Empty Space</u> (New York: Atheneum, 1968), p. 49.

[55]Brook quoted from an interview with Margaret Croyden in her <u>Lunatics, Lovers and Poets: The Contemporary Experimental Theatre</u> (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1974), p. 259.

[56]Brook, <u>The Empty Space</u>, p. 53.

[57]Croyden, p. 263.

[58]Ibid., p. 280.

[59]Brook quoted by Croyden, p. 266.

[60]Ibid., p. 263.

[61]Ibid., p. 270.

[62]Ibid., p. 266.

[63]Barbara Paul's review of <u>Conference of the Birds</u> by John Heilpern in <u>The Pittsburgh Press</u>, 6 February 1979.

[64]Georg Lukacs, "The Ideology of Modernism," <u>Marxism and Human Liberation</u> (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1973), p. 307.

[65]Christopher Caudwell, <u>Illusion and Reality</u> (New York: International Publishers, 1973), pp. 35-36.

[66]Lukacs, "The Ideology of Modernism," p. 280.

[67]Ibid., p. 299.

[68]Ibid., p. 287.

[69]Ibid., p. 292.

[70]Ibid., pp. 295 and 293.

[71]Brook, <u>The Empty Space</u>, p. 53.

[72]Friedrich Nietzsche, <u>The Will to Power</u> (New York: Russell and Russell Inc., 1964), p. 253; and <u>The Gay Science</u> (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), pp. 232-233.

[73]Jean-Paul Sartre, <u>What is Literature</u>? (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1949), p. 152.

[74]Ibid., p. 152.

[75]Ibid., p. 182.

[76]Schiller, <u>On the Aesthetic Education of Man</u>, pp. 79-83.

[77]Ibid., p. 95.

[78]Sartre, <u>What is Literature</u>?, p. 19.

[79]Schiller quoted by Lukacs in <u>Goethe and His Age</u>, p. 87.

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[80]Schiller quoted by Lukacs in <u>Goethe and His Age</u>, p. 96.

[81]Schiller quoted by Lukacs in <u>Goethe and His Age</u>, p. 96.

[82]Schiller, <u>On the Aesthetic Education of Man</u>, p. 39.

[83]Schiller quoted by Lukacs in <u>Goethe and His Age</u>, p. 81.

[84]Schiller, <u>On the Aesthetic Education of Man</u>, pp. 35-37.

[85]Ibid., pp. 37 and 35.

[86]Sartre, <u>What is Literature</u>?, p. 135.

[87]Lukacs, "Idea and Form in Literature," p. 119.

[88]Lukacs, "The Ideology of Modernism," pp. 284 and 291.

[89]Lukacs, <u>The Theory of the Novel</u>, p. 61.

[90]Coleridge, p. 417.

[91]Lukacs, "Idea and Form in Literature," p. 123.

[92]Ibid., p. 119.

[93]Lukacs, <u>Goethe and His Age</u>, p. 93.

[94]Robert B. Heilman, "Tragedy and Melodrama: Speculations on Generic Form," <u>The Texas Quarterly</u> (Summer 1960), p. 49.

[95]Seminar on tragedy held at the University of Pittsburgh, Winter Term 1977.

[96]Becker, <u>The Denial of Death</u>, pp. 6 and 5.

[97]Lukacs, <u>The Theory of the Novel</u>, p. 30.

[98]Ibid., p. 44.

[99]Schopenhauer quoted by Walter Kaufmann in <u>Tragedy and Philosophy</u> (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1969), p. 384.

[100]Susanne Howe, <u>Wilhelm Meister and His English Kinsman</u> (New York: Columbia University Press, 1930), p. 4.

[101]J. W. Goethe, <u>Elective Affinities</u> (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1962), p. 246. Goethe himself is supposed to have shared these particular qualities of his heroes. <u>Wilhelm Meister</u> is often described as autobiographical. It is a curious and revealing paradox that the man who served as

the model for Nietzsche's "superman" should have promoted characters that may seem to some as being predisposed toward acquiescence or resignation. In her Encyclopaedia Britannica article on Goethe, E. M. Wilkinson puts this paradox in sharper focus by observing how the life of Goethe had a "superior banality" to it. Though this quality of resignation may often seem exaggerated in Goethe (in both his life and his works), Lukacs observes how such resignation does not involve a complete surrender or a "total collapse and defilement of all his ideals but a recognition of the discrepancy between the interiority and the world" (The Theory of the Novel, p. 136). For Goethe, resignation seems to have signified a patient and serene acceptance of life's travails. In this sense, Lukacs considers the resignation of Wilhelm Meister as "the crowning process of education, a maturity attained by struggle and effort" (Ibid., p. 133).

[102]Goethe quoted by Nietzsche in The Birth of Tragedy, p. 132.

[103]Sartre, What is Literature?, p. 160.

APPENDIX
PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE FOUR MASTER TROPES

[1]Giambattista Vico, The New Science of Giambattista Vico (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), p. 90.

[2]Ibid., p. 90.

[3]Nancy S. Struever, The Language of History in the Renaissance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 65.

[4]We should add that Heidegger would not agree with us that his formula for concrete speech is identical with the formula for metaphor. In his recent book The Rule of Metaphor (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), Paul Ricoeur quotes Heidegger saying that "The metaphorical exists only within the metaphysical" (p. 280), which is to say metaphor can exist only in the ideological or the rhetorical. But though it may be fair to say that Heidegger disparages metaphor, it is also fair to say that he doesn't give much attention to metaphor--at least he doesn't give as much attention as we think metaphor deserves.

[5]Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 503.

[6]Paul Ziff quoted by Monroe C. Beardsley in "Metaphor,"

(Notes: pp. 392-402)

The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1967).

[7]Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 75-76.

[8]Burke, A Grammar of Motives, p. 503.

[9]Ibid., pp. 505-511.

[10]Friedrich Nietzsche, The Philosophy of Nietzsche (New York: Mentor Books, 1965), p. 511.

[11]Vico, p. 86.

[12]Soren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony: With Constant Reference to Socrates (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965). This work was submitted by Kierkegaard to fulfill requirements for his Master of Arts degree.

[13]Ibid., p. 283. Though Kierkegaard agrees with this particular remark, Hegel is usually in for a good drubbing at the hands of Kierkegaard. Hegel ultimately disapproves of irony, mistakenly thinking that it leads to a degenerating isolation of the individual. In contrast, Kierkegaard extols irony because it marks the beginning of personal life. Our phenomenology of language considers irony as the way of combining the authentic personal life of Kierkegaard with an edifying social existence.

[14]Burke, A Grammar of Motives, p. 503.

[15]Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 95.

[16]Kierkegaard, p. 92.

[17]David Kaufer, "Irony and Rhetorical Strategy," Philosophy and Rhetoric (Spring 1977), p. 107.

[18]Kierkegaard, p. 267.

[19]Ibid., p. 19.

[20]Wayne C. Booth, A Rhetoric of Irony (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 177.

[21]Kierkegaard, pp. 341-342.

[22]Ibid., p. 426.

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[23]Hugh Dalziel Duncan, Communication and Social Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 381.

[24]Ibid., p. 385.

[25]Ibid., p. 381.

[26]Burke, A Grammar of Motives, p. 514.

[27]Duncan, Communication and Social Order, pp. 385 and 381.

[28]Kierkegaard, pp. 242 and 299.

[29]Ibid., p. 298.

[30]Ibid., p. 85.

[31]Ibid., p. 92.

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